



THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

# MILITARY

# POLICE



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# MILITARY POLICE

Spring 2010

Headquarters, Department of the Army

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# Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

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## *Brigadier General David Phillips*

With continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with enduring and expeditionary deployments around the world, the Regiment continues to find itself playing a major role in the execution of national security strategy. Your Military Police School recently supported a U.S. Army North initiative for a hands-on information exchange with Mexican military police. This initiative opens opportunities for continuing dialogue and exchange programs with our neighbor to the south.

In reflecting back over the past five years of persistent conflict, specified and implied tasks have focused on our police and detainee skills. Bluntly, all requests for forces that have identified military police (MP) requirements have been based on our policing and internment functions—not on our area security and maneuver and mobility support functions. This realization recently prompted the Regiment to reassess training priorities and emphasize the “police” functions and skill sets of “military police” without forsaking the “military” functions and skill sets. In essence, as a regiment we need to move forward from our “capital ‘M,’ little ‘p’ focus,” which served us throughout the Cold War, to one where we maintain “M” skills, but enhance training and expertise in “P” skills. To remain relevant to our Army, we need to adjust our center of gravity and move forward from a culture of “Mp” to “MP.”



Look for increased training emphasis on law enforcement, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations, while we simultaneously continue to maintain expertise in skill sets involving Soldier survivability and maintenance of lethality against the enemy. Additional instruction in law enforcement and detainee operations has been added to military police one station unit training and officer and noncommissioned officer professional military education courses.

There is a stereotypical expectation of what military police bring to the battlefield, and we must fulfill that expectation. We must provide the operational Army with highly trained and skilled military police who understand and can execute all of our functions to standard. Maintenance of the status quo is not the course of action or way forward for our Regiment. Change is imperative.

*Of the Troops and For the Troops!*



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# Regimental Command Sergeant Major

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## *Command Sergeant Major Charles R. Kirkland*



### **The Military Police Brassard: A Symbol of Authority, Not an MOS Badge**

Hello once again from the home of the Military Police Corps Regiment. I trust that you all had a great holiday season, your batteries have been recharged, and you are leaning forward into another exciting year. The past year was a great one; because it was the Year of the NCO, we were reminded of our pride and traditions. That spirit was rekindled across the Army. Although it will be tough to replicate the spirit of 2009, I look forward to your accomplishments throughout 2010. In this issue of *Military Police*, I want to remind the members of our great Regiment of a unique military police tradition and warn against compromising the symbol of that tradition—our military police brassard.



The military police brassard can be traced back to the early 1900s; and although the brassard has changed in shape and color throughout the years, its intended purpose has not. Following successful campaigns during the war in the Philippines, Army leaders began to realize the importance of provost troops. Soldiers who performed policing tasks were termed “military police” and were adorned with the first military police brassards. This new distinction was written into the U.S. Army Field Service Regulations, which stated, “Officers and enlisted men, when actually performing the duty of military police, will wear a blue brassard on the left arm, halfway between the elbow and shoulder, bearing the letters ‘MP’ in white.”<sup>1</sup> The important thing here is not the specified color or placement, which have since undergone several changes, but the intended purpose. Note that the brassard was to be worn **when actually performing the duty of military police**. This requirement has not changed. The military police brassard is a symbol of authority intended to be worn during law and order missions. Here, we have strayed.

In the past few years, there has been a change in Army uniforms from the battle dress uniform to the Army combat uniform (ACU). During ACU development, senior Army leaders decided to remove branch-specific identification from the uniform. In a significant cultural shift, officers were not to wear branch insignia anywhere on their ACUs. According to Sergeant First Class Jeff Myhre, Program Executive Office Soldier product manager for Soldier clothing and individual equipment, “The Army really wants to create an atmosphere where everyone is a Soldier first and their military specialty second.”<sup>2</sup> I mention this to emphasize that the military police brassard is not a military occupational specialty (MOS) badge and should not be treated as such. Our current military police brassard wear policy states, “The MP [military police] brassard insignia is only authorized for wear on the ACU by military personnel who are performing military police duties. The authority for military personnel to wear the MP brassard is at the discretion of the provost marshals, directors of emergency services, and the military police commanders, when the mission requires identification of military police.”<sup>3</sup> It is the “at the discretion of” verbiage that seems to be a problem for some commanders.

**Commanders:** You have the authority to determine whether your Soldiers wear the military police brassard. Its integrity and the preservation of a long-standing tradition are on your shoulders. Is it necessary to identify motor pool personnel as military police? What about military police Soldiers who are performing company detail? Or conducting routine training? Or shopping at the post exchange?

The average citizen who sees a Soldier wearing the military police brassard assumes that something went wrong and that there is an authority figure present to handle it. But that is no longer the case; more often than not, the Soldier is simply going about his or her daily business. Our Soldiers are under the mistaken impression that the military police brassard may be worn whenever and wherever they please. There are many reasons why this mind-set is problematic; I will share just a couple of these. As previously stated, the average citizen views the brassard as the symbol of authority it was intended to be. Unfortunately, this includes citizens with bad intentions. One of our brassard-clad Soldiers could end up in the wrong place at the wrong time and get drawn into something that he or she is not armed to handle. The consequences could be grave. The fact that the military police brassard does not make a Soldier bullet-proof or almighty is a lesson in judgment that we learn as we mature. Why, then, do we allow our Soldiers to be placed in such a position?

*(Continued on page 5)*

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# Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

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## *Chief Warrant Officer Five T.L. Williams*

### **From “Suck It Up and Drive On” to Critical Incident Peer Support**

*“Stress is the trash of modern life—we all generate it, but if you don’t dispose of it properly, it will pile up and overtake your life.”*

—Danae Pace<sup>1</sup>

*Military police and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) agents are tough. They have no fear. They are cynical, unemotional, and unaffected by combat or their everyday jobs—jobs that may include responding to and investigating multiple deaths.*



Sadly, many Soldiers adopt this mind-set. Many believe that, to be in control, they must deny the emotional impact they feel when patrolling a war zone, investigating a crime scene, receiving bodily fluids thrown in the face, dealing with family situations, or simply handling the day-to-day work environment. This is a myth.

Stress is defined as “bodily or mental tension resulting from factors that tend to alter an existent equilibrium.”<sup>2</sup> Many demands (such as job requirements, threats, illness, or family problems) can cause stress. Distress, which is defined as an “external and usually temporary cause of great physical or mental strain and stress,”<sup>3</sup> can occur during especially intense or prolonged periods of stress.

Stress is a uniquely individual phenomenon that is dependent upon how the body and mind respond to real or perceived internal and environmental demands. Therefore, what is stressful to one person may not be to another. Elevated stress levels can result in physical, emotional, and interpersonal problems that cannot always be resolved through normal coping mechanisms. If not adequately treated, these problems can become disabling.

Events that are outside the range of usual human experience and can result in levels of stress that might easily surpass an individual’s ability to cope are known as “critical incidents.” These incidents include, but are not limited to, murder, suicide, gruesome crime scenes, mass casualty incidents, and the sudden death of a colleague. Military police and CID agents routinely experience these types of incidents.

When I joined the Army, the only acceptable response to stress was to “suck it up and drive on.” But when I performed body recovery work at the Pentagon in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, I understood the effects of stress and ensured that members of my team were afforded the opportunity to talk with a chaplain or mental health professional every night.

Now, critical incident peer support (CIPS) teams are available to perform crisis intervention and provide critical incident debriefings to persons who have experienced critical incidents. For example, a CIPS team played an integral and valuable role during the investigation that followed the Fort Hood, Texas, massacre of 5 November 2009. The CIPS team helped the investigative team and families (yes, families) cope with the terribly horrific experience. “Old school” agents commented on the tremendous impact that the team had on troops and civilians.

The U.S. Army Military Police School offers a five-day CIPS course, which is generally taught in residence or by a mobile training team (MTT). The purpose of the course is to train law enforcement personnel—including corrections specialists, special agents, and first responders—to provide an avenue for their peers to confidentially “talk out” their personal and professional problems with fellow investigators or responders (nonprofessionals) who not only care a great deal about their well-being, but who also have a firsthand understanding of their situation.

The CIPS course covers the dynamics of critical incident stress management; recognition of types, signs, and symptoms of stress; identification of the critical incident stress debriefing process; implementation of a peer support program; functions of the peer supporter; psychological effects of critical incidents; causative impacts of critical incidents on first responders and investigators; communications skills; major crisis issues; crisis intervention and referrals (to

ensure the preservation of first responders); and investigator health, welfare, safety, and confidentiality. Critiques from Soldiers who have attended CIPS training have indicated that the course is phenomenal.

Law enforcement investigators and first responders interested in attending CIPS training should contact Mrs. Donna Ferguson at (573) 563-7868 or <[donna.d.ferguson@us.army.mil](mailto:donna.d.ferguson@us.army.mil)>.

Take care of your Soldiers for a stronger Army!

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>Danzae Pace, "Quotations About Stress," *The Quote Garden!* <<http://www.quotegarden.com/stress.html>>, accessed on 4 December 2009.

<sup>2</sup>*Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Eleventh Edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., 2004.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

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## *Of the Troops and For the Troops!*

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*(Regimental Command Sergeant Major, continued from page 3)*

Furthermore, the wearing of the brassard under unapproved circumstances makes us appear arrogant and unprofessional. A nondeployed staff Soldier who wears a military police brassard to a staff call or planning session that is not law and order-related is viewed as arrogant by others. If you find yourself in a similar situation, refer to the specific purpose of identification as a military police Soldier and ask yourself what message you want to send to others. Does the brassard grant you any privileges, advantages, or clout? No, it doesn't. And I am willing to bet that everyone in the room already knows what branch you represent. So, why not just take it off and be a team player instead of symbolically separating yourself?

A few months ago, I was visiting an organization when the senior officer in charge began to complain about how everyone continually comes to him for blotter reports, investigation inquiries, and other routine law enforcement matters. He explained that this was distracting and indicated that everyone should know that these were not his functions. He further described his solution, which consisted of creating cards and fliers containing provost marshal's office contact information. Interestingly, he was wearing his military police brassard and, per his directive, so was everyone who worked for him. I respectfully suggested that he remove the contact card from his left shoulder. Just something to think about.

**NCOs:** I expect you to educate everyone around you and begin enforcing our policy so that we can grow another generation of Soldiers who know the standards and can pass on our history and tradition. I also encourage you to dust off the Spring 2008 issue of *Military Police* and read the article entitled "New Changes for the Military Police Brassard," written by our great historian, Mr. Andy Watson. (You can also read it online at <<http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/pdfs/Spring%2008/Brassards.pdf>>.) The article does a wonderful job of highlighting the history of the military police brassard, which has led us to where we are today.

You should be very proud to be military police men and women, and the fact that you want to wear your brassard is a good thing—the brassard has a way of making you stand straighter and walk taller. But as with all good things in life that are taken for granted, they become routine and the rich tradition fades. Let's all do our part. Do not use the various brassards of other branches, which you might see popping up across the Army, as your benchmark. We all know what "right" looks like, and I hope that I have convinced you to "grab the handle" and help us regain the integrity of our Regiment's most sacred symbol—the military police brassard.

I would like to, once again, remind everyone to keep our Soldiers who are currently in harm's way in your thoughts and prayers. Reach out and thank a family member for holding down the fort and supporting us while we do the business of our Regiment, our Army, and our Nation.

## *Of the Troops and For the Troops! NCOs Lead the Way!*

**Reference:**

Andy Watson, "New Changes for the Military Police Brassard," *Military Police*, Spring 2008, <<http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/pdfs/Spring%2008/Brassards.pdf>>, accessed on 25 January 2010.

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>Army Field Service Regulations, U.S. Army, 1914.

<sup>2</sup>Matthew Cox, "Your New Uniform: Army Combat Uniform Will Put BDUs, DCUs Into History Book by December 2007," *Army Times*, 21 June 2004.

<sup>3</sup>"Changes to the Military Police (MP) Brassard Wear Policy Outlined in AR 670-1, Paragraph 28-29b (9) (a) and (b)," Department of the Army, DAPE-MSO, 17 June 2008.

# Real Stories from the BTIF

*By Colonel John F. Garrity*

The Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF), located at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, houses a number of Operation Enduring Freedom detainees. America's best hope for stemming the tide of terrorism resides with the BTIF.

Task Force Protector—a joint task force built around Headquarters, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne)—is comprised of Regular and Reserve Component forces from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These personnel provide custody, control, and care of detainees while maintaining dignity and respect for the enemy. And they do so much more!

During the past 106 days that I have been in command of this task force, I have come to realize that the greatest weapon we have in the counterinsurgency (COIN) “inside the wire” fight is the professional U.S. service member. These great, young Americans stand inches away from men who have killed U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces; some, if given a chance, would kill again. Yet every day, U.S. patriots ranging in age from 18 to 57 approach their tasks with an eye toward changing the minds of Taliban, al-Qaida, Haqqani, and many other insurgent groups. And they conduct the COIN inside the wire mission with passion and professionalism. In short, they provide a daily example of what “right” looks like. Their concern and compassion for those in their custody does not coincide with the teachings of radical Islam and others with negative influence over their followers. I would like to share some vignettes, which illustrate the character of the U.S. guard force:

*One of the BTIF detainees (a 42-year-old man who had been in custody since late November 2008) was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer and recommended for a compassionate release so that he might spend his remaining days with his family. The commanding general approved the release and ordered that the detainee be returned to his village in Afghanistan. In the time leading up to his release, the detainee was held in the medical segregation area of the BTIF so that he could remain under observation and receive constant medical care. The night before his release, he requested the opportunity to say goodbye to his fellow detainees, since he did not believe that he would ever see them again. His request was granted, and he spent more than an hour walking from cell to cell informing his fellow detainees of the compassion of their American captors. He implored the detainees to follow the rules of the guard force, exercise good behavior, and use their time in the BTIF to improve themselves through education classes. The U.S. guard force did not ask the dying man to do this—he made these incredible pleas of his own volition.*

*One night when I was conducting my routine check of the BTIF, I entered the segregation area where detainees are kept apart from the general population due to discipline issues or their negative influence on other detainees. The young U.S. Army specialist who was serving as the segregation cell guard responsible for eight individual cells had his back turned toward me and did not see me enter. I stood in the cell block, watching and listening for a few minutes as this National Guardsman from Missouri sang to one of the detainees in Pashto—the detainee's native language. The guard and the detainee sang to each other through the metal door until the detainee fell asleep. When the guard finished, he turned and saw his brigade commander standing there. He apologized for not noticing me, but I dismissed his apology. I asked him where he learned to speak Pashto, and he explained that he had learned it from the detainee to whom he had been singing. He went on to relate that he serenades the detainee every night to help the detainee fall asleep in his cell.*

*Each week, the commander of the BTIF (a female lieutenant colonel with the National Guard) meets with detainee leaders in an overflow cell, where prayer rugs and pillows cover the floor. The detainee leaders are unshackled, and they sit on the floor with their legs crossed. This shura<sup>1</sup> meeting begins with a prayer led by one of the detainee mullahs.<sup>2</sup> Next, the BTIF commander provides information, which is translated by a contracted linguist who works at the facility. For the next hour, detainees discuss issues concerning their detention with the woman who serves as the warden of the facility. They request that certain detainees be moved*

to or from a particular communal cell or ask for additional items for their cells. The BTIF commander reminds attendees that she expects all detainees to follow the rules of “her house” and that good behavior is rewarded. The meeting concludes with a review of the issues covered and a promise to reconvene the following week. When asked how she manages to be so patient, given all the requests and complaints about trivial matters, the commander smiles and says, “I am the mother of sons and grandchildren. I just treat [the detainees] like my kids, and we get along great.”

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There is a preventive medicine class available to BTIF detainees who express an interest in learning skills that they can use to aid themselves, their families, and their villages. The course, which is presented by Task Force Med (the medical group assigned to Task Force Protector), consists of fourteen sessions held in an overflow cell. At the most recent graduation ceremony, seven detainees attentively listened while the brigade surgeon delivered his remarks, praising the detainees for their commitment to transforming themselves into a resource for their cells and villages. He informed them that they were now qualified to serve as teachers, able to help others learn the skills that they had developed. I noticed that many of the detainees welled up with tears when the interpreter translated these remarks. Teaching is considered to be an honorable profession in their culture. The detainees smiled as they moved in procession to receive their diplomas. And they praised their instructors for being such great teachers. The detainee class leader delivered brief remarks, thanking the staff and acknowledging his pride in being a teacher. The ceremony ended with a group photo of the detainees proudly displaying their diplomas.

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During one of my many walks through the BTIF to check on detainees and the guard force, I spent some time with a California National Guardsman assigned to the 670th Military Police Company. The guardsman was speaking with detainees who were gathered in their cells, explaining the reason for a delay in receiving water bottles. The guardsman spoke in Pashto without the assistance of an interpreter. I later asked him if he was fluent in the language, and he replied, “Not yet, sir, but I’m getting pretty close.” When I asked him where he learned how to speak Pashto, he told me that he had taught himself the language while he was serving a 2-month assignment as a guard with his squad at a field detention site in Logar Province, Afghanistan. He went on to explain that he realized someone needed to be able to speak the language to ensure that the detainees understood the rules within the temporary holding facility, so he took the task upon himself. Due to his new talent, he is an incredible asset to the guard force.

These vignettes illustrate the guard force members’ professionalism and dedication to a strategically important detainee operations mission. The guards treat every detainee with dignity and respect, regardless of how the detainees treat them. When a detainee throws urine, feces, semen, or the like onto a member of the guard force, that Soldier, Sailor, or Airman is replaced by his relief. Without cursing or striking out at the detainee, the guard then demonstrates his strength to the detainees by cleaning up, changing his uniform, returning to his post, and completing a derogatory report, capturing the incident so that it becomes a part of that detainee’s internment record.

Within a few weeks, the BTIF detainees will be transferred to the new \$60 million U.S. Theater Internment Facility–Afghanistan (USTIF-A), known informally as the Detention Facility in Parwan. While the new cells, education rooms, expanded recreation and shower areas, vocational and technical training buildings, and two farms will offer more opportunities for COIN inside the wire, the professionalism of the guard force will not change. The same BTIF guards will be working inside a state-of-the-art theater internment facility, and they will continue to treat detainees with dignity and respect. It is the young American warrior serving as a role model who will eventually convince those in detention that deeds are much stronger than words and will change the behavior and ideology of detainees.

There is a small sign that hangs above the door of the Detainee Assessment Branch office which reads, “Turning Taliban into productive citizens of Afghanistan one detainee at a time.” I could not say it better myself.

**Editor’s update.** On 21 December 2009, the BTIF was closed and all detainees were transferred to the new Detention Facility in Parwan.

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>Shura is one of the four cardinal principles of the Islamic perspective on socio-political organization.

<sup>2</sup>Mullahs are Muslim men who have been educated in Islamic theology and sacred law.

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# Suicide Attacks on the Rise

By Captain Billy J. Huntsman

**B**ased on the history of suicide attacks around the world, we can expect the increased presence of military personnel in Afghanistan to result in an increased number of suicide attacks there. Military leaders should study and understand these attacks, which are extremely dangerous and usually unpreventable.

Although suicide attacks are carried out at the operational level, they should not be viewed as merely an operational tactic, but as a means to a strategic goal. The strategic goal of political coercion involves repelling or removing an occupying force. In Afghanistan, North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces are the target.

## Origin

**S**cholars have debated the origin of suicide attacks for years. Most have pointed to the infamous attacks by the Zealots and Sicarii in the 1st Century as the first. The two Jewish sects used daggers to publicly attack political and military heads of state to repel Roman occupiers—knowing that they would not survive the attacks since high-ranking officials were generally protected by guards. Later, the Nizari (also known as the Hashshashin, from which the word *assassin* is believed to originate) were a fierce branch of Shia Muslims who conducted suicide attacks during the Middle Ages, using the same tactics as the Zealots and Sicarii.

Religion is not the cause of suicide attacks, as nonreligious groups have also been involved in suicide attacks throughout history. However, religion has been used as a tool to recruit attackers. There has been some debate about religious groups and organizations in relation to total numbers of suicide attacks. Some scholars claim that most Islamic groups fall under the umbrella of the al-Qaida terrorist network and, thus, attribute most suicide attacks to the al-Qaida. Yet, it is difficult to prove that the chains of command of the individual Islamic groups are directly linked to al-Qaida and that their operational control is coordinated by upper al-Qaida echelons. According to Mr. Robert A. Pape, a leading expert on suicide attacks, “Iraqi attacks have not been carried out through a particularly well-organized strategic operation, but rather via a loose, ad hoc constellation of many small bands that act on their own or come together for a single attack.”<sup>1</sup>

## Success

**H**istorically, suicide attacks have been effective. A 23 October 1983 suicide attack against a U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, took the lives of 241 personnel and resulted in the withdrawal of

U.S. peacekeeping forces from Lebanon. Although not a suicide attack, American forces were also killed in Somalia in 1993. Due to public outrage, U.S. peacekeeping forces were removed from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu. These incidents served as precursors to al-Qaida attempts to cause great destruction and death for the purpose of coercing the United States into changing international policy.

Statistics indicate that suicide attacks are still effective. The 188 attacks that took place from 1980 to 2001 killed an average of 13 people each—excluding the attackers themselves and the unusually large number of fatalities that occurred on 11 September 2001. Overall, suicide attacks amounted to just 3 percent of all terrorist attacks, but accounted for 48 percent of the total deaths due to terrorism from 1980 to 2001—again, excluding the fatalities of 11 September 2001.<sup>2</sup>

While suicide attacks are successful, they appear to be a “weapon of last resort” for the weaker party.<sup>3</sup> The more that insurgents are able to maintain their strength, the less likely they are to use suicide attacks; and the weaker the enemy becomes, the more desperate insurgents become to accomplish “successful” attacks (and, thus, the more likely they are to resort to suicide attacks). Suicide attacks are “double-edged swords” for insurgents—as they lose public support, they gain international Islamic radical support.

In addition to being successful, suicide attacks are simple with regard to planning, preparation, and equipment. A successful attack requires little planning because there is no need for an escape route or rescue attempt. A single person with a highly populated target can cause massive damage and instill a fear of future attacks on the public and military personnel.

## Word Play

**S**uicide or martyrdom? Take your pick; the end result is the same. But to the individual carrying out the attack, the difference between suicide and martyrdom is great. Suicide is “the act or an instance of taking one’s own life voluntarily and intentionally—especially by a person of years of discretion and of sound mind.”<sup>4</sup> With suicide, personal psychological trauma leads an individual to kill himself to escape a painful existence.<sup>5</sup> Martyrdom is “the suffering of death on account of adherence to a cause and especially to one’s religious faith.”<sup>6</sup> With martyrdom, high levels of social integration and respect for community values lead normal individuals to commit suicide out of a sense of duty.<sup>7</sup>

Japanese kamikazes were examples of personnel performing their “duty” during World War II. They voluntarily flew planes, which were laden with fuel and explosives, into American ships in a last-ditch effort to stop the Americans from approaching. Although the kamikazes were poorly trained pilots, they received spiritual training designed to reinforce their dedication to the cause. There have been numerous studies, reports, and books published regarding the actual effectiveness of the kamikazes; but while the accounts vary, the reactions of the Sailors and Marines on those ships were the same—fear and disbelief. The actions of the kamikazes led to an overarching question: How can you stop someone who does not fear death?

To counter enemy intentions, one must understand the enemy. Military leaders must view suicide attackers as the attackers view themselves—as martyrs. They must recognize that suicide attackers believe in their cause. These individuals pay the ultimate price for their beliefs; they give their lives to protect their land, people, and religion. In effect, they serve as enemy smart bombs—able to change direction and purpose within seconds, thereby increasing their chances of causing large numbers of casualties. Suicide attackers should be understood and respected as weapons—just as military personnel understand and respect their own weapons.

### Blueprint

**H**undreds of attempts have been made to describe what the enemy looks, acts, and lives like. But, suicide attacks have been conducted by all types of people—males and females, adults and children, rich and poor, educated and uneducated. Therefore, there is no single profile or blueprint for what the military should expect in a future attacker. For this reason, everyone must be viewed as a potential suicide attacker.

However, it is possible to identify sources, recruiters, and training processes for suicide attackers. Recruiters are usually known and respected in their communities. They generally have the characteristics of a leader; they tend to be intelligent, articulate, charismatic, and influential. They consider people who are in misery or have particular needs to be susceptible candidates for recruitment. They search for individuals who have lost loved ones to occupying forces, and they promote revenge (with the promise of heavenly rewards) as a driving force. They also prey upon young people, using religion as a tool to recruit and mold their minds into making the ultimate sacrifice. Recruiters use anything at their disposal (money, promises, religion) to recruit prospective attackers.

There are many different levels of training—recruiter, bomb maker, operational planner, and attacker. Recruiters, bomb makers, and operational planners are difficult to train and are considered high-level contributors. The loss of personnel at these levels is a heavy blow to the organization; thus, these personnel are protected. However, suicide attackers are easy to train. All they need to know is how to push a button and what location to attack; they



**This kamikaze attack killed 350 people.**



**Indoctrination starts at an early age. This youth wears a simulated explosive device around his waist.**

do not need to be prepared for contingencies such as detonation failures or capture. They are merely pawns that are easily sacrificed in combat. And the softest targets can easily be located and detonated to ensure maximum damage.

As countermeasures have improved, U.S. forces have successfully reduced the impact of insurgent suicide

attempts. But as the military has learned, so have the insurgents. They have begun to focus their suicide attacks on the civilian populace and use their improvised explosive devices against U.S. forces.

### Training Material

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) Handbook No. 1.03 is a centralized source of information on suicide bombing in the contemporary operational environment.<sup>8</sup> The 42-page handbook, which is a valuable resource for all experts in the field of terrorism, is quick and easy to read and should be designated as mandatory reading material for all military leaders.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

Knowledge is power.<sup>9</sup> To win, military leaders must share that knowledge with their Soldiers in a timely manner. Troops need up-to-date information; and they need to be apprised of current tactics, techniques, and trends. Therefore, training and leadership courses should be immediately and continuously updated with every change of war. The process of obtaining approvals for training modifications at every echelon in the Army bureaucracy is often too slow.

The flexibility that suicide attackers show in using different methods and tactics to accomplish their goals is one example of how conflict situations can change quickly. Military personnel must learn to predict these changes to effectively counter the attacks. To do this, they must learn to enter the minds of suicide attackers.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003.

<sup>2</sup>"Patterns of Global Terrorism," U.S. Department of State, 1983–2001.

<sup>3</sup>Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House, New York, 2005.

<sup>4</sup>Frederick C. Mish, editor, *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, Eleventh Edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, Massachusetts, 2004.

<sup>5</sup>Émile Durkheim, *Suicide*, F. Alcan, Paris, France, 1897.

<sup>6</sup>Mish, 2004.

<sup>7</sup>Durkheim, 1897.

<sup>8</sup>TRADOC G-2 Handbook No. 1.03, *Suicide Bombing in the COE*, 10 August 2006, <<http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/sup3.pdf>>, accessed on 9 November 2009.

<sup>9</sup>Sir Francis Bacon, *Religious Meditations, Of Heresies*, 1597.

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# Terrorists in the Ranks

*By Major Michael Grygar*

On 5 November 2009, Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan walked into a Fort Hood, Texas, facility and used two pistols to kill several unarmed Soldiers and a civilian. The question now facing the Army is, “How can we prevent a similar incident?”

The first step toward answering that question was taken when All Army Activities (ALARACT) 322/2009 was published.<sup>1</sup> ALARACT 322/2009 directed commanders to scrub their ranks to find anyone else fitting a profile like that of Major Hasan. But what should they do if they find such an individual? Must they wait for the Soldier to take some sort of adverse action—or can their belief that the Soldier fits such a profile be used to begin a separation action?

According to Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, “Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of Transportation, or the governor or legislature of any state, territory, commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”<sup>2</sup> Such contempt toward officials carries a maximum punishment of “dismissal, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for one year.”<sup>3</sup> However, to be punished, the officer must be publicly observed to be “contemptuous” toward the designated officials—though the term “contemptuous” is not officially defined—and those who witness the offense must complete sworn statements.

In addition, Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice states that “. . . all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.”<sup>4</sup> Certain “disloyal statements” (including praising the enemy, attacking the war aims of the United States, or denouncing our form of government with the intent to promote disloyalty or disaffection among members of the armed services)

made by military personnel may be punishable under this article. According to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, “A declaration of personal belief can amount to a disloyal statement if it disavows allegiance owed to the United States by the declarant. The disloyalty involved for this offense must be to the United States as a political entity and not merely to a department or other agency that is a part of its administration.”<sup>5</sup> The maximum punishment for this offense is dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 3 years.<sup>6</sup>

So why wasn’t Major Hasan charged under either of these articles? For that answer, I consulted with my local judge advocate general, who was unable to provide a legal opinion without access to the facts involved in the case. He did, however, give me a few pointers. And he explained the complexity of handling these situations due to the issue of free speech. He indicated that any commander who tries to put together a case of this type must ensure that all elements of the charge are met; this is generally not easy. In any case, the local judge advocate general should definitely be consulted for more detailed options before any actions are taken.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>ALARACT 322/2009, *Force Protection*, 23 November 2009.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, “Uniform Code of Military Justice,” Subchapter X, *Punitive Articles*, §888, Article 88, *Contempt Toward Officials*.

<sup>3</sup>*Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2008 Edition)*, Department of Defense, Joint Service Committee on Military Justice.

<sup>4</sup>U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, “Uniform Code of Military Justice,” Subchapter X, *Punitive Articles*, §934, Article 134, *General Article*.

<sup>5</sup>*Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2008 Edition)*.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

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*At the time this article was written, Major Grygar was an Intermediate-Level Education student at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a bachelor’s degree in criminology and criminal justice from the University of Texas at Arlington and a master’s degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.*

# Reality-Based Training: Empowering Warrant Officers, Enhancing Learning, and Developing Strong Leaders

*By Chief Warrant Officer Four Shaun M. Collins*

The Military Police/U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) is where Chief Warrant Officer Two and Chief Warrant Officer Three CID special agents receive the training necessary to assume duties as special agents in charge and operations officers within CID organizations. In the past, WOAC has been taught in the same manner as the vast majority of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) courses—using lectures and Microsoft PowerPoint slides. However, during the past couple of years, WOAC has undergone some tremendous changes that will better prepare our leaders to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Based on student critiques and input, the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) conducted a critical task selection board and reevaluated the training mechanisms employed within the course. As a result, an updated list of curriculum topics has been generated. More importantly, a revolutionary educational environment has been created.

In past iterations of WOAC, students complained about the “Battle Brief” portion of the course, in which they were required to analyze historical military battles and articulate lessons learned from military tactical perspectives. Students indicated that the briefings did not contain viable learning lessons because they could not foresee themselves as commanders who were directing battle action from the top of a hill. A subsequent analysis of the training intent revealed that, although TRADOC requires the inclusion of battle briefs in all Army WOAC curricula, there are no restrictions or guidelines regarding the nature of the briefs. Therefore, it was decided that the battle briefs could be conducted on law enforcement “battles” rather than on traditional military battles. Now students are required to research and analyze historical law enforcement battles (such as those that took place at Waco, Texas, and Ruby Ridge, Idaho). These battles are more professionally relevant to the students. The students have indicated that they derive meaningful learning points from this approach—learning points that can be employed in

their daily duty assignments and used to train their units to be more mission-capable. In addition to the clear increase in student interest in the battle briefs, TRADOC has also expressed interest. Following an inspection of the training program, the battle briefs were designated as a TRADOC best practice.

Another critical change involved the manner in which WOAC was presented. Although PowerPoint presentations were once considered revolutionary, they have since become so overused that students routinely refer to them as “death by PowerPoint.” The students described the traditional, “canned” WOAC presentations as dry and mundane and asserted that they stifled innovation and original thought. These complaints were researched and found to be valid. More effective mechanisms for encouraging creativity and gaining student buy-in to the learning process were explored. As technical experts with vast knowledge and recent experience in various course areas, WOAC students should be encouraged to pool information and share ideas in this ever-changing technical field rather than be subjected to lectures based on a narrow learning perspective. Consequently, the course has been transitioned from a lecture-based environment to an environment that is characterized by discussion and peer instruction led by a facilitator who ensures that students work through the critical concepts and issues. This approach allows students to address theories, issues, and problem solving at a college graduate level. The revised instructional methods have ignited interest from Webster University to enter into a consortium agreement with USAMPS to award graduate college credit for course alumni. This is likely to spawn a congruent credit award from the American Council on Education.

Additionally, the focus of WOAC student research projects and papers has evolved from general leadership topics to research projects that require students to address CID policy and operational or training issues that they believe need improvement. A significant portion of the

course focuses on effective ways for students to influence organizational change, which helps them develop research papers. Faculty members then assist students in “actioning” their proposals through appropriate channels, thus empowering the students to use the academic requirement to leverage actual organizational change. Because the papers are no longer just an academic exercise, students exert substantially more effort in researching, developing, and completing them—focusing on solutions rather than merely problems or abstract ideas. Students must identify the root problem to ensure that their proposals do not simply address a symptom, thereby missing the greater issue or ignoring potential second- and third-order effects of their proposals. They are taught how to remove emotional responses from their presentations, use logic and reasoning to build well-developed courses of action, and intelligently articulate organizational benefits.

Topics on which students have written proposals include, but are not limited to—

- CID Warrant Officer Online Proposal Workshop Forum.
- Restructuring Protective Services Program.
- Formalized Curriculum for CID Interns.
- Retaining Quality CID Agents.
- Realignment of Drug Suppression Teams.
- Use of Reserve Instructors at USAMPS.
- Protective Services Battalion Assignment Management.
- Technical Listening Equipment—One Party Consent Monitoring.
- Revising Evidence Description Doctrine.
- Using Major Procurement Fraud Unit to Revitalize Installation Fraud Programs.
- Active Component/Reserve Component Organizational Mentorship Relationships.
- Establishing a Progressive Training Program in CID.
- Establishment of Joint Data Repositories and Reporting Systems.
- Agent/Agency Liability Related to Use of Force.
- Future Handgun Systems.
- Reserve Component Training Models.
- CID Command Relationship Management.
- Combined DNA Indexing System Database Input and Submissions.
- USACIDC Weapons Policies.
- Assignment of Apprentice Agents to Protective Services Battalions.
- Apprentice Agent Evaluation Process.
- CID Recruitment.
- Creation of a Sworn Statement Guide for Agents.

**Note.** Senior leaders who have issues that they would like to see developed into written proposals should contact Chief Warrant Officer Four Shaun Collins at <shaun.m.collins@us.army.mil> or (573) 563-7867 to nominate the topics for evaluation and staffing. This presents a great opportunity for senior warrant officers to help shape the future of CID and the Military Police Regiment.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Bryan Janysek and Chief Warrant Officer Three John Spann further proposed that WOAC be used as a cold-case review forum for serious, unsolved CID investigations (a practice also employed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] National Academy). CID adopted the proposal, and cold-case review became a graded WOAC practical exercise. To date, two unsolved murder investigations (ranging from 12 to 16 years old) have been reviewed; and the results have been phenomenal. Students have put an unprecedented level of effort into the cold-case review and have produced top-quality results, which has benefited the students themselves and CID field elements. This tactic will almost certainly help solve real-world cases.

WOAC provides an opportunity to train future CID special agents in charge and operations officers on the skills they need to excel, but it also provides a great opportunity to exploit a “think tank” comprised of literally hundreds of years of investigative experience in each class. The students, who consist of mid- to senior-level CID warrant officers, want to make a meaningful difference and eagerly embrace the opportunity to do so in this forum. As future senior leaders and operations officers within CID, they have a tremendous stake in the health and future of the organization. We are collectively impressed with the caliber of these students and look forward to the benefits that can be gleaned from inspiring them to find ways to develop needed changes within the command and helping them present their solutions with a sound and unified voice. Our overarching message to the students is: “Don’t try to make a difference . . . Be the difference.”

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# Seven Steps in the Development of a PRTP

By Major Scott Blanchard

*Military police units that are gearing up for combat must develop comprehensive physical readiness training plans (PRTPs) to prepare Soldiers for the rigors of extended operational deployments. PRTPs should be built around the unit mission and commander's intent<sup>1</sup> and should contain clearly defined objectives and proven fitness concepts that foster the development of the Warrior Ethos. Lessons learned from deployment experiences should also be incorporated. This article outlines a seven-step process that military leaders can use to develop comprehensive PRTPs framed around the principles of exercise and lessons learned in combat.*

## **Step 1: Analyze the Mission**

Military police leaders must identify all specified and implied tasks and understand the commander's intent.<sup>2</sup> From this analysis and the five military police functions (maneuver and mobility support, area security, law and order, internment/resettlement, and police intelligence operations),<sup>3</sup> they develop a mission statement and mission-essential task list (METL). The mission statement provides the unit with the overall task and purpose and helps the unit focus on the most critical collective and individual tasks to be accomplished in wartime. Military police-specific collective and individual tasks can be found in the *Collective Task List for Military Police Company (Combat Support)* and Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 19-100-10-Drill.

## **Step 2: Develop Fitness Objectives**

It is important to develop fitness objectives that link military police training activities to the mission. Clearly defined fitness objectives provide Soldiers with an understanding of the commander's vision and goals. Because these fitness objectives drive the training strategy that the unit uses to prepare for and accomplish its mission, they should be specific, observable, measurable, and realistic. Examples of good objectives might be: "A Soldier must perform 10 pull-ups" or "All squad leaders will be Modern Army Combatives (MAC) Level 1-certified." Additionally, leaders should consider developing objectives that emphasize and foster the tenants of the Warrior Ethos. This promotes a mental and physical toughness that transfers to combat.

## **Step 3: Assess Physical Readiness**

The unit's state of physical readiness must be assessed. This assessment should go beyond the Army physical fitness test average<sup>4</sup> to consider Soldiers' abilities to complete mandatory physical training (PT) requirements (command-directed quarterly road marches, obstacle courses) and the

unit's level of proficiency in combatives and skill-related components of fitness (agility, balance, reaction time, speed, power, coordination). Assessments of the general health behaviors of Soldiers in the unit and fitness levels of special-population Soldiers (such as those with profiles and those in the Army Weight Control Program) must also be conducted. The post obstacle course is a good place to test these skills.

## **Step 4: Determine Training Requirements**

Training requirements may be mandatory (directed by Army Regulation [AR] 350-1) or related to the development of METL proficiency. From the moment they receive a warning order to deploy, military police units quickly begin to fill the training calendar with "high pay off" training that involves areas such as weapons ranges, team gunnery, lane training, and field exercises. The identification of deployment training requirements allows the unit to develop a training strategy that prevents duplicity and eliminates training distractions. In addition, the unit conducts certification and validation requirements on warrior tasks, battle drills, and theater-specific training. Leaders who use a METL crosswalk can weave the PRTP into the unit deployment training strategy so that the physical readiness of the unit does not suffer.

## **Step 5: Develop Fitness Tasks**

The fifth step is the development of fitness tasks that are supportive of battle focus and unit training requirements. Because this approach links fitness tasks to training requirements (which, in turn, are linked to the mission and METL) (Table 1), leaders and Soldiers understand the purpose behind the PRTP. They are then able to accomplish unit training objectives. In developing fitness tasks, military police leaders first identify the most physically demanding individual tasks that support the unit METL and then determine the standards to which Soldiers must be able to perform each of the tasks under various conditions. For

**Table 1. Sample battle-focused training**

| METL Task: Conduct an attack (company/platoon) (07-2-9001)  |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| Fitness Objectives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complete 12-mile foot march with combat load in less than 3 hours</li> <li>• Sprint 100 meters with body armor in less than 30 seconds</li> <li>• Demonstrate proficiency in combatives (squad leaders and above become certified at MAC Level 1)</li> </ul> |  |   |
| Individual Tasks  | Physical Requirements  | Exercises   |
| Move over obstacles under direct and indirect fire  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Full combat gear</li> <li>• 3–5-second sprints</li> </ul>                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100-meter sprints</li> <li>• Grass drills</li> <li>• Illinois Agility Test</li> </ul>    |
| Subdue a combative insurgent  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hand-to-hand grappling</li> <li>• 100-meter sprints with combat gear</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guerilla drills</li> <li>• Combatives training</li> <li>• Pull-ups and squats</li> </ul> |
| Evacuate casualties   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Movement to casualty collection point</li> </ul>                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 100-meter litter carry</li> <li>• 50-meter buddy carry</li> </ul>                        |

example, tasks and conditions might include transporting a casualty with or without equipment or moving through simple or complex terrain with or without a litter. Leaders then develop exercises and training events based on these analyses. Warrior tasks and battle drills serve as good starting points for the development of fitness tasks.

**Step 6: Develop a Training Schedule**

Military police leaders must develop an effective training schedule. Short-term training schedules are those that are implemented 3–6 months in advance of execution, while near-term training schedules are implemented 6–8 weeks in advance. Leaders can use “backward” planning to incorporate proven fitness concepts in developing a PRTP that progressively builds and peaks alongside other training objectives. The schedule is developed by considering all near-term training requirements and gathering the commander’s physical readiness training guidance. The training calendar can be refined by incorporating a training template that addresses the day of the week that each [fitness] component will be trained and who will conduct the training (Table 2). This provides Soldiers with predictability in their daily schedules as well as a means to accomplish training objectives. Leaders get more from

their Soldiers when the Soldiers have a clear understanding of the commander’s intent as outlined by the tasks and purposes listed on the training calendar.

**Step 7: Conduct and Evaluate Training**

The responsibility for conducting physical readiness training lies with all small-unit leaders, who must also forecast and secure training resources. Learning to do more with less and to be creative with available resources is important since gym space and swimming pools are difficult to reserve for an entire unit. Physical readiness training during combat is conducted similar to the way it is conducted before deployment. Predeployment training with exercise equipment that will be available down-range (ammunition cans, water cans, weighted vests, litters, vehicle tires) and in conditions that mirror the austere environment of Afghanistan or Iraq will prepare Soldiers to conduct physical readiness training during deployment. Finally, training evaluation is a continuous process that should occur daily (informal, after-action reviews [AARs]), weekly (during training meetings), and monthly (with planned training assessments that allow leaders to compare the current state of physical readiness to unit fitness objectives).

**Table 2. Sample calendar template**

| Monday  | Tuesday          | Wednesday                                  | Thursday                  | Friday                                     |
|---|------------------|--|---------------------------|--|
| Company PT  | Squad PT         | Platoon PT                                 | Platoon PT                | Squad PT                                   |
| Cardiorespiratory endurance   | Muscle endurance | High-intensity cardiorespiratory endurance | Muscle strength and power | Combatives and cardiorespiratory endurance |
| <p><b>Notes.</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Training will last a minimum of 1 hour and will include a 5–10-minute warm-up and a cooldown comprised of 5–10 minutes of stretching.</li> <li>2. There will be one company run and one company road march per month.</li> </ol> |                  |  |                           |  |

Leaders who use the seven-step process, incorporating proven fitness concepts and lessons learned from combat, will improve the physical readiness of their units. Fitness concepts that can be used include training periodization (the systematic manipulation of the volume and intensity of exercise over the duration of a training cycle)<sup>5</sup> and the principles of exercise.

With periodization, the annual training calendar is divided into quarterly, monthly, weekly, and daily bouts in an attempt to develop a prescriptive and progressive PRTP. There are five distinct phases of periodization:

- **Base phase.** The unit develops a strong base from which to progress. This phase may take 4–8 weeks.
- **Build phase.** The unit gradually increases the volume and intensity of exercise to build upon the base. This phase may take 4–10 weeks.
- **Peak phase.** The volume of exercise is decreased, and the intensity is increased. This phase lasts 1–2 weeks.
- **Recovery phase.** The volume and intensity of exercise is decreased. This phase also lasts 1–2 weeks.
- **Maintenance phase.** The unit maintains gains made during the base and build phases through regular exercise. The duration of this phase varies depending on the physical training requirements of the unit.

The principles of exercise, which are outlined in Field Manual (FM) 21-20, provide general guidance for increasing the overall unit performance throughout the five phases of periodization. The principles of exercise consist of regularity, progression, balance, variety, specificity, recovery, and overload.<sup>6</sup> The definitions of each principle are intuitive and easy to apply to the PRTP. To increase unit performance, leaders must develop plans for regular, progressively difficult exercise by overloading the body with strength and endurance activities. Overloading stimulates the physiological adaptations and changes that Soldiers' bodies need to continue at higher intensities. But, overloading must be balanced with recovery and bouts of exercise which consider individual differences that exist among Soldiers (for example, male versus female and trained versus untrained individuals). PRTPs should contain realistic exercises that will transfer to the specific physical demands of combat. For example, the "medicine ball clean" exercise replicates the same motion that a Soldier might use to move a heavy can of ammunition from the ground to the top of a vehicle. Finally, the PRTP must be balanced with a general approach to improve all components of

health- and skill-related fitness, while also offering variety so that Soldiers do not get bored with the training program.

Despite the high operational tempo over the past eight years, there is a wealth of knowledge about physical readiness. Soldiers know what does and does not work, and leaders must incorporate these lessons learned into the PRTP. For example, we have learned that military police companies generally perform missions at the squad level. With this in mind, squads must be independently capable of maintaining a high level of physical readiness without the constant oversight and supervision of company leadership. Therefore, squad leaders must know and understand how to develop and execute a PRTP for the duration of a deployment. Other lessons learned include the type of fitness equipment that should be used while deployed and the value of sporting competitions to evaluate physical attributes and leader character. Consolidated AARs such as the *Afghan Commander AAR Book* and Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 09-37 (Chapter 2) are good resources to consider when developing PRTPs.

The development of a PRTP is paramount to mission success. Comprehensive PRTPs increase unit survivability by developing Soldiers who are physically and mentally strong. Leaders who incorporate the principles of exercise and lessons learned into the seven-step PRTP process prepare their units for the rigors of extended operational deployments. Soldiers need and deserve military police leaders who are knowledgeable and understand the PRTP process.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>AR 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, 18 December 2009.

<sup>2</sup>FM 3-0, *Operations*, 27 February 2008.

<sup>3</sup>FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, 22 March 2001.

<sup>4</sup>AR 350-1.

<sup>5</sup>Jay R. Hoffman, "Periodized Training for the Strength/Power Athlete," *NSCA's Performance Training Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 9, December 2002.

<sup>6</sup>FM 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training*, 30 September 1992.

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*Afghan Commander AAR Book*, Currahee Edition, September 2009.


CALL Handbook 09-37, *Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Chapter 2, June 2009.

*Collective Task List for Military Police Company (Combat Support)*, 10 October 2008.

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# Operation Restoring Rights: Military Police in the COIN Fight



*By Captain Nate Brookshire*

*The reduction of coalition forces in Tal Afar, Iraq, since 2004 set the conditions for terrorists to return to this key piece of terrain, which is located near the Syrian border; and by the spring of 2005, it was commonly referred to as “al-Qaida’s town.” In April 2005, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) assumed control of the area of operations (AO) that included the city of Tal Afar. This article discusses the use of military police in a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation supporting the 3d ACR and 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment (2-325) (known as the “White Falcons”), 82d Airborne Division. This specific operation has been heralded as a model of the “clear, hold, and build” methodology, which was later documented in Field Manual (FM) 3-24.*

In August 2005, the 194th Military Police Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was conducting general support to the 11th ACR in Mosul, Iraq; maintaining the Division Internment Facility; transporting detainees to Abu Ghraib; and conducting the Police Partnership Program, when they were assigned as direct support to the 3d ACR for Operation Restoring Rights. The 194th Military Police Company had conducted an intense predeployment training cycle that included density ranges, live fire, and situation training exercise lanes set in an urban environment—a training methodology that was later used as a model to train Iraqi police and Iraqi Army (IA) military police using a condensed training package. The 2d platoon, 194th Military Police Company (2/194), was selected to execute the mission in Tal Afar, and they deployed in August to prepare for the assignment.

Upon arrival at Forward Operating Base Sykes, on the outskirts of Tal Afar, the platoon was task-organized under the Support Squadron, 3d ACR. The squadron, also

known as the “Muleskinners,” was preparing to operate a displaced civilian processing center, checkpoints, and several blocking positions south of the city. The 3d ACR emplaced a berm around the city to control access and egress, and residents were instructed to evacuate by moving through a screening area south of the city. Anyone left in the city after 72 hours was to be considered hostile. Key tasks assigned to the military police platoon included the training of maintenance troop Soldiers on internment/resettlement operations and the preparation of a divisional IA military police platoon for combat operations during Operation Restoring Rights.

An initial meeting with the 3d IA Division provost marshal revealed significant challenges involved in employing Iraqi military police in the fight. The Iraqi soldiers had completed a condensed basic training cycle and had each received one uniform. The soldiers and their leaders understood that the mission of division military police was to be a garrison function, focusing on discipline

and law enforcement. After several more meetings with the 3d IA Division provost marshal, assistant 3d IA Division commander, and military transition teams, the military police soldiers were released for training to support the operation.

The Joint Logistics Command at Al-Kasik Military Base provided additional organizational clothing and individual equipment, weapons, vehicles, and ammunition, meeting all of the IA platoon requirements. During an intensive, 10-day training exercise that focused on “shoot, move, and communicate,” members of the IA platoon gained the basic skills necessary to survive in combat operations. They received combat lifesaver training and individual aid kits. And the hardened vehicles, improved marksmanship skills, and basic medical knowledge helped instill confidence. Their outstanding performance as a cohesive unit during the operation was a phenomenal accomplishment, considering that the platoon was comprised of Kurds, Shi’as, Sunnis, and Yezidis.

Upon returning to Forward Operating Base Sykes, the 2/194 established a processing center (where military-aged males were escorted for screening) in the village of Sheik Ibraheem—a confirmed al-Qaida bedroom community with a population of about 3,000. The Muleskinners used “Quick Strike” (a quick-reaction force), 2/194, and a chemical platoon to execute the mission. Quick Strike, supported by a heavy platoon (Abrams) from the 2d Squadron, 3d ACR (known as the “Sabre”), secured the outskirts of and main routes into the village. The 2/194 received an attachment of Mosul emergency police, who secured a village schoolhouse for use as a base of operations for the screenings. The platoon also processed numerous military-aged males and helped identify twelve anti-Iraqi forces (AIF). During the evacuation, more than fifty detainee family members rioted. IA and Iraqi military police conducted outer-cordon security, which helped quell the riot; and the detainees were moved back to the Regimental Internment Facility without incident.

On 26 August 2005, Operation Restoring Rights commenced with the evacuation of the remaining populace of Tal Afar, which numbered more than 3,000. On 5 September, kinetic operations began with a volley of artillery that included the Guided, Multiple-Rocket Launch System—a system that had never before been used for this type of clearing operation. The 2/194 occupied two checkpoints south of Tal Afar and a blocking position to the east and funneled most of the populace, consisting of mainly women and children, to the processing center operated by the Muleskinners. The initial plan, which called for the displaced civilians to walk 2 miles to the processing center, was replaced by a plan which specified that truck shuttles be provided by the attached Iraqi military police. This change presented an opportunity for the platoon medic to treat the sick and wounded that had been identified during the initial screening. The confidence

of the IA was bolstered each day; and before the operation ended, the platoon was operating independently.

Once the town was evacuated, clearing operations began in earnest. The platoon of IA military police and one squad with an attachment of Iraqi emergency police conducted a cordon-and-knock operation in the southern portion of the Sarai neighborhood and throughout 9 kilometers of Muleskinners battlespace to the south of the city. More than 150 houses were searched, resulting in the identification and detention of nine AIF and two caches. The 4th Squadron, 3d ACR (“Longknife”) provided air support during all route movements and stayed in contact with 2/194 during the cordon-and-knock operation.

More than 1,000 Iraqi police were trained at Al Kisic and were sent to Tal Afar to help secure the city. Initially, there were just more than 100 Iraqi police forces in the city. The task of building and occupying police stations began, in coordination with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as soon as the city was cleared. The 2/194 escorted a contractor, who was responsible for building the police stations, into each of the districts. Over a period of several months, the stations were built in close proximity to the populace and to a level of protection that provided standoff from direct-weapons threats and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

The city was divided between the 3d ACR and the 2-325. The 2/194 maneuvered with three squads; the headquarters team was attached to the 3d Squad, resulting in a total of twelve platforms of combat power. The 1st Squad was responsible for the 3d ACR AO police stations, and the 2d Squad covered the Sarai neighborhood in the 82d AO. The 3d Squad covered the headquarters, located at the castle in the center of Tal Afar, and conducted convoy security missions and force protection assessments of all the stations in Tal Afar and surrounding villages. The division of labor and the trust placed in the squad leaders to execute high-level missions were key elements of military police success in Tal Afar. Mr. David Kilcullen, author of “Twenty Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency,” states that leaders should “Train the squad leaders—then trust them.” He further adds, “Counterinsurgency is a squad and platoon leader’s war, and often a private Soldier’s war.”<sup>1</sup>

The 3d ACR was quick to begin rebuilding Tal Afar. They initiated a fund distribution program to reimburse residents for property that had been damaged during the clearing operation. By winning the trust of the populace through improvement programs and partnerships with city officials, the 3d ACR set the foundation for holding the terrain. With their participation in securing fund distribution, conducting elections, and investigating a mass grave in the Sarai neighborhood, the credibility of the Iraqi police forces increased daily. North of the city, a Special Forces detachment worked to secure the town of Avgani, using the 2/194th to obtain the logistics necessary

for the police force. Several follow-on missions that were conducted to secure surrounding villages resulted in the identification of AIF and allowed the 3d ACR to deliver much-needed humanitarian aid.

Humanitarian missions became a daily activity during stabilization operations. The local Iraqi police identified pockets within the city that did not have running water or access to fresh food. In coordination with the Muleskinners, several tons of water and meals were delivered to the elders of the community for distribution. This action, along with the respectful cordon-and-knock operation led by Iraqi police, resulted in the cooperation of Tal Afar citizens in a short period of time.

In conclusion, military police participation in Operation Restoring Rights demonstrated their versatility in the COIN fight. The military police trained, equipped, and employed an IA military police platoon and an intelligence (G-2) cell. With command and control of more than 100 emergency police and more than 100 local Tal Afar police, the 2/194 conducted cordon-and-knock operations, resulting in the capture of AIF and the identification of caches. The skill set developed during predeployment training enabled the platoon to conduct combat operations and train Iraqi forces to conduct the operations themselves, thus putting an Iraqi face on the fight. Military police

have proven their worth in COIN operations and created a lasting impression on the Soldiers of the Cavalry and Airborne Infantry Regiments.

Following Operation Restoring Rights, members of the 2/194 were inducted into the coveted Order of the Combat Spur,<sup>2</sup> and the White Falcons authorized the platoon to wear the 82d All-American Patch to signify their attachment during several key stability operations.

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency," Edition 1, March 2006, <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/28articles.pdf>>, accessed on 28 January 2010.

<sup>2</sup>The Order of the Combat Spur consists of a certificate and spurs to cavalry troopers deployed to Iraq.

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## **Brigadier General Colleen L. McGuire Becomes PMG of the Army, Takes Command of CID**

*By Mr. Jeffrey Castro*

**B**rigadier General Colleen L. McGuire was sworn in as the Provost Marshal General (PMG) of the Army and assumed command of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as "CID") in a ceremony held at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on 14 January 2010. Brigadier General McGuire, the first woman to hold either of these positions, succeeds Brigadier General Rodney L. Johnson, who is retiring after 33 years of service.

General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, hosted the assumption of command ceremony. During his remarks, which were addressed to the Army law enforcement team, he stated, "I absolutely believe Brigadier General Colleen McGuire is the right person to lead you in the challenging days ahead. She is a proven, gifted leader—both in garrison and combat."

During her nearly 30 years of active service, Brigadier General McGuire has been assigned in key command and staff billets, from platoon level to the Army staff. She graduated from the University of Montana, where she was commissioned in the Military Police Corps. She holds a master's degree in military arts and sciences from the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a master's degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Brigadier General McGuire's awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with two oak-leaf clusters, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (4th Award), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal with three oak-leaf clusters, Army Achievement Medal with three oak-leaf clusters, Iraq Campaign Medal, Senior Parachutist Badge, and Army Staff Identification Badge.

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*Mr. Castro is a public affairs specialist with CID, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.*

# 54th Military Police Company Commentary Driving Initiative as Part of Law Enforcement Training

By Captain Mary M. Caruso

*Basic driver skills training should be the cornerstone of every Emergency Vehicle Operator's Course (EVOC) that is conducted as part of the Law Enforcement Training Program. Commentary driver's training (training in which the driver is encouraged to talk or provide commentary) is incorporated into many civilian law enforcement EVOC courses, and we in the 54th Military Police Company wanted to make it part of ours. So, as we completed law and order certification and began fulfilling the road commitment, we implemented a Commentary Driver's Initiative Program for junior drivers (Soldiers under the age of 21 and E4 or below). This training is designed to increase the hazard awareness and risk perception of junior drivers. Historically, accidents involving junior military police Soldiers have not been simply a result of bad basic driving skills or Soldiers' inattentiveness, but rather of tunnel vision and the unintentional risk-taking behavior commonly experienced by younger drivers with elevated adrenaline levels such as those that occur when responding with activated lights and sirens.*

The aim of a 2008 study on the "Effect of Video-Based Road Commentary Training on the Hazard Perception Skills of Teenage Novice Drivers" was to answer the question of whether hazard perception can be improved through road commentary training. The outcome was astonishing. The hazard detection skills of the novice driver group (drivers under the age of 25) significantly improved after they viewed 12 trials of video-based commentary training. These results strongly indicate that commentary driver's training is an effective method of road safety intervention for young drivers.

The concept of the Commentary Driving Initiative adopted by the 54th Military Police Company is simple. The main objectives are to—

- Mentor junior Soldiers who lack driving and life experiences.
- Improve the cognitive skills of junior Soldiers.
- Reduce the effects (tunnel vision and risk-taking behavior) resulting from the adrenaline rush associated with responding to an incident.

To accomplish these objectives, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) accompanies each junior driver and—

- Provides mentorship for basic driving skills.
- Assesses the driver's skills and abilities.
- Encourages the driver to provide commentary on the daily hazards and risks surrounding the patrol car.

While the driver operates the vehicle, the NCO mentor asks a series of questions. These questions allow the NCO mentor to assist in building and shaping the junior driver's thought processes and developing his or her visual scanning ability, attention to detail, hazard recognition

ability, and risk perception, which are critical safe-driving skills—especially for police.

It is especially important to reduce the occurrence of tunnel vision in junior drivers. With lights flashing, sirens screaming, and two-way radio traffic blaring while moving at an accelerated rate of speed, deciphering existing weather and road conditions, and combating other traffic on the road, the junior driver has much to think about and process on the way to a scene. Their basic senses are overloaded! The increased workload on thought processes during hazardous situations places them in a high-risk category for impaired detection. For example, research indicates that, due to limited driving experience, the eyes of novice drivers are fixated on hazardous objects longer than those of experienced drivers. This results in the reduced ability of novice drivers to detect peripheral events. One way to combat this problem is through driver training and experience. Another is the strict enforcement of standing operating procedures for "running code" with activated lights and sirens in response to hazardous events. The Commentary Driver's Initiative covers these areas, focusing on attention to detail and information recall.

To successfully complete the Commentary Driver's Training, students must pass a final driver's exam. Platoon and company leaders also use the same exam for quarterly check rides with junior drivers.

The Commentary Driver's Program is one that can be implemented immediately, with limited strain on unit resources. And our 45-day junior driver mentorship program has made a world of difference. For those who might be interested in initiating their own Commentary Driver's Program, here are the specific task, condition,

and standard used for the 54th Military Police Company commentary driver's training:

**Task:** Improve cognitive and commentary driving skills to increase hazard awareness and alleviate tunnel vision while driving in high-stress situations.

**Condition:** While conducting law enforcement duties in an issued patrol car, drivers answer specific questions asked of them by their mentors to improve their awareness of hazards while driving.

**Standard:** Drivers are able to effectively identify hazards while continuing to drive safely.

Basic driver skills training should be the cornerstone of every EVOC conducted under the Law Enforcement Training Program. Commentary driver's training, which is commonly employed by our civilian law enforcement

counterparts, is a valuable tool that can be used to develop the driving skills of our junior military police Soldiers by increasing their hazard awareness and risk perception, thereby making them better, safer drivers.

**Reference:**

Amy Rose Williamson, "Effect of Video-Based Road Commentary Training on the Hazard Perception Skills of Teenage Novice Drivers," thesis submitted for a master's of social sciences in psychology degree from the University of Waikato, New Zealand, 2008.

*Captain Caruso is the commander of the 54th Military Police Company, assigned to the 504th Military Police Battalion, 42d Military Police Brigade. She holds a bachelor's degree in elementary education from the University of Idaho and a master's degree in business and security organizational management from Webster University.*

### Sample Questions From the Final Driver's Exam

#### Vehicle/Equipment Operator's Qualification

1. Does the driver possess a valid state driver's license without any revocations or suspensions? If so, from which state? What is the expiration date?
2. Does the driver possess a valid DA Form 348 (*Equipment Operator's Qualification Record [Except Aircraft]*) authorizing him or her to operate the appropriate vehicle? If so, what is the expiration date?
3. Did the driver complete the mandatory (online) vehicle safety course? If so, what date was the course completed?
4. Did the driver attend and satisfactorily complete the Fort Lewis EVOC? If so, what date was the course completed?

#### Before-Operation Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS)

1. Did the driver satisfactorily complete a thorough PMCS of the vehicle before operation to ensure that instruments were working properly?
2. Did the driver check vehicle fluid levels to ensure that they were appropriate?
3. Did the driver check the condition of the vehicle and tires and the operation of the headlights, battery, horn, and hand and foot brakes?
4. Did the driver ensure that emergency equipment (fire extinguisher, warning kits) was present in the vehicle?
5. Did the driver conduct a thorough "walk around" of the vehicle to ensure that it was clear of any debris or obstruction before moving the vehicle?
6. Did the driver make the necessary adjustments to mirrors, seats, and any other equipment that required adjustment before starting the vehicle? Did the driver buckle the seatbelt?
7. Did the driver conduct a dry run of vehicle controls (gears, brakes, front axle)?

#### During Vehicle Operation

1. Did the driver properly use depth perception to ensure that the vehicle had enough clearance to safely pull out of the designated parking area without hitting other vehicles or objects?
2. Did the driver properly use turn signals (in the direction of travel), look in all directions, and use mirrors to ensure that the road was safe and clear before departing from the parking area and proceeding into traffic?
3. Did the driver continuously maintain the vehicle's speed according to the posted speed limit?
4. Did the driver continuously scan the roadway (front, rear, and sides) for traffic and other objects that might unexpectedly enter the roadway?
5. Did the driver use a turn signal (if necessary) to indicate the upcoming direction of travel when approaching and while stopped at a stop sign? Did the driver stop the vehicle behind the white line painted at the designated stopping area? Did the driver look in all directions to ensure that the road was clear from other traffic before safely proceeding in the intended direction of travel?
6. Did the driver apply the same principles outlined in Question 5 when stopping at a red light?

(Continued on page 50)

# Pentagon Assignments: A Plea for a New Way of Thinking

*By Lieutenant Colonel John Voorhees, Lieutenant Colonel Duane Miller,  
and Lieutenant Colonel Ross Guieb*

After a year of reflecting on the time we spent serving on the Army Staff before rejoining the “field Army,” we feel compelled to address some common misperceptions about working at the Pentagon. We believe that these misperceptions lead some of the best military police officers and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to steer clear of a Pentagon assignment, even though that may be where their talents could be of most value to the Military Police Corps and the Army.

Following our assignments as battalion executive officers and operations and training officers (S3s), we arrived at the Pentagon expecting what many other officers had warned us about—a giant, unyielding bureaucracy incapable of adapting to change and impervious to the efforts of individual field grade officers, no matter how hard they worked. Many of these officers claimed that they “would never work at the Pentagon.” But now that we have actually worked there, we would like to share our completely different insight in an effort to encourage other officers to consider a Pentagon assignment.

We quickly realized that, with genuine persistence and people skills, rocks *can* be moved uphill and officers *can* get things done in the Pentagon. We were able to pursue a number of important actions and projects—some of our own initiative (based on operational experience) and some directed by our leadership—and we were able to see them through to completion. We are proud to have been a part of the various action officer teams that shaped Army decisions to expand the military police force structure by 47 percent (the largest military police growth since the Vietnam “ramp up”); build deployable internment/resettlement units at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Fort Lewis, Washington, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and initiate the Expeditionary Forensics Program, among many other significant projects.

Good Pentagon action officers have a big impact on major decisions. Senior leaders really do listen to action officers. In fact, they depend on action officers to provide the best information and analysis possible for shaping significant decisions. The complexity of the problem sets faced by the Pentagon requires that action officers conduct comprehensive research to determine the core issues. Quality research and analysis have a significant impact. Good action officers often find themselves working with the Joint Staff, sitting at the desk of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G-3) and preparing him for a meeting in the “tank,” or serving as subject matter

experts in briefings to the Vice Chief of Staff or Secretary of the Army.

Working at the Pentagon offers the opportunity for unique professional and personal experiences that provide a solid foundation for future leadership positions. Action officers are often called upon to brief members of Congress and the professional staffs of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They may also interact with the media by providing background information or being interviewed. In addition, action officers attend numerous meetings with senior leaders that force action officers to thoroughly prepare and develop situational awareness on many levels. We can honestly say that we never left a meeting with a senior Army leader without learning something about senior level leadership, the Army, or a wide variety of other important issues. Our experiences have made us better Army officers.

Most importantly, we can attest that exceptional people work at the Pentagon. The best officers, senior NCOs, and civilians from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps work there. They are positive team players who are willing to help anyone who needs assistance. Simply stated, they are great people to be around and you can learn from them.

After leaving Washington, D.C., and reflecting on the time we spent serving on the Army Staff, we recognize that our tenure there was professionally and personally rewarding. We encourage all leaders to seek opportunities to serve at the Pentagon—on the Army or Joint Staff or within the Department of Defense. It is essential that we build a solid bench of military police officers and senior NCOs with successful Pentagon tours to help shape future decisions of our Military Police Corps and, more importantly, our Army.

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*Lieutenant Colonel Voorhees is the commander of the 504th Military Police Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington. He served on the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training (G-3/5/7) Staff from 2004 to 2006 and in the Office of the Provost Marshal General from 2006 to 2008.*

*Lieutenant Colonel Miller is the commander of the 95th Military Police Battalion, Mannheim, Germany. He served on the Army G-3/5/7 Staff from 2006 to 2009.*

*Lieutenant Colonel Guieb is the commander of the 728th Military Police Battalion, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He served in the Office of the Provost Marshal General from 2006 to 2009.*

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# U.S. Unveils New Era of Detention Operations in Afghanistan

In an impressive display of transparency and partnership with Afghan allies, U.S. military officials hosted a series of visits to the new Detention Facility in Parwan, located at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, in November 2009. The facility, which was complete but not yet occupied, is expected to advance the counterinsurgency and reintegration efforts of Afghanistan detainee operations while also complying with the highest standards of care and custody.

Visitors to the new facility included key leaders from the government of Afghanistan and personnel from various embassies, coalition forces, Afghan and international media, and human rights organizations. The visits were conducted by Task Force Protector, with support from Combined Joint Task Force (JTF) 82 and JTF 435.

The new facility, which will informally be referred to as the Detention Facility in Parwan until the Afghan government selects an appropriate name, replaces the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (located several kilometers away). The new, 40-acre compound is severable from the base and was specifically designed for detention operations and associated support requirements. The facility is expected to hold about 700 detainees (with an expanded capacity to support more than 1,100) who have been determined to have ties to al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States or coalition partners. The programs and incorporated changes support the coalition counterinsurgency strategy to defeat violent extremism in Afghanistan. In addition, the humane living conditions of the facility exceed the mandatory standards set by the International Committee of the Red Cross. Furthermore, the new compound provides more recreational areas and improved medical facilities for detainees.

Officials say that the facility design is safer, more secure, and more accommodating, substantially improving the quality of life for detainees, guards, and other staff. "The Detention Facility in Parwan provides improved detainee living conditions and better accommodates family visitation as well as vocational, technical, and other programs to assist with peaceful reintegration of released detainees into Afghan society," said Brigadier General Mark S. Martins, interim commander of JTF 435.

The Detention Facility in Parwan is currently operated by Task Force Protector, under the command of Colonel John Garrity, commander of the 16th Military Police Brigade. However, JTF 435 will assume responsibility from Combined JTF 82 (upon order) for U.S. detainee operations in Afghanistan. These operations include the care and custody of detainees at the Detention Facility

in Parwan, oversight of detainee review processes, programs for the peaceful reintegration of detainees into society, and coordination with other agencies and partners for promotion of the rule of law in Afghanistan.

"This facility and these reintegration programs represent real progress; and in the coming months and years, they will promote transparency and legitimacy," added Martins. "We're linking up detention practices with longer-term strategic objectives, so it's not just international law, it's not just human rights, it's strategy and counterinsurgency in the context of Afghanistan."

Martins went on to say, "Detention, if not done properly, can actually harm the effort. We think transparency is certainly going to help the effort and increase the credibility of the whole process."

Martins was joined during the media events by key Afghan officials, including Brigadier General Haji Safiullah Juma, commandant of the Afghan National Detention Facility; Brigadier General Mohammad Mujahed, deputy spokesman for the Ministry of Defense; Deputy Minister of Justice Abdul Qadir Adalat-Khwa; and Brigadier General Arif Ahmadi, Ministry of Justice Central Prisons Directorate.

The U.S. government intends to transfer the Detention Facility in Parwan to the government of Afghanistan as soon as the transfer can responsibly occur in accordance with all applicable national and international laws. The new facility will substantially increase Afghanistan's capacity to securely detain serious offenders, including those determined to harm the population and institutions of state, while separating them, as necessary, from those for whom reconciliation, education, and peaceful reintegration into society are possible.

Afghanistan's Minister of Defense, Abdul Rahim Wardak, who was among the Afghan officials who visited the new facility, addressed the other participants following the tour, saying he was impressed by the quality of the facility and the expertise and professionalism of the guard force personnel. He expressed the consensus of the visitors in supporting a close partnership with U.S. officials to eventually transfer the facility to the government of Afghanistan, noting, "It's time for us to stand on our own feet." In his inaugural address days later, Afghan President Hamid Karzai echoed the same theme, setting the stage for the transition to an appropriate Afghan ministry.

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*This article was submitted by the Public Affairs Office, JTF 435.*

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# DOCTRINE UPDATE

## U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Directorate of Training Doctrine Development Division

| Publication Number   | Title                                    | Date                      | Description  |
|--|--|---------------------------|--|
| <b>NEW IN 2010! Military Police Doctrinal Manuals Change From 3-19 Series to 3-39 Series</b>   |  |                           |  |
| <p>The nomenclature of military police doctrinal publications will change this year to support new and ongoing Army doctrinal reengineering efforts designed to reduce the number of Army field manuals (FMs). The U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) will retain two Army FMs and adopt the new Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (ATTP) doctrinal designator for other branch-specific manuals. Publications that essentially contain technical and procedural doctrine may be reflected in a general subject technical manual (GSTM). Additional information will be published in future editions of this Doctrine Update and other USAMPS command information venues and publications.</p> |  |                           |  |
| <b>Current Publications</b>  |  |                           |  |
| FM 3-19.1<br>(will be FM 3-39)   | Military Police Operations               | 22 Mar 01<br>C1 31 Jan 02 | A keystone manual that is the foundation for all military police doctrine. This manual communicates (to all levels of leadership and staff) how the military police provide a flexible and scalable force capable of full spectrum operations.<br><b>Status:</b> Under revision (to be published FY 10).   |
| FM 3-19.4<br>(will be TC 3-39.30)  | Military Police Leaders' Handbook        | 4 Mar 02<br>C1 2 Aug 02   | A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary.<br><b>Status:</b> Current. |
| FM 3-19.6<br>(will be GSTM 3-39.31)  | Armored Security Vehicle                 | 24 May 06                 | A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle.<br><b>Status:</b> Current.  |
| FM 19-10<br>(will be ATTP 3-39.10)   | Military Police Law and Order Operations | 30 Sep 87                 | A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including law enforcement, investigation, U.S. military prisoner confinement, and counterterrorism operations.<br><b>Status:</b> Under revision (to be published FY 11).  |
| FM 3-19.11<br>(will be ATTP 3-39.11)   | Military Police Special-Reaction Teams   | 13 May 05                 | A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams.<br><b>Status:</b> Current.   |
| FM 3-19.12<br>(will be ATTP 3-39.31)   | Protective Services                      | 11 Aug 04                 | A manual that addresses TTP for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and military police assigned to protective services duties.<br><b>Status:</b> Current.  |
| FM 3-19.13<br>(will be ATTP 3-39.12)   | Law Enforcement Investigations           | 10 Jan 05                 | A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments.<br><b>Status:</b> Current.  |
| FM 3-19.15<br>(will be ATTP 3-39.33)   | Civil Disturbance Operations             | 18 Apr 05                 | A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities.<br><b>Status:</b> Current.   |

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

| U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence<br>Directorate of Training<br>Doctrine Development Division   |   |                          |   |
|---|---|--------------------------|---|
| Publication Number  | Title                                   | Date                     | Description   |
| <b>Current Publications (continued)</b>   |   |                          |   |
| FM 3-19.17<br>(will be<br>ATTP 3-39.34)   | Military Working Dogs                   | 6 Jul 05<br>C1 22 Sep 05 | A manual that addresses the current capabilities of the Military Police Working Dog Program and the potential for future capabilities.<br><b>Status:</b> Under revision (to be published FY 11).  |
| FM 19-25<br>(will be<br>ATTP 3-39.13)   | Military Police Traffic Operations      | 30 Sep 77                | A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments.<br><b>Status:</b> To be incorporated into ATTP 3-39.10 in FY 10.  |
| FM 3-19.30<br>(will be<br>ATTP 3-39.32)   | Physical Security                       | 8 Jan 01                 | A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. This manual is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be a one-stop physical security source.<br><b>Status:</b> Under revision (to be published FY 10).   |
| FM 3-19.40<br>(will be<br>FM 3-39.40)   | Internment/Resettlement Operations      | 4 Sep 07<br>C1 17 Dec 07 | A manual that addresses I/R operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. It serves as the key integrating manual for I/R operations and depicts the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police employ when dealing with I/R populations (detainees, U.S. military prisoners, and dislocated civilians).<br><b>Status:</b> Under revision (to be published FY 10). |
| FM 3-19.50<br>(will be<br>ATTP 3-39.20)   | Police Intelligence Operations          | 21 Jul 06                | A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, homeland defense, and protection of the force by integrating police engagement, police information, and police investigations to support law and order operations and the intelligence process.<br><b>Status:</b> Under revision (to be published FY 10).             |
| FM 3-90.31  | Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations | 26 Feb 09                | A manual that provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. It facilitates operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full spectrum operations.<br><b>Status:</b> Current.   |
| <p><b>Note:</b> Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at <a href="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/">http://www.adtdl.army.mil/</a> or from the USAMPS Web site at <a href="http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/">http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/</a>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <a href="mailto:leon.mdottedmpdoc@conus.army.mil">leon.mdottedmpdoc@conus.army.mil</a>.</p> |   |                          |   |
| <b>Emerging Publications</b>  |   |                          |   |
| FM 3-07.2<br>(will be<br>ATTP 3-37.2)   | Antiterrorism Operations                | Jul 10<br>(estimate)     | A manual that will establish the Army's guidance on how to integrate and synchronize antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. This manual will show how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process.                                   |

# FULL SPECTRUM PARTNERING

*By First Lieutenant Kristofer B. Melton*

The K-1 Iraqi Army (IA) Base, Kirkuk Province, Iraq, is home to the 12th IA Division Military Police Company, which consists of 62 Soldiers, 21 noncommissioned officers, and 6 officers from across Iraq—most of whom have had no advanced military police-specific training. The company conducts static guard and civil disturbance operations and detainee transport missions and also mans traffic control points within Kirkuk Province.

But with the Iraqi national elections that were tentatively scheduled for January 2010, it became apparent that the 12th IA military police would need additional training. As a result, the 12th IA military transition team worked closely with the 218th Military Police Company, 716th Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to forge a new partnership with the 12th IA military police, with the specific goal of preparing them for the elections. The 218th Military Police Company's 1st Platoon, which had aggressively accepted and completed their original police transition team mission in Kirkuk, was assigned to provide the actual training.

Leaders of the 1st Platoon determined that the best course of action was to divide the training into three progressive phases. The first phase focused on basic combat medical skills such as determining responsiveness, applying pressure dressings, applying tourniquets, and selecting types of litter carriers for casualty evacuation. In addition, training on squad level civil disturbance formations, stances, and methods for properly using assigned equipment was also conducted. During the second phase of training, IA military police learned how to administer intravenous fluids and insert nasal pharyngeal airways. They also learned how to properly search combatants and noncombatants and how to perform preventive maintenance checks and services on, maintain, and ground-guide M1114 up-armored humvees. In the third phase of training, IA military police learned how to use platoon level civil disturbance formations, how to command and control the formations, and how to use extraction formations. In addition, they learned to drive M1114s in on- and off-road conditions. During the third phase, IA military police were also tested on the medical information presented in the first two phases.

After completing the three phases of training, the 12th IA military police were prepared to react to any situation that might arise during the national elections. "The training we are conducting with the Americans will help us during our missions in and around Kirkuk," said a platoon leader with the 12th IA Military Police Company. The commander of the 12th IA Military Police Company stated, "Most of my soldiers have come from across the Iraqi army and have never received any formal training on the missions they are expected to complete. This training will help prepare them for what we need to do as MPs [military police]."

Since achieving their initial training goals, leaders of the 1st Platoon, 218th Military Police Company, have been planning a more aggressive training schedule. They are considering further training for the IA military police, including training on hasty checkpoint operations, the proper handling of detainees, and weapon skills.

At a time when military police companies are moving farther away from the traditional police transition team mission, the partnership between the 12th IA military police and the 218th Military Police Company showcases a promising, new use for military police forces deployed worldwide.



**Soldiers practice crowd control techniques.**

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*First Lieutenant Melton is the 1st Platoon leader, 218th Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.*

# 10th Military Police Battalion in Iraq: Job Well Done!

*By Captain Andrew Stipp*

*The Soldiers of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Military Police Battalion (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command [USACIDC], commonly referred to as “CID”) (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, recently returned from a September 2008–July 2009 deployment in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.*

The detachment served as the command and control element for the CID task force assigned to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. The task force was comprised of the 24th Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Rucker, Alabama; 38th Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Hood, Texas; 41st Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Carson, Colorado; 348th Military Police Detachment (CID), Fort Dix, New Jersey; and 481st Military Police Detachment (CID), Kaiserslautern, Germany. The battalion provided protective services and felony criminal investigation support in Iraq (for the Multinational Division–West, Multinational Division–Baghdad, and Multinational Division–Central-South), Kuwait, and Afghanistan.

The 10th Military Police Battalion coordinated and supervised 881 criminal investigations (with a 90 percent success rate) and recovered \$15.7 million in stolen and diverted property during the deployment. Among the investigations were a number of high-profile cases that garnered national media attention. For example, the 24th and 348th Military Police Detachments (CID) led an investigation into the electrocution death of a Soldier. Their collaboration with numerous federal law enforcement and private agencies resulted in a larger investigation into questionable maintenance practices of a major defense contractor. The 38th investigated the murders of three Soldiers by an Iraqi security forces soldier. The detachment coordinated with various commanders, the Armed forces medical examiner, and the Multinational Corps–Iraq Law Enforcement Forensics Laboratory to collect and quickly process critical evidence in support of prosecution efforts of the Iraqi criminal court. The tireless efforts of the 38th resulted in a death sentence for the perpetrator. Agents also provided extensive protective service detail support to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Army, and Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Although the deployed mission of the 10th Military Police Battalion was largely the same as the mission at home, the deployed environment often presented unique challenges for special agents. Lieutenant Colonel Kerrilynn A. Corrigan, former battalion commander, described those difficulties. “One challenge for the battalion was gaining a true understanding of the different levels of support between the three different commands—U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, and Multinational Force/Corps–Iraq,” she said. “. . . our mission support evolved as U.S. forces moved from combat operations to a more permissive state . . . U.S. Army CID took on a role to conduct joint investigations with the Iraqi CID.” Lieutenant Colonel Corrigan went on to cite an example of a joint investigation involving a Soldier who was murdered outside the confines of the forward operating base.

Chief Warrant Officer Five Brian Chmielewski, the battalion operations officer during the deployment, recalled many ways that agents demonstrated their flexibility and creativity during investigations. “Agents,



**Investigator processes a crime scene.**

many times, had to find alternate means to conduct an investigation from the school-taught method,” he said. “[They] routinely had to use their ingenuity to figure situations out.” Chmielewski cited two specific examples—one in which an agent telephonically instructed a civilian contractor on how to shoot crime scene photos and another in which a staff officer helped CID agents process evidence at a mass murder scene. While these practices were atypical with regard to investigative protocol, they were effective in accomplishing the task at hand.

Agents and Soldiers of the 10th Military Police Battalion consistently found ways to develop and implement solutions to ongoing and peculiar problems. Command Sergeant Major Andre Proctor, the battalion command sergeant major, specifically recounted the efforts of two noncommissioned officers in advancing systems for collecting and processing evidence and tracking down disbanded units to obtain delinquent Department of the Army Forms 4833, *Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action*. “[These noncommissioned officers] did an outstanding job with identifying these systemic problems and coming up with effective resolutions,” he said. He also indicated that the two agents were responsible for implementing an automated tracking system for new evidence and successfully disposing of 1,600 pieces of evidence.

By adapting and overcoming each obstacle, the 10th Military Police Battalion provided vital support to ongoing military operations in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. CID agents and support Soldiers provided thorough, meticulous investigative support and dedicated, professional protective services support to commanders in all locations. Their redeployment was quickly followed by a change of command from Lieutenant Colonel Corrigan to Lieutenant Colonel David E. Heath. As the battalion prepares for its next deployment to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, the new leadership is committed to building upon the past successes of the unit to ensure future mission accomplishment.

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*Captain Stipp is the supply officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 10th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s degree in psychology from Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, and a master’s degree in business and organizational security from Webster University, St. Louis, Missouri.*

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## 2009 Military Police Warfighter Challenge

*By Ms. Kerstin Lopez*



Teams were focused, geared up, and ready for battle during the 13th Military Police Warfighter Challenge, which was conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in mid-September 2009. A total of 34 teams participated in 13 events (and covered 60 miles by foot) during the 4-day competition. “This has been the most teams we’ve seen in years,” said Regimental Command Sergeant Major Charles Kirkland.

The competition between Team 11 (Corporal Thomas Lemonds, Specialist Leonard Salazar, and Private First Class Sam Meroney) from the 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado, and Team 3 (Staff Sergeant John Atkins, Specialist Aaron Ebersole, and Private First Class Kevin Wallace) from the 92d Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, was close; but in the end, the team from Fort Carson earned the title of 2009 Warfighter Champions. Team 21 (Corporal Gordon Simonis, Private First Class Matthew Wetzell, and Private First Class John Salinas) from the 289th Military Police Company, Fort Myer, Virginia, captured third place.

“The Warfighter Soldiers are highly motivated individuals—the best of the very best,” said Brigadier General David Phillips, chief of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment and commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School.

In addition to bragging rights, each member of the first-place team received prizes totaling \$5,000. Prizes were also awarded to the second- and third-place teams. The three winning teams remained at Fort Leonard Wood to participate in Regimental Week, which followed the Warfighter Challenge. Team members were introduced at the culminating event of the week—the Military Police Regimental Ball—on 26 September.

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*Ms. Lopez is a member of the Fort Leonard Wood Guidon staff.*

# 89th Military Police Brigade Awarded Meritorious Unit Commendation

In August 2009, the 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation for exceptionally meritorious service in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 14 September 2006–29 October 2007. According to the orders, “The brigade’s superior performance of all assigned duties and its commitment to creating a professional and competent Iraqi police service contributed immeasurably to the success of Multinational Corps–Iraq.”<sup>1</sup>



other units with similar missions. The degree of achievement required is the same as that which would warrant award of the Legion of Merit to an individual. Only on rare occasions will a unit larger than a battalion qualify for award of this decoration.”<sup>2</sup>

“I remain immensely proud of all of the Soldiers who served with the 89th [Military Police Brigade] and Task Force Griffin during OIF 06-08,” said Colonel Mike Galloucis, who was the commander of the 89th Military Police Brigade from June 2005 to November 2007. “We had a great team and an important mission. The men and women who served with the brigade during this challenging period did a magnificent job under some of the most difficult conditions our Nation has faced in Iraq. Their work in improving the capabilities and professionalism of the Iraqi police contributed significantly to the success of the surge and helped set the conditions for the relative calm and stability we see in Iraq today. This Meritorious Unit Commendation officially recognizes that great work and their sacrifice.”

In addition to the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, units that served under the command and control of the 89th Military Police Brigade in Iraq were also identified and singled out on the same orders. These included Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), 92d Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; HHD, 97th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas; HHD, 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood; and HHD, 759th Military Police Battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado, as well as twenty-four company-size, Regular Army and Reserve Component military police, infantry, and artillery units.

The HHC, 89th Military Police Brigade, is currently stationed in Iraq, serving its third tour since 11 September 2001.

According to Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-22, Meritorious Unit Commendation recognition is appropriate only in those instances when a unit has displayed “such outstanding devotion and superior performance of exceptionally difficult tasks as to set it apart and above

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Permanent Orders 233-24, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 21 August 2009.

<sup>2</sup>AR 600-8-22, *Military Awards*, 11 December 2006.

### Address Corrections Requested

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### Letters to the Editor

*Military Police* welcomes letters from readers. If you have a comment concerning an article we have published or would like to express your point of view on another subject of interest to military police Soldiers, let us hear from you. Your letter must include your complete address and a telephone number. All letters are subject to editing for space or clarity.

Our mailing addresses are:

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Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926

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# Dedication

*The following members of the Military Police Corps Regiment have been lost in the War on Terrorism since our last issue. We dedicate this issue to them.*



Specialist Daniel P. Drevnik  
34th Military Police Company  
34th Infantry Division  
Minnesota Army National Guard  
Stillwater, Minnesota



Sergeant Randy M. Haney  
Headquarters and Headquarters Company  
2d Special Troops Battalion  
4th Infantry Division  
Fort Carson, Colorado



Private First Class Thomas F. Lyons  
545th Military Police Company  
Arctic Military Police Battalion  
Fort Richardson, Alaska



Staff Sergeant Daniel D. Merriweather  
118th Military Police Company  
503d Military Police Battalion  
16th Military Police Brigade  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina




Private First Class Zachary T. Myers  
545th Military Police Company  
Arctic Military Police Battalion  
Fort Richardson, Alaska



Private First Class Brandon A. Owens  
118th Military Police Company  
503d Military Police Battalion  
16th Military Police Brigade  
XVIII Airborne Corps  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina



Sergeant Christopher M. Rudzinski  
293d Military Police Company  
385th Military Police Battalion  
16th Military Police Brigade  
Fort Stewart, Georgia



Staff Sergeant Shannon M. Smith  
545th Military Police Company  
Arctic Military Police Battalion  
Fort Richardson, Alaska



Specialist Brandon K. Steffey  
178th Military Police Detachment  
89th Military Police Brigade  
III Corps  
Fort Hood, Texas



Specialist James D. Wertish  
34th Military Police Company  
34th Infantry Division  
Minnesota Army National Guard  
Stillwater, Minnesota



Private First Class Geoffrey A. Whitsitt  
118th Military Police Company  
503d Military Police Battalion  
16th Military Police Brigade  
Fort Bragg, North Carolina



Specialist Carlos E. Wilcox IV  
34th Military Police Company  
34th Infantry Division  
Minnesota Army National Guard  
Stillwater, Minnesota

# USAEUR and Seventh Army Soldier of the Year Credits Supporters

*By Sergeant Adrienne Killingsworth*

Specialist (now Sergeant) Daniel Micek, a military police Soldier with the 615th Military Police Company, 709th Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade, was named the U.S. Army Europe (USAEUR) and Seventh Army Soldier of the Year on 27 August 2009.

Sergeant Micek's journey seemingly began almost a year ago, when he was named Soldier of the Month for his company. But Micek's quest to live up to his own potential actually began long before that—in his hometown of Silver Creek, Nebraska. According to Sergeant Micek, it was there that he decided to push himself to his limits. "I just wanted to do something with my life, make something of myself. I wanted to do something that people don't normally get to do," he said.

To that end, Micek enlisted in the Army as a military police Soldier and pushed himself to do more and to be more. With just a little more than two years in the service, it is safe to say that he has accomplished more than most and that he has earned the opportunity to do things that many do not get a chance to do.

After his success at the company level Soldier of the Year selection board, Micek tried out for his company warfighter team—an experience which he says gave him the push that he needed to reach his current level of success.

The warfighter team trains heavily for the annual Warfighter Challenge competition held at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—home of the U.S. Army Military Police School. "Training six days a week on warrior tasks and drills, obstacle courses, Army knowledge, and physical training is not for the weak-hearted," Micek said.

But Micek's success at the Soldier of the Year board meant the postponement of his warfighter team status; he was able to train with the team only under the affectionate title of "boardfighter." He credits the team for his ability to do so well in the Soldier of the Year competitions.

With every competition, the requirements and intensity increased. Micek said that his teammates and his sponsor, Staff Sergeant Jason Nepa, pushed him and motivated him through it all. "The USAREUR [competition] was pretty intense," Micek said, noting that at one point, "They didn't give us a standard [for completing a task] because they wanted to see what our own personal standard was."

Micek said he sees his Soldier of the Year title as something more than an individual accomplishment. "I really don't feel like I'm the best Soldier in USAREUR," he said. "I know there's a lot of people 'downrange' fighting the war. For me, I'm just trying to represent them." The sergeant also gives more credit to those around him—particularly his warfighter team—than he takes for himself.

Looking back over the past year and ahead to the future, Micek said the entire process that has led him to where he is now has been a blessing and a rewarding adventure. "Personally, it's a really good experience," Micek said. "I mean, I've enjoyed every moment of it. Everybody is really proud of me—the warfighter team, the company, my family back home, and friends." "Honestly," he says, "I'm kind of humbled by it."

Micek is now ready to tackle another challenge—testing his warrior skills downrange. He has extended his tour with the 615th Military Police Company so that he can accompany them on their upcoming deployment.



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*Sergeant Killingsworth is a public affairs specialist with the 18th Military Police Brigade, Mannheim, Germany. She holds a bachelor's degree in English literature from California State University–Northridge.*



# 71st Military Police Detachment Activated



*By Major Kevin M. Pelley*

On 16 October 2009, Lieutenant Colonel David F. Koonce, commander of the Benning U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as “CID”) Battalion, and Chief Warrant Officer Three Shirley Hawkins, also with the Benning CID Battalion, uncased the 71st Military Police Detachment (CID) guidon, marking the unit’s reactivation at Fort Benning, Georgia. Orders to activate the 71st were approved in November 2008; the activation ceremony was the culmination of nearly a year of planning and preparation.

The Benning CID Battalion was authorized an increase based on its geographically dispersed structure, the number of unit and individual deployments, and an increase in support requirements due to the growth of Fort Benning and other installations within the battalion footprint. The high demand for CID agents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters resulted in detachments within the Benning CID Battalion performing felony criminal investigative missions with less than half of the required strength. As Lieutenant Colonel Koonce stated at the activation ceremony, “With the addition of this detachment and the personnel positions that the activation authorizes, the battalion will be able to better support the Fort Benning community and the expected increase in population that the Armor School and the Maneuver Center of Excellence will bring.”

The activation of the 71st also allowed the battalion to officially stand up two new offices in Florida—one at Eglin Air Force Base (to cover the panhandle region of Florida) and another in Lakeland (to provide support to the central and southern portions of Florida, including Tampa, Orlando, Miami, and MacDill Air Force Base). In addition, the activation authorized the personnel whom the battalion had been providing as support for the Puerto Rico office.

The 71st Military Police Detachment was originally constituted on 8 November 1950 as the 71st Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment. The guidon has since been furled and unfurled many times. In 1976, the unit earned campaign credit for service in Vietnam. From 2000 to 2006, the 71st provided law enforcement support at Fort Benning; during that time, individual augmentees were deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the detachment was awarded the Brigadier General David H. Stem Award as the best U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command military police detachment. The unit was last inactivated on 17 April 2006.

The Military Police Corps has nearly doubled in size during the last seven years—a direct result of combatant commanders’ demands for military police and CID units in their theaters. Lieutenant Colonel Koonce remarked, “The activation of the 71st Military Police Detachment (CID) is an honor for the Benning CID Battalion for two reasons—one, the only new growth within CID this fiscal year is this detachment; and two, with the activation of this detachment, the Army continues to recognize the importance of law enforcement and investigative units within its ranks.”

With the high demand for criminal investigators, the 71st Military Police Detachment was scheduled for deployment even before it was activated. The deployment, which is scheduled for Spring 2010, will be in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The newly activated unit will conduct felony investigations, support intelligence fusion operations, and mentor Iraqi investigators.

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*Major Pelley is the operations and training officer for the Benning CID Battalion. He holds a master’s degree in security management from Webster University.*

# Boy Scouts of Iraq:

## The 571st Military Police Company Lends a Hand

*By First Lieutenant Aaron D. Fairman*

As we begin to draw down forces in Iraq, there are many programs that are still in the process of being reestablished. One of those programs is the Boy Scouts.

On 10 December 2009, service members from the International Zone, including Soldiers of the 571st Military Police Company, participated in a day camp designed to help facilitate the rebuilding of the Iraqi Boy Scout program. The day camp, which was attended by more than 130 boys ranging in age from 8 to 16, consisted of 10 stations (including stations on fire safety, tent erection, compass and land navigation, knot tying, first aid, and good sportsmanship games such as soccer).

Whether the participating service members had previously been involved with Boy Scouts for just a couple of months or had attained the rank of Eagle Scout, they realized the positive influence that scouting had on them. Consequently, they eagerly volunteered their very limited spare time to help with the camp.

Soldiers of the 571st Military Police Company manned the knot-tying station, where two knots—the square knot and the bowline—were taught. The volunteer instructors avoided language barrier issues by demonstrating how to tie the knots step by step. This allowed for less verbal communication and more practical exercise. One of the instructors stated, “The language barrier was difficult for me to tell them how to work and how to do things. But, I was very surprised at their extreme amount of teamwork and dedication to learning new things. I’m proud to know things are looking up here for them by starting to prepare the future leaders of Iraq.” Another instructor added, “I was eager to help out with the Boy Scouts here in Iraq. It was a good opportunity to show them some of the skills we use back in the [United States]. I hope that the skills we showed them help them out in the future.”




**Iraqi Boy Scouts learn knot-tying techniques.**

The scouting program in Iraq, which was one of the first Arab countries to join the scouting movement, began in 1921 and has struggled ever since. Although numbers grew during the early 1930s, they dwindled a decade later. In the 1940s, scouting started to pick up and, with the assistance of the British Royal Air Force, sporadic movements were initiated. Unfortunately, because Saddam Hussein was using scouting for corrupt military means, the World Scouting Organization council disbanded scouting in Iraq during his regime. In 2004, Mr. Chip Beck (a former Navy commander, Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] operative, and assistant commissioner for Venture Scouting) decided to reinstate the program. He created the Green Zone Council—an organization comprised of U.S. and Iraqi military and government officials—to encourage the rejuvenation of scouting in Iraq. The Green Zone Council created a legal, fully recognized scouting program in Iraq. The program extended to Victory Base Complex in 2008 and has begun to grow throughout Baghdad. The Iraqi Boy Scout program is now operated exclusively by Iraqis and is open to boys and girls of all ethnic backgrounds.

With scouting currently on the rise, it is great to see the positive influence that events such as the day camp have on young Iraqi children. The kids enjoyed themselves, and they and the volunteers left the camp with a shared sense of accomplishment.

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*First Lieutenant Fairman is an executive officer with the 571st Military Police Company. He holds a bachelor's degree in information systems engineering from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.*



# Task Force Protector Assumes Responsibility for Detention and Law and Order Operations in Afghanistan

*By Captain Thomas Cieslak*

A military police brigade headquarters comprised of paratroopers is now responsible for oversight of detention operations at Bagram Airfield and law and order operations throughout Afghanistan.

Task Force Protector, led by Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, assumed responsibility of the Bagram Theater Internment Facility and theater law and order operations from Task Force Guardian in a transfer-of-authority ceremony conducted 15 August 2009.

This is the first time that a military police brigade headquarters has deployed to Afghanistan. The 16th Military Police Brigade paratroopers deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in late July and had been preparing for the transfer of authority ever since. The unit assumed leadership of eight subordinate units that contained Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel and became known as Task Force Protector, reflecting their partnership with units from across the U.S. military.

The leaders of Task Force Protector will provide senior level oversight for detention and law and order

operations, while the brigade special staff will support subordinate units with expertise in areas such as logistics, public relations, and personnel actions.

Previously, the brigade headquarters oversaw detainee operations in Iraq at the height of the surge, providing care, custody, and control of approximately 26,000 detainees. Due to its extensive experience, the headquarters element has been integral in developing a doctrine of “counter-insurgency operations inside the wire.”

“It is the right time, the right place, and the right mission for Task Force Protector. We are charged with the awesome responsibility of ensuring the safety and humane custody and control of detained persons. We are trained, ready, and eager to accomplish all our tasks safely and professionally,” said Colonel John Garrity, commander of Task Force Protector. “We will make a difference, and we will make it matter.”

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*Captain Cieslak is the public affairs officer for the 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Gannon University, Erie, Pennsylvania.*

## MILITARY POLICE Online

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Brigadier General Quantock addresses members of JTF 134 before the run.

# Challenge at Lost Lake

*By Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Butler*

As the sun set over Baghdad, Iraq, on 29 August 2009, most units were “calling it a day.” But Joint Task Force (JTF) 134 was just getting ready to start a new challenge. The U.S. Army Military Police Regiment had challenged military police units around the world to complete a 68-mile run in recognition of the 68th anniversary of the establishment of the Military Police Corps as a basic branch of the U.S. Army. The Camp Victory course consisted of a 1.6-mile loop around an area known as Lost Lake. To meet the challenge, JTF 134 personnel were required to run forty-three laps around the course.

Brigadier General David E. Quantock, commander of JTF 134, provided opening remarks and encouragement for the task ahead. The first lap, which began at about 7:15 p.m. (when the temperature was about 100°F), was completed by personnel representing all Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine career fields assigned to JTF 134. The next forty-one laps were individual relay legs completed by Army military police officers, noncommissioned officers, and junior enlisted Soldiers; Navy masters of arms; Air Force security forces; and Marine military police at a rate of one lap every fifteen minutes throughout the night. The individual laps were followed by a final group lap, which was completed at 5:50 the next morning. The temperature remained above 85°F the entire night.

Leaders from Headquarters and Headquarters Company established and maintained a support area where refreshments, games, and movies were available for those who participated and those who supported the runners throughout the night.

The 68th anniversary challenge presented a great opportunity for our joint service team to work together and promote fitness. Mission accomplished! Return with honor!

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*Command Sergeant Major Butler is the command senior enlisted leader, JTF 134. He holds an associate's degree in law enforcement from Central Texas College, Killeen, Texas, and a bachelor's degree in liberal arts from Regents College (now Excelsior College), Albany, New York.*

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# Anatomy of a Murder

*By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)*

*People commit murder for many reasons. Some murders are committed in a fit of rage, while others are meticulously planned. This article describes a case that does not fit either category.*

According to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, “Any person . . . who, without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being when he—

- (1) has a premeditated design to kill;
- (2) intends to kill or inflict great bodily harm;
- (3) is engaged in an act that is inherently dangerous to another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life; or
- (4) is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of burglary, sodomy, rape, rape of a child, aggravated sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual contact, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual contact with a child, robbery, or aggravated arson

is guilty of murder and [if subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice] shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct, except that if found guilty under clause (1) or (4), he shall suffer death or imprisonment for life as a court-martial may direct.”<sup>1</sup>

Although the case discussed in this article occurred before the 1951 adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the definition of murder at that time would have been similar.

Johannes Wilfried Helm was born to Charlotte and Hans Helm on 2 November 1930 in Dresden, Germany. During the latter years of World War II, the city of Dresden was subjected to several bombing attacks launched by air forces of England and the United States. Helm indicated that his parents were killed on 13 February 1944 in a raid on the town; however, the U.S. Air Force cites the date of the bombing as 13 February 1945.<sup>2</sup> The attack, conducted by the Royal Air Force, was an infamous one in which hundreds of bombers dropped high-explosive and incendiary bombs throughout the city. More than 90 percent of the Dresden city center was estimated to have been destroyed that day. In addition to the deaths of his parents, Helm also lost a younger brother in the incident. Two older brothers were serving on the Russian front at the time of the bombing.

Orphaned in the raid, Helm left school and ran away from the city. The teen traveled through Czechoslovakia and Austria before returning to Germany, where he first came into contact with American troops at Bad Woerishofen.<sup>3</sup> Fluent in English, Helm was quickly hired as an errand boy and dubbed “Billy” by an antitank company of the 80th Division. He traveled to Czechoslovakia and on to Aschaffenburg, Germany, with the company. But, the unit soon rotated home and Helm was on his own again.

The transient status of many American units presented opportunities for Helm to improve his financial status. He began to take advantage of these opportunities by stealing cigarettes from Soldiers and selling them on the black market. Helm was first incarcerated after getting caught driving a stolen jeep, but he quickly escaped. He then went on to Nurnberg, where he befriended some military police of the 397th Railroad Military Police Company. He began working for them as an interpreter and errand boy, but he continued to steal cigarettes—even expanding the scale of his operation. Caught and confined several times, Helm began to avoid staying in one place too long by increasing his travel. Arriving in Bremerhaven, he again approached military police for work. He stole an American passport and began impersonating its rightful owner, taking advantage of clubs, post exchanges, and the U.S. Consulate. Helm’s tale about being an American who had been abandoned by his father, a colonel, was so convincing that he was transported to the United States, where it was learned that he was not a citizen at all. He was immediately shipped back to Bremerhaven in March 1947. Helm was tried by a military court and sentenced to one year of confinement; however, he escaped again and traveled from Bremerhaven, through Munich, to Garmisch, where he resumed selling stolen cigarettes (and also added gasoline coupons). Wanted by military police for breaking into about twenty barracks, Helm skipped town once more.

On 19 April 1948, Helm was arrested by military police and confined at a prison in Munich. He informed the prison director that he had information about the murder of an American Soldier. Prison authorities notified Munich police and they, in turn, contacted the

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U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) (commonly referred to as "CID"). Although this was just another of Helm's ploys to improve his chances for escape, the story needed to be checked out.

Special Agent Walter E. Snyder, 13th Military Police Detachment (CID), and Mr. Franz Eichinger, Munich police detective, interviewed Helm on 4 May. He related a convincing story of a murder that took place in the vicinity of Rudesheim, and they arranged to take him to that vicinity the following day. Due to the length of the drive, the party stopped along the way and Helm spent the night in the Wiesbaden Prison. On 6 May, he was retrieved from the prison and the party completed their trip to Rudesheim, where it was quickly determined that Helm had no information at all. However, when Eichinger confronted him, he stuck to his story. Helm was returned to Wiesbaden Prison while Snyder checked with military authorities regarding any information about a missing or murdered Soldier. No such information was available.

On the following Sunday morning, Snyder and Eichinger stopped by the prison and picked up Helm for the return trip to Munich. Snyder drove the CID sedan, while Eichinger sat in the backseat with the handcuffed Helm. On their way out of town, they stopped by the CID Office at Wiesbaden, where Snyder briefed the local commander and informed him that they were headed back to Munich. Back at the car, Helm was again placed in the rear seat; however, Eichinger moved to the front passenger seat. After some time, Helm began complaining that his hands, which had been cuffed behind him, were swollen and hurting. Over Snyder's objections, Eichinger removed the handcuffs and refastened them with Helm's hands in front. Eichinger then positioned himself so that his back was against the door; this gave him a better view of Helm in the backseat. At some point, Eichinger reached into a briefcase that had been placed on the seat and removed a cigarette.

As the car traveled along the autobahn, Helm noticed that Eichinger had dozed off. He took that opportunity to reach into Eichinger's briefcase to steal the cigarettes; and as he did so, he felt a revolver. He grabbed the gun and straightened up just as Eichinger awoke. Helm shot Eichinger in the head and then turned on Snyder. His first shot missed Snyder and struck the windshield, another misfired, but the third attempt found its mark.<sup>4</sup> Snyder slumped over onto Eichinger, and the car began weaving all over the road. Helm was able to reach the steering



**Special Agent Snyder**



**Mr. Eichinger**

wheel and control the vehicle until he could climb over the seat and get it stopped. He retrieved the handcuff keys from Eichinger's pocket and freed himself. He left the autobahn at Furstenfeldbruck and headed down a side road and then a dirt path into a forest. There, he removed the victims' clothing, identification cards, and jewelry and rifled through their pockets for cash. He used Snyder's coat to cover both bodies, saturated them with gasoline, and set the car and its occupants on fire. He buried Snyder's revolver and credentials, then tossed his briefcase into the woods. Helm, dressed in Snyder's clothing, walked into Augsburg and hitchhiked north. His plan was to travel to Belgium, where he would attempt to board a ship headed for America.

Local police apprehended Helm in Liège, Belgium, on 18 June 1948. Special Agent Albert "Nick" Nokutis, 13th Military Police Detachment, was dispatched to Belgium to bring Helm back for investigation.<sup>5</sup> Upon his return, CID Agent Robert B. Shaw (the 13th Military Police Detachment case agent) and K.K. Schmitt (a Munich detective) interviewed Helm several times. Helm provided the agents with a thoroughly detailed account of his life of crime, including the murder of the two policemen.<sup>6</sup> Helm directed the agents to the crime scene, where he dug up Snyder's revolver and identification papers. Other personal items were found scattered around the site.

Helm was tried by a military tribunal and convicted of the two murders. The court sentenced him to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by General Lucius D. Clay, then military governor of the U.S. Zone of Occupation. In October 1958, The German Ministry of Justice reduced the sentence to fifteen years

*(Continued on page 44)*

# Who Was Barney Flood?

*By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)*



The U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regimental Museum recently acquired a large collection of artifacts related to the service of Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz. While examining these new acquisitions, I discovered a medallion that had been presented to Bandholtz by Major Bernard A. Flood, commander of General Lafayette Police Post 460 of the American Legion, in 1920. There were several occasions when these two could have met.

Bernard Alexander (more commonly known as Barney) Flood was born to Irish immigrant parents in New York City on 2 October 1877. He had at least one sister, Florence, and a younger brother, John J.<sup>1</sup> The family resided in Manhattan,<sup>2</sup> and Barney attended parochial schools in New York City. He later enlisted in the U.S. Army and served during the Spanish-American War. On 3 March 1902, Barney Flood joined the New York City Police Department (NYPD). He was assigned Patrolman's Badge 4793<sup>3</sup> and served in the 3d Precinct, with duty at the District Attorney's Office.

It wasn't long before Flood proved his abilities. In 1904, he was cited for his bravery at a fire. He was promoted to detective and assigned to the detective bureau in Manhattan; he performed duties with the 19th Precinct and then returned to the District Attorney's Office.<sup>4</sup>

Detective Flood married Helen M. Hughes on 22 February 1906.<sup>5</sup> On 24 July 1907, Flood was promoted to detective first grade and issued Patrolman's Badge 18.<sup>6</sup> While still assigned to the District Attorney's Office, Flood was involved in many high-profile criminal cases. He gained notoriety for his uncanny ability to track down and arrest fugitives—often traveling around the world to do so. On at least a dozen occasions, he traveled to Europe in pursuit of fugitives, bringing them back to New York for trial.<sup>7</sup> During these expeditions, he made many contacts who would serve him well in future endeavors.

In August 1909, Flood was in London working on the extradition of a female swindler who was identified only as Ms. Beattie.<sup>8</sup> While the case was proceeding through the courts, the District Attorney's Office wired Flood, directing him to be on the lookout for Adelbert E. Hoyt, a fugitive real estate dealer who had "jumped" bail, was wanted on forgery charges, and had escaped to Europe. Flood tracked Hoyt from London to Scotland;

Amsterdam; Ostend, Belgium; and Dieppe, France—and then back to London. Accompanied by a detective from Scotland Yard, Flood confronted the fugitive at an American Express office.

When Flood informed Hoyt that he had a warrant for his arrest, Hoyt pulled a blade from a cane sword and threatened the British detective. Flood overpowered Hoyt and took his weapon, and the fugitive was arrested.<sup>9</sup> In another incident in 1913, Flood tracked down a fugitive in Valpariso, Chile, and transported him across the Andes Mountains to Buenos Aires, Argentina, for extradition.<sup>10</sup>

Flood also became active with the New York Division of the National Guard. He attended the first Reserve Officer's Training Camp at Plattsburg, New York, in 1917 and was then appointed second lieutenant. At that time, Bandholtz was the chief of staff of the New York Division. In September of that year, Second Lieutenant Flood was sent to France, where he was assigned to the recently formed Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). His immediate supervisor was Major Allan Pinkerton (grandson of the famous Allan Pinkerton, Abraham Lincoln's chief spy during the Civil War),<sup>11</sup> who was president of the Pinkerton Detective Agency when he offered his services to the U.S. Army. He was accepted into the Army, commissioned as a major, and tasked to organize the DCI. However, a lack of centralized control and qualified personnel hindered their efforts. It was not until Bandholtz was appointed as Provost Marshal General that the DCI became a formidable investigative agency.<sup>12</sup>

While working for the DCI, Flood assisted French authorities in investigating the subversive activities of a man named Bola Pacha, a French businessman who received millions of dollars from German spies to purchase French newspapers that then printed articles favorable toward German war efforts. Pacha was tried and convicted by French courts and executed by a firing squad on 17 April 1918.<sup>13</sup>

In February 1919, "Captain" Flood returned to New York on a troop ship. In an interview conducted upon his arrival, he related, "The men who had been criminals and who got to France with the Army proved honest and patriotic in nearly every case. They made good. There is absolutely

no organized bandit gang in the whole American Army in France.”<sup>14</sup> While this may have been the case before he left France, the Provost Marshal General’s report for a later period in 1919 contradicts Flood’s statements.

Detective Flood reported back to the NYPD, resuming his work in the District Attorney’s Office. However, he remained active in the Army Reserve and recruited many policemen as Reserve military police. About 1,200 members of the NYPD served during World War I—several as military police. In October 1919, these veterans were notified of an organizational meeting for an American Legion post for police veterans. The organization evolved into General Lafayette Police Post 460 of the City of New York.<sup>15</sup>

In October 1922, General John J. Pershing presented “Major” Flood with the Distinguished Service Medal for his actions with the American Expeditionary Force during the war. The NYPD published the following general order: “Acting Detective Sergeant Bernard A. Flood, Shield #18, Detective Division, for services in the World War while on leave of absence from this department, as expressed in General Orders #43, War Department, Washington, D.C., October 22, 1922, as follows: Award of Distinguished Service Medal—By direction of the President, under the provisions of the act of Congress, approved July 9, 1918, the Distinguished Service Medal was awarded by the War Department to the following named officer: Bernard A. Flood, Major, Military Police Officer’s Reserve Corps, then Captain, Provost Marshal General’s Department, United States Army. For exceptionally meritorious and distinguished services. As Chief Inspector of the Division of Criminal Investigation on the Staff of the Provost Marshal General, American Expeditionary Forces, he organized, coordinated, and directed this important office in a highly efficient manner. The successes achieved by this section are largely due to his sound judgment, untiring efforts, and exceptional ability and were of great value to the American Expeditionary Forces. Residence at appointment: New York, [New York]”<sup>16</sup>

In March 1927, after 25 years of service, Flood retired from the NYPD. In recognition of his service, he received honors from the police department and District Attorney’s Office. Shortly after his retirement, Flood returned to Paris, where he organized an international detective agency and joined an American Legion post. He died on 14 May 1933. Following a funeral mass in Paris (attended by American and French mourners), his body was shipped to New York City for additional ceremonies. Many high-ranking police and other city officials attended the services. The burial (with military and police escorts, firing parties, and buglers) took place



**Medallion presented to Bandholtz by Flood in 1920.**

at the Gate of Heaven Cemetery, Mount Pleasant, Westchester County, New York.<sup>17</sup>

In 1935, Flood was posthumously awarded the NYPD’s highest award—the Medal of Honor with Gold Bar. His wife, Helen, died 8 November 1936.

**Acknowledgement:** Special thanks to Mr. Andy Watson, U.S. Army Military Police historian, for his contribution of reference materials; the Military Police Corps Regimental Museum for permission to use illustrations of the Bandholtz medallion; and the Office of the Chief of Personnel, NYPD, for providing personnel records and other documents related to Barney Flood’s service.

**Endnotes:**

- <sup>1</sup>John J. Flood Dies,” *New York Times*, 21 December 1932.
- <sup>2</sup>Completed *Application for Passport*, 1921.
- <sup>3</sup>*Transfer and Assignment Card* for B. Flood, Shield 4793, Office of the Chief of Personnel, NYPD.
- <sup>4</sup>*Special Orders 64*, 18 April 1905, NYPD.
- <sup>5</sup>*Marriage License Certificate 6322*, New York County Vital Records.
- <sup>6</sup>*Transfer and Assignment Card* for B. Flood.
- <sup>7</sup>“Barney’ Flood Decorated,” *New York Times*, 8 October 1922.
- <sup>8</sup>“Hart in Beattie Case,” *New York Times*, 8 August 1909.
- <sup>9</sup>“Hoyt, Wanted Here, Caught in London,” *New York Times*, 13 August 1909.
- <sup>10</sup>“Barney’ Flood Decorated,” 8 October 1922.
- <sup>11</sup>“Report of the Provost Marshal General,” U.S. Printing Office, 1942.
- <sup>12</sup>Patrick V. Garland, *A Forgotten Soldier: The Life and Times of Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz*, Infinity Publishing, March 2009.
- <sup>13</sup>John Price Jones and Paul Merrick Hollister; *The German Secret Service in America*; Small, Maynard, and Company; Boston, 1918.
- <sup>14</sup>“2,995 More Troops Home From France,” *New York Times*, 14 February 1919.
- <sup>15</sup>“Police Plan Legion Post,” *New York Times*, 5 October 1919.
- <sup>16</sup>“General Orders 14,” Office of the Police Commissioner, NYPD, 22 May 1924.
- <sup>17</sup>*Spring 3100*, Police Department, City of New York, June 1933.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*

# 18th Military Police Brigade



## *Lineage*

Constituted 23 March 1966 in the Regular Army as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 18th Military Police Brigade.

Activated 20 May 1966 at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

Inactivated 29 March 1973 at Oakland, California.

Redesignated 16 August 1985 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 18th Military Police Brigade, and activated in Germany.

## *Campaign Participation Credit*

### *Vietnam*

Counteroffensive, Phase II; Counteroffensive, Phase III; Tet Counteroffensive; Counteroffensive, Phase IV; Counteroffensive, Phase V; Counteroffensive, Phase VI; Tet 69/Counteroffensive; Summer–Fall 1969; Winter–Spring 1970; Sanctuary Counteroffensive; Counteroffensive, Phase VII; Consolidation I; Consolidation II; Cease-Fire

### *War on Terrorism*

Campaigns to be determined

## *Decorations*

Valorous Unit Award for IRAQ 2003–2004

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for VIETNAM 1966–1967

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for VIETNAM 1967–1968

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for VIETNAM 1968–1971

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for VIETNAM 1971–1973

Army Superior Unit Award for 1995–1996

Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm for VIETNAM 1966–1973



*Of the troops  
and for the troops*

THE MILITARY POLICE CODE OF ETHICS

I AM A SOLDIER IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

I AM OF THE TROOPS AND FOR THE TROOPS.

I HOLD ALLEGIANCE TO MY COUNTRY AND DEVOTION  
TO DUTY ABOVE ALL ELSE.

I PROUDLY RECOGNIZE MY OBLIGATION TO PERFORM  
MY DUTY WITH INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, AND HONESTY.

I WILL ASSIST AND PROTECT MY FELLOW SOLDIERS IN  
A MANNER THAT IS FAIR, COURTEOUS, AND IMPARTIAL.

I WILL PROMOTE, BY PERSONAL EXAMPLE, THE  
HIGHEST STANDARDS OF SOLDIERING, STRESSING  
PERFORMANCE AND PROFESSIONALISM.

I WILL STRIVE TO MERIT THE RESPECT OF OTHERS;  
SEEKING NO FAVOR BECAUSE OF POSITION  
BUT INSTEAD, THE SATISFACTION OF A MISSION  
ACCOMPLISHED AND A JOB WELL DONE.

© WAR DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

SCHLAIKJER 1942

The Military Police Code of Ethics, or Military Police Creed, overlain on Jes Schlaikjer's "Of the troops and for the troops" painting. This background was favored for use over the crossed pistols and badge images.

# Clean as a Hound's Tooth: *The Origin of the Military Police Creed*

*By Mr. Andy Watson*

The well-known Military Police Code of Ethics, commonly referred to as the Military Police Creed, was officially approved on 17 May 1974 by Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey, who was the Provost Marshal General at that time.<sup>1</sup> The creed was intended to serve as a constant reminder of personal responsibilities as Soldiers and members of the Military Police Corps.<sup>2</sup> But how did it originate? And why?

When I began to research the answers to those questions a few years ago, the earliest source of information I was able to locate was Field Manual (FM) 19-5.<sup>3</sup> However, the Military Police History Office, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), has since acquired more detailed information concerning the origins of the creed. Fortunately, Major General Peter T. Berry (Retired), a former action officer with the Office of the Provost Marshal General, had preserved and safeguarded some of the original paperwork from the project. He recently sent the documents to Brigadier General David Phillips, the current chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment and commandant of USAMPS. The historic papers, which consist of original handwritten notes and carbon copies, tell the story of the creation, debate, and adoption of the Military Police Code of Ethics. The papers are now located in the military police archives.

The U.S. Army and the Military Police Corps faced considerable challenges in the early 1970s. The specter of Vietnam, decline in morale, and reorganization of military police and criminal investigation structures and operations took their toll. There were also some unsavory Soldiers who should not have been in uniform. Major General Berry remembers this as “an interesting time.”

In October 1972, three military police Soldiers from Camp A.P. Hill, Virginia, illegally entered the commissary ration breakdown building and stole food. They were caught, relieved of duty, and convicted. Although the crime was thwarted and the guilty were sentenced, the offense damaged the reputation of military police. It was later determined that two of the three Soldiers had not

received formal military police training; and while this was no justification for their improper actions, it did result in further inquiry. Army leadership began to consider how to “enhance the moral values and integrity of the military police.”<sup>4</sup>

Distressed by the incident, General Ralph E. Haines Jr., commander of the Continental Army Command (CONARC),<sup>5</sup> asserted, “[Military police] must be as clean as a hound's tooth.”<sup>6</sup> He added, “This is the part of the burden they carry, but I would hope they carry it proudly.”<sup>7</sup> General Haines' office sought a formal code for military police.

But what would the creed contain? How would it be approved? (The U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry and the Office of Military History [later renamed the Center of Military History] indicated that there was no system in place for official “creed recognition.”) And, how would it be distributed?

Personnel from the Office of the Provost Marshal General soon began discussions and work on the project. They reviewed mottos and similar items for other Army branches and received input from military police Soldiers. Opinions regarding the creed ranged from approval to rejection. Colonel Zane Kortum, USAMPS commandant, agreed with the establishment of a creed, writing, “We need a code which highlights what being an MP [military police Soldier] is all about.”<sup>8</sup> However, other military police officers considered the code to be an indictment against the branch; thus, they felt insulted. In addition, some leaders believed the code should be Army-wide, rather than branch-specific. Despite differences of opinion, the work continued.

The prevailing thoughts and concepts with regard to the creed involved verbally capturing the mission of the military police Soldier and reinforcing the integrity of the branch. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Wood, chief of the Military Police Crime Prevention Division, had focused on a code of ethics for his Military Police Officer's Advanced Course student monograph years

earlier (in 1959). Lieutenant Colonel Wood provided those materials for further review.

The Military Police Code of Ethics underwent various paper shuffles and semantic reviews. Once a working document was created and approved, the creed was distributed in FM 19-5 and in the form of graphic training aids and wallet-size cards. Copies of the code were sometimes circulated at military police graduation ceremonies.

Although widely disseminated, the use of the code varied by unit and command. Some viewed the code more positively than others. However, by design, the use of the code was “limited only by the imagination of the individual.”<sup>9</sup>

More than three decades after its adoption, the Military Police Code of Ethics is still in use. Some continue to argue that it is an unnecessary reminder. Others believe that integrity and professionalism should always be stressed. Interestingly, the seven current Army core values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage) directly mirror the principles of the Military Police Creed.

**Acknowledgement:** A special thanks to Major General Peter T. Berry (Retired) for preserving and providing the original documentation and story of the creation of the Military Police Creed.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>FM 19-5, *The Military Police Handbook*, 28 November 1975 (rescinded 15 September 1979).

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>“Creed of a Military Policeman,” DAPM-PLO (memorandum from Major General Lloyd B. Ramsey to the CONARC commander), undated.

<sup>5</sup>The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Forces Command were created from CONARC on 1 July 1973.

<sup>6</sup>“Serious Incident Report—Camp A.P. Hill” (memorandum from Headquarters, CONARC, to General Ralph E. Haines), 3 November 1972.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>ATSMPC (memorandum from Colonel Zane V. Kortum to Colonel Glen A. Hill), 17 May 1973.

<sup>9</sup>“Military Police Code of Ethics,” DAPM-PLO (memorandum from Major General Peter T. Berry to ATTS-AT, TRADOC), 29 March 1974.

If you know of historical documents related to Military Police Corps history that you would like to see preserved in the military police archives, please contact the U.S. Army Military Police historian, Mr. Andy Watson, at <[andy.watson@us.army.mil](mailto:andy.watson@us.army.mil)> or (573) 563-5440.

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*Mr. Watson is the U.S. Army Military Police historian.*

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*(Anatomy of a Murder, continued from page 38)*

and suspended the five years that had not yet been served. With the concurrence of the German-American Leniency Commission, Helm was released from the high-security prison in Straubing.<sup>7,8</sup> However, his life of crime was not over. In 1994, Helm was wanted by German authorities for additional criminal behavior. Further information regarding Helm has, so far, been unavailable.

Snyder, who was 37 years old at the time of his murder, was survived by his widow in Newark, New Jersey. Eichinger, who was 34, was survived by his widow and 7-year-old son.

**Acknowledgement:** Special thanks to the late Special Agent Nokutis and to Special Agent John W. Dillon, who reinvestigated this incident in 1994, enabling Special Agent Snyder’s addition to the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial, Washington, D.C.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, “Uniform Code of Military Justice,” Subchapter X, §918, Article 118.

<sup>2</sup>“Historical Analysis of the 14–15 February 1945 Bombings of Dresden,” U.S. Air Force Historical Division, Research Studies

Institute, Air University, <<http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/dresden.htm>>, accessed on 23 November 2009.

<sup>3</sup>“Statement of Johannes Helm,” taken by German police and U.S. Army CID agents, 9 August 1948.

<sup>4</sup>This information was obtained from the “Statement of Johannes Helm;” however, German police reports indicate that all five shots were fired.

<sup>5</sup>Personal communication with Mr. Albert “Nick” Nokutis, Hawaii, 1998.

<sup>6</sup>“Statements of Johannes Helm,” taken by CID Agent Robert B. Shaw and Munich detective K.K. Schmitt, CID Case 0036-95-CID-337, 9 August 1948, 11 August 1948, and 12 August 1948.

<sup>7</sup>*Schwaebische Landeszeitung*, 28 October 1958.

<sup>8</sup>“Two-Time Killer Free,” *Overseas Weekly Newspaper*, 2 November 1958.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*

# 59th Military Police Company

## *Lineage*

Constituted 30 November 1943 in the Army of the United States as the 59th Military Police Company.

Activated 1 December 1943 in North Africa.

Inactivated 28 October 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.

Allotted 13 October 1950 to the Regular Army and activated at Fort Dix, New Jersey.

Inactivated 2 May 1955 in Korea.

Activated 1 June 1957 in Germany.

Inactivated 30 March 1971 in Germany.

Activated 21 June 1977 in Germany.



## *Campaign Participation Credit*

### *World War II*

Naples-Foggia; Rome-Arno

### *Korean War*

Chinese Communist Forces Intervention; First United Nations Counteroffensive; Chinese Communist Forces Spring Offensive; United Nations Summer-Fall Offensive; Second Korean Winter; Korea, Summer-Fall 1952; Third Korean Winter; Korea, Summer 1953

### *Southwest Asia*

Defense of Saudi Arabia; Liberation and Defense of Kuwait; Cease-Fire

### *War on Terrorism*

Campaigns to be determined

## *Decorations*

Presidential Unit Citation (Navy)—Streamer embroidered IRAQ 2003

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1952

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered KOREA 1953

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered KOREA 1953–1954

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army)—Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 1990–1991

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation—Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1952

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation—Streamer embroidered KOREA 1952–1953

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# The 300th Military Police Company and Lam Son 719

*By Command Sergeant Major James W. Frye (Retired) and Mr. Andy Watson*

*Operation Lam Son 719 was an offensive campaign conducted by South Vietnamese forces in the southeastern portion of Laos from 8 February to 25 March 1971. The operation was a test of the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Army. Although South Vietnamese troops took the lead in combat, U.S. forces provided support. However, American ground forces were prohibited from entering Laotian territory. The strategic goal of the campaign was the disruption of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which traversed Laos and was used to supply the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam.*

## **300th Military Police Company in Vietnam**

The 300th Military Police Company arrived in Vietnam on 25 June 1966 and was initially billeted at the Shes Compound, Saigon, but later moved to the 92d Military Police Battalion area at Pershing Field. Assigned to the 92d Military Police Battalion and under the operational control of the 4th Transportation Terminal Command provost marshal, the company's mission mainly consisted of providing physical security for Saigon Harbor. Other missions varied from providing traffic control in and around Saigon to serving as escorts for very important persons (VIPs). The mission changed when a new harbor facility (Newport) was constructed four miles north of the older Saigon port. Due to increased water and ground traffic, the security mission at Newport was expanded as operations at the original port were gradually phased out.

When the 92d Military Police Battalion was inactivated in February 1970, the 300th Military Police Company was assigned to the 95th Military Police Battalion. Harbor security missions and other commitments continued. The 300th supported customs operations at Bien Hoa and security operations at United Service Organizations shows. They also transported military prisoners to the Long Binh Stockade. In addition, members of the 1st Platoon were deployed to Di An Base Camp to perform military police tasks and receive further on-the-job training.

By December 1970, the 300th Military Police Company had completed their assistance with Bien Hoa customs operations and had finished providing security for the Bob Hope Christmas Show; operations at Newport Harbor and Di An continued. But, the company was to start the New Year with a special guest and an unexpected message.

Staff Sergeant Peter Porche, 1st Platoon, remembered the visit, stating, "Brigadier General [Wallace] Wittwer, the 18th Military Police Brigade commander, made a visit to the 300th Military Police Company, and a company formation was called. [Brigadier General] Wittwer told the men that they did really well on the past IG [inspector general] inspection and he had selected the 300th for a special mission. He couldn't tell the troops what or where, but he was sure that they would make the brigade proud. He then left, and the gates were closed to our compound; no one was allowed in or out."

While on lock-down status, the unit was notified to be prepared to move to any destination within twelve hours' notice, so personnel and equipment were quickly organized and readied. At that time, the 300th was understrength. The first sergeant had returned to the United States on a prisoner shipment and had been reassigned there. The operations sergeant had been flagged and could not be deployed. Within days, seven other Soldiers were dropped due to medical problems, adding to the personnel shortage. Replacements were obtained from other military police companies, but refresher training was required.

Sergeant Carl Mann, of the 300th, experienced some surprises in addition to duty station changes. "After serving a brief stint as 'dock guard,' I was assigned as a clerk in the provost marshal's office," he said. "Then, in the latter part of January 1971, I returned to the company area following the completion of my duty to find a large contingent of 'strangers' occupying the company area—more specifically, my housing area. After a few days of wondering and speculating, we were informed that our company TO&E [table of organization and equipment] was being enlarged and combined with other units."

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To remedy the problem of enlisted leadership, First Sergeant James Frye (557th Military Police Company) was selected to serve as the first sergeant of the 300th. Command Sergeant Major Frye (Retired) remembers, “The 95th Military Police Battalion commander and command sergeant major called me to headquarters. The battalion commander told me that the 557th did well on the IG inspection and that I was being assigned to the 300th Military Police Company because they were being deployed on a classified mission and they did not have a first sergeant.”

### **Involvement of the 300th in Lam Son 719**

The message to deploy was received on 30 January 1971. Information indicated that the 300th would be deployed from different air bases, but the names and locations were initially kept secret. Finally, on the day of flight, word was received that half of the company would deploy from Tan Son Nhut Air Base. This group consisted of the company commander, Captain Jacob D. Baergen; company executive officer, First Lieutenant Keith Phoenix (who was also serving as the supply, motor, and mess officer); Headquarters Platoon; and 1st Platoon. The second group, consisting of First Sergeant Frye and 2d and 3d Platoons, would deploy from Ben Hoa Air Base. Mission details and orders were to be received upon arrival at the new (and, thus far, unknown) destination. At this point, the members of the 300th knew only that the unit would be operating as an independent military police company.

Once the two groups reached their departure bases, they loaded onto C-130 aircraft. After the group that departed from Ben Hoa was airborne, First Sergeant Frye asked the pilot about the destination and was informed that the group would land at Quang Tri. Frye was also informed that aircraft at Tan Son Nhut were grounded due to bad weather and poor visibility.

Command Sergeant Major Frye (Retired) remembers encountering new challenges on the first day of the operation. “I landed at Quang Tri with my two platoons,” he recalls. “The clouds were so low the C-130s hit the runway as they dropped from the low-hanging, thick clouds. It was so cold and rainy that we thought we had landed in North Vietnam. The aircraft were unloaded, and the C-130s departed. I moved the troops under an open, old aircraft (overhead cover) hangar and began to look for a contact person. I did locate the commander of Charlie Company of the 504th Military Police Battalion and informed him of our situation and that we would need help because of the cold and night was approaching. He was able to put us inside one of his buildings, out of the cold. I also told him we did not have any rations. He told me he only drew rations for his troops and we could go to his

mess area and eat after his troops ate. It was a cold night; we bedded down.”

The other half of the 300th Military Police Company arrived at Quang Tri the next day. Sergeant Mann was assigned a special task. “Top [First Sergeant Frye] entrusted me with accompanying and safeguarding the company papers, colors, etcetera,” Mann said. “As a result, I found myself seated solo in the back of a C-130 air transport with the company jeep and trailer and other equipment, wondering where we were headed and what would welcome us. When the plane landed and the crew lowered its ramp, I was amazed to see the high volume of military armored vehicles and military moving up the highway and the amount of planes being unloaded at the air base. Top met me at the bottom of the ramp with, ‘How was your flight?’ and his quick, assuring smile. Our company, equipment, and materials were moved to Quang Tri.”

An officer from the XXIV Corps Provost Marshal’s Office (which was located in Da Nang and controlled all U.S. ground forces in Region 1 [comprised of the five northern provinces of South Vietnam]) briefed the 300th, informing them that things were ahead of schedule and that they would be moving farther north—to the Dong Ha Fire Base, which was a small, semisecure compound. Regarding the briefing, Sergeant Mann recalls, “We were informed that it was our ‘privilege’ to be chosen to participate in an ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam]-American joint effort that would be known as ‘Lam Son 719.’ Our role as military police would be to support the transporting of materials and supplies to the various fire bases along [Main Supply] Route [MSR] QL-9 to ensure the success of the ARVN troops that were trying to cut off the effectiveness of [the] Communist transport system most commonly known as the ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail.’ This would require various MP [military police] troops to escort transportation convoys, secure crossroads, and ‘maintain peace’ on various fire bases and support headquarters. In essence, many of us were destined to become combat MPs!”

The 300th traveled to Dong Ha as a full company, where they were informed that they were one week ahead of schedule. They were directed to establish company headquarters and prepare for convoy escort on MSR QL-9, which was the most northern route running parallel to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh into Laos. On their second day at Dong Ha, the 300th received a message indicating that they were to move a platoon to Vandergrift Fire Base. Then, a second message directed them to move another platoon to Khe Sanh.

The escort duty was made exceptionally difficult by the narrow, muddy, 18-mile defile that traversed the

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mountainous terrain from Vandergrift Fire Base to Khe Sanh; only multiwheel-drive vehicles could travel the route. A combat engineer detachment (with heavy equipment) was positioned near Old French Bridge, which was located midway along the defile, to provide road maintenance. One night, the detachment was ambushed by the Vietcong (VC) and they sustained very heavy casualties.

While American forces were not allowed to cross the border into Laos, North Vietnamese forces were under no such restrictions. According to Frye, "Our mission was to move convoys from Dong Ha to the Laos border. We had checkpoints/roadblocks at Vandergrift (2d Platoon) and Khe Sanh (3d Platoon). Rules of engagement became second nature immediately. The MPs became aware of how to move a convoy thru the kill zone, call in fire support, etcetera. For some reason, someone believed the convoys would be safer at night but this proved to be false. There were many ambush sites on [MSR] QL-9, and the VC were able to slow or knock out most of the night convoys in those areas. The day convoys became the only way to move supplies. The convoys were 60 to 100 vehicles transporting potable water, food, medical supplies, jet propellant [JP]-4/diesel fuel, ammunition, and ordnance. The transportation companies had gun trucks located in the convoy, providing firepower that was necessary to move convoys through an ambush."

As escorts along the dangerous route, Soldiers of the 300th Military Police Company were equipped with jeeps and V-100 Commando armored security vehicles. Although some of the V-100s were organic to the unit, some had been requested from the 18th Military Police Brigade. Companies from within the 18th provided the additional V-100s. Frye stated, "Even though they were welcome, the V-100s were in bad shape. We needed tires, parts, and repairs. The motor sergeant, Staff Sergeant Williams, was able to keep our vehicles operational; and Supply Sergeant Morgan had a difficult time getting the needed supplies and equipment for this operation, but somehow he was able to meet most of our needs. He was unable to obtain tires using proper requisition; but the ARVN had V-100 tires, and a trade was made with no questions asked. We also had 'skin jeeps' with M-60s [machine guns]. We called them 'skin jeeps' because you did not have any protection—just your helmet and flack vest."

Specialist Andrew Ross, also of the 300th wrote, "Huge convoys were assembled in Quang Tri to make the often treacherous drive to Khe Sanh. Interspersed in the convoys were gun trucks; armored, five-ton trucks outfitted with .50-caliber machine guns; M-60s; Honeywell grenade launchers; and about a half dozen highly motivated Soldiers providing overwhelmingly suppressing firepower. Our V-100 escort vehicles, also heavily armed, took their positions in the convoys and in the very front, leading

the way. In every convoy, there were a couple of our military police patrol leaders in their jeeps. 'Move out,' the order was given. Onward and upward they went—often driving through the rain—[along] the single-lane, winding roads carved high into the sides of the mountains. The 18-mile defile would be muddy, with only multiwheel-drive vehicles allowed. Some of the vehicles would bog down, and the combat engineers located in the middle of the defile used bulldozers to keep the convoy moving."

Sergeant Mann recalls, "As a result of our assignment, the 300th Military Police Company was moved up one morning in late January [at] approximately 1:00 a.m. to an area that moved us closer to Khe Sanh and, ultimately, the DMZ. My particular assignment was to lead a group of six men in three skin jeeps located at Fire Base Vandergrift, approximately 1.5 miles from the 'Rock Pile' [hill and site of heavy resistance on the route]. I had the privilege of making some good friends during this time. We were assigned temporarily to the 5th Mechanized Infantry Division. This was of particular interest to me, since my father was assigned to the 5th Infantry Division during World War II and I also had the same rank [E-5, sergeant] as he did. I have always been proud to carry his name, but never more than at that time."

Captain James G. Ferguson took command of the 300th Military Police Company on 22 February 1971; and on 25 February 1971, tragedy struck a night patrol. Specialist Peter M. Lopez was killed and his squad leader, Sergeant Peter Van Prooijen, was wounded when a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) struck their jeep during a VC ambush. Military police night convoys were terminated after the incident. Although there were other casualties and numerous "close calls" along the road and in the company area, Specialist Lopez was the only 300th Military Police Company fatality during the Lam Son 719 operation.

Sergeant Mann recalls, "After a period of time, my supervising sergeant told me that my 'services' [administrative duties] were requested at the company area in Dong Ha, but it was my decision whether to go back or not. I took a few days to think about it, and after some time, I told him I was willing to go back. I returned to the company area on the morning of 25 February 1971. On the night of 25 February 1971, [Specialist] Peter Mitchell Lopez Jr. was killed by an RPG round while patrolling Highway QL-9. Peter was driving the jeep I would have been driving. I think of him and my decision every day!"

As patrols continued, other operational concerns surfaced. Frye remembers, "The communication chief erected 292s [antennas] at all three locations, giving us our own comms [communication]. The MPs were accustomed to the Radio 10 series. Going tactical was a change to most."

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And there were other interesting incidents. Sergeant Bob Dalton, 3d Platoon, recalls, "We were located at the end of MSR QL-9. We would sweep the 18-mile defile from Khe Sanh to Vandergrift every morning and just before sundown with gun jeeps. After sundown, it belonged to Charlie [VC]. On one occasion, I was traveling with an advisor on the defile and we were near the Old French Bridge. We came under mortar attack. The carburetor foot feed rod came off, and he and I got our carcasses out of the jeep and into a ditch, and the VC decided to be quiet. We were able to fix the jeep and get out. Two VC were captured and turned over to my platoon [as prisoners of war]. One of the captured VC was an officer of low grade, and he had 300 vials of cocaine. One was an enlisted soldier. We released them and the cocaine to the proper authorities. We were receiving artillery fire almost daily. [VC] hit the helo [helicopter] rearmament pad [and] blew up a couple of helos. The Hueys [helicopters] were making strafing runs on the hills around us." Staff Sergeant Porche remembers another incident, stating, "The Rock Pile was in my patrol area between Dong Ha and Fire Support Base [FSB] Vandergrift. I remember, in February 1971, we were escorting a convoy of 5,000-gallon JP-4 tankers from Quang Tri to Khe Sanh when we got hit hard at the Rock Pile. 1st Platoon MPs pulled what was left of the convoy into FSB Vandergrift to wait until daylight to continue on to Khe Sanh. I took over as convoy commander, and Lieutenant Phoenix got us some medevacs to get out the wounded under air support from a couple of Cobra gunships that laid down some heavy firepower as we moved the remainder of the convoy. 2d and 3d Platoons dug bunkers to protect themselves from incoming fire."

Enemy attacks were also a problem in the company area. VC sappers occasionally lived in spider holes<sup>1</sup> inside the perimeter of Fire Base Vandergrift. They came out at night and used satchel charges to blow up fuel bladders and helicopters. Specialist Virgil Miller wrote, "As I recall, it was a very dark night—maybe 2:00 a.m. I had to step out of my bunker. I heard a commotion coming from the other side of our area of operation. I ran over there with my .45 in hand; I always carried [it] under my left arm. As I got there, one military police Soldier yelled 'stop' two times, and all at once, the VC [sapper] threw a grenade—with shrapnel hitting a fellow military policeman in the right leg and me in the left leg. The other military police Soldier shot the sapper. I ran back to my bunker to get my M-16 [rifle] and yelled on my way 'Get out of your bunkers; there's sappers in the wire.' After getting my M-16, I took cover near the top of my bunker, where I could have two lines of fire. By then, the platoon was in a defensive mode. Some shooting started. A second sapper ran into one [of] our bunkers. [There was] some more shooting, and one of our men shot an M-79 [grenade

type] round into the bunker. At the same time, I saw the sapper come out to the right rear of the bunker and he ran over to a dead tree, where he stayed a short time. Then, he began to run between popped flares and one of our guys behind my bunker shot once; then his M-60 jammed. As the sapper ran for the wire, I put him down. When the sun came up and it was all over, the wounded military policeman and I went to the aid tent down the hill. I was told my leg wasn't bad, and returned to duty. The other military police Soldier was not sent back [to] duty; I assumed he was medevaced."

### **Following the Operation: Chu Lai Base Camp**

Lam Son 719 operations wound down in early April 1971. The 2d and 3d Platoons of the 300th Military Police Company were pulled from Vandergrift and Khe Sanh, and stand-down operations began at the A Company, 504th Military Police Battalion, area at Phu Bai. On 7 April 1971, the 300th Military Police Company Lam Son 719 mission was complete, and 1st Platoon began their stand-down at Quang Tri. However, new challenges were in store for the 300th.

In late April 1971, the company convoyed to the Chu Lai Base Camp. From Chu Lai, 3d platoon was divided into detachments and sent to serve at Hoi An, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai. Those members of the 300th who remained at Chu Lai continued to provide combined road patrols with the 23d Infantry (Americal) Division Military Police Company, travelling north and south along MSR QL-1. In addition, the 300th provided security for the prisoner-of-war hospital at Chu Lai and support to the 23d Infantry Division provost marshal.

Frye described some of the problems and complications facing the 300th at Chu Lai. "During this time, we Soldiers were seeing the erosion of national will," he said. "The antiwar movement at home was high, young men were trying to avoid the draft, the drug culture was 'in,' [and] combat refusals [and] 'fraggings' all combined to undermine military discipline." Frye continued, "When our mess became operational, the division had combat refusals<sup>2</sup> that were told to eat at our mess. They caused delays in the chow line. As a result, some of the military police Soldiers complained and I assigned NCOs [non-commissioned officers] to the chow line, with instructions to move the chow line without interruptions. This did not go well with them, but it was good for my troops. Some [combat refusals] went to the IG."

An attack followed. Frye said, "It appeared [that] those combat refusals were involved in the fragging of my living area. My operations sergeant and I were in it

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at the time. Two grenades were thrown, with only one going off. God was watching over us.” An investigation was conducted, but the attacker’s identity was never determined.

First Sergeant Frye was reassigned to the continental United States in August 1971. In September 1971, the 300th began moving to a new station at Long Binh, where 1st and 2d Platoons served with the new U.S. Army Drug Abuse Holding Center Vietnam. The company also provided gate security at Long Binh and returned to its mission at Newport Harbor.

### Afterward

In April 1972, the 300th Military Police Company was inactivated in Vietnam. The 300th was reactivated in Germany in October 1977 and continues to serve with distinction.

Command Sergeant Major Frye (Retired) states, “I strongly feel the 300th MP Company was called upon to perform a mission with unclear objectives [but] came together (cohesion) in a combat environment that would make the 18th Military Police Brigade commander proud. Unfortunately, the courage of the men of the 300th Military Police Company was never reported.”

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>A spider hole is a small, one-man foxhole, which is often camouflaged and used for ambushes.

<sup>2</sup>A combat refusal was a Soldier who refused to obey orders.

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*Command Sergeant Major Frye (Retired) served as the first Regimental Command Sergeant Major of the Military Police Regiment, September 1980–October 1984. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal with three oak-leaf clusters. He is also a member of the Military Police Corps Regimental Hall of Fame.*

*Mr. Watson is the U.S. Army Military Police historian.*

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*(54th Military Police Company Commentary Driving Initiative as Part of Law Enforcement Training, continued from page 21)*

7. Did the driver yield for traffic at yield signs?
8. Did the driver yield for pedestrians at designated pedestrian crossings?
9. Did the driver use a turn signal to indicate an upcoming lane change before conducting the change? Did the driver turn his or her head and eyes and use mirrors to ensure that traffic was clear before executing the lane change? Did the driver gradually proceed to execute the lane change?
10. When backing into a parking location, did the driver use a ground guide (if available) or dismount the vehicle and inspect the area behind it for obstructions that could not be seen from inside?
11. Ask the driver—
  - What is the name of the street we are on?
  - What is the most significant landmark to your current location?
  - What is your current direction of travel?
  - What is the legal speed limit on this portion of the roadway?
  - What hazards do you currently see?
  - How many pedestrians have you seen in the last 5 minutes?
  - What is the next major intersection that you will be approaching?
  - What is the structure of the upcoming intersection? How many center lanes, right-turn lanes, and left-turn lanes are there?
  - How many pedestrians are waiting to cross the street at the upcoming crosswalk?
  - How many vehicles were stopped at the last intersection where you were stopped?
  - What is the color of the car three cars ahead of you in the left/right lane?
  - What was the color of the last vehicle that passed you in the oncoming lane?
  - What type of vehicle was behind you last?
  - What is the safest, most direct route back to the provost marshal's office?

#### After Vehicle Operation

1. Did the driver place the vehicle in “park” and use the parking brake?
2. Did the driver turn off all instruments before turning off the vehicle engine?
3. Did the driver perform after-operation PMCS checks on the vehicle (such as cleaning out trash) before turning it in to vehicle dispatch for inspection and supervisor review?

# An Ever-Present and Highly Disturbing Worry

By Mr. Robert Hiatt

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, their intent was to destroy the U.S. Pacific fleet in harbor so that it could not interfere with Japanese advances through the South Pacific during World War II. In addition, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers that were at sea were also to be destroyed. Although many in the Japanese navy disagreed, battleships were widely considered the “king of the sea” at that time and aircraft carriers, mere supporting arms. Even the results of the attack on Pearl Harbor had failed to convince the battleship faction that the aircraft carrier might be “king.” So, with U.S. carriers still at sea, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, commander in chief of the 1st Air Fleet—thinking that the carriers could be involved in training exercises south of Oahu—concluded that the first strike had inflicted the anticipated damage, the element of surprise was gone, and the whereabouts of enemy submarines was unknown. He also decided that remaining in the attack range of land-based planes was too risky. Therefore, he ordered the task force to head for the inland sea in Japan without destroying the U.S. aircraft carriers, thus leaving the mission incomplete and canceling a second strike on Pearl Harbor.<sup>1</sup>



Vice Admiral  
Chuichi Nagumo

At dawn on 18 April 1942, sixteen B-25 Mitchell bombers took to the air from the U.S. Ship (USS) Hornet, at sea more than 600 miles. Their target was the Japanese homeland. The damage that could be inflicted on the Japanese war effort by the B-25s was minimal; however, the main purpose of the Doolittle Raid<sup>2</sup> was to answer Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor by giving the Japanese a taste of their own medicine.

As the B-25 crew members sped toward Japan, they must have wondered about their own odds for success and whether the Japanese knew about the raid. (They had been informed that their chance of survival was 50 percent.) Their targets consisted of various cities; the most important was Tokyo, since it was the capital of the Japanese empire and, more importantly, the location of the emperor’s residence. In the end, the successful raid deeply embarrassed the Japanese high command. Worse yet, it put the emperor at risk, which was an even more serious breach of the Japanese code of honor.<sup>3</sup>



B-25s aboard the USS Hornet, en route to Japan,  
April 1942

Americans cheered at the radio broadcasts indicating that Tokyo had been bombed. At last, there was some good news about the war—and some payback to boot. But was the attack a surprise, as it was made out to be in the West? Or did Japan know of the Doolittle Raid in advance?

When asked about the raid and where the planes had originated, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt answered, “from a secret base in Shangri-La.” And the American people believed this story until after the war. But did the Japanese believe it? Or did they already know where the bombers had come from?

The historical record indicates that the Japanese were well aware of the threat that American aircraft posed to their mainland. On 26 December 1941, Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki (chief of staff of the

Japanese Combined Fleet) wrote, “Tokyo should be protected from air raids; this is the most important thing to be borne in mind.” And he was not alone. Captain Yoshitake Miwa, a Combined Fleet air officer, did not necessarily consider the possibility of an enemy air raid on Tokyo to be a big problem, but he believed that such a raid must be avoided at all cost. The consensus was that there were only two places from which a raid could originate—in China and aboard aircraft carriers—and aircraft carriers were the most likely points of origin.<sup>4</sup>

So, the Japanese were at least thinking about an attack originating from the sea. In fact, it seems that some even expected it. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, supposed that the surprise carrier strike on Pearl Harbor had set an example that the Americans might follow; and he felt that the retaliatory strike would come at the earliest possible moment. He went so far as to characterize the American carriers as “an ever-present and highly disturbing worry.” With the weight of this suspicion on his mind most of the time, he diligently monitored the weather reports and was relieved when there was bad weather to the east. He figured that clear weather would be needed to launch a carrier strike and recover the aircraft involved in the raid.

But Yamamoto had been concerned about the threat of an aircraft carrier strike even before the attack on Pearl Harbor. At the start of the war, he had established a picket line 600–700 miles east of Japan, covering a front of nearly 1,000 miles from north to south. In addition, he also sent daily, long-range air patrols by naval aircraft.

Therefore, based on historical evidence, a raid by enemy aircraft carriers would not have been a great surprise to the Japanese. In fact, it would almost have been considered welcome if it led to the destruction of the attacking carriers.<sup>5</sup>

Yet, the Japanese apparently missed several significant clues related to the impending attack. On 3 February 1942, two B-25s were loaded onto the flight deck of the USS Hornet in Norfolk, Virginia. The planes were then moved to the end of the flight deck and spotted for what appeared to be takeoff positions. Later, when the ship returned to port, the planes were gone. Admittedly, it would have been difficult for the Japanese to determine the purpose of these planes had they been aware of the event. (The planes could have simply been loaded onboard for transport to another port.) But, the two planes had actually been placed onboard to confirm that B-25s could, indeed, take off from a carrier deck—which they did. Then, they flew to a land base. A little research would have revealed that the ship did not make port at any other location, begging the question, “What happened to the planes?” Neither the Germans nor the Japanese, who surely must have had spies monitoring the port, appeared to be aware of this event.<sup>6</sup>

Additionally, sixteen B-25s were later moved from the Naval Air Station Alameda, Alameda, California, to the pier and loaded onboard the USS Hornet. As before, Japanese spies could have mistakenly assumed that the planes were simply being transported to Hawaii or some other location. However, it was virtually impossible to hide the fact that there were Army bombers onboard the carrier as it sat anchored in San Francisco Bay ready to go to sea. Yet, again, there is no evidence that Japan was even aware of the event.<sup>7</sup>

But, American carriers began conducting raids in the Republic of the Marshall Islands in February 1942. The raids grew in frequency and intensity to the point that an attack on the Japanese homeland seemed inevitable. With this worry on his mind, Yamamoto ordered the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku to Japanese waters to reinforce the defensive belt around the home island. The 26th Air Flotilla assumed this mission in April, and the two carriers became available for other operations.

A 4 March 1942 U.S. carrier strike on Marcus Island (the easternmost Japanese territory), led by Vice Admiral William Frederick Halsey Jr., took place just 1,000 miles from Tokyo and inside the outer ring of Japanese defenses. Japanese military intelligence must have realized that the American carriers were “testing the waters” to determine the strength of Japan’s outer defenses. No one knew how well the inner defenses would fare in an attack, but it seemed that a good system was in place if an attack occurred.<sup>8</sup>



**Rear Admiral  
Matome Ugaki**



**Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto**



**Vice Admiral  
William F. Halsey Jr.**

The Japanese Combined Fleet and Navy General Staff wondered what to do about the American fleet—the carriers, in particular. The Japanese had always planned to defeat the Americans in the open sea, far away from their bases. But, the Japanese needed to devise a way to get the American fleet to come out and meet them in a surface battle. A proposal was made to attack Midway Island (near the northwest end of the Hawaiian archipelago) and force the American fleet from its base in Hawaii. Yet, not all were onboard with this plan. The Combined Fleet and Naval General Staff were at odds on the direction the offensive should take. The issue dividing the group was whether the offensive should continue south (as it had been) or head west toward Midway Island. There seemed no way to break the deadlock, short of Admiral Yamamoto issuing a direct order.

In the meantime, not all was missed by the Japanese. A radio intercept station located on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands began picking up an unusual amount of radio traffic, with the first intercept (a conversation between Vice Admiral Halsey and Captain Marc A. Mitscher, skipper of the USS Hornet) coming on 10 April. With the information gleaned from the intercept, Ugaki made some assessments about the American force. He surmised that the force was headed for Japan and would arrive no sooner than 14 April. Plans were made to muster a force to meet the oncoming threat. The 26th Air Flotilla was called upon to back up the home defenses already in place, adding 69 bombing and scouting planes to the defense. The first bombing attack against the Americans was to be launched when their forces reached a point 600 miles from shore.<sup>9</sup>



**General Hideki Tojo**

But here, the fog of war took over. No more intercepts were made. And when 14 April came and went with no reported sightings, the Japanese began to wonder if the Americans were headed elsewhere—or if they had turned back. However, General Hideki Tojo (the Japanese prime minister) was still convinced that the threat of a raid by carrier aircraft was real and pressing and that Tokyo would be the target. He demanded that the highest level of vigilance be maintained.<sup>10</sup>

The picture became clearer for the Japanese on the morning of 18 April, when the guard boat 23 Nitto Maru, on its post in the picket patrol line some 720 miles east of Tokyo, spotted American carriers steaming westward. The headquarters of Japan's Combined Fleet was notified at 0630. Due to unusual enemy radio traffic during the previous several days, the Combined Fleet had already sent a concentration of naval air strength to the Kanto District around the capital.<sup>11</sup>

Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo was ordered to send his 2d Fleet to sea and to take command of all available surface units in Yokosuka. His mission was to seek out and destroy the American fleet as soon as possible. In addition, Vice Admiral Takasu Shiro's 1st Fleet was ordered from Hiroshima Bay to support Kondo's force. Nagumo's carrier force, which was returning to Japan, began plotting a course to the battle area to support the other two elements en route. Although Nagumo had little chance of making it back to join the battle, he would try.<sup>12</sup>



**Lieutenant Colonel  
James H. Doolittle**

The discovery of his force by the 23 Nitto Maru compelled Vice Admiral Halsey to order Captain Mitscher's Hornet to launch Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle's B-25 raiders earlier than planned, which was also earlier than the Japanese expected.<sup>13</sup> The planes flew low over the water to reach their targets, one of which was Tokyo. After the bombs were dropped, the pilots attempted to escape, as the rule was "every plane for itself." Admiral Yamamoto's statement describing American carriers as "an ever-present and highly disturbing worry" was accurate.

Were the Japanese taken by complete surprise by the Doolittle Raid, as I was informed as a kid growing up in the late 1950s and early 1960s? No. But, were there aspects of the attack that the Japanese did not expect? Yes. Did the Japanese believe that the raiders launched from a secret base called Shangri-La? Not for a moment! They knew that the launch took place from carriers, and they even knew the names of the carriers. They knew that the raiders were coming, and they had a good idea of how—they just weren't sure when. Such is the way things are in the confusion that is war.

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan; The Japanese Navy's Story*, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, June 1955.

<sup>2</sup>The Doolittle Raid was the first U.S. air raid on the Japanese homeland during World War II. The raid was planned and led by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle.

<sup>3</sup>*Doolittle Raid on Japan, 18 April 1942*, Naval History and Heritage Command online library, <<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/misc-42/doolitl.htm>>, 11 March 2001, accessed on 12 January 2010.

<sup>4</sup>Gordon W. Prange, Donald M. Goldstine, and Katherine V. Dillon, *Miracle at Midway*, McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, New York, 1982.

<sup>5</sup>Fuchida and Okumiya, 1955.

<sup>6</sup>Carroll V. Glines, *The Doolittle Raid: America's Daring First Strike Against Japan*, Orion Books, New York, New York, 1988.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Fuchida and Okumiya, 1955.

<sup>9</sup>Glines, 1988.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Bob Hackett and Sander Kingsepp, "Ijn Awata Maru: Tabular Record of Movement," *Tokusetsu Junyokan!* 1998–2008, <[http://www.combinedfleet.com/Awata\\_t.htm](http://www.combinedfleet.com/Awata_t.htm)>, accessed on 13 January 2010.

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Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle (front left) and his "raiders"

## ***MILITARY POLICE* Writer's Guide**

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
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| David E. Quantock   | Jeffrey A. Butler     | TF 134                   | Baghdad, Iraq         |
| David D. Phillips   | Charles Kirkland      | USAMPS                   | Ft Leonard Wood, MO   |
| Byron A. Freeman    | Norwood Patterson     | 8th MP Bde               | Scofield Barracks, HI |
| Jerry D. Stevenson  | Jeffrey A. Palmer     | 14th MP Bde              | Ft Leonard Wood, MO   |
| John F. Garrity     | Brian K. Lambert      | 16th MP Bde              | Ft Bragg, NC          |
| Thomas P. Evans     | Brenda K. Curman      | 18th MP Bde              | Mannheim, Germany     |
| David P. Glaser     | Edgar W. Dahl         | 42d MP Bde               | Ft Lewis, WA          |
| John Huey           | Michael E. Ashford    | 89th MP Bde              | Ft Hood, TX           |
| Jeffrey S. Davies   | John F. Schoenrock    | 3d MP Gp (CID)           | Ft Gillem, GA         |
| Thomas H. Tatum     | Timothy S. Fitzgerald | 6th MP Gp (CID)          | Ft Lewis, WA          |
| Robert Q. Ake       | Paul W. McDonald      | 701st MP Gp (CID)        | Ft Belvoir, VA        |
| Dan McElroy         | Drew Underwood        | 202d MP Gp (CID)         | Heidelberg, Germany   |
| James W. Gray       | Jonathan O. Godwin    | USDB                     | Ft Leavenworth, KS    |
| Bruce Vargo         | Gary J. Fowler        | Joint Detention Group    | Guantanamo Bay, Cuba  |
| Katherine N. Miller | Jeffrey N. Plemmons   | Army Corrections Command | Ft Belvoir, VA        |
| Deborah B. Grays    |                       | Garrison, Ft McPherson   | Ft McPherson, GA      |
| Charles Williams    |                       | Garrison, Ft Leavenworth | Ft Leavenworth, KS    |

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|-------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|
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| Robert Kenyon     | Thomas Legare     | 11th MP Bde   | Ashley, PA      |
| Kevin R. McBride  | Joseph Diniz      | *43d MP Bde   | Warwick, RI     |
| Donald Currier    | Andres Roman      | *49th MP Bde  | Fairfield, CA   |
| Michael Nevin     | Richard Michael   | *177th MP Bde | Taylor, MI      |
| John E. Cornelius | Patrick Scanlon   | 800th MP Bde  | Uniondale, NY   |
| Mandi A. Murray   | Daniel Lincoln    | *46th MP CMD  | Lansing, MI     |
| Adolph McQueen    | Brendan Toth      | 200th MP CMD  | Ft Meade, MD    |
| Robert Hipwell    | Theodore Copeland | 300th MP CMD  | Inkster, MI     |

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| Dennis M. Zink         | Angelia Flournoy      | 92d MP Bn              | Ft Leonard Wood, MO       |
| Thomas H. Byrd         | Dawn J. Ripplemeyer   | 93d MP Bn              | Ft Bliss, TX              |
| Matthew J. Coulson     | Ricky L. Haralson     | 94th MP Bn             | Yongsan, Korea            |
| Duane R. Miller        | Henry Stearns         | 95th MP Bn             | Mannheim, Germany         |
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| Michael C. Henshaw     | William A. Fath       | 385th MP Bn            | Ft Stewart, GA            |
| William R. Black       | Todd E. Sprading      | 503d MP Bn             | Ft Bragg, NC              |
| John G. Voorhees Jr.   | Albert Nelson         | 504th MP Bn            | Ft Lewis, WA              |
| Zane H. Jones          | Christopher Muller    | 508th MP Bn (I/R)      | Ft Lewis, WA              |
| David J. Detz          | Quentin J. Cormier    | 519th MP Bn            | Ft Polk, LA               |
| Alexander Conyers      | Steven M. Raines      | 525th MP Bn (I/R)      | Guantanamo Bay, Cuba      |
| Thomas P. Lombardo     | Scott W. Toy          | 701st MP Bn            | Ft Leonard Wood, MO       |
| Daniel D. Deadrich     | William F. Hutchings  | 705th MP Bn            | Ft Leavenworth, KS        |
| Robert N. Dillon       | William B. Chambers   | 709th MP Bn            | Hanau, Germany            |
| Ignatius M. Dolata Jr. | Richard Woodring      | 716th MP Bn            | Ft Campbell, KY           |
| David J. Segalia Jr.   | Peter Ladd            | 720th MP Bn            | Ft Hood, TX               |
| Ross T. Guieb          | Gerald Stegemeier     | 728th MP Bn            | Scofield Barracks, HI     |
| Laurence C. Lobdell    | Jonathan Narcisse     | 759th MP Bn            | Ft Carson, CO             |
| Timothy P. Fischer     | Mark E. Porret        | 787th MP Bn            | Ft Leonard Wood, MO       |
| David M. Oberlander    | Richard E. Epps       | 793d MP Bn             | Bamberg, Germany          |
| Bryan E. Patridge      | James Schultz         | 795th MP Bn            | Ft Leonard Wood, MO       |
| Michael C. Petty       | Bruce A. Sirois       | LEC, Ft Knox           | Ft Knox, KY               |
| Raymond Stuhn          | Dennis Higgins        | 5th MP Bn (CID)        | Kaiserslautern, Germany   |
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| Kenneth J. Tauke       | Christopher S. Heldt  | 1001st MP Bn (CID)     | Ft Riley, KS              |
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# **Camp Sabalu-Harrison and the New Detention Facility in Parwan Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan**

