THE PROFESSIONAI BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

MILITARY POLICE



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THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

MILITARY POLICE

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, United States Army Military Police School

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

Greetings from the home of the Regiment! The past eight months have flown by as I have been able to get out and see our great Regiment at work. I have discovered what a great job I have as the chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment. No matter where I go, everyone tells me what a great job our military police men and women do, in combat or in protecting our families at home. I wanted to tell you how proud I am to be your commandant and that our one and only goal is to support you in the field.

There has never been any doubt about the valor and courage that our Soldiers display every day. That point was driven home last month when Staff Sergeant Timothy Nein was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions in Salman Pak, Iraq. The courage displayed by his squad during a particularly violent complex ambush clearly demonstrates a Warrior focus that truly makes a difference on the battlefield. Of course, one of his team leaders was Sergeant Leann Hester, the first woman to receive the Silver Star since World War II. The 617th Military Police Company, out of the Kentucky National Guard, made all of us proud of our Regiment. Congratulations to them and to all our Soldiers for the truly magnificent job they do each and every day.

Our Warrior Police Soldiers continue to be a critical combat multiplier across all three of our military police disciplines—combat support, internment/resettlement/corrections, and criminal investigation. It is for this very reason that we should see the size of our Corps continue to grow as we support our country's fight in the War on Terror. Having just returned from a visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center, it is not lost on me the price we continue to pay for the freedoms we enjoy. All of us have lost friends and comrades during this fight and the motivation that drives me every day is that those Soldiers' sacrifices were not made in vain. Let there be no doubt that our No. 1 priority is to support the War on Terror and that we will do everything in our power to help you prosecute it.

I want to explain some of the "big rocks" that we are working on to "operationalize" the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). First, we remain committed to producing quality military police Soldiers who are able to join your ranks and immediately contribute to the contemporary operating environment. One-station unit training (OSUT) has been revamped to focus almost exclusively on initial combat proficiency, from combat live-fire exercises to training in military operations on urbanized terrain, including weapons immersion and reflexive fire techniques. Now OSUT Soldiers may not be the best drill squads in the Army. In fact, giving them a "counter column" command might be pretty ugly, but they can fight. If for some reason you get a batch of Soldiers who do not meet your expectations, please feel free to contact me or the regimental command sergeant major (RCSM) with the specifics and we will fix it.

Other big rocks we are working on to support our Warriors include—

- A train-the-trainer, Police Training Team (PTT) Course with our first course starting 12 March 2007.
- Support for mobile training team requests for our new High-Risk Personnel Security Course for units preparing to deploy.
- Police intelligence operation (PIO) solutions, which include enabling our squad leaders to input intelligence directly from the fight into databases that can be accessed through a fused common operational picture.

- One-stop shopping with lessons learned integration (L2I) and knowledge management where leaders can get the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures; programs of instruction; training support packages (TSPs); doctrine products; collaborative planning tools; and other resources.
- Development of the military police pentathlete through continuous revision of the Professional Military Education System and changes in the Basic Officer Leadership Course III and the Captains Career Course.
- Opportunities for military police structure growth as we move from an Active Army of 482,000 to one of 547,000 Soldiers and a total force of more than 1.2 million.
- Development and fielding of nonlethal capabilities that will impact current and future systems such as the Future Combat System.
- Material initiatives such as the armored security vehicle; the mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle; tunnel detection; and the active denial system that will increase military police effectiveness and survivability on the battlefield.

As I explained in the last bulletin, I am placing special emphasis on the PIO function. From my personal experience, reviewing after-action reviews (AARs), and talking to Soldiers on the ground in combat, it has proven essential that military police Soldiers, in conjunction with other warfighting functions, develop a module/system on an Army platform to let our Warrior Police transmit police intelligence up the chain of command. That intelligence will simultaneously populate databases to provide commanders a complete picture of the battlefield with fused intelligence. The baseline system, the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS)–Army Human Domain, has been designed and will give commanders automated capabilities to collect, report, analyze, and disseminate counterintelligence and human intelligence. We are currently working on an implementation plan and our resident expert will give a presentation and demonstration of this system at the Regimental Strategic Forum in April. It is our hope that this system, along with other initiatives, will give the Army synergy in the police intelligence arena.

In order to synchronize all military police PIO functions, USAMPS is currently conducting a working group to select the near-term solutions and gain resources to fill near-term PIO capability gaps, such as the DCGS. However, there is a long-term approach to improving the Military Police Corps PIO capability. USAMPS is currently conducting an assessment to explore what would best support the PIO function. This includes determining what courses and training requirements are needed in order to saturate the Military Police Corps with PIO. We will compile a tiger team here at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to focus on long-term PIO requirements that will enable combatant commanders to realize the importance of criminal intelligence and the role military police Soldiers play in delivering that capability.

The second big rock I want to touch on is the development of the PTT Course. Our intent is that there will be a train-the-trainer course here that will train key personnel from deploying units on how to train police in Iraq or Afghanistan. The goal is to have a single standard for advising, mentoring, and teaching indigenous police forces. This is a requirement driven by an operational need identified by commanders in the field. Currently, military police Soldiers are leading the effort on training host nation police in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new PTT TSP will make this effort synchronized and more efficient. The PTT Course will give leaders the training and tools required to conduct preparatory training at home stations and mobilization sites and ensure that their units are prepared for deployment.

On another topic, we have changed the way we are observing the Military Police Regimental Week. After reviewing AAR comments and advice from the field, the RCSM and I have decided to split the events from past regimental weeks into two separate events—the Warrior Police Challenge Week and the Regimental Anniversary Week. This year's theme for the first annual Warrior Police Challenge Week from 25 to 29 April is "Warrior Police – Keeping the Army Strong!" The week will include the Warrior Police Warfighter Team Challenge, a Regimental Strategic Forum, the Hall of Fame presentation and luncheon, and the RCSM breakout. The Regimental Anniversary Week will still be held in September and will include the regimental ball, the memorial tribute, a military police golf tournament, a regimental run, and the regimental review. We believe that this new timeline will best cater to your desires and ensure top notch events in the spring and fall. Please come out and support the Soldiers at the Warfighter Challenge and sign up to attend the Regimental Strategic Forum. Thanks for all you do for our Army. I look forward to seeing you all there.

Warrior Police!

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Butler

What is SSQ?

Greetings from the home of your Military Police Corps Regiment. This quarter, I want to talk to you about a leadership tool called **SSQ** that I have been preaching about for the past few years. I see too many noncommissioned officers (NCOs) acting and performing like officers. Too many NCOs are involved in command-type business and like to think that they run everything. The higher we serve, the more likely that we may fall into that trap. The reality is that the commander is always in charge and our mission is to support that commander. That is the basic foundation that the NCO Corps was built on. The starting point for our mission and our duties is always back at the basics. We can get so lost in our systems, programs, processes, and policies that we actually lose sight of the basics.

I asked in the article title what is **SSQ**? **SSQ** is the basics of leading. **SSQ** is where you must always come back to if you want to do the mission right. The NCO creed speaks of the accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of our Soldiers. **SSQ** is the road to ensure that you do it successfully. **SSQ** is simply—

- **S**tandards—The Army is built on standards. By enforcing regulations, policies, standing operating procedures, and commander's directives, NCOs ensure that the mission is not only done but done right. A unit that overlooks the little things will surely fail at the big things.
- **S**afety—Composite risk management, or safety, is crucial to how we go about business. The Army is by definition dangerous. We are manned to protect our country and defeat our enemy in armed conflict when needed. While we cannot make every task absolutely safe, we can make each task safer.
- **Q**uality of life—A basic field craft rule is to always improve your position. This applies downrange as well as back at home station. Do what you can to improve the conditions that your Soldiers serve in. We ask much of our Soldiers, and we owe them leadership that takes care of them.

SSQ is nothing new or earthshaking, is it? Keep it on top of your kit bag to remind you of what is important.

Warrior Police Keeping the ARMY STRONG!

Warrior Police Challenge Week

The Warrior Police Challenge Week takes place 25 to 29 April 2007 at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Events include the Warrior Police Warfighter Team Challenge, 25 to 27 April; the Regimental Strategic Forum, 25 to 29 April; and the Hall of Fame induction luncheon, 25 April. Senior leaders will convene to discuss lessons learned and the way ahead for the Military Police Corps. For more details, contact Master Sergeant Todd Brunelli at (573) 563-7802 or <*todd.brunelli@us.army.mil*>.

Kentucky Guard Soldier Honored

© The Courier-Journal

By Mr. Tom Loftus

Timothy Nein vividly recalls what happened along a highway 26 miles southeast of Baghdad on Palm Sunday, 2005. A staff sergeant deployed to Iraq as part of the Kentucky National Guard's 617th Military Police Company, Nein was leading a squad of 10 Soldiers patrolling the key supply route when it came upon two truck convoys under fire from automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades.

"The guys from my squad can tell you there's not a day that goes by that that day does not affect us in one way or another, good or bad," Nein said [17 February 2007].

Despite heavy fire from a force of insurgents much larger than he initially expected, Nein led a successful counterattack. At a ceremony at the Marriott Griffin Gate Resort [Lexington, Kentucky], Nein was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions that day. The medal is the Army's second-highest decoration, behind only the Medal of Honor, and is awarded for extreme gallantry and risk of life in combat. Nein, 37, of Henryville, Indiana, is just the fifth U.S. Army Soldier to receive the Distinguished Service Cross in the War on Terror. And he is the first member of the Kentucky Guard to receive the medal since World War II.



His wife, Renea, and sons, Samuel, 11, and Ian, 6, were part of a gathering of more than 200 that fell silent as the chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, prepared to pin the medal. Blum said written accounts of the actions of Nein and other winners of the medal read almost like fiction.

"This is no fiction," Blum said. "Ladies and gentlemen, you're looking at a true American hero, Kentucky Army National Guard Soldier."

Afterward, Nein said that at the time he was not aware he was acting with extreme gallantry. He said he was just trying to make the right decisions under extreme circumstances.

"We do a job every day and there are a lot of guys out there doing it every day," he said. "They just don't find themselves in the situation that we did at that time."

Nein said, "I've read the stories of so many men over my life from World War II, Vietnam, and so on and so forth, and of all the things that they did. And to be put in this light with them now is quite an honor and actually pretty humbling." Nein recalled that as his squad drove up to the stopped convoys—one headed north, the other south—he suspected the attack involved a fairly small group of insurgents.

"We dismounted and began doing assaults against their different positions," he said.

"When we made the turn to flank the AIF (anti-Iraqi forces) I saw seven cars—all four doors open, and I did the math real quick in my head," he said. "That's 28 against 10. It's 2.8 to 1 odds. That's not very good. Little did I know that it was really 5 to 1 odds. Even worse."

Nein said he considered ordering the squad to destroy its equipment and withdraw. Instead, he decided to attack a trench line that many of the insurgents were using for cover.

"We had taken a couple of wounded and I knew at that point that we needed to start going into the trenches or canal systems to start trying to eliminate some of those guys," he said. "If not, I was afraid we were all going to die there."

The certificate of his award says, "Under heavy fire, Staff Sergeant Nein displayed great courage by directing an assault on an enemy trench line, firing his weapon and throwing hand grenades to suppress the enemy. His squad killed several insurgents, captured large quantities of weapons and ammunition, and saved the lives of numerous convoy members."

Nein, now on active duty as the noncommissioned officer for training with the 223d Military Police Company in Louisville, Kentucky, had previously been awarded the Silver Star for his actions.

Nein said his family was a bit overwhelmed by the ceremony.

"We're real excited about it. It's just part of being in the Army," he said. "You've got to take the good with the bad. We're taking the good this time."

Mr. Loftus writes for the Louisville, Kentucky, Courier-Journal.

Counterinsurgency Operations Within the Wire—

The 306th Military Police Battalion Experience at Abu Ghraib

By Lieutenant Colonel John F. Hussey

The commander of the 18th Military Police Brigade, Colonel James Brown, used a personal experience to shape the thinking of the leaders of the 306th Military Police Battalion as the unit prepared for mobilization to the Baghdad Central Correction Facility at Abu Ghraib. He discussed a meeting he once had with a German landlord who had spent time as a prisoner of war (POW). Colonel Brown extended his sympathies but the landlord said it was the best thing that could have happened to him. He was removed from the fighting and treated well by the Americans. This former German soldier's treatment forever changed his view toward Americans.[1]

After the detainee abuse story at Abu Ghraib was reported, the Soldiers of the 306th realized that they had to ensure the highest standards when it came to detainee operations. Similar to the example of the German POW, the 306th would have Iraqi and foreign fighters returning to the streets of their homelands to report their encounters with Americans. For many of these individuals, it would be their only contact with Americans and their experiences would be passed to future generations. The 306th Military Police Battalion's ability to conduct the mission to Army standard and treat detainees with dignity and respect was paramount because of the insurgency within Iraq and the growing extremist Islamic movement throughout the region.

The detainee population could not be managed from a desk. As commander of the 306th Military Police Battalion, I was committed to knowing my battlespace. In order to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations (COIN), leaders must interact with the population.[2] One of my overall objectives was to have U.S. leaders in the camp at all times. This would ensure oversight that would allow us to identify problem detainees and problem Soldiers and remove them from the camp. This was also a commonsense approach that paid dividends during disturbances. Establishing credibility with the detainee population during daily interaction allowed the U.S. leaders to use that credibility to reduce tension during times of conflict. It would be difficult for the U.S. leaders to ask for detainee cooperation if they had not worked with the detainees on a daily basis.

Each week U.S. leaders met with detainee leaders. I promised detainees that when I gave my word, it would be honored, which is another key to COIN. Once, a detainee leader told me that U.S. military guards were rude in their approach to new detainees. He said this was resented among the population. I told the detainee leader I would investigate the matter, and I asked my command sergeant major to address the noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the guards. The matter was resolved and several nights later I returned and asked the detainee leader for feedback. He told me there was great improvement and thanked me. These actions have a dramatic effect on the detainees' perception of their captors.

One detainee leader said he originally came to Iraq to kill Americans, but his treatment in the camp had changed his view. Before his arrival at the camp, he had never met an American. He had learned to hate the Americans because of propaganda. Based on his interaction with Americans and the way Soldiers treated detainees, he said "the fire in his belly was now out." He was sincere and there were occasions when he was helpful in calming detainees during disturbances, a true measurement of effective COIN.

U.S. leaders spent countless hours talking with detainee leaders about problems in the camps. The dedication and patience of the U.S. leaders were key factors to the success of the 306th Military Police Battalion. The ability of officers and senior NCOs to

Detainee leaders meet with the Baghdad City Council to address issues regarding their detention and legal status.

communicate and demonstrate respect for detainees and their culture and religion earned the respect of the population. Knowledge of the camp gave them instincts that helped them measure and anticipate problems. The net result was a detainee population that usually adhered to the camp rules and regulations.

Soldiers stationed throughout Iraq learned how different America's culture is from Iraq's, especially when it comes to religion. The question of dividing and housing the detainee population by religion was discussed frequently. The detainee leaders were in favor of the idea but my staff and I vehemently opposed it. Our decisions considered COIN within the wire, but also COIN on the streets of Iraq. Consider the many races, religions, and cultural groups found in a prison. If each group was provided with a wing populated with its members only, the groups would become more unified, creating problems for the U.S. military guards. Consider the consequences when the groups were released from the prison. They would now be stronger outside, based on networks created in prison. That would be dangerous for the maneuver commanders working in the villages of Iraq.

Detainees were allowed visits by immediate family members, who made appointments and appeared at the reception center on the day of their appointment. This was a great opportunity for COIN within the wire. I always visited the visitation center to ensure that the Soldiers were conducting operations correctly. Visitors were the people who would return to the Sunni Triangle, and I wanted to demonstrate to them that the Soldiers were treating detainees and their families with respect. I took the time to meet family members and ensure that Soldiers conducted civil-military operations to bolster our image.

Visitation was also an activity where COIN could lose momentum. During weekly meetings with detainee leaders, U.S. leaders addressed complaints. At one such meeting, detainee leaders accused some interpreters of treating visiting family members disrespectfully. Upon review, the complaints were valid and the interpreters were provided with the policy on the treatment of detainees and their visitors. Detainee leaders also complained that the U.S. military guards had dogs at the gate to use against visitors and that Iraqi females were forced to strip in front of males. These were patently false rumors being spread by a minority extremist group. To dispel the rumors, I gave the detainee leaders my word that there were no dogs used to search civilians coming into the prison. The detainee leaders were presented with photographs to show that there were covered tents and female Soldiers provided for searching female visitors out of the view of men. The photographs were distributed to the population, eliminating the rumors and destroying the credibility of the extremists. Photographs were also used to prove that detainees were being released.

The commander of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Colonel H. R. McMaster, recognized that detainees should be treated with dignity and instructed his Soldiers to refrain from using slang terms such as "haji" when referring to detainees. Colonel McMaster also had to relieve a battalion commander who "did not get it."[3] Soldiers of the 306th Military Police Battalion were trained that detainees were to be treated with dignity and respect, but this had to be monitored and enforced. A blackboard in the processing area had English phrases translated into Arabic. One of the phrases translated was, "I don't care," reflecting a mindset that had to be changed. It was explained to the NCO at the desk how that type of message set the wrong tone.

In a battalion, I had to expect that some Soldiers were going to march to their own beat. Also, after guarding detainees for several months while wearing full battle gear in temperatures exceeding 120°, I knew that there would be some burnout. Officers and senior NCOs were told to watch for the signs. Reports of Soldiers cursing, yelling, and requesting transfers and detainee complaints served as indicators. If Soldiers verbally abused detainees or displayed inappropriate conduct, they would be monitored. This allowed U.S. leaders to retrain potentially abusive Soldiers and educate them on alternative ways to deal with stress. The policy was to try to accommodate requests for transfer from Soldiers who were burned out. This gave physically and emotionally exhausted Soldiers an opportunity to be assigned to a different mission within the facility.

One time it was alleged that a Soldier made derogatory remarks to a detainee regarding Islam, causing a minor disturbance. Although the detainee's accusation against the Soldier was not allowed to stand alone, it was used as a foundation to review the matter. In this instance, another Soldier corroborated the accusation and the accused Soldier was admonished and removed from the camp. This sent a clear message to the Soldiers and the detainees that U.S. leaders would not tolerate Soldiers who did not follow the rules governing their conduct in the camp. The key thing to remember is that one undisciplined Soldier can cause a major disturbance that could result in the serious injury or death of Soldiers or detainees and thus destroy COIN within the wire.

COIN within the wire are no different from COIN in the field, but they require more leadership involvement. Soldiers in the field see various aspects of Iraqi life. They may be shot at and subjected to improvised explosive devices, but they also see

Detainees meet visitors in a booth built for that purpose.

positive aspects of Iraqi life such as family, school, and work. These positive aspects motivate those Soldiers and give them the necessary drive to continue the mission. In a prison environment, however, Soldiers see only the negatives of Iraqi life. It is difficult for young Soldiers because the same detainees that they care for day after day are the same detainees who pelt the Soldiers with rocks in the middle of the night. They are the same detainees who may be setting up Soldiers for mortar and rocket attacks day after day. The Stanford Prison Experiment in 1971 revealed that ordinary people placed in charge of others in a prison setting quickly became sadistic and abusive toward their captives when there was a void in proper supervision.[4] To avoid this scenario, U.S. leaders stressed leadership presence in the camp to ensure successful COIN within the wire. Detainees are constantly assessing Soldiers. Many of the detainees served in the Iraqi military. Based on their military experience, they know how to evaluate Soldier behavior and conduct. They use their own form of intelligence gathering to gain insight into their captors to help them plan their own operations inside the wire. They capitalize upon weakness and manipulate it to their advantage.

Having a disciplined detainee population requires visibly disciplined U.S. military guards. Detainees in Abu Ghraib included foreign fighters, former members of the Iraqi security forces, and former soldiers of the Iraqi military. They understood authority and military discipline. They recognized that the U.S. military guards were disciplined. The Soldiers and detainees knew when senior U.S. leaders were present because the announcement that the battalion commander or command sergeant major were on the ground caused a chain reaction. Soldiers ensured that minor rules were observed, that they were alert, and that their uniforms were worn properly.

This behavior was observed by the detainees and served as a key indicator. If the detainees felt that Soldiers were weak or that U.S. leaders would not enforce simple Soldier standards, they saw that as a chink in the armor. On the other hand, if U.S. leaders walked around the camp in 120° temperatures to ensure that Soldiers were conducting themselves properly, to include such minor issues as uniform wear and common military courtesies, then how strictly would those U.S. leaders treat infractions by the detainees? Detainees saw Soldiers enforcing cleanliness in the detainee areas and constantly conducting physical security checks. This Soldier discipline, enforced and encouraged by senior U.S. leaders, demonstrated the command support and leadership necessary to conduct the mission to standard.

One example illustrates this point. Based on an increased population, the 306th Military Police Battalion expanded the size of the facility within Abu Ghraib, opening Camp Remembrance, named in honor of the law enforcement officers who died on 11 September 2001. Camp Remembrance was home to foreign fighters and individuals who had been convicted by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. They were "dead enders" with nothing to lose. The camp was slowly becoming a problem for U.S. leaders. I assigned one of the best NCOs in the battalion to the camp. He immediately started to clean up the U.S. military guards. He understood that he would not gain control of his detainee population if he did not have the control of the military police Soldiers assigned to him. Within days he wrote up several subordinates and the message went out that there was a "new sheriff in town." The U.S. military guards came into compliance and within weeks Camp Remembrance became a model camp with well-disciplined U.S. military guards and a detainee population that adhered to the camp rules.

Night is the most dangerous time in the detention operations business. That is when escapes and fights among the detainees and loss of discipline among the U.S. military guards are most likely to occur. The 306th Military Police Battalion was fortunate to have an outstanding NCO as its nighttime sergeant of the guard. He represented the battalion's command group during the night and understood the importance of the mission. It is simple, good leadership that enforces discipline through basic Soldier standards.

Many aspects of detainee operations had to be conducted to execute successful COIN within the wire. The medical care provided to detainees ensured that their treatment was according to international standards. The positive and professional relationship between the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and the military police regarding the security of the camp and the U.S. military guards was also a factor. The judge advocate general (JAG) officers who spent hours reviewing detainee files to ensure due process were another factor. Additionally, the JAG officers responded to detainee requests and helped prepare cases for the Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB). This was a process in which detainee cases were reviewed if they lacked evidence or if the detainees were believed not to be a threat. The CRRB could recommend that detainees

be released and sent home. The use of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) helped establish a system of checks and balances to ensure that detainees were treated according to international rules and the standards outlined by the U.S. military. The CID investigated any allegation of abuse that a detainee made against a Soldier, either at the time of apprehension or during detention at Abu Ghraib, and reported its findings through the CID chain of command.

The detainee mission in COIN is difficult. Numerous factors and other missions will be encountered. Leaders simply must incorporate the art and science of war to complete the mission. I would suggest that the enemy prisoner of war internment/resettlement battalion modified table of organization and equipment be adjusted to include a JAG officer, a cultural advisor, and an information operations officer to support the operational theme. In an insurgency, the U.S. Army needs a civil affairs team to work with maneuver units in matters that occur between family members and detainees held by the United States. The 306th Military Police Battalion completed its mission at Abu Ghraib without having to use deadly force against any detainees. There were no serious injuries to U.S. personnel or detainees due to the use of force, and there were no substantiated claims of abuse.

To have successful COIN within the wire, leaders must—

- Be present in the camp, interacting with detainees and Soldiers every day.
- Actively seek intelligence from all avenues. This includes reviewing detainee files, working with interrogators, and using the intelligence collected by U.S. military guards. Educate U.S. military guards on what to look for as part of the guard mount. Use assigned counterintelligence personnel.
- Enforce basic Soldier standards through strict discipline. If standards are not maintained, discipline will break down and the U.S. military guards will commit errors in judgment, reducing the ability to conduct COIN. Soldiers and detainees must understand the command's intent. If detainees see fairness in their treatment, then the COIN will have a better chance of succeeding.
- Never break their word. This is no different from dealing with Soldiers. A promise made must be a promise kept.
- Listen to their Soldiers, since they are in the trenches and have a better feeling for what is going on.
- Listen to detainees. Verify and corroborate detainee accounts, but do not dismiss them out of hand. In many instances, they are correct, especially about Soldiers who display negative attitudes and present problems within the camp.
- Remove leaders who do not "get it" and do not support the command plan. Leaders who are not loyal and who fail to execute the plan will have an adverse effect on other Soldiers.
- Assign the best Soldiers to work at night, which is a dangerous time. Use staff duty officers as a system of checks and balances.

Endnotes

[1] Colonel James Brown, USA, Commander, 18th Military Police Brigade, during a briefing to the Headquarters, Headquarters Command, 306th Military Police Battalion, September 2004.

[2] David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice,* Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 81.

[3] Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Penguin Press, New York, 2006, p. 420.

[4] The Stanford Prison Experiment. A Simulation of the Psychology of Imprisonment Conducted at Stanford University by Philip Zimbardo, <*http://www.prisonexp.org/*>.

Lieutenant Colonel Hussey commanded the 306th Military Police Battalion at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and is now commander of the 411th Civil Affairs Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Iona College, a master's degree in business administration from Manhattan College, and a master's degree in public administration from John Jay College. He is employed as the chief clerk for the Rockland Supreme and County Courts and lives in Cornwall, New York.

Check It Out!

By Command Sergeant Major Edgar W. Dahl

The desert heat beat down on the gravel parking lot as a platoon of military police Soldiers lounged lazily on their M1114 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Safe on the forward operating base (FOB), they drank water; ate meals, ready to eat (MREs) or junk food; told stories; and otherwise relaxed and tried to stay cool on this day off. Weapons and equipment were mounted or strewn over hoods, leaned against tires, stuffed in open hatches, or tucked in between seats. The platoon's noncommissioned officers (NCOs) huddled nearby and looked on nervously as the command sergeant major's vehicle approached.

As the command sergeant major dismounted, shed his individual body armor (IBA) and helmet and wiped his brow, the platoon sergeant came up, offered his hand and welcomed the battalion's senior NCO. At the same time, the unit NCOs cajoled their Soldiers to wake up, fix their uniforms, and otherwise look as presentable as possible. After the customary pleasantries, the command sergeant major followed the ritual of greeting Soldiers and NCOs and asking how everything was going. The condition of each vehicle, the team leader, Soldiers, and equipment was noted as he moved down the line chatting and joking with the Soldiers.

His smile turned to a scowl as he noticed the haphazard placement of the gear and the dirty and disorganized interior of each HMMWV. Snack containers, water bottles, and soda cans were scattered around the interiors of the HMMWVs. Caked mud and loose sand covered the floors and cargo areas. Smoke grenades and witty cartoons were taped on the dashboards and loose rounds of ammunition rolled around inside. Windows were dirty, mirrors were cracked, and half a transmission filled one cargo area because the vehicle was deadlined and there was no storage area available for the mechanic's tools and parts.

Continuing to stroll down the line, the command sergeant major noticed spare weapons barrels beginning to rust, high-value communications equipment getting crushed under the weight of dusty rucksacks, and ammunition cans overflowing with muddy cartridges. Dirty ice chests occupied valuable storage space, and opened battery boxes revealed trash and batteries with corroded terminals. Tires were worn to the nub, and stacks of magazines with bikini-clad women on the covers were stuffed in between the seats.

Under the hood, dry rot had taken hold of the hoses and dirt painted the engines. Personal weapons were bone-dry and fouled with burnt powder. Maps were crinkled, dirty, and scattered with no apparent method. Field gear was sullied, and duffle bags and rucksacks were musty from being closed up for weeks. A filthy sleeping bag was rolled up and bracing other equipment in the back hatch, and the smell of grimy canvas filled the air. Grubby helmet covers were covered with writing. IBA was stained with food and sweat, and desert boots were black with grime. Magazines of rifle ammunition were polluted with sand.

It was a nice sunny day and the Soldiers counted the minutes until the command sergeant major was finished so that they could go back to their trailer, pull out video games, or take a nap in the air-conditioned confines of their temporary home. That plan got derailed. Rather than point out his displeasure with the unit's NCOs in front of the Soldiers, the command sergeant major pulled the NCOs to the side and went down the list of obvious deficiencies. He instructed them to pull out every piece of equipment in the vehicles and inventory and clean it. In addition, every weapon and spare barrel would be cleaned and every vehicle and radio would undergo preventive maintenance checks and services according to the technical manual. The command sergeant major planned to return at the end of the day and check the progress of the platoon in a full layout of field gear and personal uniforms and gear. Chagrined NCOs trudged back to their Soldiers and spread the news. Shoulders shrugged and heavy sighs signaled the arrival of the instructions.

As he departed to call the unit first sergeant, the command sergeant major wondered how it had come to this. How had a whole platoon of NCOs decided to

A squad leader conducts a precombat inspection of his unit's team members before a mission.

neglect their equipment to this degree? Had they not been trained? Had they not been checked often enough? Did they not know the consequences of their actions or how their lackadaisical attitude could cause injury or death? One thing he knew for sure was that basic NCO duties had been neglected. No one had performed proper troop leading procedures (TLP), precombat checks (PCCs), precombat inspections (PCIs), or after-action reviews (AARs) in that platoon lately.

TLP, PCC/PCIs, and AARs are basic NCO responsibilities—period. These enablers do not guarantee mission success, but they do put the odds greatly in the favor of the Soldier and NCO, especially in war. Deliberate and practiced use of these time-proven techniques saves time, hones tactical prowess, and can save lives in combat and in garrison. They reinforce NCO authority and responsibility and underpin everything that is expected of junior NCO leaders in their two basic responsibilities—accomplishment of the mission and the welfare of Soldiers.

These techniques have been written about in countless manuals, printed on graphic training aids, and sandwiched in lesson plans across numerous leadership schools. They are organic chapters in field and tactical standing operating procedures (SOPs) and known by virtually every Soldier leader who has been graded during a field training exercise, attended an NCO school, or undergone Ranger training.

Now NCOs are leading strategic missions in a tactical setting. They have a full kit of responsibility and expectations and frequently lead without direct officer guidance. Decisions are made on the spot and the consequences speak volumes about how professional and prepared they are to handle this burden on the battlefield. For the most part, they do a great job and we can be proud of how the Army trains, selects, and promotes Soldiers to the NCO ranks. Everything the unit does or fails to do rests on the back of the units' NCOs. That is directly attributable to how well the NCOs lead and what preparations they make for each mission.

Field Manual (FM) 7-22.7, *The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide,* outlines TLP and explains the conduct of PCC/PCIs. The manual advises conducting inspections of the weapons, ammunition, organic equipment, and mission-essential equipment of each Soldier and team. In addition, it proposes inspecting water, rations, communications equipment, and camouflage and reinspecting any earlier deficiencies. Moreover, it outlines the need to conduct a test of the Soldiers' understanding of the mission and individual responsibilities by quizzing them about it. The *U.S. Army Ranger Handbook, SH 21-76,*[1] mirrors the same requirements.

Individual inspection includes uniform and gear.

FM 7-22.7 goes on to say that, "PCCs and PCIs are key to ensuring leaders, trainers, and Soldiers are adequately prepared to execute operations and training to Army standard. PCC/PCIs are the bridge between pre-execution checks and execution of training. They are also detailed final checks that all units conduct before and during execution of training and combat operations. Conduct PCC/PCIs at the beginning of each event or exercise as part of the troop leading procedures to check personnel, equipment, vehicles, and mission knowledge . . . . Pre-execution checks ensure that all planning and prerequisite training (Soldier, leader, and collective) are complete prior to the execution of training. They systemically prepare Soldiers, trainers, and resources to ensure training execution starts properly. Pre-execution checks provide the attention to detail needed to use resources efficiently."[2]

Following this guidance, where does FM 7-22.7 put the responsibility to conduct this part of the TLP? It puts this rock in the rucksack of NCOs. Paragraph 2-40 states: "You [the NCO] are the key to inspections, checking Soldier and unit readiness in personal hygiene and appearance, weapons, field equipment, displays, and sanitary conditions. Inspections must be done regularly to help reinforce standards and instill discipline. Regular, impartial inspections of important areas develop confidence, teamwork, and Soldiers' pride in themselves and their equipment."[3]

It is easy to see a direct link between how and when inspections are conducted and the performance of a unit in combat, in training, and in garrison. If NCOs are pressed for time and cannot train on anything else, they should train on the basics. NCOs should—

- Make PCC/PCIs part of the basic building blocks of leadership.
- Insist that PCC/PCIs be done every day.
- Make PCC/PCIs part of physical training.
- Make in-ranks inspections part of the daily routine.
- Incorporate inspections into unit maintenance and training programs.
- Include PCC/PCIs as part of law enforcement duties and hold subordinate NCOs accountable for their conduct.

Units should develop both generic and mission-specific PCC/PCI checklists and cheat sheets. The checklists should be laminated and placed in unit NCO leader books in place of all the useless material that some NCOs cram into these "portable filing cabinets." A picture showing where ribbons go on the Class A uniform is not much help in Mosul or Kandahar, but a list of items to check before "leaving

the wire" at night is. Use every opportunity to use these documents. Be wary of the NCO whose checklist is neat and pristine, but praise the NCO whose checklist is dog-eared and worn from use. By using PCC/PCI checklists for the guard mounts performed before assuming law enforcement or guard duty in confinement facilities, NCOs will gain confidence in their authority and expertise in their use. In addition, Soldiers will be deliberate when they prepare to go to work. Keep the checklist viable by making it a living document that adapts to changes in the mission.

Take NCOs out to the field and train them on the basics of the TLP, especially PCC/PCIs. Under the direction the battalion's senior NCOs, the 759th Military Police Battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado, conducted such an exercise in September 2002. More than 100 NCOs went to the field and conducted dismounted reconnaissance, ambush, and raid missions. They were divided into 30- to 35-Soldier platoons and assigned various leadership and fire team positions. The graded portion of the missions focused on how the NCOs performed their TLP, not on how tactically proficient they were at conducting the reconnaissance, ambush, and raid missions. They ate MREs and drank water exclusively for those four days and walked at night on each mission. The bonding and the confidence gained and the knowledge shared were tremendous. The NCOs saw how actions taken before and after each mission directly influenced the performance during the mission.

They were forced to use the TLP before the mission and to conduct to-standard AARs after the mission. It was the first time many of the NCOs had been the sole planner and leader for a complicated operation. Likewise, lining up their peers to inspect and quiz them before crossing the line of departure made the NCOs feel that they had done everything they could to prepare for success. Coupled with a later NCO development class that focused on the conduct of inspections in garrison and barracks, the fruits of these combined training events paid dividends in the conduct of everything that the NCOs did.

It might be easy to dismiss these musings as a blinding flash of the obvious, but then why do many units struggle with substandard conduct of the TLP? Specifically, why are PCC/PCIs frequently neglected? Can you think of a time when you arrived at the range and some valuable piece of equipment was left at the motor pool by mistake or when a Soldier showed up at a training event without the appropriate clothing even though a pack list was published? How many times have you reached down to turn on flashlights or night vision goggles only to find the batteries dead and no spares on hand? These are simple examples that illustrate how—despite the countless resources available on how to conduct them—the PCC/PCI checklists commonly collect dust on a bookshelf or in a document protector in a spotless, unused leader's book.

Take a look at your unit and observe how your NCOs conduct their TLP when given a mission. See what reference they use to do the PCC/PCIs. Ask them how they accomplish the task of conducting PCIs. Many units possess quality PCC/PCI checklists in their tactical SOPs, but rarely are they in the hands of the leaders who would use them. They are frequently found in the unit operations section's footlocker or in the senior leader's rucksack. Do your NCOs conduct a deliberate inspection of their Soldiers before going on a mission or do they pencil whip it?

Think back to the platoon mentioned at the beginning of this article. Imagine if the NCOs had done deliberate, to-standard inspections before and after each mission. My comments were based on an actual event I observed when I checked out a dislocated platoon downrange. Had they done their PCC/PCIs to standard, the platoon could have retired to the cool atmosphere of their hootches rather than sweat in a hot parking lot servicing their equipment so that I could come back and reinspect them.

Endnotes

[1]SH 21-76, *U.S. Army Ranger Handbook,* Byrrd Enterprises, Alexandria, Virginia, 2000, pp. 2-7.

[2] Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide,* U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002, pp. 2-13, para. 2-39.

[3] *Ibid,* para. 2-40.

Command Sergeant Major Dahl is the command sergeant major of the 42d Military Police Brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington. He served as the command sergeant major of the 759th Military Police Battalion at Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 95th Military Police Battalion in Mannheim, Germany, before assuming duties at Fort Lewis. He is a graduate of Class 50 of the Sergeants Major Academy, the 18th Airborne Corps Reconnaissance Commando Doughboy (RECONDO) Course, and the Ranger School. He holds a master's degree in military arts and science from the American Military University.

Attack on Abu Ghraib:

Warrior Police in an Iraq Theater Internment Facility

By Major Robert L. Berry

The 306th Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement) operated the Abu Ghraib Internment Facility (AGIF) in Iraq from January to November 2005. The insurgent attack on the facility on 2 April 2005 was a testament to the quality of our Warrior Police and provided key lessons learned for future detainee missions. The intricacy, length, and intensity of the attack and the number of attackers made this one of the most sophisticated assaults ever on a coalition facility within Iraq. More than 60 insurgents conducted this well-planned and well-coordinated attack using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), truck bombs, indirect fire, and a small-unit assault that signaled a new era in insurgency attacks.

Background

Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib, which included and was dominated by the AGIF, was located on the southwestern outskirts of Baghdad about 8 miles west of the Baghdad International Airport. The FOB (which was shut down along with all its facilities during the summer of 2006) was a rough square about a kilometer on each side with cement walls around the entire base. Outside the FOB were a four-lane highway along the south side, two-lane highways along the north and west sides, and a dirt road along the east side. The city of Abu Ghraib was just several hundred meters outside the north and west walls of the FOB and was known to be heavily infested with insurgents.

At the time of the attack, there were Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, and civilians based at the FOB. Almost half of these were assigned to the 306th Military Police Battalion. Other units included part of a military intelligence battalion, a field hospital unit, a rear-area operations center (RAOC) unit for base support operations, and a Marine rifle company task-organized under the RAOC for external base defense. The Marines manned the towers on the perimeter of the FOB and the FOB access gates, while Soldiers from the 306th Military Police Battalion occupied the interior detention facility towers and performed roving patrols. The detainee population included Sunnis, Shiites, and a small number of non-Iraqi foreign nationals. They were housed primarily within Camp Redemption inside air-conditioned tents surrounded by multiple layers of chain-link fence, concertina wire, and guard towers. Until 2 April 2005, most enemy activity in the area consisted of indirect-fire attacks on the AGIF once or twice per week, weekly IED ambushes against coalition forces (CF) convoys passing through the area, and an occasional vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack on either a passing convoy or a fixed CF site.

The Attack

The overall attack on the AGIF began several hours before the first indirect-fire and small-arms rounds hit the base itself. At about 1630 hours there was an IED attack against a passing CF convoy about 4 kilometers northeast of the AGIF. This was the first of a multitude of ambushes and roadblocks on the routes leading to the AGIF in an apparent attempt to isolate the FOB. The primary route that reinforcing CF units would take from the airport to the AGIF was hit with four IED ambushes, four small-arms attacks, three VBIED assaults, and two indirect-fire strikes. Antitank mines were also placed at a key intersection. Other routes to the AGIF received lesser enemy attention but were nonetheless blocked against reinforcing CF units. The enemy apparently believed that the AGIF was isolated, and they initiated their main attack on the FOB around dusk, at 1915 hours.

The attack started with heavy mortar and rocket attacks. An estimated 78 rounds struck the base throughout the assault. An attack with small-arms fire was then initiated from the south. Several minutes later, small-arms fire started coming from the northwest. At about 1935 hours, the enemy tried to suppress base defenses in the area of Tower 4 on the southeast corner of the base with small-arms

fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and hand grenades. In the midst of this action, a fuel truck was used for an attempted suicide attack against the tower. The truck was detonated about 75 meters short of the tower and the FOB wall, resulting in several casualties. Following that attack, the enemy launched a small-unit ground attack against the area around Tower 4. This ground attack by a reinforced squad was beaten back with Marine rifle and machine gun fire and hand grenades.

Shortly after the attack against Tower 4, hundreds of detainees within Camp Redemption began to riot. They armed themselves with improvised weapons, including clubs and slingshots. Several lit fires, threw rocks at perimeter lights, and caused other disruptions to cover attempts to create holes in the facility fences. Soldiers of the battalion were faced with a huge rioting detainee population to their front and an intense insurgent attack to their rear. Soldiers manning the Camp Redemption bunkers nearest Tower 4 were receiving weapons fire from one side and rocks and other projectiles from the other side. One military police Soldier had been caught in the middle of Camp Redemption when the initial attack began, forcing him to dive alone into a nearby bunker. In the midst of the incoming rounds, he observed a group of detainees trying to cut through the compound fence in order to escape. The Soldier began firing less than lethal (LTL) shotgun rounds at the detainees to drive them back. After his last LTL round was fired, he drew his pistol and kept the group at bay until his fellow Soldiers could reinforce him.

Simultaneous with this effort, the battalion was able to move a platoon-size element from one end of the FOB to the other to reinforce Camp Redemption. This movement under fire was done using the battalion's organic high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles. Upon arrival, this force bolstered the perimeter defense of Camp Redemption with emphasis on the southern end, which faced Tower 4. Two military police teams moved to the vehicle gate adjacent to Tower 4 and helped the Marines repel an enemy ground assault.

The battalion's higher headquarters, the 18th Military Police Brigade, had been trying to push reinforcements to the AGIF throughout the entire fight. Elements of the 306th Military Police Battalion's sister unit, the 503d Military Police Battalion, had been fighting tenaciously to push through on the routes to the AGIF but were unable to pass. The brigade commander requested helicopter support and directed the Soldiers of the 503d to prepare in case they were needed for a possible air assault into the AGIF.

At about 2000 hours, with the enemy's indirect and small-arms fire continuing, a diversionary attack was launched on Tower 9, across the FOB from Tower 4. Marines around Tower 9 took heavy small-arms and RPG fire and the enemy got close enough to launch a barrage of hand grenades over the FOB walls. The Marine gunners of crew-served weapons in Tower 9 observed a vehicle racing toward their position. They struck the vehicle with withering machine gun fire, causing the enemy suicide truck to explode a couple hundred meters from their position. By 2020 hours, the battalion had sufficient reinforcements at Camp Redemption to quell the rioting detainees. With the external attack continuing, several military police Soldiers were moved out to the towers to reinforce the Marines there.

The overall attack began to ebb at about 2050 hours. Emergency accountability procedures for detainees were implemented and a fence line check was begun. Sporadic small-arms and indirect fire continued for about an hour. Full accountability of all detainees was achieved. Only three confirmed enemy bodies were found around the FOB perimeter. However, later information from the local morgues, hospitals, and mosques indicated that the enemy sustained dozens of killed and many wounded in action. Eighteen unexploded rounds were found within the FOB. An ice truck located about 20 meters from the Camp Redemption command post received a direct hit of indirect fire and was completely destroyed. The day after the attack, two abandoned VBIEDs were discovered on the road leading up to Tower 4.

The enemy attack on the AGIF was a resounding defeat for the insurgents. While impressive in its organization and preparation, it failed to cause large numbers of U.S. casualties, help any detainees escape, or accomplish any degradation to the battalion's detainee mission. While the insurgents tried their usual tactic of claiming success for the attack in the media, they also failed in this. The world's media was distracted by the death of Pope John Paul II on the same day.

Lessons Learned

An event of this magnitude was bound to spawn numerous lessons learned. Perhaps one of the most

important for the battalion was not to underestimate the enemy. It is easy to fall into a feeling of superiority when fighting an enemy with such comparatively limited resources. The insurgent effort was obviously well planned and certainly involved an abundance of reconnaissance. We must always remember that we could face the full force of the enemy and have to deal with a worst-case scenario at any time.

The military police are often called "the force of choice" because of their ability to judiciously apply the rules of engagement and the rules for the use of force across the full spectrum of operations. The 2 April 2005 attack presented some intense challenges to this standard. Like most confinement facilities, we restricted weapons inside areas where detainees could reach them. However, since the AGIF was not in a rear area but rather in the middle of the insurgency, we had to be able to arm Soldiers quickly with their lethal weapons. The military police Soldiers were tested, trying to quell rioting detainees with LTL means while also defending themselves from insurgents attacking from the outside. One of the most critical points during the attack was when the interior riot was escalating and the fate of the outside attack was uncertain. A point developed when detainees inside the facility were effectively changing their status from unarmed detainees to becoming part of the armed combatant group attacking the facility. They seemed to be trying to coordinate their efforts inside the facility with the actions of the insurgents attacking from the outside. The detainees' efforts hampered our ability to fight the insurgents. After issuing repeated warnings and using large numbers of LTL munitions, we prepared to use deadly force in case detainees attempted a mass escape during a possible insurgent penetration of the FOB perimeter.

The enforcement of standards and discipline was paramount to the battalion's success. The battalion's Soldiers were expected to maintain the warrior mindset at all times and were always prepared for battle. This mental preparation enabled them to rapidly respond to any situation. Even though standards and discipline were not always popular, we found that they were important in our responses to enemy attack and detainee disturbances.

Adaptive leadership with flexible plans proved to be very effective in this engagement. The basic battle drills we had trained were employed, with leaders using their own judgment to fill the gaps. Soldiers reported to their unit assembly areas with full battle gear and were ready to move into action. Leaders were aware of the battalion's priorities during a crisis and initiated action to independently achieve these as quickly as possible. It is not possible to create a detailed plan to cover every contingency, but adaptive Soldiers and leaders who are well grounded in the basics can quickly adjust to any situation.

Personal leadership by many of the senior leaders was also critical to the battalion's success. Orchestrating 500 military police Soldiers and controlling large numbers of detainees in the midst of a simultaneous riot and external attack required personal leadership from the front. While the battalion commander and command sergeant major were rallying Soldiers at Camp Redemption, the battalion operations officer was coordinating with the FOB's base defense center and the 18th Military Police Brigade, as well as moving reinforcements to Camp Redemption and to FOB defensive positions. Company commanders moved to their assigned areas of responsibility, and first sergeants surged their Soldiers forward. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders led their Soldiers toward contact with the insurgents. All this was done despite oppressive enemy fire, testifying to the need for personal leadership.

In the end, the success of any engagement depends on a unit's Soldiers. The Soldiers of the 306th Military Police Battalion rose to the challenge and proved themselves worthy of the title Warrior Police. Countless Soldiers in the battalion overcame the natural fear of coming under an intense enemy attack and accomplished their duties. There were numerous combat action badges awarded for this attack and two Soldiers of the battalion were decorated for valor. The battalion's motto of "Serve with Honor" shines even greater from their efforts.

Major Berry was the operations and training officer for the 306th Military Police Battalion in Iraq from December 2004 to November 2005 and commanded the battalion upon its demobilization in January 2006. His previous assignments include operations and training officer with the 2d Battalion, 98th Division (Institutional Training), and commander of the 423d Military Police Company, Uniondale, New York. He has been on operational deployments to Panama, Haiti, and Saudi Arabia. He is an Army Reserve Officer Training Corps graduate of Fordham University and is currently enrolled in the intermediate level education course of the Command and General Staff College.

Stryker Brigade Combat Team Memoirs

By Major Robert Arnold

The primary intent of this article is to share military police experiences and lessons learned during combat operations in northern Iraq. The secondary intent is to show other brigade combat team (BCT) provost marshals (PMs) that their job is not simply relegated to managing post force protection, tracking DA Forms 4833 *(Commander's Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action),* briefing others on the DA Form 3997 *(Military Police Desk Blotter),* and the usual myriad of additional duties. When you deploy with a unit to combat, your special expertise as a military police leader is invaluable. There will be more work and more responsibility than you can fathom. The first lesson to be learned by BCT PMs is that there is light at the end of the tunnel.

In the 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the mission priorities were—

- Detainee operations.
- Iraqi police operations, (managing police transition teams [PTTs] and partnering with and mentoring the provincial director of police [PDOP]).
- Planning the employment of military police assets and military working dog (MWD) operations.
- Force protection.
- Customs operations.

The bottom line was that I was in charge of anything that "sounded, smelled, or tasted" like military police or law enforcement activities. That was a good thing because it showed that the SBCT understood the value that military police play in supporting combat operations. I conducted the following military police functions while deployed to Iraq:

- Internment/resettlement operations.
- Law and order operations.
- Police intelligence operations.
- Area security operations.

The 172d SBCT's mission priorities were to train and transition battlespace to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISFs) and neutralize the anti-Iraqi forces (AIFs). Partnering with and training the Iraqi police were integral parts of putting the ISF in the lead. An effective Iraqi police force is the key to establishing a truly normal society in Iraq. The Iraqi Army (IA) cannot secure the Iraqi society in the long term—the police must. Obviously, detainee operations are a part of neutralizing the AIF and will attract international scrutiny if done incorrectly. I spent most of my time focusing on detainee operations and Iraqi police operations since they were both SBCT mission priorities. The Iraqi police in the area had steadily increased their capabilities since August 2005. They conducted six joint and combined complex cordon and search operations with the IA and coalition forces (CF) in two major cities in 2006. Part of my partnering with the PDOP was guiding the Iraqi police military decision-making process and recommending which neighborhoods to search. The PDOP was also very savvy with information operations (IO). He effectively used the media to positively influence the local populace.

Military police assets were focused almost exclusively on PTT missions at the Iraqi police provincial, district, and station levels. The only exception was a military police platoon that conducted detainee operations at the brigade internment facility, called the Mosul Detention Facility (MDF). Operating the MDF became the responsibility of the 172d SBCT in January 2006. From August 2005 to January 2006, the SBCT operated five battalion holding areas. The military police platoon leader managed the MDF and worked directly for me. The remainder of the Soldiers working in the MDF came from our maneuver battalions. When the military police battalion headquarters departed the area of operations (AO), the military police units came under the tactical control (TACON) of our maneuver battalions to conduct PTT missions. As the SBCT PM, I had oversight of the PTT and monitored it to ensure that military police Soldiers were being properly employed. The provincial PTT reported directly to me since it was TACON to the 172d SBCT. The district PTT and station PTT (in essence, the military police companies) and the Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron detachment at the Mosul Public Service Academy (the Iraqi police basic training academy) were TACON to the maneuver battalions to conduct PTT missions.

The following are some additional lessons learned during combat in Iraq. There is no reason for

a maneuver support cell (MSC) to exist as a section within an SBCT. First, there is no common MSC task and purpose. The MSC is composed of topographic engineers, combat engineers, and military police Soldiers. Combat engineers and military police Soldiers have very distinct missions in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom so there is no reason to lump them together with the topographic engineers, especially when the majority of the MSC personnel are engineers. Second, who is in charge of the MSC? There are an engineer major and a military police major. My recommendation is to discontinue the MSC since it does not work. All three SBCTs that have operated in combat treat the PM and engineer cells as separate and distinct sections with separate and distinct missions. That is the way it works best.

It is absolutely critical that the BCT PM be a major, not a captain. That is the case in the SBCT but not in infantry BCTs and heavy BCTs. Having a field grade officer as a PM demands a greater level of respect and will automatically put the PM on equal footing with the rest of the BCT staff, where he belongs.

There also needs to be a law and order detachment (with additional customs duties) in each BCT AO. Each BCT needs the capability to investigate crimes in the BCT AO. I recommend a small law and order detachment that would assist the unit in properly policing the Soldier population. Additionally, I recommend resourcing this detachment from the U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force to allow U.S. Army military police Soldiers to conduct PTT missions.

I hope this article has provided an accurate picture of the task and purpose assigned to the PM in combat and also shed some light on changes required to improve military police support for combat operations. Although several issues have been identified that require improvement, having military police elements assigned to the BCT is extremely beneficial to the Military Police Corps and to the individual military police Soldiers filling those positions. Above all else, the Military Police Corps needs to continue its representation within the Army Transformation movement. That means keeping military police Soldiers in the building block of Army Transformation—the BCT. If the Military Police Corps chooses to disengage from involvement with the BCT, military police Soldiers may become irrelevant in our future Army and that would be a tragic loss.

Major Arnold was commissioned through the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1995. He holds a bachelor's degree in elementary education from Trenton State College, Trenton, New Jersey, and a master's degree in international relations from Troy State University. His military education includes military police officer basic and advanced courses, unit movement officer course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, advanced airborne school (jump master course), and the test and evaluation basic course.

His assignments include chemical decontamination specialist, training noncommissioned officer (NCO), and nuclear, biological, and chemical NCO, 7th Transportation Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; platoon leader, 527th Military Police Company and the 92d Military Police Company, Ayers Kaserne/Giessen Depot, Germany and Bosnia-Herzegovina; assistant operations and training officer, 709th Military Police Battalion, Fliegerhorst Kaserne, Germany; adjutant, 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg; commander, 21st Military Police Company (Airborne), Fort Bragg; military police evaluator with the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; provost marshal, 172d SBCT, Fort Wainwright, Alaska; and provost marshal and assistant operations and training officer, 1st SBCT, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Wainwright.

Major Arnold deployed to Florida in support of Hurricane Andrew Relief in August 1992, to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Operation Joint Endeavor from December 1995 to August 1996, to Kosovo in support of Operation Joint Guardian from May to November 2001, to Iraq and Afghanistan from November 2003 to January 2004 in support of an operational assessment for the Army Battle Command System, and to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from August 2005 to December 2006.

The Ninewa provincial director of police is interviewed by the Iraqi media during a search operation.

92d Military Police Battalion Is "On the Watch" in Iraq

By Captain Kevin Pelley and First Lieutenant Enrique Enriquez

The Soldiers of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 92d Military Police Battalion, and the 372d Military Police Battalion assembled in formation last month on the rocky ground outside their headquarters in Iraq for a ceremony to recognize the official transfer of authority from the outgoing 372d Military Police Battalion to the incoming 92d Military Police Battalion. When the ceremony was complete, the Soldiers of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 92d Military Police Battalion, assumed responsibility for military police operations in West Baghdad and the Al Anbar Province. This area encompasses the greater part of the capital city with its seven million inhabitants, the volatile cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, and the land all the way to the Syrian border.

Meanwhile, its mission complete, the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment of the 372d Military Police Battalion prepared for the journey home. The 372d is proud to trace its roots to the Revolutionary War. The unit's colors have seen service throughout the nation's history. During a speech at the ceremony, Lieutenant Colonel Aaron Dean, 372d Military Police Battalion commander, commended his troops for their flexibility through the deployment. Colonel Michael Galloucis, commander of the 89th Military Police Brigade, praised the Soldiers of the 372d for their role in support of the Police Partnership Program and the initiation of the police transition teams and for their support of Operation Together Forward. Colonel Galloucis and Command Sergeant Major Michael Sampson, the brigade command sergeant major, took the time to thank and shake hands with each Soldier in the detachment.

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Cosby, 92d Military Police Battalion commander, and Command Sergeant Major Patrick Dawson, the battalion command sergeant major, had the honor to uncase the battalion's colors. This marked the beginning of the latest call to service for the 92d Military Police Battalion. The Army has activated the battalion in times of need during World War II and the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Panama. It was most recently reactivated at Fort Benning, Georgia, on 19 April 2006 with the mission to deploy to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lieutenant Colonel Cosby said, "Everyone in the 92d should take great pride in the fact that we are writing the next chapter in the history of this battalion. We assume our mission in full stride with the momentum generated by the 372d as we coach, teach, and mentor the Iraqi police force, forging an effective, visible, and professional force. I know that we will succeed in accomplishing this important mission."

The 92d Military Police Battalion, under the 89th Military Police Brigade, is responsible for more than 10 subordinate units. This brings a challenge to the battalion headquarters, which must now support an unprecedented number of subordinate units. Increases in technology give commanders access to accurate, timely, and relevant information more quickly than ever before. The headquarters of the 92d prepared for this mission through numerous staff exercises at Fort Benning and Fort Hood, Texas, setting the conditions for their success.

The battalion must mold the Iraqi police forces into a competent force capable of providing security for the Iraqi people. With the colors unfurled and the transfer of authority complete, the Soldiers of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 92d Military Police Battalion, understand the importance of this mission and will work to help set the stage for an Iraqi police force that will assume the lead for domestic security.

Captain Pelley is the commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 92d Military Police Battalion. His previous service includes deployments to Iraq and Kosovo. He served as an armor crewman before receiving his commission through the officer candidate school.

First Lieutenant Enriquez is the assistant adjutant for the 92d Military Police Battalion. His previous assignment was as executive officer for A Company, 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry Basic Combat Training Brigade, Fort Benning. He graduated from Florida International University where he was commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program.

724th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 15 January 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 724th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 25 January 1942 at Camp Blanding, Florida.

Inactivated 20 April 1946 in Hawaii.

Redesignated 6 August 1947 as the 326th Military Police Battalion, allotted to the Organized Reserves and activated at St. Louis, Missouri. (Organized Reserves redesignated 25 March 1948 as the Organized Reserve Corps. Redesignated 9 July 1952 as the Army Reserve.)

Inactivated 30 March 1951 at St. Louis, Missouri.

Redesignated 24 June 1953 as the 724th Military Police Battalion.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 724th Military Police Battalion, activated 16 December 1991 at Tallahassee, Florida.

Location changed 15 July 1997 to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Ordered into active military service 27 December 2002 at Fort Lauderdale; released from active military service 9 April 2004 and reverted to reserve status.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II
Asiatic-Pacific Theater—Streamer without inscription
War on Terror
Campaigns to be determined

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army) for Pacific Theater

Historical note: The Soldiers of Company C of the 724th saw action at Iwo Jima during World War II. Originally sent to escort Japanese interpreters to the island, their role would expand to maintaining enemy prisoners of war and circulation control. Although not part of the initial invasion forces, the company would endure the demanding conditions and assist in fighting off a "banzai" attack.

18th Military Police Brigade

By Specialist Daniel D. Blottenberger

On 22 January, 28 competitors from 18th Military Police Brigade units all across Germany faced off for an intense competition at Baumholder for the chance to compete at the Military Police Corps Warfighter Challenge at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in April 2007. The brigade will send two teams from its three battalions—the 709th, the 793d, and the 95th Military Police Battalions. Since the 709th had recently returned from a deployment and had fewer Soldiers ready for the rigorous competition, it combined forces with the 793d to compete with the much larger 95th Military Police Battalion.

"Because of this week-long event and the upcoming training, we should have strong, competitive teams representing our organizations at Fort Leonard Wood," said the noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the event.

The Warfighter teams consist of an NCO team leader and two Soldiers. The competition to choose the teams took place over four days. The first day began at noon and consisted of a pugil stick competition and an 8-kilometer run in uniform. The second day consisted of a 6-kilometer road march with a 35-pound rucksack, an obstacle course and rope climb, a hands-on weapons test, and a combatives competition.

Warfighter Challenge 2007

By the third day, temperatures were dropping below freezing and snow was falling, but the competition continued. The day included a unique physical fitness assessment consisting of five 1-minute events, with a 45-second break between events. The assessment began with each Soldier bench-pressing his own body weight as often as possible, then performing hanging leg raises, pull-ups, elevated sit-ups, and elevated push-ups. Next, the Soldiers qualified with their assigned M4 rifles and M9 pistols immediately after finishing another physical stress test. Finally, the Soldiers completed hands-on and written day and night land navigation courses.

On the final day, the Soldiers concluded the competition with a 10-kilometer road march with a 35-pound rucksack. During the 96-hour competition, the Soldiers also completed five written exams and performed various Warrior tasks and drills. At the end of the four grueling days, the brigade had picked two teams of primaries and alternates to represent it in April 2007 at Fort Leonard Wood.

Specialist Blottenberger entered the Army in December 2004 and attended basic combat training at Fort Leonard Wood. He trained as a combat medic and was later reclassified as a public affairs specialist at the Defense Information School at Fort Meade, Maryland. He is assigned to the 18th Military Police Brigade at Coleman Barracks in Mannheim, Germany.

64th Military Police Company Trains With Navy

By First Lieutenant Jennifer Pozzi

Islamic prayer music echoed eerily off the dilapidated buildings as Soldiers from the 64th Military Police Company prepared to enter and clear a battered cinder block structure in a hostile environment at the Elijah Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) facility at Fort Hood, Texas. Everyone's adrenaline was pumping and the Soldiers concentrated on the skills recently taught to them by members of Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) teams. The training was much different from the Army's usual MOUT training, using the same techniques practiced by the Naval Special Warfare Command warriors to train in an urban environment.

For a week in early December 2006, Soldiers from the 64th Military Police Company's third platoon trained with the SEAL teams at the Elijah and Hargrove MOUT facilities at Fort Hood in preparation for deployment. In this training exercise, the Soldiers acquired new skills and methods for urban warfare to include patrolling, reacting to fire, conducting close-quarters combat, and using distraction devices to enter and clear rooms. Day one began with some basic but crucial instruction to include basic weapons handling and scanning all three dimensions of the battlefield. Soldiers were then instructed in techniques of patrolling and recovering from enemy contact.

The next block of instruction focused on clearing buildings in teams. Speed and an aggressive posture were key elements in accomplishing this task. The Soldiers learned that their stance and muzzle position made all the difference when encountering hostile

A Soldier prepares to ambush Navy SEAL team members acting as the opposing force at the Elijah MOUT site.

Soldiers fire at Navy SEAL team members acting as the opposing force at the Elijah MOUT site.

threats in close quarters. Similarly, they learned that communications must be constant and concise as different elements conduct a tactical movement on a structure to neutralize a threat. The operations involved cordon-and-assault elements that moved independently, so good communications were essential as Soldiers were constantly coming around blind corners and through doorways in anticipation of enemy insurgents. Precise and deliberate communications help to avoid confusion and costly mistakes when under fire.

Confusing the opposition with distraction devices worked to our benefit. Using crash grenades and smoke to disorient the enemy was another task we learned for close-quarters combat. Finally, members of the platoon conducted sniper and countersniper training with the SEAL snipers. Many tactics, techniques, and procedures were taught and practiced to keep the Soldiers aware of the constant threat of sniper attack on the noncontiguous battlefield.

The new techniques involved unlearning the old methods we were accustomed to using in urban warfare. Repetition and demonstration served to instill the new techniques, which had proven to work in operations in hostile environments. The SEAL teams carefully explained their reasoning for each technique and demonstrated how each worked before the Soldiers began to rehearse and employ the technique. The use of simulated munitions reinforced the use of proper techniques by all members of the platoon.

As a culmination of our newly acquired skills, the platoon went through a movement-to-contact exercise using troop leading procedures to conduct a patrol in a hostile city with the SEAL teams acting as the opposing force. With only a few days of training, Soldiers in the platoon were able to accomplish the mission by using the skills and methods they had learned. Only a handful of the Soldiers had any training in urban warfare before this exercise, but the explicit instruction and hands-on approach of this training will serve the platoon well in its future deployments.

First Lieutenant Pozzi has a bachelor's degree in history from the University of California at Santa Barbara. She was assigned to the 64th Military Police Company at Fort Hood and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Criminal Investigation Task Force

By Chief Warrant Officer 4 L. J. "Jim" Powlen

One of the most unique organizations to emerge from the Military Police Corps as a result of the War on Terror is the Department of Defense (DOD) Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF). Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, with forward-deployed detachments in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Iraq; and Afghanistan, this joint task force, established in February 2002 as the result of a Presidential military order, tackles the challenges of investigating accused terrorists in U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. It also builds criminal cases against accused terrorists for presentation in a judicial venue.

Early in the task force's evolution, it was evident that its personnel needed a specialized knowledge base and skill set in order to be successful. The personnel learned most of those skills through "on-the-job" training that sometimes took as long as three months, until the CITF created the Agency Development Branch inside the Investigations Division in March 2005.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 L. J. "Jim" Powlen was tasked with developing, implementing, and institutionalizing a training program to provide all personnel assigned to the CITF—including special agents, analysts, attorneys, data managers, support personnel from all branches of the military, and DOD civilians and contractors—with the necessary knowledge and skills to reduce the learning curve to six weeks or less. Since the task force is a temporary organization with personnel assigned to it for periods of four months to two or three years, reducing the learning curve was essential to achieving maximum mission accomplishment.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Powlen, a special agent with the Army Criminal Investigation Command, initially developed a five-day, 50-hour entry level training (ELT) program. He formerly served as the commander of the CITF's Afghanistan detachment and as the operations officer for CITF's headquarters and its Cuba detachment.

Day one familiarized the attendees with the CITF's mission, its evolution, and its structure down to the division level. Day two focused primarily on the Investigations Division down to the unit level and on building a basic knowledge of the history, structure, events, and personalities that formed Al Qaeda. Day three covered the basics of Islam and the origins of Islamic extremist ideology, the psychology of how people from the Middle East and South Asia process information, and risk assessment methodology. Day four focused on intelligence tools and the case management system used in the task force. Day five completed the case management system training and focused on briefings regarding combat crime scene examinations, a case study presentation, and the CITF interview protocol. Nationally renowned experts were recruited to be part of the teaching cadre, including Dr. Max Gross, the former dean of the Joint Military Intelligence College.

As the ELT evolved, it grew from a five-day program to an eight-day program, based on feedback from students that more time was needed to process the flood of information. Today the first three days of training remain the same. Day four is dedicated entirely to teaching the use of various intelligence databases and tools. Day five is the capstone day with presentations on combat crime scenes, a case study, electronic media exploitation, and the interview protocol. The remaining three days are dedicated to teaching the case management system and ensuring that students have achieved an acceptable level of proficiency.

Personnel from numerous federal and DOD agencies—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the U.S. Secret Service; and the DOD Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of

Enemy Combatants, which reviews the cases of all detainees held at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay—also send their personnel to the training classes on a regular basis.

In-service training consists of the following three subprograms:

- External courses. Personnel assigned to the CITF attend courses outside the task force that are relevant to the CITF's mission.
- CITF library. The library contains books, compact discs, and digital versatile discs (DVDs), many produced by the CITF, that are fielded to forward-deployed elements and down to the unit level in the Investigations Division.
- Guest lecturer series. Nationally and internationally renowned experts in terrorism give lectures to the task force. The lectures are professionally recorded and DVDs are fielded to forward-deployed elements to ensure the widest possible dissemination of the information. Guest lecturers have included Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, author of "Inside Al Qaeda"; Hekmat Karzai, former first secretary of the Afghan Embassy to the U.S.; and Brian Michael Jenkins from the Rand Corporation.

CITF also provides tailored training on several topics to allied organizations. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Powlen has been involved with the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in developing curriculum for human intelligence collectors. CITF instructors also serve as adjunct faculty with the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment, the Joint Counterintelligence Training Center, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Academy, and the U.S. Army Medical Command.

A complete list of CITF training materials and mobile training teams can be found on the CITF home page at <*http://www.citf.army.smil.mil*>. From the home page, select "Units," and then "Agency Development." The CITF has also published a "Counseling, Evaluating, and Mentoring Guide for the Joint Environment" and an "Educing Information Guide." For copies of any of these products or training materials or for information about joining CITF, contact Chief Warrant Officer 4 Powlen at <*lester.powlen@belvoir.army.mil*> or <*lester.powlen@citf.army.smil.mil*>.

Chief Warrant Officer 4 Powlen was a municipal police officer in Maryland from 1979 until he joined the U.S. Army in 1983. He became a special agent with the CID in 1988. Since joining the CID, he has served in numerous assignments, including special agent in charge at branch offices in Egypt; Puerto Rico; and Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. He has been working with the CITF since February 2002. He holds a master's degree in forensic psychology–psychophysiology from Argosy University.

Military Police Bulletin Writing Contest

The Military Police Bulletin writing contest has concluded. The following authors are the winners of the competition:

First place—Major James G. Lake
Second place—Captain Will McKannay
Third place—Captain Darrin Haas

The winners will be formally recognized by the commandant and a plaque with their names engraved on it will be installed at the U.S. Army Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Congratulations to our winners!

Criminal Investigation Division Continues to Support Kosovo

By Chief Warrant Officer 2 Eric Moss

For the last seven years, Criminal Investigation Division (CID) agents have provided criminal investigation support to Operation Joint Guardian. The 5th Military Police Battalion, Germany, continues to deploy its agents to Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo, making up the 515th Military Police Detachment (CID).

The U.S. military presence in Kosovo has slowly declined from the onset of the mission in 1999 when approximately 15 CID agents made up the detachment. Recently, foreign militaries have closed their camps within Kosovo and moved to Camp Bondsteel. As the Kosovo peace talks conclude, it is anticipated that the U.S. presence will decline even further over the next few rotations, eventually resembling the Bosnia mission in size.

The 515th Military Police Detachment continues to adapt to the challenges of conducting investigations throughout Kosovo. Recently, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) transitioned into conducting all off-post investigations with oversight from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Police. Off-post investigations involving Kosovo Forces (KFOR) personnel are challenging since the KPS retains investigative authority over the crime scenes. Through joint CID and KPS investigations, Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act prosecutions of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel who commit off-post felonies are being accomplished. This process can be difficult since KPS crime scene technicians collect and analyze evidence. Together with local national victims and witnesses, the technicians may be called to testify in U.S. courts.

Due to the diligence of several rotations of agents from the 515th Military Police Detachment and the European Special Investigations and Fraud Field Unit, numerous local national and American contractors have been implicated in the theft of over one million gallons of U.S. government fuel. Special agents conducted numerous hours of off-post surveillance with the assistance of military police Soldiers, infantry personnel, and other military assets. Through their coordinated efforts, they were able to videotape the transfer of the fuel from military vehicles to civilian trucks so that it could be sold on the local black market. The American suspects are currently being prosecuted in the U.S. court system. The local nationals of Kosovo appreciate the investigative efforts and subsequent prosecutions of DOD personnel, since it shows that even though the DOD personnel are immune from local prosecution, there are consequences for committing crimes while working in Kosovo.

Accomplishing the mission in Kosovo can be challenging. However, according to the special agent in charge, the CID in Kosovo has a "secret weapon"—a local national detailed from the translator's pool in Camp Bondsteel since 1999. This person works directly for the CID office, is fluent in numerous languages, and has many regional contacts. He is frequently recognized while traveling throughout Kosovo and has been instrumental in recovering numerous stolen items throughout Kosovo over the years. He also guides agents in their dealings with the various cultural differences they face while conducting interviews. He was there from the very beginning of the mission and will likely remain associated with CID Soldiers until the mission is complete.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Moss is the special agent in charge of the Friedberg, Germany, CID office and a member of the 5th Military Police Battalion (CID).

Fort Leavenworth Employs Low-Cost Security Enhancement at Access Control Points

By Mr. Eric Cashin and Colonel Tim Weathersbee

In late August 2006, the Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, post commander expressed concern that the post had no effective means at access control points (ACPs) to identify individuals who were barred from entry to the installation. Because all former inmates at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks are included on the installation's bar list, the list includes several hundred names. The only way security personnel could screen the list at ACPs was to manually search dozens of printed pages filled with names. In addition to simply enforcing the bars, the purpose of identifying and stopping these individuals before they entered the installation was to reduce crime on post. The garrison commander took on the challenge and formed a team that included members of the provost marshal's physical security office (PSO) and personnel from the directorate of information management. Working with limited money and a self-imposed short suspense, the garrison team identified, procured, modified, and employed an effective automated system in three weeks. The system cost less than $4,000 and in three months identified a dozen barred persons and one individual with suspended on-post driving privileges attempting to illegally enter the post. The manual system used previously identified only an average of six violators per year.

In seeking a solution, the garrison team initially focused on systems it had been assessing for several months. These systems were in use at some other Army installations. The challenges with these systems were that they were expensive, costing up to $250,000, and in most cases could not perform the necessary task without software modifications. Even if the software could be modified to perform searches for barred persons, the cost of these systems was simply too great.

In an effort to find a more economical solution, the garrison team began looking to the civilian sector to find businesses that might be screening for individuals on watch lists. The garrison team identified a potential solution being used to check identification (ID) cards at casinos, nightclubs, bars, and other establishments that developed local watch lists or screened for underage persons. Although this system required some software modifications, it was a low-cost system that could be fielded almost immediately. The initial intent was to use this off-the-shelf system as a short-term solution until funds could be obtained to purchase a more permanent system similar to those in use at some other Army installations.

In September 2006, Fort Leavenworth began using handheld ID card readers at ACPs to screen for individuals who were barred from post or had suspended driving privileges. The initial system consisted of handheld ID card readers and a stand-alone computer. The PSO analyzed the system's capabilities and developed protocols for importing the lists of those who were barred from post or had suspended driving privileges and for extracting and recording every transaction that occurred in each reader. Using this system, Fort Leavenworth security personnel have been able to scan Department of Defense and other government ID cards and U.S. driver's licenses. Information from the ID card is matched against databases of individuals who are barred from the installation or have suspended driving privileges. The readers are deployed in the ACP lanes for vehicles without installation decals. When the name on a scanned ID card matches a name on the bar list, a screen pops up and gives a list of potential matches. The security personnel then verify the name on the printed copy of the lists kept at the ACPs.

Because the system has been so successful, Fort Leavenworth is building on it instead of simply using it as an interim solution. The PSO has expanded the initial capability of the readers to include scanning for "most wanted" terrorists and criminals on lists from national agencies, several surrounding states, and nearby metropolitan areas. The PSO will continue to build these watch lists to enhance security and reduce crime on the installation. Although no direct linkage can be drawn between the use of the ID card readers at the ACPs and the number of shoplifting cases at the post exchange (PX), detected cases of

shoplifting at the PX over similar three-month periods before and after use of the system were down by 95 percent. Additionally, Fort Leavenworth will procure and employ scanners in the decal lanes at the ACPs now that the concept has proven successful.

To learn more about the system in use at Fort Leavenworth or to make recommendations to improve the system, please contact Mr. Eric Cashin, PSO, Office of the Provost Marshal, at (913) 684-3536 or via e-mail at <*eric.cashin@us.army.mil*>.

Mr. Cashin has an extensive background in the design and implementation of electronic security and building automation systems. He transferred from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of the Army at Fort Leavenworth in March 2006. He serves as the installation's subject matter expert for electronic security.

Colonel Weathersbee has a bachelor's degree in sociology from the University of Virginia and master's degrees in administration from Central Michigan University and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. His military education includes the military police officers basic and advanced courses, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. Among his assignments, Colonel Weathersbee served as deputy provost marshal and special weapons security officer, 56th Field Artillery Command, Schwaebisch Gmuend, Germany; installation military police operations officer, Fort Bliss, Texas; commander, 978th Military Police Company (Combat Support), Fort Bliss; assistant brigade operations and training officer for the 220th Military Police Brigade (U.S. Army Reserves) in Maryland; and operations and training officer, then executive officer, 519th Military Police Battalion (Combat Support), Fort Polk, Louisiana. After duty in the Antiterrorism Directorate at Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, he returned to Fort Leavenworth to command the 705th Military Police Battalion. He was assigned to the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, then attended the Army War College, and assumed command of the Fort Leavenworth garrison in August 2006.

MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide

MILITARY POLICE is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photos in PowerPoint® or Microsoft® Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to *MILITARY POLICE* must be accompanied by a written release by the author's unit or activity security manager prior to publication. All information contained in the article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. *MILITARY POLICE* is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

Send submissions by e-mail to <*mppb@wood.army.mil*>. If you prefer to send a hard copy, send it to *MILITARY POLICE* Professional Bulletin, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1081, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926.

984th Military Police Company (Immortals)*

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 14 July 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 984th Military Police Company.

Activated 1 August 1942 at Camp Riley, Minnesota.

Reorganized and redesignated 10 August 1945 as the 984th Military Police Company, Aviation.

Inactivated 1 December 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.

Redesignated 29 December 1966 as the 984th Military Police Company and allotted to the Regular Army.

Activated 25 February 1967 at Fort Carson, Colorado.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II
European-African-Middle Eastern Theater—Streamer without inscription
Southwest Asia
Defense of Saudi Arabia; Liberation and Defense of Kuwait; Cease-Fire

Decorations

Army Superior Unit Award for 1996-1997

**An official special designation is a "nickname granted to a military organization" which has been authorized by the Center of Military History and recognized through a certificate signed by the Secretary of the Army.*

Dedication

The following members of the Military Police Corps Regiment have been lost in the War on Terror since our last issue. We dedicate this issue to them.

Specialist Wilson A. Algrim	759th Military Police Battalion Michigan Army National Guard
Sergeant Kenneth E. Bostic	519th Military Police Battalion Fort Polk, Louisiana
Sergeant First Class Daniel A. Brozovich	1st Battalion, 213th Air Defense Artillery Regiment Pennsylvania Army National Guard
Airman First Class Leebernard Chavis	372d Military Police Battalion Moody Air Force Base, Georgia
Sergeant Mickel D. Garrigus	91st Military Police Battalion Fort Drum, New York
Corporal Nathan J. Goodiron	1st Battalion, 188th Air Defense Artillery Regiment North Dakota Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Darrel D. Kasson	259th Security Forces Company Arizona Army National Guard
Sergeant Courtland A. Kennard	720th Military Police Battalion Fort Hood, Texas
Specialist Chris Kleinwachter	1st Battalion, 188th Air Defense Artillery Regiment North Dakota Army National Guard
Staff Sergeant Gregory W. G. McCoy	720th Military Police Battalion Fort Hood, Texas
Private Bobby Mejia II	759th Military Police Battalion Michigan Army National Guard
Sergeant Ashly L. Moyer	793d Military Police Battalion Bamberg, Germany
Private First Class Michael K. Oremus	718th Military Police Battalion 8th U.S. Army
Sergeant Brandon A. Parr	793d Military Police Battalion Bamberg, Germany

Staff Sergeant Lawrence L. Parrish	110th Engineer Battalion Missouri Army National Guard
Sergeant Michael C. Peek	793d Military Police Battalion Bamberg, Germany
Sergeant Joseph W. Perry	503d Military Police Battalion Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Sergeant First Class James D. Priestap	210th Military Police Battalion Michigan Army National Guard
Corporal Jeffrey G. Roberson	95th Military Police Battalion Kaiserslautern, Germany
Sergeant Paul T. Sanchez	91st Military Police Battalion Fort Drum, New York
Staff Sergeant Michael A. Shank	95th Military Police Battalion Kaiserslautern, Germany
Private First Class Kenny F. Stanton Jr.	718th Military Police Battalion 8th U.S. Army
Specialist Brandon L. Stout	210th Military Police Battalion Michigan Army National Guard
Specialist Chad J. Vollmer	759th Military Police Battalion Michigan Army National Guard
Sergeant Christopher D. Young	3d Battalion, 160th Infantry Regiment California Army National Guard

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Articles from recent issues of *Military Police* are now available for download online at <*http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/default.htm*>.

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Military Police Heroism

By Mr. Andy Watson

In this installment, two groups of military police Soldiers are listed along with the featured examples of individual heroism. Although these Soldiers served in different times and conflicts, they all performed as proficient military police. As always, it is challenging to list only a few examples of military police heroism in the space allotted.

Private First Class Paul V. Healey
Distinguished Service Cross
Vietnam

Private First Class Healey was serving with B Company, 716th Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade, when the Tet Offensive began in January 1968. The battalion was stationed in Saigon and thought to be in an area relatively safe from major fighting until the surprise attack. Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese forces attacked nearly all major cities and many American bases in South Vietnam, as well as the American embassy at Saigon. Private First Class Healey was on patrol with other members of his unit when they received the call that the embassy was under attack.

What follows is best described by his medal citation: "Private First Class Healey distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 31 January 1968 while serving with a military police reaction force during a combined VC and North Vietnamese Army offensive against Saigon. The enemy had launched concerted attacks on installations throughout the city, and his unit was called to dislodge a VC suicide squad which had taken control of the American embassy compound. Heedless of enemy fire directed at him, Private First Class Healey rammed the main gate of the embassy with a jeep in an attempt to gain entrance to the compound. When the gate failed to open, he shot the lock off with a pistol and fearlessly led a charge into the bullet-swept grounds. Braving a savage hail of automatic weapons fire and exploding grenades, Private First Class Healey moved from position to position, killing eight insurgents with rifle fire and grenades as he advanced. He then moved to the rear of the compound to rescue an embassy officer trapped on the second floor of a house occupied on the ground floor by VC. Fully exposed to withering hostile fire, he raced across the open lawn and hurled a riot gas grenade into the building. The insurgents continued to resist, and he fearlessly approached the building a second time through intense fire and tossed weapons and ammunition up to the unarmed officer. Assured that the man had a means of defending himself, Private First Class Healey withdrew to cover and placed fierce fire on the VC in the building until they were annihilated. His dauntless and aggressive efforts in close combat saved the life of the fellow American and were instrumental in the successful defense of the United States embassy."[1]

During Private First Class Healey's assault, one of the VC attackers he shot threw a grenade that bounced off Healey. Private First Class Healey moved behind the VC, with the enemy absorbing the blast.[2] Speaking frankly of his accuracy in taking out the enemy, Private First Class Healey explained, "Every time a VC moved from behind a flower pot, I shot him."[3] In the coming weeks, members of the 716th were constantly on the attack in Saigon, with numerous firefights erupting through the city. From the end of January through the first weeks of February, the 716th Military Police Battalion lost 27 military police Soldiers killed in action with an additional 45 wounded.

First Lieutenant Ronald Baughman,
Corporal John Apostol, and
Corporal Amando Halnais
Soldier's Medal
Korea

First Lieutenant Baughman, Corporal Apostol, and Corporal Halnais were serving with the 622d Military Police Company on 12 August 1950. After receiving reports of artillery fire near Kumhae, Korea, elements of the company went to investigate.[4] They discovered that an ammunition truck was burning on the main supply route between Pusan and Masan, halting traffic and posing an immediate danger to numerous bystanders. Knowing that the bomb disposal team they had requested could not reach the area in time, First Lieutenant Baughman, Corporal Apostol, and Corporal Halnais immediately climbed into the truck and started unloading ammunition.[5] Due to the heat of the fire, the hands of Corporal Apostol and Corporal Halnais were burned. The truck's dangerous cargo was unloaded and the important supply route remained open.

Private First Class Albert F. Cleary
Distinguished Service Cross
World War I

Private First Class Cleary was serving with the 117th Train Headquarters and Military Police Company of the 42d Division on 21 July 1918 when the town of St. Hilaire-au-Temple, France, came under attack.

Private First Class Cleary's citation reads: "The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Albert F. Cleary, Private First Class, U.S. Army, for extraordinary heroism in action at St. Hilaire-au-Temple, France, on the night of July 21, 1918. While on duty as a town patrol during an enemy aerial bombardment, Private First Class Cleary, disregarding his own danger, remained at his post and continued to make his rounds to see that all other troops were under cover until he was struck by an enemy aerial bomb and made the supreme sacrifice."

Specialist 4 Robert L. Scott
Silver Star
Vietnam

Specialist 4 Scott was serving with the 716th Military Police Battalion when the VC launched an offensive in May 1968. On 5 May, Scott was on patrol when his unit was dispatched to assault the VC-controlled Phan Thanh Gian Bridge.[6] Joining the military police Soldiers in the attack against the VC were South Vietnamese soldiers and members of the Vietnamese National Police. Assessing the situation, Specialist 4 Scott described the scene: "The Viet Cong were holed up in a group of houses across the river . . . After helping several of the hundreds of the refugees across the partially blown-up bridge, we moved across to get a better firing position."[7]

Once the firefight began, the VC poured machine gun fire on the American and South Vietnamese troops. Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, chief of the Vietnamese National Police, was at the front of the assault when he was struck by the VC fire. Specialist 4 Scott grabbed the general and pulled him to the safety of a nearby house and then returned to the firefight. ". . . I went back and fired about five clips into the top floor of the house when I saw this VC pulling a pin on a grenade. I am sure I got him," said Specialist 4 Scott.[8] Cut off from their forces on the other side of the river, Specialist 4 Scott and others made their way to safety by walking through neck-deep water for a block and then pushed their way through the floor of a house on the river.[9] Recognized for his rescue of Brigadier General Loan under fire, Specialist 4 Scott received the Silver Star.

Brigadier General Albin F. Irzyk, Commanding General U.S. Army Headquarters Area Command, congratulates Sergeant Scott after presenting him the Silver Star.

Corporal James C. Foster, Corporal Robert Harley, Corporal William J. St. Pierre, Private First Class Donald P. Chaput, Private First Class James O. Eberhard, and Private First Class Harold R. Farnsworth
Bronze Star for Valor
Korea

These military police Soldiers served with the X Corps Military Police Company (Provisional), which was formerly C Company of the 720th Military Police Battalion. A detachment of military police Soldiers from the company was directing convoys on the narrow mountain roads between Hagaru and Koto-Ri on 28 November 1950 when Chinese Communist forces blocked the roads and began to surround American forces. The military police Soldiers joined a nearby Marine Corps company in defending the area and would remain separated from the rest of their unit for another month. While assisting in the defense of the perimeter, fighting both the enemy and the bitter cold, the six military police Soldiers volunteered to evacuate wounded personnel from the Chosin Reservoir area.[10] Over the course of two days, using a jeep or sled and sometimes just walking, the military police Soldiers brought wounded personnel to be evacuated from a nearby airstrip.[11] Gathering the wounded, the military police Soldiers were exposed to gunfire and were under constant enemy observation.

Specialist 6 (Criminal Investigation Division [CID] Special Agent) James T. Abbott
Soldier's Medal
Vietnam

Specialist 6 Abbott was recognized for his selfless service while attempting to apprehend a Soldier who was indiscriminately firing a weapon into a company area.[12] The incident took place on 11 January 1971 at Camp Evans in the Republic of Vietnam. Specialist 6 Abbott was trying to

convince the shooter, first verbally and then at gunpoint, to surrender his weapon when the shooter mortally wounded the special agent.[13] Awarded a posthumous Soldier's Medal, Specialist 6 Abbott would again be recognized in 1993 as the CID building at Fort Knox, Kentucky, was memorialized in his honor.

Staff Sergeant John McCaughey
Silver Star and Bronze Star for Valor
World War II

Staff Sergeant McCaughey served with the Military Police Platoon of the 1st Cavalry Division, later to be designated the 545th Military Police Company. Staff Sergeant McCaughey and his fellow military police Soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division accompanied forward elements during the division's push into the Philippines, preventing enemy infiltration and establishing traffic points.[14] Keeping the traffic flowing and maintaining order in their areas of control proved to be difficult as lines of support were stretched, and often the military police Soldiers were isolated.

Far from being a mop-up mission, the drive to Manila had numerous transportation and supply complications. During one of these difficult convoy escort missions, Staff Sergeant McCaughey was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor for ". . . guiding a cavalry unit to a river crossing . . . assembling the force once across, and accomplishing the mission without regard to personal safety."[15] On 3 May 1945, Staff Sergeant McCaughey was on a reconnaissance patrol with his unit when they encountered a sizeable force of Japanese soldiers.[16] As the firefight ensued, Staff Sergeant McCaughey voluntarily exposed himself to draw fire from the concealed enemy forces and was mortally wounded.[17] He posthumously received the Silver Star for his actions during the battle in Laguna Province and is buried at the Manila American Cemetery.

Endnotes

[1] Department of the Army, General Orders No. 1173, 18 March 1968.

[2] Major Gary A. Sorensen, editor, "Healy Awarded DSC for Heroics," Military Police Journal, Volume XVII, No. 12, July 1968, p. 29.

[3] Ibid.

[4] First Lieutenant Joe C. Gunn, editor, "Action Awards," The Provost Marshal's School Training and Newsletter, January 1951, p. 5.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Major Gary A. Sorensen, editor, "One of Many Heroes in VN," Military Police Journal, Volume XVII, No. 12, July 1968, p. 28.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Department of the Army, General Orders No. 73, 13 April 1951.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Department of the Army, Citation "Soldier's Medal" issued posthumously to Specialist 6 James T. Abbott.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Major Harold Rupkey, 1st Cavalry Division Provost Marshal's report, "Unit History," 11 July 1945.

[15] Major Harold Rupkey, 1st Cavalry Division Provost Marshal's report, "Bronze Star Medal," 11 July 1945.

[16] Major Harold Rupkey, 1st Cavalry Division Provost Marshal's report, "Unit History," 11 July 1945.

[17] Major Harold Rupkey, 1st Cavalry Division Provost Marshal's report, "Luzon Campaign/Silver Star Medal," 11 July 1945.

Mr. Watson is the U.S. Army Military Police School historian.



Vehicle Registry: 60 Years of History

By Mr. Robert Szostek

The United States Army, Europe (USAREUR) Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) celebrated its 60th anniversary in 2006. Less than one year after D-Day, the RMV was created in the rubble and chaos of postwar Germany. First established in Frankfurt in May 1946, it kept track of the cars that Soldiers acquired or brought into Germany. Today's RMV operates as a nonappropriated fund activity under the operational control of the USAREUR provost marshal and is located at Taylor Barracks in Mannheim. The organization operates around the clock every day of the year and monitors the operations of 24 field registration stations throughout Germany. Its automated system also includes U.S. Army units in Italy.

Fifty employees keep track of more than 100,000 registered privately owned vehicles (POVs), 240,000 driver's licenses, and nearly 6,000 privately owned firearms (POFs) with its vast database. The RMV also establishes policy and creates the publications that govern driving and registering vehicles as well as owning and registering POFs in Germany. These regulations must conform to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization status of forces agreement and German laws.

"The registry has gone through many changes over the years," said the current registrar, Tom Lorenzini. Ironically, one sign of the times is that in December 1958, the number of POVs actively registered was 92,044, which is not far from the current total.

In the first years of the RMV, USAREUR license plates were American-style, with a white letter "E" for European Theater of Operations, followed by four numbers on a green background. In those days, only higher-ranking officers were allowed to own a POV overseas. Those first pressed-steel license plates were made locally in Germany. However, the tons of salt dumped on German streets in winter corroded the plates so badly that aluminum plates from the United States were used from 1962 until 2000, when

the RMV itself started buying the blanks locally and making the plates. Later plates featured many different background colors with varying combinations of letters and numbers until white plates with black characters were introduced in 1983. A black stripe across the top and bottom of the plates was added two years later to keep them from standing out so much.

"These plates are still in use today as temporary plates, but their days are numbered as they will be phased out over the next year. Security has often been an issue in the past. In the old days, generals, colonels, warrant officers, sergeants major, chief master sergeants, and master chief petty officers received special plates, but that was changed in 1978 because of the threat from Baader-Meinhof terrorists," said Lorenzini. The current "look-alike plates" were introduced for security reasons in July 2000 so that the POVs of USAREUR and U.S. Air Force, Europe personnel would be less conspicuous on the road. These plates closely resemble German license plates but have lettering reserved solely for U.S. forces personnel and their family members.

Last year, after many years of negotiations and final approval by German authorities, the RMV began converting its license plates to genuine German plates. When the changeover is fully implemented, all U.S. forces personnel and their family members will receive German license plates from the area where they are stationed. Since the implementation of this program in January 2006, it has expanded to 17 of the 24 registration stations throughout Germany. The RMV itself makes the license plates used by U.S. forces personnel to ensure positive control and to save money. It is cheaper to make the plates than to purchase them as a manufactured product.

In the early years of the RMV's existence, the number of U.S. forces personnel and family members involved in traffic offenses was not high. Over the past few years this has changed as German police have intensified traffic enforcement measures. The RMV processes hundreds of thousands of traffic citations worth millions of dollars in fines, as well as suspensions and revocations. The current average is only about one citation per registered car per year but the penalties for violations have increased significantly as German authorities have also stiffened fines for violators.

Recently, the RMV has been taking care of the vehicles of deployed Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines to reduce or eliminate vehicle-related problems for them while deployed. This extra service was first offered during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

From its birth at the end of World War II to its numerous actions in support of the War on Terror, the RMV has carried out its mission and provides a valuable service to USAREUR personnel. The RMV has a comprehensive Web site at <*http://rmv.hqusareur.army.mil*> with information on all aspects of registering a POV, license requirements, POF registration, and all the forms and regulations associated with its varied missions.

Mr. Szostek is the police liaison and public affairs officer (PAO) for the USAREUR Office of the Provost Marshal. He has served as PAO for both the 14th Military Police Brigade and 42d Military Police Group.

Web Site Provides Valuable Information About Training Resources Available at Fort Hood, Texas

The Fort Hood Training Capabilities Web site at <*https://mdtt.hood.army.mil/capability/main.html*> is a single online entry point for III Corps and Fort Hood's Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) and Joint, Interagency, and Multinational (JIM) training capabilities. The site provides users with training resource descriptions, scheduling instructions, and resource information links to help match training requirements with Fort Hood's vast array of training resources. Fort Hood is one of the premier Army locations providing Soldiers with a wide variety of realistic maneuver areas and live-fire training ranges designed to support training at both the individual and collective levels. Visit the Fort Hood Training Capabilities Web site today and learn about the resources available to enhance your training mission.

Military Police and Engineer Special Brigades: The Normandy Invasion

By Mr. Andy Watson

The invasion of Normandy was enormous. Aside from its historical impact and effect on the course of World War II, it was a massive effort that encompassed many thousands of Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen among the Allies. As with other major battles and invasions during World War II, the Military Police Corps not only participated but had an active role in ensuring victory.

Planning for the invasion, military strategists strived to ensure success on all levels. Military police missions such as circulation control, force protection, and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) management would require numerous military police units. Based upon their need, there would be a large number of military police involved in the landings at Normandy. Consider just the divisional military police units included in the assault forces for 6 June 1944—1st Military Police Platoon, 1st Infantry Division; 29th Military Police Platoon, 29th Infantry Division; 4th Military Police Platoon, 4th Infantry Division; 90th Military Police Platoon, 90th Infantry Division; and the military police platoons of the 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions. (Although listed as divisional military police platoons, these units were larger and actually closer to company strength.)

Military police units at the corps level tasked for the invasion included Companies A and B of the 507th Military Police Battalion, with B Company becoming VII Corps' Military Police Company. The 518th Military Police Battalion's companies would be divided between the V and VII Corps. The 428th Military Police Escort Guard Company would be assigned to V Corps for the invasion and later attached to various divisions within V Corps. Company C of the 509th Military Police Battalion, a First Army military police unit, would also take part in the invasion. Some First Army and V and VII Corps military police Soldiers were freed from their normal assignments and attached to a relatively new type of unit, engineer special brigades (ESBs).

Although named engineer special brigades, these units were composed of many different branches of service needed for the assault. Some of the specialties found within ESBs were engineers, amphibious truck companies, signal units, chemical decontamination sections, quartermaster units, and military police units. Military police units assigned to the ESBs included the 449th Military Police Company, which was attached to the 1st ESB and took part in the D-Day invasion. The 301st and 595th Escort Guard Companies were also attached to the 1st ESB and would arrive a few days later to assist in EPW control. The Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group contained the 5th and 6th ESBs as well as Companies C and D of the 783d Military Police Battalion and the 302d Military Police Escort Guard Company. The 210th Military Police Company was attached to the 5th ESB, and the 214th Military Police Company was attached to the 6th ESB. Other escort guard military police companies attached to the ESBs would serve following the initial landings.

Through amphibious training and conditioning, these Soldiers honed their military policing skills on beaches in the United States and England as they waited for the assault. Attachment to an ESB meant constant training and also a frontline position against a heavily defended beach. Units attached to the ESBs also wore a conspicuous arc on their helmet, which a few veterans have referred to as the "high-water mark." Similar to the brassard and ubiquitous "MP," this was another symbol for instant recognition. Though the patterns differed between the ESBs and their landing areas, the arc signified personnel who were authorized to remain on the beach. ESB members would remain on the beach under fire while clearing mines, traffic, EPWs, and any other obstacles necessary for the invasion to succeed.

The first and third platoons and a portion of the second platoon of the 214th Military Police Company were directly attached to the 149th Engineer Battalion. The remainder of the second platoon was attached to the 74th Ordnance Battalion. The military police trained within these units for the coming battle. On 6 June 1944, the Soldiers of the 214th Military Police Company were en route to Omaha Beach when they had to abandon their transport. Their

landing craft was hit, first by mines and then by German artillery. Evacuating the burning craft, the Soldiers made their way to the "Dog White" section of the beach in neck-deep water. Once on the beach, brigade members realized that the previous assault group of infantry and Rangers was pinned down by devastating enemy fire. Bolstering the first assault group's forces, ESB Soldiers from all branches helped push the enemy back. Members of the 214th Military Police Company immediately took over traffic control and evacuated the wounded under enemy fire. Despite the danger, only four members of the company were wounded on the beach. As the fighting moved inland, the 214th established traffic control points and, by 13 June 1944, created a brigade stockade for EPWs. For their part in the assault, Staff Sergeant William T. Orr and Sergeant James S. Powell of the

Military police on a landing craft vehicle, personnel (LCVP) awaiting transport to Omaha Beach as a wounded Coast Guardsman is transferred to a larger vessel.

German prisoners are searched and questioned at the Normandy beachhead in 1944.

214th Military Police Company were awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in action against the enemy. Also recognized within the 214th were First Lieutenant O. L. Davis, Staff Sergeant Donald Wesslund, Private William J. Dollar, and Private George F. Lord Jr., who were awarded the Bronze Star Medal.

The 210th Military Police Company landed on the "Easy Red" section of Omaha Beach. During the first days of the landings, the Soldiers of the 210th Military Police Company helped medics and provided security for the 5th ESB headquarters, in addition to their primary task of traffic control. In the days following 6 and 7 June 1944, the 210th expanded its duties into law enforcement to prevent pilfering and apprehend Soldiers who had gone absent without leave. Two military police Soldiers from the 210th were wounded on 7 June 1944 and evacuated to England for hospitalization. The 210th would continue to have casualties from beach operations in the weeks following the initial assault.

At the time, the 302d Military Police Escort Guard Company was not considered a frontline unit since 57 percent of its members were "limited service" personnel averaging 28 years of age. However, the 302d landed on Omaha Beach on the afternoon of 6 June 1944 with its elements scattered on the "Easy Red" and "Easy Green" sections of the beach. During the first few days of the assault, the 302d had numerous casualties from artillery and mortar fire but persevered and established a stockade for EPWs. By 20 June 1944, the stockade had received and processed 3,290 EPWs.

The 449th Military Police Company took part in practice invasion operations for six months with the 1st ESB. During breaks in training, the military police Soldiers would also perform military police duties in nearby English towns. The 449th also had the added responsibility of guarding the top secret planning room for the 1st ESB portion of the invasion. The 449th landed on Utah Beach at approximately 0800 hours on 6 June 1944. Although enemy resistance was lighter than on Omaha Beach, there was a constant threat of artillery and sniper fire. To counter these dangers, the 449th kept men and vehicles moving off the beach to make room for incoming waves of Soldiers and supplies. The military police Soldiers also oversaw EPW operations and within four days had supervised the removal of 4,000 EPWs to England. Casualties for the 449th during beach operations consisted of seven military police Soldiers wounded and one killed. The following 449th members were awarded the Bronze Star Medal: Lieutenant E. J. Barattino, Technician Fourth Class D. Feingold, Corporal E. G. Streich, Corporal J. Feinstein, and Private H. Kuperberg.

In the days immediately following the initial assault, other ESB military police units landed at Normandy. The 301st and 595th Escort Guard Companies maintained beach evacuation pens filled with German EPWs and processed the stream of new prisoners. Companies C and D of the 783d Military Police Battalion assisted in directing the considerable amounts of beach traffic four days after 6 June 1944.

In the coming months, beach operations became more routine and less dangerous. Battle lines moved inland and many military police units followed. Most military police units attached to the ESBs were reassigned, but they continued processing many thousands of EPWs and also kept supply lines operational. Although the beachhead was secure, the war in Europe loomed ahead.

Mr. Watson is the U.S. Army Military Police School historian.

Corporal Ernest Streich, 449th Military Police Company, speaks to a German prisoner, 8 June 1944, at Utah Beach.

Military Police Museum Begins Exhibit Improvements

The museum's introductory cases present the five modern military police functions of area security, police intelligence operations, internment/resettlement operations, law and order operations, and maneuver and mobility support. The mannequins depict Soldiers from different time periods of military police history.

By Mr. Jim Rogers

In 2006, the staff of the U.S. Army Military Police Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, began a comprehensive exhibit upgrade process that will eventually encompass the entire exhibit gallery. The exhibit improvements will employ new graphics, photos, artifacts, and interpretive panels. Existing dioramas and exhibit cases will be improved with better materials, lighting, and display techniques. The focus of the improvements will be the incorporation of artifact-friendly exhibit furniture and techniques.

The first step was the installation of a new introductory exhibit at the gallery entrance, featuring the five modern military police functions in a historic context. A graphic timeline of the military police heritage from 1776 to 2006 is also featured in this entry area.

The museum's World War II area was the first existing exhibit to be targeted for improvement. This area incorporates a relatively large gallery in order to accurately portray a significant portion of military police history. The exhibit interpretation focuses on the birth of the Corps, home front security, operations in the varied theaters of war, African-American military police, Ludendorff Bridge operations, amphibious operations, circulation control, military police helmet markings, security at war crimes trials, and postwar occupation service. Frequently, the biggest challenge for the museum staff is to condense huge amounts of historical information to a text length and type size designed for comfortable reading by museum visitors. New and colorful graphics are included whenever possible, including large photos of applicable campaign medals. Artifacts chosen for

The new museum entrance sign features the branch symbol with a photo of the museum's Harper's Ferry pistols and the museum's mission statement.

the exhibit include military police uniforms, equipment, awards, insignia, and enemy equipment.



This insignia was worn by First Lieutenant John Hyde of the 9th Armored Division military police during his service in the European Theater in 1944-45.

The museum's "immersion" or walk-through diorama, featuring military police operations at the Ludendorff Bridge in March 1945, has always been popular with visitors. During this renovation, the diorama received a face-lift featuring new mannequins and more authentic props. The armored car and jeep now have drivers, and the two military police mannequins represent the military police of the 9th Armored and the 9th Infantry Divisions. All mannequins were refitted with well-researched replica clothing and equipment. Both of the military police figures are based on contemporary historic photographs of the operation. During the research to support the diorama improvements, museum staff had the unexpected benefit of the recollections of a veteran of the operation, retired military police Colonel John Hyde. As a first lieutenant, he commanded the 9th Military Police Company, 9th Armored Division, during the first critical day at the bridge. His input contributed to several aspects of the diorama layout and details, including the green stripe on the replica helmet on the 9th Armored Division military police mannequin, an unusual marking color that had been unknown to the museum staff.

The end result of this and future exhibit renovations is intended to educate and inspire military police Soldiers, family members, and other visitors to the museum. The next gallery slated for renovation is the Civil War exhibit area.

Mr. Rogers is the director of the U.S. Army Military Police Museum at Fort Leonard Wood. He began his museum career as an exhibit designer with the Ohio Historical Society in 1977. He has been director of the Motorcycle Heritage Museum in central Ohio and was previously the director of the Fort Bliss Museum in El Paso, Texas.

The Ludendorff Bridge diorama depicts a 9th Armored Division military police Soldier at the left and a 9th Infantry Division military police Soldier in the center, plus an impatient jeep driver at the right. Military police Soldiers and drivers were often under fire while on the bridge.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
A. Scott Jones	Freddie L. Brock	8th MP Bde	Schoffield Barracks, HI
Charles A. Tennison	Tommie Hollins	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
John G. Chambliss	Brian K. Lambert	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Mark S. Spindler	Bernard C. McPherson	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, Germany
Katherine N. Miller	Edgar W. Dahl	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Michael S. Galloucis	Michael T. Sampson	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Deborah L. Geiger	John F. Schoenrock	3d MP Grp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Scott A. Halasz	Craig P. Brott	6th MP Grp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Joe E. Ethridge, Jr.	Paul W. McDonald	701st MP Grp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Kenneth L. Prendergast	Thomas Seaman	202d MP Grp (CID)	Heidelberg, Germany
Mark S. Inch	Johnnie Jones	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Forrest R. Newton		USA Spt Act I	Camp Red Cloud, Korea
Marguerite C. Garrison		Garrison, Fort McPherson	Ft McPherson, GA
	Dorsey L. Newcomb	CMDT, MANSCEN NCOA	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Timothy A. Weathersbee		Garrison, Ft Leavenworth	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Pamela L. Martis		Garrison, Presidio of Monterey	Presidio of Monterey, CA
		Garrison, Ft Monmouth	Ft Monmouth, NJ
Wade Dennis	Jeffrey N. Plemmons	JDOG, GTMO	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
David J. Clark		USAG, Ft Drum	Ft Drum, NY
Stephen Wilkins		6th RCTG	Nellis AFB, NV
	Mark F. Offermann	III Corps PM	Ft Hood, TX
	Michael D. Hayes	MANSCEN CSM	Ft Leonard Wood, MO

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Adolph McQueen	Michael Shanner	11th MP Bde	Ashley, PA
Kevin R. McBride	Joseph Diniz	*43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Rod Barham	Andres Roman	*49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Michael Nevin	Richard Michael	*177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Dennis P. Geoghan	Kurtis J. Timmer	220th MP Bde	Gaithersburg, MD
John E. Cornelius	Scott Toy	800th MP Bde (EPW)	Uniondale, NY
Nelson J. Cannon	Daniel Lincoln	*46th MP CMD	Lansing, MI
Robert Hipwell	Virgil Akins	300th MP CMD (EPW)	Inkster, MI

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Joseph Poth	John T. C. Williamson	76th MP Bn (P)	Ft Bliss, TX
LaTonya D. Lynn	Michael E. Ashford	91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Leonard A. Cosby	Patrick R. Dawson	92d MP Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Donnie L. Thomas	Norwood L. Patterson	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Thomas P. Evans	Brenda K. Curfman	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, Germany
Michael Apodaca	Kevin P. Nolan	97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael D. Blackwell	Roger D. Macon	342d MP Bn (P)	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Hollis L. Bush		384th MP Bn (USAR)	Ft Wayne, IN
Donna W. Martin	Charles R. Kirkland	385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Robert K. Byrd	Donald L. Gower	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
James H. Mullen	Floyd A. Thomas	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Steven L. Donaldson	Ronnie E. Hamlin	508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
Bradley Graul	Mark D. Green	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
William S. Wozniak	Avery K. Jones	525th MP Bn (I/R)	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Kevin Vereen	Arthur R. Vanwyngarden	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Patrick W. Williams	Edward F. Weeks	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Thomas S. Blair	William B. Chambers	709th MP Bn	Hanau, Germany
Darryl H. Johnson	Jeffrey A. Palmer	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Frank Y. Rangel, Jr.	Jerry Craig	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Douglas L. Ingros	John R. Ewbank	728th MP Bn	Scoffield Barracks, HI
Chad B. McRee	John E. Coleman	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Ramona D. Plemmons	Melanie S. Mapuoletuli	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Michael Blahovec	Eric D. Hodges	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, Germany
Robert E. Lowe	Tony L. McGee	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Francis J. Davidson		LEC, Fort Knox	Ft Knox, KY
Barry V. Hadley	Gail A. Dippel	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, Germany
Kerrilynn A. Corrigan	John R. Mazujian	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Carter A. Oates	Patrick M. Zangarine	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Jan F. Apo	Benjamin M. Kellam	19th MP Bn (CID)	Yongsan, Korea
Rhonda P. Howard	Thomas E. Brown	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Randy D. Durian	Denise L. Young	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Jimmy L. McConico	Andre Proctor	1001st MP Bn (CID)	Ft Riley, KS
Hillary R. Baxter	Andrew F. Underwood	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Bamberg, Germany
Kevin R. Clarke, Jr.	Roberto J. Tapia	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Timothy J. Chmura	Jeremy J. Monnet	3d RGN WA, District	Ft Myer, VA
Kerry T. Skelton		USAG Picatinny	Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
Jonathan A. Johnson	Crystal L. Wallace	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

*National Guard Units

Current as of 8 March 2007

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