Maneuver Support Magazine

Maneuver Support Center

Summer 2009

MEBs Side by Side With a BCT: is the Gap Filled?

MEB: The Road to Full Operational Capability

The MEB and Its Role in Stability and Support Operations

The MEB in the Early Phases of Campaign Planning

Maneuver Support Points of Contact

United States Army Maneuver Support Center

573-563-xxxx / DSN 676- xxxx

COMMANDING GENERAL
MG Gregg F. Martin
563-6158
<gregg.martin@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY to the COMMANDING GENERAL
Dr. Rebecca Johnson
563-5521
<rebecca.johnson1@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL – ARNG
BG David B. Enyeart
563-4034
<david.enyeart@us.army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF – USAR
COL Jennifer L. Curry
528-4514
<jennifer.curry@us.army.mil>

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Corbly L. Elsbury
563-6151
<corbly.elsbury@us.army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF
COL Thomas W. Kula
563-6118
<thomas.kula@us.army.mil>

COMMANDER, 4TH MANEUVER ENHANCEMENT BRIGADE
COL Robert H. Risberg
573-596-2787
<robert.risberg@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT & INTEGRATION
Mr. Stuart D. Saulpaugh
563-5558
<stuart.saulpaugh@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR, CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT & INTEGRATION
COL Peter Tabacchi
563-7158
<peter.tabacchi@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR, MANSCEN DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING
COL John C. McClellan, Jr.
563-4123
<john-mcclellan@us.army.mil>

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PURPOSE: This publication presents information designed to keep maneuver support personnel informed of current and emerging developments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; concepts; tactics, techniques, and procedures; historical perspectives; and problems and solutions can be exchanged and discussed for purposes of enhancing professional development. However, all information contained in the submissions must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public.

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UNITED STATES ARMY MANEUVER SUPPORT CENTER

COMMANDER
Major General Gregg F. Martin

MANAGING EDITOR
Shirley Bridges

EDITOR
Rick Brunk

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR
Susan Stevens

GRAPHIC DESIGNER
Jennifer Morgan

Front Cover: Maneuver Enhancement Brigades

Back Cover: U.S. Army Soldier decontaminates his skin during Warrior task testing. Photo by Carolyn Erickson.

DEPARTMENTS

FEATURES

From the Commanding General

By Major General Gregg F. Martin
United States Army Maneuver Support Center

Teammates: HOO-AAH! And greetings from the epicenter of our Maneuver Support and Protection Enterprise and Center of Excellence (CoE)—Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Thanks for WHO YOU ARE and for ALL YOU DO in building strong warriors, leaders, forces, and families—one PERSON and capability at a time—to defend our nation through full spectrum operations in this era of persistent conflict.

This message reflects my latest thinking after nine months in this awesome command and builds on the things that I laid out in the previous issue of this magazine.

Together, we've made significant progress across the entire doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains from the new Maneuver Support Warfighting Forum and enhanced Knowledge Network to the great work being done by our three core branches and regiments—chemical, engineer, and military police.

By using the comprehensive approach and applying the 3Cs (coordinating, collaborating, and cooperating), I envision us creating a living laboratory and network of innovation and learning. We must be as adaptive and flexible at MANSCEN as our tactical units are in the fight. Working as one team, I believe we can make this vision a reality and live up to our commitment and obligation to our troops and the American people.

As an enterprise, we can leverage some unique advantages that flow from the amazing range of missions, capabilities, and expertise here at MANSCEN and Fort Leonard Wood, which include, but are not limited to, the following: developing, managing, and executing basic combat training, one-station unit training, and advanced individual training, as well as running the Army's largest NCO Academy; developing strong leaders—from NCOs, warrant officers, and lieutenants to captains and colonels; executing 66 highly technical courses; integrating and working side by side with our large population of guardsmen and reservists; training all DOD truck drivers; training our sister Services and doing the 3Cs with numerous joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational–industry (JIIM–I) partners; developing and integrating capabilities for our three branches, maneuver support, and protection and related capabilities; working with the 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) and its subordinate tactical units; collaborating with the University of Missouri system and the Leonard Wood Institute and other academic and think tank organizations; and much more!!! Indeed, we are a major intellectual and physical engine for our region, Army, and DOD. And...we GET TO do all of this in the heart of the Ozarks!!!

I've never soldiered in a more supportive place than the great state of Missouri—wonderful people and region!!! I encourage and challenge each of you to learn more about what's going on here at MANSCEN and Fort Leonard Wood and then engage with and leverage us for the good of our Army, joint force, and nation! In fact, come see us here—Fort Leonard Wood is a great place to visit, train, and even conduct leader off-sites. The well-known and prestigious RAND Corporation held its senior leader strategic off-site here this summer and observed what's going on and engaged with us!

To enhance transparent communications and to clarify my intent, I share the following, which reflects my dash 1 and includes my goals, objectives, and priorities:

We need to make our PEOPLE—military, civilians, and families—our centerpiece and main effort, while executing our MISSION: building strong warriors, leaders, forces and families—one person and capability at a time—to defend the nation through full spectrum operations in this era of persistent conflict. I challenge each of you to create and foster a climate where your people are inspired to live the Army Values, do their best, and take care of each other while accomplishing our four priority tasks:

- BUILD STRONG PEOPLE—mind, body, heart, and spirit. I ask that each of you assess your existing programs and develop new programs and methods to help every person and family become stronger—mind, body, heart, and spirit—and BUILT TO LAST and thrive in an uncertain future. Improving our effectiveness with a holistic approach to the Human Dimension is a major strategic effort at MANSCEN and Fort Leonard Wood. Please check it out on our website and partner with us in this critical, trailblazing initiative.

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- TRAIN strong, expert warriors and EDUCATE/develop strong, agile, adaptive LEADERS. I expect all of my civilian and military subordinates to advocate passionate, inspired leadership. We must develop adaptive, innovative warriors and leaders grounded in the basics, experts in their functional specialties, and ready for combat. As appropriate, we will also develop—in a way that best supports the maneuver/joint force commander—multifunctional maneuver support leaders who are confident, competent, and ready for full spectrum operations. Daily, look for opportunities to advance JIIM-I across DOTMLPF domains. Develop a culture and ethos that we are, and will develop, military and civilian "Leaders for a Lifetime" who will lead our families, communities, and nation long after we retire from our service.
- SUPPORT ARFORGEN and win the current fight. We must prepare our chemical, engineer, military police, and multifunctional maneuver support units for full spectrum operations and provide responsive capabilities to our forces worldwide. Assess operational observations and incorporate lessons learned across DOTMLPF. Look for ways to improve our ability to get the right people with the right skills and the right capabilities to the right place at the right time.
- DEVELOP and INTEGRATE maneuver support organizations and CAPABILITIES. Applying the 3Cs, help us fulfill our responsibilities as specified in AR 5-22. Help MANSCEN in its service as the TRADOC proponent and advocate for chemical, engineer, and military police organizations and capabilities, as well as for MEBs, brigade special troops battalions (BSTBs), 20th Support Command, improvised explosive device (IED) defeat, geospatial, base camps, and unmanned ground vehicles. Continue MANSCEN's momentum as a CoE. Cultivate a maneuver support ethic that focuses on the maneuver/joint force commander and our nation as the ultimate customers. Capitalize on synergies between the chemical, engineer, and military police branches as well as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), civil affairs, and others as appropriate.

Simultaneously, we must all ENGAGE our stakeholders and the American people—to include families, communities, political leaders, academia, think tanks, media, industry, nonprofit organizations, and others—to ensure that we have their understanding and support to sustain our all-volunteer force (a national treasure that must not be taken for granted). Individually and collectively, tell our story effectively and improve our Army and maneuver support image. As you do so, build relationships with key partners and always use the 3Cs. Develop a culture and ethic in which engagement becomes a natural part of ALL we do—like breathing.

Meanwhile, we are working hard to make Fort Leonard Wood THE installation of choice by asking our service organizations—whose purpose is to support our important mission and our population—to focus on and enforce a customer-focus ethic in all they do. I am asking these organizations to understand that the answer to customers is never "No" or "Yes, but…." Rather, the answer is always "Yes" or "Yes, if…." Our daily attitudes and lasting culture must be service-based; we must always think, "How may I/we serve you?"

How will we accomplish all of these things? First, we will make headway by focusing on the basics and the fundamentals and by applying the timeless principles—such as "disciplined people applying disciplined thought and taking disciplined action—of the leadership classic *Good to Great* by Jim Collins. We are using this book as a basis for focus and continuous improvement at MANSCEN and Fort Leonard Wood; I encourage you to read and apply it to your organizations as appropriate. In addition, we'll make progress by working together as one team across our maneuver support/protection enterprise; applying the comprehensive approach and the 3Cs; willingly sharing lessons learned, good ideas, and best practices; shamelessly stealing good ideas from others; and learning continuously.

Achieving true greatness means moving beyond our talent and CHOOSING the attitude and approach we take in our lives and in our work. Leadership guru John Maxwell describes and captures this concept superbly in *Talent Is Never Enough* (another book we are reading and applying at MANSCEN and Fort Leonard Wood). Let's CHOOSE to ignite a fire of passion, excitement, and energy within ourselves and our organizations as we strive to achieve true greatness, which I define below, in our professions:

- Delivering superior performance every time!
- Setting the standard for our profession—people come to us for our advice and expertise!
- Making a unique, positive, worldwide impact!
- Creating people and organizations that are Built to Last! (*Built to Last* is the classic companion to *Good to Great* by Jim Collins.)

With all of these things in mind, keep making a positive difference every day; keep supporting our troops and their families, especially those who are in harm's way; and keep the faith, knowing that you and our team are making a difference in defending our great nation!

Be SAFE, and strive to balance our important national security work with the "Five Fs": Faith, Family, Friends, Fitness, and Fun. Maintain an Attitude of Gratitude—always! Make every day count! Carpe Diem!

Thanks, and may the Good Lord continue to bless you, your units, and your loved ones! All the best—today and for the rest of your lives!!!

ARMY STRONG!

From the Command Sergeant Major

By Command Sergeant Major Corbly L. Elsbury
United States Army Maneuver Support Center

It is an honor to be a part of this exciting time at Fort Leonard Wood and to extend my first welcome to each of you, the discerning readers of the *Maneuver Support Magazine*.

As leaders, we have a professional obligation to share best practices, educational information, and lessons learned with our teammates; this magazine is a great forum to do so. It also provides me an opportunity to update you on current and future initiatives.

Our top priorities are, and will remain, as follows:

- Produce warriors capable of fighting and winning on today's battlefield.
- Develop strong, agile, adaptive leaders.
- Support Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).
- Develop and integrate relevant warfighting capabilities.
- Remain a cutting-edge joint training venue.

The foundation to these priorities is a grounded approach to discipline, thereby producing highly skilled warriors.

The warrior we deliver to the warfighting formations must not be a "basic Soldier." The MANSCEN deliverable will be infused with a warrior mentality and focus. In order to train such a Soldier, we will continue to take advantage of our veteran drill sergeant/cadre noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and their battlefield experience. The Soldiers will be honed in warrior tasks and drills. Programs such as combatives, improved rifle marksmanship techniques, and complete fitness (mind, body, and spirit) will be our trademarks. With those trademarks, discipline and attention will permeate our everyday training regimen.

The development of agile, adaptive leaders who can think quickly in complex environments—and capable of operating full spectrum—will remain an imperative. The MANSCEN Noncomissioned Officer Academy, the largest in the United States Army, trains a rigorous and relevant program of instruction that is flavored with the current operating environment. I expect our cadre to enhance the current processes, encouraging a thought-provoking methodology from our NCO students.

The Maneuver Support Center of Excellence will continue to support ARFORGEN. We must be more aggressive with our mobile training teams (MTTs) so we can go to the fighters to reduce "away time" from their home station. We are committed to delivering a warrior who is "ready to deploy," and we intend to provide a suite of flexible training options to the resetting commanders.

Today's formations make up the best-trained and best-equipped Army this country has ever put on the battlefield. As warriors, we are unmatched; but this didn't come by happenstance. As highlighted by the Secretary of the Army, our NCOs continue to be the "backbone" of every outfit. During this designated *Year of the NCO*, I ask that everyone take a moment to thank your NCOs—then get back to work; there's still much to be done!

As the MANSCEN CSM, it is my greatest privilege to support and train America's sons and daughters—with the ultimate goal of fighting and winning our nation's bidding. Disciplined and expertly trained warriors are paramount to our success. You can count on my determined efforts to provide the best full spectrum warrior possible.

See you on the high ground!

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Background: Current and Potential Employment of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

By Dr. John A. Bonin

Beginning in September 2003, the United States Army began envisioning—then converting to—a fundamentally new organizational design, while simultaneously conducting combat operations in two overseas contingencies. Later termed the *modular force*, this conversion would shift the Army from a division-based structure to a modular, brigade-based force. As described by one historian, "This massive effort would represent the most far-reaching transformation of the Army's operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s."[1] This transformation changed the Army from generating and employing divisions in decisive land operations to providing the joint commander a flexible mix of different brigades with requisite command and control (C2) for land control operations as part of an interdependent joint force. The shift makes it easier for the Army to strategically tailor land forces to the combatant commanders' full spectrum requirements and employ flexible, smaller formations distributed across an expanded operational area.

The initial modular design envisioned that a division-size force would control six basic types of brigades:

- Maneuver
- Aviation
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
- Protection
- Strike
- Tactical sustainment

The protection and ISR brigades became the most transformational, as well as the most controversial. This article will describe the conception and evolution of the original protection brigade to the current maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) and offer some potential employment options for the MEB.

Background

To most Army officers, the MEB is a completely strange and new organization that appears to threaten several single-branch structures. Field Manual (FM) 3-90.31, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*, states that "the MEB has no direct antecedents in today's force structure."[2] That is not completely correct. The Army struggled during the 20th century to find the best organizational solution for placement of maneuver support units—engineer; military police; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosive (CBRNE). In the Army's first permanent divisional structure of 1917, the 28,000-man square division not only had four infantry regiments in two brigades and an artillery brigade of three regiments as organic units but also had division trains of nearly 3,000 with a military police platoon and an engineer regiment of 1,672 personnel. The 1920 postwar infantry division, reduced to some 19,000, included an engineer regiment of 867 Soldiers and a military police company of 155 Soldiers.

For World War II, the triangular infantry division not only included an engineer battalion of 664 and a military police platoon of 73, but the division also received standard augmentation from corps or Army levels of additional engineer, military police, and chemical units. By 1961, the new Reorganization Objective Army Division-concept infantry division still retained a robust engineer battalion of 970 personnel and a military police company of 178, while the Division 86 studies added a chemical defense company with a strength of 141 in the 1980s.[3] Just before the first Gulf War, the Army reorganized corps engineer assets in the heavy division to form the division engineer (DIVENG) command of three combat engineer battalions with more than 1,000 Soldiers, while retaining military police and CBRNE companies as separate divisional troops. Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, each heavy division had an assortment of nondivisional units totaling more than 12,000 personnel that constituted its doctrinal augmentation for major combat operations in addition to its organic assets. This package included 3,490 additional engineers in a group of four battalions, a chemical battalion of 864 Soldiers, and some 512 military police Soldiers in two companies and several teams. In addition, a Reserve Component rear operations center was allocated to each division to supervise rear security. Essentially, on the eve of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army still had not solved the challenge of how to organize and synchronize "stovepiped" maneuver support assets.

During 2003-2004, the leaders of the Warrior Brigade at Fort Polk, Louisiana, offered a solution for the lack of combat support in the austere design of the new Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), built around the Stryker armored vehicle. Called the Stryker Support Group, it consolidated the United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) engineer, military police, CBRNE, and other sustainment units into an operational unit designed to provide backup support to SBCTs upon deployment. It also included a signal battalion to supervise the "digital bridge" signal companies being created outside the SBCT, but intended to



Figure 1

provide dedicated support[4] (see Figure 1). Not surprisingly, the Warrior Brigade transformed into the first Regular Army MEB—1st MEB—in 2007.

The need for a better organizational structure for maneuver support was evident during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which ad hoc headquarters provided command and control (C2) for missions where no standing headquarters previously existed. Even more flexible, adaptive headquarters will be needed for emerging missions to alleviate such ad hoc requirements."[5] Likewise, in Operation Enduring Freedom, engineer, military police, CBRNE, and other support elements experienced C2 challenges because they arrived without their normal higher headquarters. A properly tailored MEB could serve as an operational protection and maneuver support headquarters for such orphaned units.[6]

The initial drive to Baghdad by the 3d Infantry Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom also provided some new organizational models. During that operation, the division employed its Engineer Brigade in several nondoctrinal ways (see Figure 2, page 7). While providing organic battalions to directly support the division's three maneuver brigades, the Engineer Brigade received control of additional divisional and nondivisional assets, as well as responsibility for operational area management. In essence, the Engineer Brigade owned the division rear and had control of a mechanized task force and the divisional air defense artillery battalion for security at Objective Peach, an important bridge across the Euphrates River. It also supervised the 937th Engineer Group from corps in its performance of main supply route maintenance and general engineering.[7]

Later, the Engineer Brigade, located at the Baghdad Airport, conducted operations such as terrain management, life support, and force protection.[8] "The unit helped restore power, water, and sewage to portions of Baghdad,"[9] overcoming problems with personnel shortfalls, logistics support, and communications. In a similar situation, an MEB headquarters could have provided a more robust operations staff, military police Soldiers, logistics, and communications capabilities.

In addition, the Army formed an exploitation task force out of the 75th Field Artillery Brigade to conduct site operations at a number of sensitive locations in Iraq, such as suspected sites for weapons of mass destruction. The task force included technical escort, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), CBRNE, and intelligence units. Due to the importance of its task and its composition, this type of function should not be performed by an ad hoc unit.[10]

The Army has always provided augmentation support to the United States Marine Corps during major operations, and Operation Iraqi Freedom was no different. The support United States Army Central provided to the First Marine Expeditionary Force consisted of more than 3,000 personnel in two brigade/group headquarters and seven battalions with a wide spectrum of capabilities.[11] Analysis indicated that a single MEB could have provided a better single Army point of contact for the support provided to the Marines (see Figure 3, page 7).

Maneuver Enhancement Assets with 3d Infantry Division for Operation Iraqi Freedom



Legend:

ADA	Air defense artillery
BIAP	Baghdad International Airport
CA	Civil affairs
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CM	Chemical
CSE	Combat support equipment
DSA	Division support area
EN	Engineer
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
MP	Military police
MSR	Main supply route

Figure 2

United States Army Assets Provided to I MEF



Legend:

ADA	Air defense artillery
BIDS	Biological Identification Detection System
CA	Civil affairs
CBT	Combat
CM	Chemical (Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear)
MP	Military police
OD	Ordnance
PB	Panel bridge
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MRB	Multirole bridge
Recon	Reconnaissance

Figure 3

"MEBs are transformational, multifunctional units that offer tremendous potential for full spectrum operations in an era of persistent conflict."

Starting in late 2002, the National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) began a study of an organization to be dedicated to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) functions. The concept evolved over a period of time until presented as "stability and reconstruction joint commands" in the final version of Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.[12] This paper argued that while recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, and relatively small deployments of American forces, American armed forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed the defeat of the Iraqi military. This failure to establish security emboldened those who opposed the coalition.

In the view of the CTNSP editors, it was precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid, decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform the way it prepares for and executes S&R operations. The very rapid defeat of our enemies meant that the United States should have been ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly—ideally concurrently—with the end of major combat. That could only be done if planning for the S&R operations was integrated into planning from the beginning and the right skills were in-theater to begin operations concurrently with the collapse of the enemy military.[13]

"Because future contingencies could impose such diverse conditions and requirements for capabilities, U.S. forces should have a diverse set of assets capable of performing a wide variety of S&R functions. They should also be modular, flexible, and adaptable so that they can be combined and recombined to create different packages tailored to each situation. While creating such forces is a complicated task that requires detailed planning, a notional S&R command would provide a healthy portfolio of assets for most situations. It contains some combat forces—a Stryker brigade augmented with an attack helicopter battalion—for demanding security tasks. The core forces for the S&R mission are four battalions of military police, construction engineers, civil affairs, medical support, psychological operations, and other assets commonly needed for S&R tasks. . . . Such an S&R joint command might be organized into three or four brigade-size task forces for S&R missions, a combat brigade, and division-level combat service support forces. Its S&R brigades could be detached to assist combat divisions or be kept under the S&R command."[14]

Based on their analysis, CTNSP argued for two S&R joint commands organized to conduct core S&R operations across a theater of operations. One would be composed primarily of Regular Army units. The second would be in the Reserve Component but with an active headquarters and active key cadre at the next lower commands (the S&R group). At least initially, the S&R joint command would not require permanently assigned subunits except for its immediate subordinate S&R group headquarters and its special staff. However, specific battalion-equivalent units of each type would be designated as S&R units by priority mission and in operational plans and must be ready for immediate deployment.[15] Building on the concepts presented in the CTNSP paper, then-Colonel Bryan G. Watson (now Brigadier General Watson, commandant of the United States Army Engineer School) argued in his 2005 United States Army War College strategy research project for a substantial "progressive stabilization" capability for the expeditionary United States Army, to include multifunctional "stabilization brigades" in support of BCTs.[16] Conceptually, these S&R groups and stabilization brigades are MEBs.

Task Force Modularity

As part of Task Force Modularity design work beginning in September 2003, several organizational precedents had to be considered. Besides designing modular units of action (UAs)—which later became BCTs—we also considered five types of multifunctional support units of action (SUAs)—which later became support brigades—that each division would normally have. Support that UAs might need only part of the time could not be provided as permanent, organic assets. Likewise, we attempted to revise the division from a large, fixed structure with a specific set of organic units to a flexible structure, unit of employment-X (UEx) with a tailored set of support units.[17] The protection brigade was initially one of five division-level multifunctional support units considered in the use of engineer, military police, CBRNE, and air defense artillery assets. The resulting protection UA also had the mission to perform rear area security at the division level in place of a division rear operations center.

As we initially envisioned it, the protection UA was designed to use assigned assets to shape, leverage, and mitigate the effects of the operational environment to enable, enhance, and protect strategic, operational, and tactical freedom of action. The protection UA was to be a multifunctional brigade headquarters with the primary task of providing C2 for assigned, attached, or operationally controlled air missile defense, engineer, military police, and CBRNE forces operating in support of task-organized joint, interagency, and multinational forces. The brigade headquarters was to be enabled, by elements drawn from the pool of available forces, to form a mission-tailored force package designed to meet a discrete mission set in support of a



Figure 4

higher headquarters. The protection UA could operate independently of a UEx, but would normally be deployed in support of multiple maneuver UAs, a UEx, joint force command, other service, or a multinational or functional component commander. The protection UA could be assigned an area of operations or used to form a rear area headquarters. Its subordinate elements could be task-organized in support to maneuver UAs. The protection UA could provide C2 for maneuver, civil affairs, and psychological operations assets in combined arms battalions or companies, depending on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). It provided coordination and supervision of security operations for areas designated by higher headquarters. With suitable augmentation from civil affairs, psychological operations, and sustainment forces, the protection UA could also perform as an S&R brigade headquarters. The protection UA might receive CBRNE/EOD augmentation to serve as a sensitive site exploitation task force when required (see Figure 4).[18] That protection UA became today's MEB.

Current MEB Employment

Since the original conception of the MEB, several have been employed. During 2005-2006, the 555th Engineer Group was labeled a provisional combat support brigade (maneuver enhancement), but it remained organized only as an engineer group and did not have C2 over other types of units.[19] In 2008, the 110th MEB, Missouri Army National Guard, deployed as the United States brigade-level headquarters for Kosovo. The 1st MEB, Task Force Warrior, deployed to Afghanistan the same year, essentially in lieu of a BCT. For the deployment, the unit received only three focused days of mission training and had several key billet shortfalls. It had a large area of operations with four provinces—three stability-focused and one offensive operation-focused. The unit was not tailored with sufficient liaison officers, an ISR company, or information operations capabilities. The 1st MEB did receive significant interagency augmentation in Afghanistan from the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Aid, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the United States Public Health Service, and the United States Department of Agriculture. The recently activated 4th MEB, as well as additional National Guard MEBs, may be employed in the role of CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) headquarters under United States Army North control. The CCMRF is a tailored joint force capable of rapidly deploying to an incident site to provide technical CBRNE mitigation, medical, and aviation support to civil authorities.[20] MEBs in such operations would be more effective if considered by Department of the Army and FORSCOM to be similar to a BCT rather than a functional support brigade in regard to training center access and force tailoring.

Potential MEB Employment

With the agreement of the Iraqi government and the guidance of the American president, all Army combat brigades must be out of Iraq by 2010. However, selected advisory and training assistance personnel will remain through 2011. The Army has already begun designating tailored BCTs to be specifically tailored to serve as advisory and assistance brigades (AABs). As part of this new strategy, MEBs could back up the AABs with up to



Figure 5

battalion-size tactical reaction forces and provide essential support to Iraqi army divisions as part of specially organized multinational divisions. Potential advantages to this construct would be to—

- Reduce the strain on BCTs.
- Reinforce the Army's supporting role (MEBs are not BCTs).
- Provide C2 for critical enabling engineer, military police, EOD, and civil affairs Soldiers and others.

Potential disadvantages include—

- Higher security risks due to reduced combat power.
- Lack of sufficient Regular Army MEBs to sustain a viable Army Force Generation rotation (see Figure 5).

Conclusion

MEBs are transformational, multifunctional units that offer tremendous potential for full spectrum operations in an era of persistent conflict. While this article focuses on the MEB's background and several potential uses in current stability operations, the MEB also has great utility in both major combat operations in support of BCTs, as joint security area coordinators, and for domestic civil support operations. MEBs are neither BCTs nor single functional brigades. Each of the different brigades has its place in the total modular force and its unique competencies for different missions, but overlap also exists. While BCTs are primarily intended for C2 of an operational area, they can be reconfigured for stability. MEBs are the only other brigade designed to control operational areas as well as perform stability and maneuver support tasks. Functional engineer, military police, and CBRNE brigades are intended for focused efforts in those specific areas, but the MEB and its multifunctional staff also provide overlapping C2 for those functions. One of the ways for the Army to mitigate its risk of having only 45 instead of 48 Regular Army BCTs would be to add three Regular Army MEBs. These could be stationed at the divisional locations that are losing BCTs. For example, an MEB at Fort Stewart, Georgia, would provide the 3d Infantry Division the multifunctional maneuver support headquarters it needed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and provide simplified C2 for the engineer, military police, and CBRNE units already stationed there.

Dr. Bonin, a retired Army colonel, is the Professor for Concepts and Doctrine at the United States Army War College and holds the General George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies. He holds a bachelor's from the United States Military Academy, a master's in military history from Duke University and a doctorate in military history from Temple University and is a 1995 United States Army War College graduate. He served as an original member of Task Force Modularity in September 2003.

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(Continued on page 16)

4th MEB: New Unit, New Mission

By Captain Robert M. McCullough

On 16 October 2008, the United States Army activated its second Regular Army maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB)—the 4th MEB—at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. At the same time, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) and the 94th Signal Company were activated, and the 193d Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) was reactivated—all as organic units of the 4th MEB.

United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) assigned the 4th MEB training readiness authority (TRA) for the 5th Engineer Battalion and the 94th Engineer Battalion (both already stationed at Fort Leonard Wood) and the 92d Military Police Battalion (restationed to Fort Leonard Wood from Fort Benning, Georgia). The commanding general of the United States Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), in his role as senior commander at Fort Leonard Wood, also assigned administrative control of these units to the 4th MEB, which is under the TRA of 1st Infantry Division.

The 4th MEB has a dual mission—to train Soldiers for the current conflicts and to prepare for its role as Task Force Operations for the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management response force (CCMRF). Task Force Operation's higher headquarters for the CCMRF mission is Joint Task Force–Civil Support (JTF–CS), based at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The mission of this task force is to deploy to an incident site, establish command and control of designated Department of Defense forces, and provide defense support of civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support.

The MEB is one of the Army's newest concepts, as part of its transformation to a lighter, more lethal force. Developed at Fort Leonard Wood by members of the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, the MEB brings all the maneuver support facets together in a multifunctional brigade for the Army. Maneuver support operations integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key functions,

HHC 4th MEB Soldiers working as a team to problem-solve at the TOCEX

tasks, and systems of protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment to enhance the freedom of action of the supported commander (division, corps, joint task force [JTF]).

When the 4th MEB activated, it received a training focus from the Army, centering on the core competencies of MEBs. The brigade's core mission-essential task list (CMETL) is as follows:

- Conduct command and control.
- Protect the force.
- Conduct maneuver support operations.
- Conduct support area operations.
- Provide sustainment.
- Conduct stability operations.
- Conduct consequence management.

The MEB contains no organic units other than its HHC, a signal company, and a BSB. The staff includes CBRNE, engineer, and military police functional operations and planning cells. The staff also includes a fires cell, area operations section, and airspace management section that support the capability of the MEB to be assigned an area of operations. During full spectrum operations, the MEB could potentially command and control unique combinations of units, such as CBRN, civil affairs (CA), engineer, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), military police, air and missile defense (AMD), and/or a tactical combat force (TCF).

The Army gave the brigade a specific training focus when it received its CCMRF mission in December 2008—the directed mission-essential task list (DMETL). The DMETL crosswalks directly to the MEB CMETL, with the addition of "conduct defense support of civil authorities (DSCA)" in place of "conduct stability operations." Task Force Operations' CCMRF mission is: On order, Task Force Operations deploys and establishes the brigade task force at a designated location within the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) joint operations area and executes CBRNE consequence management operations in support of civil authorities to save lives, mitigate human suffering, and facilitate recovery operations in a CBRNE environment.

Task Force Operations executes the consequence management and DSCA missions in strict adherence with the principles of the U.S. Constitution and public law. When directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, USNORTHCOM provides DSCA, and Task Force Operations functions under the operational control of United States Army North (USARNORTH) and JTF–CS.

In preparation for the brigade to assume the CCMRF mission, FORSCOM identified additional units to work under the task organization of the 4th MEB. These units include an Army unit from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with robust manpower capabilities; the Marines' Chemical–Biological Incident Response Force from Indian Head, Maryland; an Air Force unit that will provide engineering capabilities, expertise, and equipment; an Air Force radiological assessment team (AFRAT) that provides rapid, global response for radiation and nuclear accidents/incidents to deliver radiological risk assessment for contingency planning, consequence management, and site recovery; and several additional transportation and chemical companies and platoons from around the country. After those units were identified and the 4th MEB published its train-up operation order for the mission, the units began their own training programs.

The first phase in training individuals or a brigade staff for DSCA is to impart a unique set of individual and leader skills, created through self-study, online training, and MEB-focused briefings—including an introduction to CCMRF, an introduction to the MEB, and functional area-specific briefings (military police, engineer, logistic). Besides typical Army individual training, an individual in the MEB can expect increased training on media awareness, the Posse Comitatus Act, antiterrorism, rules for the use of force (particularly important during a homeland mission), and CBRNE-specific tasks.

Leader training includes all of the above individual training, with some additional emphasis on DSCA. A company-level leader can expect to train on DSCA in a four-hour online course titled "Tactical DSCA." The distributed learning orients the participants and develops awareness, comprehension, and competence. All staff sergeants (serving in a sergeant first class position) and above in the brigade will complete the DSCA Phase I Online Course (8–10 hours). Senior leaders will execute a resident DSCA course focusing on intergovernmental and interagency response.

In late May 2009, the JTF–CS sent a mobile training team to Fort Leonard Wood to prepare the brigade for the CCMRF mission. The training brought together the subject matter experts from JTF–CS and Task Force Operations to train them in CCMRF mission operations. Exercising the processes and procedures of the mission, the training taught key leaders how to network with their counterparts in the task force at other bases. During the three-day span, there were about 30 classes that prepare leaders to immediately jump in and be effective in a crisis situation. Leaders also learned about methods of operation, potential issues, and possible solutions.

The first major exercise in the certification process was the Dauntless Response Command Post Exercise, conducted in a field environment. Since all of the units are spread throughout the continental United States, the exercise was distributed in a joint network node-based tactical network, so that each unit participated from its home location without having to deploy Soldiers, Airmen, and Marines to Fort Leonard Wood.

The next major phase of training was the mission rehearsal exercise for all of the units assuming the Fiscal Year 2010 CCMRF mission. This exercise, Vibrant Response 09 (VR09),

(Continued on page 22)

Regions in Transition

The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade's Role in Counterinsurgency

By Colonel Scott A. Spellmon

My introduction to the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) occurred when I assumed command of the 1st MEB more than fifteen months ago. Looking across the parade field that morning, I began to understand the intent for this new organization as the engineer, military police, chemical, and brigade support battalions assembled under one of the Army's new, multifunctional support brigade headquarters, task-organized to perform protection, mobility, and stability tasks in a division or corps support area. While there is much in the Army's modularity concepts and new doctrine that I have yet to fully grasp, I learned over the course of my recent deployment that the MEB has much potential to play an important role in today's counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.

There is a growing recognition among our senior civilian and military leaders that improving infrastructure, local economies, indigenous security forces, and local governments is just as important in COIN as offensive, lethal, direct-action operations. From my experiences in both theaters, I have seen many cases where the nonlethal tasks are even more critical to securing populations and achieving stable peace.

After years of hard work, there are regions in Afghanistan and Iraq today that are moving left on the spectrum of conflict—from insurgency to unstable peace, and from unstable to stable peace. The combat power of a brigade combat team (BCT) may not be required in those areas, or even desirable. The MEB—with its robust engineering, military police, and effects staff—offers planners another viable option for a brigade-level command and control (C2) headquarters that is capable of integrating joint, combined, and interagency capabilities necessary for regions that are not yet ready for full transition to civilian control.

The intent of this article is to highlight the 1st MEB/Task Force Warrior experiences in Afghanistan, assigned as the brigade headquarters and operational environment owner for a region in transition.

Northern Gate to Kabul

During numerous conflicts and regimes across Central Asia, Kabul has held strategic importance as the seat of Afghan government. Our area of responsibility—the provinces of Bamyan, Panjshir, Kapisa, and Parwan—has often been called the "Northern Gate" to Kabul. Through these provinces pass the major economic, political, and military lines that connect central Afghanistan to the northern markets of Mazar-e-Sharif and the country's northern neighbors. The region has a population of approximately 1.7 million, including the largely

homogeneous Hazaran population of Bamyan, the Tajik of Panjshir, and the divided Tajik/Pashtu communities in Kapisa and Parwan. The terrain throughout the area is incredibly challenging. Our Soldiers, Airmen, and Marines operate from elevations of 4,500 feet at Bagram all the way up to 11,000 feet in western Bamyan and strategic points in northern Parwan. The infrastructure throughout the region is poor, but is slowly improving due to the dedicated work of many provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) over the past seven years.

There are 31 political districts that comprise the four provinces. Placed on the spectrum of conflict, four would be to the far right in active insurgency, seven would fall in the unstable peace category, and the remaining twenty are just beginning to experience stable peace. I believe that this threat environment does not require the combat power found in our modularized BCTs. However, I would argue that a brigade-level organization is still required to continue the integration of the joint, combined, and interagency functions necessary to move these districts even further to the left on the spectrum and enable their full transition to civilian control and self-sufficiency. The MEB is a good fit for this COIN environment. Its headquarters has the staff expertise necessary to plan and provide C2 for the restoration of infrastructure, development of security forces, improvement of local governance capacity, and the many other tasks that help an indigenous government to stand on its own.

Organization and Mission

The 1st MEB did not deploy to Afghanistan with its organic home-station structure, but the headquarters did perform many of its intended doctrinal functions as outlined in Field Manual 3-90.31, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*. As one of five ground brigades assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command–East, the major subordinate commands of Task Force Warrior included—

- Two maneuver battalion task forces.
- A United States Air Force expeditionary security forces squadron.
- Three PRTs.
- An agribusiness development team.
- A human terrain team.
- A military police company.
- A signal company.
- An Air Force Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force (BEEF) detachment and facility engineer team.
- Afghan National Army (ANA) embedded training teams and police mentoring teams.

The task force headquarters also maintained interagency representation with the United States Public Health Service, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, and advisors from the United States State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In all our operations, we partnered with an ANA brigade, the Afghan National Police (ANP), and ISAF special operations forces. Broadly speaking, the mission of Task Force Warrior was to help the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) secure the people of our assigned region so that the provincial- and district-level governments could exercise and extend their authority.

Lines of Operation

To accomplish this mission with our many partners, we developed a COIN campaign across four lines of operation (LOOs): security, development, governance, and information. We reorganized a portion of the task force staff during our predeployment training to synchronize our efforts in each of these areas and maximize their combined effects. Although there is much work yet to accomplish in each of the provinces, we experienced significant progress as a direct result of the unique organization and skill sets of the MEB headquarters.

In the security LOO, Task Force Warrior conducted more than 50 battalion- and company-level offensive combat operations, including 10 air assault missions. All of these were combined operations with our Afghan partners, designed to disrupt known insurgent networks in our four most unstable districts. These were "limited offensive operations" for the brigade in the doctrinal sense, but in effect, each was a major operation for the task force. The complexity of operating on Afghanistan's isolated terrain, working at the tactical level with joint and coalition partners, and the synchronization requirements for general support enablers such as aviation; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms; and close air support brought significant brigade-level C2 requirements for every offensive mission.

Just as important as disrupting insurgent networks was the need to simultaneously develop the capacity of our ANA and ANP partners. Without a brigade-level transition team, we formed an ANSF cell from the military police operations staff to accomplish this critical task. This team worked daily to coordinate and recommend priorities for the limited resources of our operationally controlled police mentoring teams and ANA embedded training teams. This staff cell also synchronized our efforts with several contractors supporting the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs programs. Tangible effects of this effort included improved ANSF performance across many districts, as well as an incident-free voter registration period in each of the four provinces.

In the development LOO, our focus centered on road construction. While the battalions and PRTs did exceptional work across many economic sectors—including the development of new schools, medical clinics, and irrigation systems—the brigade took a regional approach with an expansive road development program. Roads are the No. 1 priority for each of the provincial governors, and we realized early

Building roads with local manual labor served multiple COIN objectives in each of the provinces.

in the deployment that improved road networks would better connect the Afghan people to their government, natural resources, and markets. The planning, budgeting, and inspection requirements for the road projects also served as a vehicle to improve the technical capacity of the provincial staffs. This effort was led by our civil-military affairs and engineer operations cells. With a generous budget from the Commander's Emergency Response Program, the brigade staff worked with the Afghan Ministry of Public Works to complete more than 280 kilometers of asphalted roads built to Afghanistan's national highway standard. These road systems will serve as the foundation for future economic development throughout the Northern Gate region.

Governance proved to be the most challenging of the four LOOs and remains so today. Throughout many meetings with the provincial governors and deputy ministers, a common trend we found across each of the provinces was a lack of ability in the staffs to perform the day-to-day functions expected of the provincial and district governments—to provide security, prioritize needs, and distribute resources. Host nation technical advisors contracted by USAID made significant strides in select government offices and proved to be of great assistance to battalion and PRT commanders.

At the brigade level, one of our principal governance efforts was working to improve Afghan rule-of-law capacity. In our assessment, the rule of law serves as the foundation for the government's ability to provide security and distribute resources. Our task force judge advocate led this effort, hired a number of local national attorneys, and developed a series of programs to reestablish rule-of-law services. In addition to the construction of district-level courts and other judicial facilities, this team partnered with our ANSF cell and conducted in-depth training in our most troubled districts to improve the efficacy of the Afghan security, judicial, and penal institutions.

Finally, the task force worked diligently to tie together all the LOOs with a nested information campaign. Most Afghans in our region obtained their news and information from the radio. Our provinces were served by five radio stations where we and our Afghan counterparts regularly attempted to highlight the significant progress being made in security, development, and local governance. Other methods of connecting with the population were used, including the traditional *shuras*, where we and our Afghan government counterparts met with large groups of citizens to hear their needs and demands.

Organizational Challenges

While I have claimed that the MEB is a good fit for this COIN environment, two additions to the current structure could make the brigade significantly more capable. First, the MEB needs organic ISR capability. Whether employed as an operational environment owner in a Stage 2 or Stage 3 COIN operation, or in a division or corps support area, the MEB commander needs the capability to see the enemy through each of our intelligence disciplines. Depending on general support coverage from the limited assets of the division or battlefield surveillance brigade is not sufficient. Secondly, the MEB needs a small staff cell of trained information operations specialists. As our doctrine suggests, information operations are often the decisive line of effort, and the MEB requires a cadre of these specialists to succeed in any mission set.

Conclusion

Today, my peers often ask a number of good questions concerning the MEB:

- What is the purpose of the organization?
- Why are the engineer, military police, and chemical battalions organized under this headquarters when there are already functional brigades in the force?
- What do these branches have to do with each other on the battlefield?

These are all valid questions and ones that I admit I'm not fully qualified to answer. But, having fought with the brigade for the past 15 months in a difficult COIN campaign, I can state that this organization has an important role to fulfill today in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether by design or happenstance, the integration of engineers; military police; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE); civil affairs; and other combat support specialists under one headquarters brings exactly the right mix of skills needed to conduct COIN operations in regions that are transitioning from insurgency to peace. As we progress in both theaters and look to transition our combat forces with other formations that can continue progress toward our operational and strategic objectives, planners must consider the MEB as a viable C2 option.

Colonel Spellmon is Commander, 1st Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and Task Force Warrior. The brigade headquarters deployed to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom from June 2008 to September 2009.

"Background," continued from page 10)

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

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence Management Response Force:

The Title 10 Initial Entry Force

By Mr. Mark T. Anderson and Mr. Matthew K. McLaughlin

"The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed…."

—George W. Bush
43d U.S. President

Deliberate or inadvertent WMD incidents pose a great and foreseeable challenge to the security of the American people. Beyond simply putting boots on the ground, the Department of Defense (DOD) can bring to bear substantial command and control (C2), logistical, and technical resources in response to requests for federal assistance. Historically, such response had been organized on an ad hoc basis, with no specific units being committed to homeland consequence management (CM) missions. However, national-level reviews of our ability to respond to WMDs and other disasters eventually led to important pieces of legislation in the mid-1990s.

This is the second of three articles designed to address the layered military response to support civil authorities and will detail the Title 10 initial entry force—the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF). (The first article, "Weapons of Mass Destruction–Civil Support Team: The Title 32 Initial Response Force," by Lieutenant Colonel Christian M. Van Alstyne and Mr. Stephen H. Porter, appeared in the Winter 2009 issue of *Maneuver Support Magazine*. The individual state—Title 32—response assets will be addressed in the third article in the series.)

Background

A terrorist attack or an accidental CBRNE incident could create catastrophic results that may overwhelm the response capacity of civil authorities. Recognizing this, Congress enacted the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, which directs the president to enhance the federal government's capabilities to prevent and respond to CBRNE incidents. These required capabilities are codified in two sections of United States Code (USC). First, 50 USC 2313 directs DOD to provide federal, state, and local CBRNE assistance and established the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs as the lead for coordinating DOD efforts. Second, 50 USC 2314 directs DOD to develop and maintain at least one terrorism rapid response team to help federal, state, and local officials respond to CBRNE incidents.

The need for timely, specialized, and effective response to a CBRNE event, combined with the expectations put forth under the National Response Framework and federal law, point to a clear need for a well-orchestrated military CM response. There are several layered components of DOD support to civil authorities. A CCMRF capability will be employed at the request of the Department of Homeland



Figure 1. CCMRF role in response to a major CM event

Security or designated lead agency when the effects of a CBRNE incident exceed state and local capabilities. State capabilities include—

- United States National Guard WMD–Civil Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) that identify CBRNE hazards and provide response advice.
- United States National Guard CBRNE enhanced response force packages (NG–CERFPs) that provide medical support, casualty search and extraction, and casualty decontamination support.

Mission

The CCMRF mission, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff CBRNE CM execution order, is: "DOD provides CBRNE CM support, as approved by the Secretary of Defense or as directed by the President, in response to deliberate or inadvertent CBRNE incidents." To meet this mission, a CCMRF is composed of forces with specialized CBRNE training and equipment as well as general-purpose forces trained to operate in a CBRNE environment. The CCMRF role in the overall response to a major CM event is illustrated in Figure 1. The CCMRFs are able to deploy rapidly, assist local civil responders and other state assets to determine the limits of the hazard, provide medical and technical advice, and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on federal military response assets.

Current Configuration

Each CCMRF mission is executed by a joint task force composed of Regular Army, United States Army Reserve, and United States Army National Guard units, other service capabilities, and interagency augmentation, numbering approximately 4,700 personnel. The current fielding plan incrementally sources three separate CCMRFs to provide the capability to respond to multiple CBRNE events. Each CCMRF is organized into a joint task



Figure 2. CCMRF response structure in a major CBRNE incident

force headquarters, a brigade-level operations task force (Task Force Operations), a brigade-level aviation task force (Task Force Aviation), and a brigade-level medical task force (Task Force Medical).

A CCMRF is designed to provide a wide range of capabilities, to include—

- Incident assessment.
- C2.
- Search and rescue.
- Medical.
- Decontamination.
- Transportation (aerial and ground).
- Mortuary affairs.
- General logistical support.

The modular, scalable design of the task force is key to its effectiveness. For smaller events, it allows for deployment of only those capabilities that are actually required. For larger events, the robust C2 structure enables the CCMRF to fill its intended role as the lead element of a DOD response. For the CCMRF response structure in a major CBRNE incident, see Figure 2.

Employment and Capabilities

If requested, CCMRFs will be employed by United States Army Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in support of the Department of Homeland Security or a designated lead federal agency. Each CCMRF contains forces for its own security, but response to civil disturbances is not part of the CCMRF mission set, and DOD adheres to the Posse Comitatus Act. Mobilization of Reserve Component forces within CCMRFs is predicated upon legal authority in specific sections of the USC.

The CCMRF's primary role when responding to a CBRNE event is to augment the CM efforts of civil responders by providing complementary and reinforcing capabilities when the effects of the event exceed state civilian and National Guard capabilities, to include—

- Hazard assessment.
- Robust C2.
- Comprehensive decontamination of personnel and equipment.
- Handling and disposal of hazardous material (HAZMAT).
- Air and land transportation.
- Aerial medical evacuation.
- Mortuary affairs.
- General logistical support to provide extended operations (sustainment).

CCMRF–One units, which are primarily Regular Army units, were assigned to NORTHCOM on 1 October 2008. CCMRF–Two and CCMRF–Three, to be composed primarily of Reserve Component units, will assume missions in the next few years. CCMRF forces are organized into FPs, which deploy in phases in response to a CBRNE event. The FPs include—

- FP1, which offers C2 and advanced echelon elements, assessment capabilities, and initial response elements, including CBRNE reconnaissance (detection and identification of CBRNE hazards) and initial decontamination and medical response capabilities.

- FP2, which reinforces FP1's capabilities and adds transportation, logistical support, security, and public affairs capabilities.
- FP3, which provides additional reinforcement, particularly for transportation and logistics missions, and adds a mortuary affairs capability.

Maneuver Support Perspective

In the CCMRF, much of the specialized capability is concentrated in Task Force Operations. While Task Force Medical and Task Force Aviation act largely within their normal doctrinally designated mission areas, Task Force Operations addresses requirements that are more specific to a CBRNE incident in support of a CM mission.

Technical support forces include units that provide mass casualty decontamination and CBRNE reconnaissance (which are CBRNE core capabilities) and technical rescue. Engineers, particularly in the 21M (firefighter) military occupational specialty, are best suited for technical rescue. In addition to military training requirements, Servicemembers in these types of units require training according to various National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes or standards or 29 Code of Federal Regulations guidelines to work effectively with their civilian counterparts. The United States Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is best suited to provide these capabilities.

A similar situation prevails with the security units assigned to the CCMRF mission. The requirement is for security of sensitive military equipment, probably in an urban environment, among a presumably friendly if understandably upset populace. It is not the CCMRF's mission to deploy nonlethal capabilities during civil control, but to interoperate effectively with civil law enforcement authorities. Only the military police core competencies include support to civil law enforcement.

The result is a Task Force Operations that looks very much like a combat support force. Specifically, it is a combination of maneuver support and logistics forces, with specialized requirements concentrated in the maneuver support arena. While a brigade combat team or other brigade-level C2 element could effectively serve as the Task Force Operations headquarters element, the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) is uniquely suited for command of engineer, military police, and CBRNE units. The MEB command structure and operational employment concept, which include CM as a core part of the mission set, provide an optimized capability for this requirement. By rapidly establishing a substantial joint task force command structure on the ground, the CCMRF ensures that DOD can respond to requests for follow-on forces with confidence that assigned units will be effectively integrated into the response.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Secretary of the Army to lead DOD efforts to improve military support for response to incidents involving WMDs. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and MANSCEN took responsibility for the core functions of requirements determination, doctrine development, organizational design, and training development/training execution for the CBRNE CM programs on 10 May 2001. These were further amplified on 9 June 2001. The new Army Regulation (AR) 5-22, *The Army Proponent System,* identified MANSCEN as the force modernization proponent for CBRNE CM. Its functions include—

- Developing and documenting concepts.
- Developing doctrine.
- Developing organizational design.
- Determining materiel requirements.
- Developing training programs.
- Developing training support requirements.
- Developing manpower requirements (except as provided in AR 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponency System*).
- Coordinating proponent initiatives with user units.

In 2007, a Government Accountability Office audit listed a number of major problems with the readiness of CBRNE units, particularly those designated to support the CCMRF program. The report questioned whether these "… units would be able to respond effectively to significant wartime or terrorist CBRNE events…." and doubted the Army's plans to improve this condition. However, the Army did not concur and described the actions it has taken, to include—

- Developing concepts and doctrine.
- Developing organizational design.
- Developing training and leadership standards.
- Developing a joint capability.

Concepts and Doctrine. Operational concepts and doctrine must be laid down as the foundation for employment of the asset. The field manual (FM) that includes the employment of the CCMRF mission in a broader civil support roll is under revision. MANSCEN is responsible for the development of tactical-level CBRNE operations doctrine (either multi-Service or Army), and provides support to joint doctrine development. The fundamental difference is the level of military operations addressed in the doctrine. A critical publication is Joint Publication 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations*, published in October 2006 by NORTHCOM. Another critical CM publication is FM 3-11.21, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations*. The current version is April 2008.

Organizational Design. The MEB is the only organization in the Army with C2 of CM forces in the Standard Requirements Code of the Table of Organization and Equipment, making CM a specified mission capability. Other

Figure 3. Examples of commercial equipment for the CCMRF mission

organizational design issues, particularly those regarding CBRNE units, are continuously under review.

Training and Leadership Standards. The Army had to lay down a training and leader development foundation for the program. From 1999 until 2006, units relied on the standards promulgated in NFPA No. 450, Guide for Emergency Medical Services and Systems; No. 472, Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident; No. 1006, Standard for Technical Rescuer Professional Qualifications; and No. 1670, Standard on Operations and Training for Technical Search and Rescue Incidents. However, these were not sufficient for the full spectrum response, nor did they address the military aspects of the mission. In 2006, the United States Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School at Fort Leonard Wood established the Mass Casualty Decontamination Course and the CBRN Responder Course to provide mandatory training for all Chemical Regiment Soldiers before they could assume the CCMRF mission. This training accomplished in less than three weeks what once took months to complete and has been a great benefit to the program. Soldiers and Airmen who attend the CBRN Responder Course now receive certifications compatible with, and recognized by, their civilian counterparts.

The United States Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood is currently reviewing training requirements for casualty extraction, search, and rescue. This technical rescue skill set currently resides in only one Regular Army engineer company and select Army National Guard units. Other TRADOC centers of excellence and schools, as well as the United States Army Medical Department Center and School, San Antonio, Texas, have been tasked to conduct a similar review for medical, C2, and intelligence fusion tasks. This review will be completed late in 2009 in time for the fiscal year 2012 to 2017 DOD program objective memorandum cycle.

Joint Capability. The CCMRF is a joint capability. The Joint Staff J-8/Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense has developed an initial capabilities document for CBRNE CM. There are also other programs of record for some of the equipment needed for this mission, either HAZMAT equipment or search-and-rescue gear. However, most of the materiel for this effort is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) and continues to be procured by the operational force. Examples of some of the COTS equipment are shown at Figure 3.

Finally, facilities are a critical component in the ability to train this mission. Training Circular (TC) 25-1, *Training Land*, and TC 25-8, *Training Ranges*, provide little guidance concerning the types of training space required for the CCMRF mission. There are several specialty training ranges, such as rubble piles, installed around the country for technical rescue training, but nothing to standardize them according to the Army mission profile for that mission. TRADOC and MANSCEN are working on this issue as part of an ongoing doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) assessment of the CCMRF mission. MANSCEN has world-class facilities to support the generating force portion of this mission.

Conclusion

As directed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, TRADOC—with MANSCEN as the office of primary responsibility—and Army stakeholders are following standard Army business practices by—

- Using the Systems Approach to Training.
- Validating training at the Structure and Manning Decision Review.
- Writing requirements documents.
- Reviewing the organizational design.

Today, through the use of communities of practice—coupled with the TRADOC Homeland Defense/Civil Support Integrated Capabilities Development Team—MANSCEN is working to resolve most of the issues identified in previous assessments and has established mechanisms for continuous improvement and feedback. Unfortunately, the threats the nation faces today make the need for a meaningful CBRNE CM response all too real. Just as with operations overseas and abroad, U.S. forces must be prepared to do everything possible to protect our nation on the home front. And whether as part of a CCMRF or under some other paradigm, maneuver support forces will always be at the heart of that response.

Mr. Anderson is Acting Director of the Homeland Defense/Civil Support Office, United States Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He has been a legislative assistant for a U.S. representative and an elected official. His assignments included rifle and scout platoon leader, decontamination platoon leader, executive officer, chemical detachment commander, and brigade chemical officer. He holds a bachelor's from the University of Illinois and a master's in public administration from Jacksonville State University. He is a candidate for a doctorate degree in technology management at Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana, with a research interest in leading virtual teams.

Mr. McLaughlin is a military development analyst in the Homeland Defense/Civil Support Office of MANSCEN. He serves as the radiological and nuclear subject matter expert and coordinates capabilities development for United States Army response to domestic WMD events. He is a former submarine nuclear power plant operator, engine room supervisor, and chief petty officer. He holds a master's in nuclear engineering from the University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and Technology). He serves as an engineering duty officer in the United States Navy Reserve, was deployed as a seaward security officer in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and commands a shipyard support unit in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

("4th MEB," continued from page 12)

took place in late July through early August 2009 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Vibrant Response is a USNORTHCOM-directed, USARNORTH-executed, joint CCMRF mission rehearsal exercise designed to train and exercise USARNORTH JTFs and CCMRF task force headquarters staff in homeland defense and civil support processes. At the end of this exercise, the Task Force Operations command and control capability was validated and key leaders and staffs were trained and ready to assume the CCMRF mission.

The final stage of the CCMRF certification process was the validation of the entire unit during an emergency deployment readiness exercise and field training exercise. This was the pinnacle training event and involved all units coming together to train at a simulated CBRNE incident site. The entire regular Army CCMRF JTF alerted, marshaled, and deployed according to actual mission timelines and procedures, then conducted consequence management operations in support of federal, state, and local authorities. This was the first full exercise of the CCMRF and presented a tremendous training opportunity.

While the 4th MEB trains for and executes its CCMRF mission, it also continues to execute its role as the FORSCOM TRA higher headquarters to the 92d Military Police Battalion, the 5th Engineer Battalion, and the 94th Engineer Battalion. Each of these FORSCOM units has a different tactical mission focus and a different Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) timeline. The 92d is preparing for future military police missions in Southwest Asia. The 5th redeployed from Iraq and its own 14-month combat tour in July 2009 and continues its engineer and military working dog team deployments to both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The 94th recently completed reset (recovery from its 15-month combat tour in Iraq and retraining in preparation for a future Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom deployment).

"The 4th MEB has a challenging future ahead—a national homeland security mission of critical importance to the United States, with continuing support to the War on Terrorism with military police and engineer units. This is a challenge the brigade enjoys, and the 4th MEB relishes its role as a key member of the great 1st Infantry Division, JTF–CS, and MANSCEN teams."

—Colonel Robert H. Risberg
Commander, 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

Captain McCullough is the fire support and effects officer for the 4th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. His most recent assignments include assistant operations officer, 3d Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, and fire support officer, 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment—both units part of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and is pursuing a master's in management and leadership at Webster University.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade:
The Road to Full Operational Capability

By Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Eining and Lieutenant Colonel Mark P. Wiesner

In April 2007, the South Dakota Army National Guard (SDARNG) began converting the 147th Field Artillery Brigade to its new formation as the 196th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB). The transformation mission brought with it numerous challenges in personnel, operations, logistics, and leadership. In addition, the MEB was tasked to transform several subordinate units to their new mission sets as a brigade support battalion with its subordinate units and signal company. The MEB received command and control over all engineer units in the SDARNG—as the long-standing 109th Engineer Group transformed to the 109th Regional Support Group—and over all military police and field artillery assets within the SDARNG. This brought the total assigned force structure under the MEB to 2,300 Soldiers. The MEB was further challenged by receiving a notification for training in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, just two years from its stand-up date.

The intent of this article is to share lessons learned and techniques the unit found helpful in becoming a fully operational MEB, capable of meeting its state and federal missions and ready for a pending deployment. The article includes a timeline of events (see table), from inception to the present, and covers the issues that arose in the areas of personnel, operations, and logistics. The article also describes the strong relationship established with the United States Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the outstanding support provided by that organization.

Timeline

2006	South Dakota National Guard accepted a combat support brigade–maneuver enhanced.
February–May 2007	Filled key leadership positions and began work on a flag, crest, TACSOP, mission-essential task list (METL), and manning document.
September 2007	Personnel attended the Maneuver Support Brigade Experiment at Fort Leonard Wood. Made initial face-to-face contacts with MANSCEN. Attended 196th MEB Activation Ceremony. Implemented carrier unit identification.
February 2008	Requested assistance visit and forecast training opportunities through MANSCEN.
March 2008	Personnel observed Captains Career Course Warfighter III Exercise at Fort Leonard Wood.
May 2008	Key staff attended MEB Commanders' Conference. MANSCEN trainers gave initial MEB brief at Sioux Falls armory. Unit planned 2-week annual training date for January 2009 at Fort Leonard Wood.
July 2008	Personnel attended the Maneuver Support Seminar at Fort Leonard Wood.
August 2008	MANSCEN subject matter experts (SMEs) assisted 196th MEB staff with military decision-making process (MDMP).
September 2008	196th MEB received notification for training.
November 2008	MANSCEN SMEs assisted 196th MEB staff with completion of MDMP exercise. Unit conducted preannual training coordination visit with MANSCEN exercise personnel.
January 2009	196th MEB conducted two-week annual training at Fort Leonard Wood.
Spring 2010	196th MEB mobilization date is expected.

Personnel

The process of assigning personnel to the 196th MEB was complicated due to the uncertainties of the continually evolving doctrine, missions, and manning of the MEB. Unit leadership was presented numerous occasions to transform Soldiers from their former positions in the field artillery and engineer worlds to the new MEB force structure. The MEB brought with it new enlisted career management fields (CMFs) and officer branches that the SDARNG had not previously experienced. In conjunction with the transformation process, the joint force headquarters for the SDARNG compiled a transformation catalog that described the new duty positions; Military Physical Profile Serial System factors of physical capacity, upper extremities, lower extremities, hearing, eyes, and psychiatric (PULHES); Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores; security clearances; training; and a myriad of additional requirements needed for manning. Once Soldiers identified their desired CMF or branch, the transformation commands within the SDARNG began selecting lateral applicants and then promotion positions for the remaining vacancies to cross-level and fill each of the transformation units, of which the 196th MEB was a factor.

A particular challenge for the MEB was identifying the specific CMF and branch requirements and idiosyncrasies for changing enlisted CMF and officer branch transfers. Some CMF and branch transfers were easy to identify and accomplish—a short three- or four-week resident Reserve Component (RC) military occupational skill qualification

(MOSQ) course or a combination of distributed learning and resident training. Other CMF and branch transfer qualifications still present obstacles after a year of coordination. The civil affairs (CA) training has limitations to CA units only, even though the MEB modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) has a CA major position listed on the MTOE. The unit's attempt to gain access for branch qualification at the Civil Affairs Officer Qualification Course (CAQC) continues to draw repeated denials of enrollment.

The MOSQ courses for CMFs 11, 15, and 68 have grade limitations for attendance. For example, the CMF 11 course does not allow for enrollment above the grade of E-7, making sergeants major and master sergeants targeted for CMF 11 positions in the MEB unable to enroll in the CMF 11 MOSQ course, unless they take a reduction to E-7. CMFs 15 and 68 have similar policies that limit attendance to E-5s or lower. Other low-density military occupational specialties (MOSs) and officer branches have presented challenges in counseling officers and noncommissioned officers on the opportunities afforded by transferring to a new career field. Such transfers sometimes carry a heavy cost of branch qualification in terms of time and school attendance. These career fields may be valid for only one grade before Soldiers need to transfer to new career fields to continue with their military career. In South Dakota, those career fields are not predominant in numbers in the state and have no lower-ranked positions to fill from normal progression.

The final hurdle for unit manning is induced by the pending mobilization within the next year. With the limited time and knowledge of the various career field requirements, not all schools are offered on a routine and continual basis for RC units. This means that some courses may have limited enrollment for RC Soldiers, and if school availability does not align with other military and civilian requirements, Soldiers selected for certain positions do not have the opportunity to become MOSQ- or branch-qualified prior to the mobilization of the unit, thus impacting unit and individual readiness. In addition, Soldiers have also gone through the multiple steps required for additional skill identifiers and clearance requirements not needed in their former career paths or units.

However, the 196th MEB has had numerous successes in the personnel arena; officers and enlisted members took on the challenges to reclassify and move forward in their new careers. More than a third of the 196th MEB Soldiers have gone through MOS or branch transfers to pursue their new career paths and are now continuing with their individual contributions to the collective MEB mission as the unit prepares for mobilization.

Operations

When the 196th was alerted, there was limited doctrine available. Select staff attended conferences and other events at MANSCEN, where they were exposed to MEB doctrinal principles that were then shared with the unit. With the absence of a field manual (FM)—and with very few magazine articles or publications to reference—the development of training was difficult. In April 2008, a draft of FM 3-90.31, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*, was published. This was the unit's first opportunity to really understand how the Army envisioned the applicability of the MEB. After this, FM 3-90.31 went through several more drafts and was finalized in February 2009.

In January 2008, the MEB S-3 began to develop the METL. There was no mission training plan manual for an MEB, so the unit's METL was built using FM 7-15, *The Army Universal Task List*, and basing it on FM 3-90.31, as well as on information obtained from MANSCEN. This first METL allowed the unit to begin its initial training program. Eventually, the 196th obtained a copy of the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) for an MEB, which helped considerably because it broke out the missions, tasks, and supporting tasks for each section. The unit then revised its METL to reflect the CATS data, in conjunction with the Army Universal Task List. Its current METL is the product of several revisions after various pieces of data became available.

The 196th does not have a directed mission-essential task list (DMETL) in its predeployment training, but is moving forward by anticipating what its DMETL might look like. The 196th knows the types of missions being conducted by MEBs in-theater and knows the projection of the MEB it is scheduled to replace. If that mission set remains the same through the next rotation, the 196th feels confident of what its DMETL will comprise.

To build its own tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP), the 196th obtained TACSOPs from two established MEBs, as well as one from a rear operations center (ROC), since an MEB seemed to inherit missions similar to those performed by ROCs. And since South Dakota has a strong history with engineer and field artillery units, the 196th used those brigade-level TACSOPs in its development of a new draft document.

It was a somewhat difficult process to put together a draft TACSOP because of the diversity of staff sections. The 196th knew that communication and staff integration would be critical. Every section contributed to the draft so that it captured the diversity of the MEB's staff sections. Two staff members monitored the construction of the base document and developed timelines, guidance, and monitoring techniques to ensure completion and assembly of the document.

Logistics

When looking at the overall logistical mission associated with transforming from a field artillery brigade to an MEB, the 196th identified four major tasks that needed to be accomplished:

- Develop an all-inclusive, brigade-wide, cross-leveling plan.
- Develop a turn-in plan for all excess equipment.
- Prioritize and order stock-funded items.
- Establish and execute a new equipment fielding plan.

Although these tasks had to be addressed in sequential order, at times some of them overlapped.

Develop a Cross-Leveling Plan. When the 196th MEB developed a cross-leveling plan, it examined projected MTOEs for the new subordinate units and filled as many shortages as possible from the legacy unit property books. The changes in MTOE between activation date and effective date presented a challenge. The cross-leveling plan was prioritized based on filling the higher equipment readiness code first, as well as looking at the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model to prioritize one unit over another. Once the cross-leveling was accomplished throughout all the brigade units, property book reconciliation occurred at the state level to ensure that all shortages were filled before excess equipment was identified.

Develop a Turn-In Plan. After cross-leveling occurred, the 196th developed a plan in which it conducted normal turn-in procedures for all excess equipment. The plan was executed two full years from the effective date of the MTOE. This ensured that the MEB had accomplished the turn-ins prior to being overwhelmed by receiving new equipment being fielded. A shortcoming the 196th encountered during the turn-in of equipment was the failure to identify the number of man-hours required to properly condition-code all the equipment for turn-in.

Prioritize and Order Stock-Funded Items. The logistics section worked with other staff sections and unit commanders to develop a list of priorities for using its budget as it ordered stock-funded items. The money spent on these items was prioritized according to the current ARFORGEN Model. A serious issue encountered was that the transformation to an MEB occurred more than two years prior to the effective date of the MTOE, causing major delays in the ability to order MTOE equipment.

Establish and Execute a New Equipment Fielding Plan. The concern with this plan, developed through coordination with the state headquarters, continues to be the time constraints imposed due to a pending mobilization. There is a massive amount of fielding associated with the creation of an MEB and a large number of hours training on, and issuing, the equipment. This, combined with the premobilization training requirements, makes time the most valuable commodity.

Prior planning and organization of tasks are essential to this mission, due to the many individual transactions required to successfully complete the process. Troublesome issues were avoided during the transition, since there was good communication with subordinate units and higher headquarters, as well as an exceptional plan that was well-thought-out and flexible enough to change with the situation.

MANSCEN Team and Facilities

The 196th MEB made the decision early in the transformation process to contact and use the MANSCEN team for resources at home station and at Fort Leonard Wood. The team responded with excellent training, mentorship, and advice for MEB operations. The support staff and resident experts provided excellent technical and tactical support to facilitate training for an MEB that illustrated numerous examples of how an MEB staff would handle real-world situations. The Warfighter Exercise conducted during the 196th's two-week annual training at Fort Leonard Wood brought its diverse staff team together into a solid MEB staff group. The MEB Soldiers acquired knowledge in other functional areas and gained respect for the technical skills of their peers. The MANSCEN team worked hard to ensure that the 196th received the best training possible while at their facility and continues to be a valuable asset to the unit.

Summary

The road to becoming a fully operational MEB was a demanding and rewarding experience for the Soldiers of the 196th MEB. This period of time was intense as the unit manned, equipped, and trained for future mission deployment—working in uncharted territory with limited resources and a short time frame. The efforts of the 196th MEB to transform from a field artillery brigade to an MEB in the midst of a transforming Army at war provides a sound methodology for other MEBs facing the same endeavor. The areas of MOSQ, CMF, and branch requirements; doctrinal principles; equipment fielding; and, most important, time will prove to be critical factors to readiness. The progress made in each of the sections of personnel, training, and logistics—coupled with a working relationship with MANSCEN—will surely set the conditions for success for any MEB to be fully operational and ready when facing future deployments.

Lieutenant Colonel Eining was the executive officer of the 196th MEB during the development of this article and has since assumed command of the 153d Engineer Battalion. He deployed as the S-3 for the 153d Engineer Battalion in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004–2005, and is projected to assume command of the 153d. He is a graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Intermediate Level Education (ILE), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and holds a bachelor's in sociology from Northern State University in Aberdeen, South Dakota.

Lieutenant Colonel Wiesner is the civil affairs officer in the 196th MEB. He deployed as an embedded training team mentor S-1 with the 147th Field Artillery Brigade in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2006–2007. He is a graduate of CGSC ILE and holds a bachelor's in business administration from the University of South Dakota in Vermillion.

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U.S. Army photo

The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and Its Role in Stability Operations—Part I

By Colonel Todd R. Wood

This is the first of a two-part discussion of the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) as the best stabilization force to meet the United States Army's future postconflict needs.

The evolution of the U.S. military to embrace stability operations has been characterized by policy decisions that internalize lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq and projections of future conflicts. The United States Army continues to learn and adapt lessons from the last seven years of sustained operations. The importance of stability operations in the overall operational success in today's environment has emerged as one of the largest lessons. The result has been a new doctrinal approach that emphasizes the role of stability operations. Consequently, new combat organizations are needed to achieve our nation's goals and protect its people. The MEB may be the correct stabilization force, with the potential to meet the challenges of future postconflict security environments.

The U.S. military's major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were initially quick, effective, and successful, while follow-on phases have been challenging. Winning the war was relatively easy; establishing the peace has proved to be much more difficult because of the rapidly changing nature of war and the specific problems this dynamic environment imposes on the organization of the U.S. military. While the U.S. military had experienced conflict short of major combat operations—such as peacekeeping operations, stability operations, and civil support operations—it was organized and trained to win major wars against nation-state opponents. For example, the military force used in Operation Desert Storm was created to succeed against opponents on the plains of Central Europe. The overwhelming success of this force against Iraq validated the Cold War model of military operations, which subsequently influenced the military training, doctrine, and force structure that entered into combat operations after 11 September 2001. Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq did not fit the traditional ideas of offensive and defensive operations. The U.S. military needed to adapt and change to achieve our national aims in both countries by embracing stability operations in planning and execution.

Joint doctrine defines stability operations as various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside

the United States with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.[1] The lack of stability operational planning and execution began to affect overall mission success at the conclusion of major combat operations. In Afghanistan and Iraq, "Failure to establish area security concurrent with destruction of the enemy control set back plans to restore essential services and emboldened opponents of U.S. occupation."[2]

Battalion and brigade commanders noticed the tactical effects of not rapidly following up security success with efforts to meet the needs of the local population. Leaders quickly realized that establishing public services such as trash collection, power, potable water, hospital administration, and public education was necessary to meet the basic needs of the population, begin the transition to stability, and prevent further violence. In both theaters, the basic force used to conduct these stability operations was brigade combat teams (BCTs) composed of traditional combat forces from infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery units. These units were designed to establish security and were not focused or resourced to perform stability tasks. The other brigade-size units that did have stability and reconstruction focus—such as divisional engineer brigades and civil affair brigades—were very few and operated mostly at the national level in major cities such as Baghdad. The result was a deficient and inconsistent stabilization effort throughout the country that created a permissive environment for insurgency. The factors of poor postconflict planning and lack of critical stabilization forces caused the U.S. military to lose the initial security successes achieved through regime change and opened a door of opportunity for enemy forces to further destabilize the countries.

Policy Shift

As insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq gained a foothold, the policies and strategies at the national level began to shift. In turn, this changed the military approach to stability operations in both theaters. The president, through the National Security Strategy, gave the military and the rest of the government clear direction on postconflict operations: "Once peace has been restored, the hard work of postconflict stabilization and reconstruction must begin. Military involvement may be necessary to stop bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful."[3] The President's emphasis on stabilization directed the military to reshape policy and strategy. It also paved the way for Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, which states that stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations, addressed and integrated into doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.[4]

This clear guidance, and events on the ground, focused joint and Army doctrine on the importance of stability operations to the current security environment in the War on Terrorism. DODD 3000.05 placed stability operations on equal footing with combat operations and elevated their level of importance to gain adequate attention and resources. Two specific results of the U.S. military's embrace of stability operations are:

- A different doctrinal approach to military operations, emphasizing the role of stability.
- The formation of new organizations that will allow the Army to better achieve our nation's goals and protect the American people.

The MEB was designed to "enable, enhance, and protect the operational and tactical freedom of action of the supported force," to meet the specific needs of commanders, and to support full spectrum operations—with the additional caveat of including stability operations as one of its core missions.[5] This new organization has tremendous potential, and to understand its significance for current and future stability operations it is important to understand the evolution and organizational adaptation that occurred in the U.S. military concerning the role of stability operations.

Doctrinal Changes

Historically, the Army has participated in stability operations far more often than conventional wars.[6] Recent analysis, however, suggests that an institutional and ideological bias in the leadership existed against this activity. The focus on stability doctrine has been blurred because "the U.S. military … viewed these activities as separate and detracting from its primary warfighting mission… The result has been an inability to train, equip, and plan for these operations properly."[7] The events in Afghanistan and Iraq have begun to change this attitude and culture, and the senior leadership in the Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the military's role in stability. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates stated in a recent speech:

> *Whether in the midst of or in the aftermath of any major conflict, the requirement for the U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid and comfort, begin reconstruction, and stand up local government and public services will not go away. Even with better funded State Department and USAID [United States Agency for International Development], future military commanders will no more be able to rid themselves of these tasks than Eisenhower was.*[8]

Leaders and Soldiers on the ground were rediscovering some of the same lessons that their predecessors learned in previous stability operations. When these leaders rotated back from combat zones, they sparked Army doctrinal transformation from within by introducing changes at the training centers to merge doctrine with tactical and operational needs. In the 2008 Army Posture Statement, the Army said it had—

- Incorporated stability operations tasks and scenarios for units training to deploy.
- Established a stability operations division within the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, G3.
- Expanded the mandate of the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to serve as the center of excellence for mastering stability, security, transition, reconstruction, and peace operations.
- Established the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance to serve as the center of excellence for DOD and the focal point for the U.S. military for international security force assistance missions.

In 2008, the Army published its newest version of Field Manual (FM) 3.0, *Operations*, to inculcate the idea of full spectrum operations—offensive, defensive, and stability operations—into the vernacular of Army culture. The doctrine states in the introduction:

> *Success in future conflicts will require the protracted application of all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Because of this, Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive operations. This parity is critical; it recognizes that 21st century conflict involves more than combat between armed opponents.*[9]

The idea of full spectrum operations also addressed the relationships and interaction with the population, friendly forces, and enemy forces in a complex, dynamic environment. This doctrine forces us to take a holistic approach to conflict and postconflict operations. America benefits from peace and globalization, and "The challenge … is gradually to bring such areas of the world that exist beyond the pale of the globalized world into the modern integrated structures of planetary civilization."[10]

In October 2008, the Army released a new doctrinal manual, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, that underscored the close connections among offensive, defensive, and stability operations.[11] The 2008 doctrine merely stated ideas that had already been embraced by the tactical forces operating in both combat theaters. Commanders at all levels recognized early in their operational deployments that success hinged on understanding and mastering the fundamental tasks associated with stability operations. These key tasks properly identified in the doctrine are:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Provide support to governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.[12]

Further study by Binnendijk and Johnson echoed these points, claiming that military units must simultaneously suppress, defeat, or destroy elements that resist the emergence of a new society or simply promote anarchy; establish law and order; repair damage to infrastructure that is essential to the emergence of a new social order; and establish an effective interim government.[13]

There are three critical points worth noting:

- *Simultaneity.* There can be no conceptual or practical gap between combat and stability operations.
- *Cooperation.* The Army must use the resources and support the efforts of other interagency and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
- *Self-reliance.* In the absence of supporting organizations, commanders must be prepared to address the task with internal means.

"The importance of stability operations in the overall operational success in today's environment has emerged as one of the largest lessons."

Doctrinal changes affect the way the Army views stability operations and organizes for missions. Identifying the key set of stabilization tasks allowed the Army to focus on developing an organizational structure to meet these demands. In Afghanistan today, the five core stabilization tasks are being carried out by several different organization models and units. These different organizations were individually developed to achieve specific tasks during stability operations. To understand the potential of an organization such as the MEB, it is important to examine the evolution of these prior organizations.

Development of Stabilization Forces

Three organizations—BCTs, provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), and military transition teams (MTTs)—are fulfilling the majority of stability tasks, and it is important to understand their contributions as well as their deficiencies. Each has made significant contributions to their specific tasks, but none has proved versatile enough to address all aspects of stability operations adequately.

BCTs. Initial stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were conducted by BCTs, the combat forces that are the building blocks of the modular Army. They are generally formed from combat forces and augmented with combat support enablers such as military police, civil affairs, or

other forces as needed. BCTs are best suited for traditional warfighting tasks, but the realities of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have forced them to shoulder tasks associated with stability operations. Two common criticisms of the stabilization capabilities of conventional forces are that they focus too much on the lethal approach to security operations and have insufficient numbers of specialized troops to conduct other necessary stabilization and reconstruction tasks.

The doctrine of relying on combat units for stability and reconstruction operations as they complete their combat missions served us well in the past, but for rapid, decisive operations it is an unsatisfactory ad hoc approach. Combat commands need a unit tailored specifically for postconflict operations that is readily deployable and available for planning, training, and exercising.[14]

Getting the right force to the correct place on the battlefield has always been the challenge of military planners. The BCT's greatest contribution to stability operations is its ability to establish security. But often in stability operations the force best suited for providing security is not optimal for the other long-term stabilization tasks. Current doctrine states: "The BCT is designed for combined arms combat. However, as a versatile and flexible force, it also can conduct stability operations very effectively. The BCT will likely have to focus on simultaneous combat and stability operations."[15] This doctrine speaks more to what BCTs could become in the future than to what they are accomplishing in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Army leaders have mitigated the difficulty of stability operations through planning, task organization, training, and creation of new organizations to ensure that the BCT has the right force for its mission set. One such organization to emerge out of the need for more effective stability forces is the PRT.

PRTs. BCTs struggled to be an initial invasion force and a stabilization force. In Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition decided to develop and deploy PRTs in 2002 to respond to stabilization needs in the provinces, which had little contact with the limited number of Internal Security Assistance Forces.[16]

The PRT is a combined civil-military organization designed to operate in semipermissive environments at the conclusion of major combat operations.[17] Its primary objectives are to extend the authority of the Afghan central government, improve security, and promote reconstruction.[18] PRTs are multinational and have become the model used by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other coalition members for postconflict reconstruction, security, and development tasks in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today there are 26 PRTs in Afghanistan—12 led by the United States and the rest by NATO's International Security Assistance Force. Military personnel lead most of the U.S. PRTs and report to the BCT that controls the area where they operate. The nonmilitary members of the PRT and PRTs that are not guided by military personnel report to their respective agencies.[19] U.S. PRTs receive direction from the State Department, USAID, and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), but the PRT commander, operating at the provincial level, has primary authority over security decisions.[20]

PRTs have been instrumental in fulfilling the critical need of furthering the influence of the Afghanistan government through election support, infrastructure improvement, and conflict mediation, but the organization is not without problems. The initial PRT idea showed great potential in theory, but from the beginning it had organizational and conceptual flaws. As one expert observed, "The impression [given by the coalition headquarters] was that the PRTs were to be observing and facilitating everything—being all things to all people—but not actually accomplishing anything vital to the political or military missions."[21] Criticism of the PRT approach to stability operations included a disjointed and ad hoc approach to restoring civil control, essential services, support to governance, and economic and infrastructure development; military and civilian operators who lacked training or skills for essential tasks; lack of a long-range focus on development; inconsistent mission statements; unclear roles and responsibilities; and limited resources. All of these have directly limited the potential contributions of PRTs.[22]

In Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David W. Barno saw the need for an organization like the PRT in 2003 and sought to change the unit's attitude that PRTs were a "civil affairs thing." To rectify the PRTs' shortcomings, he increased their number and sought to change their strategic context by enforcing unity of command and placing the PRTs under the brigade commander.[23] While his efforts alone were not enough to fix the PRT, this type of thinking identified an organizational need required by the military for stability operations. In 2004, Charles L. Barry, a senior research fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, said the U.S. military needed dedicated, tailored commands to execute postconflict stability and reconstruction operations—readily deployable units to establish control and combat and prevent lawlessness and anarchy.[24]

MTTs. These teams, often referred to as the advisory training program, were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq with the mission to train, advise, equip, and mentor security forces. In certain cases, they work for the BCTs; in others, they simply operate in the BCTs' operational environment. MTTs are the long-term solution to security issues in Afghanistan. Their ability to train the military and police force is critical to establishing societal peace and order. The MTT actions in training host nation security forces directly address the core stability task of security. However, the small number of trainers available, many who are specialists in training police or military, is a disadvantage. In September 2007, a team of Army officers evaluating the advisor training program concluded that the wrong Soldiers were being chosen for advisor training and that their training was poor, "seriously undermining the effectiveness" of the overall training mission and "fundamentally detracting from the U.S. strategy for transition in Iraq."[25] While the need for host nation security force training is essential—and the

MTT concept has great potential for fulfilling that critical need—it represents another ad hoc organization that exists outside the current forces' structure and doctrine.

The optimal force for conducting stabilization operations in Afghanistan will combine the BCT's security capacity; the MTT's training capacity; and the PRT's capacities for government, infrastructure, and economic development. One possible stability force described by Richard L. Kugler calls for "a set of four battalions of military police, construction engineers, civil affairs, medical support, psychological operations, and other assets that commonly are needed for the tasks," which he believes would require "about 11,300 personnel."[26] This description describes the possible task organization of the MEB and highlights the potential of this new organization.

Colonel Wood is Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Stryker), 25th Infantry Division. He has served as a platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and battalion operations officer (S-3) in 2d Armored Division; commander of a rifle company and long-range surveillance detachment in the 25th Infantry Division; battalion executive officer and brigade S-3 in 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; Commander, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division, while deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom; and strategic planner for the War on Terrorism, Joint Staff–Civil Affairs, Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy. He is a recent graduate of the United States Army War College as an Army Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. He holds a bachelor's in criminal justice and a master's in public administration.

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The MEB in the Early Phases of Campaign Planning

By Major Levi J. Sutton

Field Manual (FM) 3-90.31, *Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations*, published in February 2009, joins the body of published doctrine and scholarly considerations of ways that the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) will be employed in current and future conflicts and contingencies. That body of published doctrine considers mission sets that an MEB would best be equipped to execute in support of a division or corps conducting defensive, offensive, or stability operations in an established theater. It does not give any consideration to the opening phases of a campaign and the benefits that the MEB affords a regional combatant commander during the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) process as the commander builds combat power in order to begin decisive operations.

Because of its multifunctionality and inherent capabilities, the MEB is uniquely suited to enter a theater of operations during the initial phases of a campaign. The MEB offers the combatant commander a single command and control node designed to control all of the combat enablers necessary for mission support during JRSOI, as well as combat missions once the commander has assembled sufficient combat power to begin decisive operations. This capability is in addition to operations in support of an existing deployed force, already thoroughly described in the existing body of doctrine. By acting as a single headquarters that is responsible for supporting units conducting JRSOI, the MEB provides significant synergies to initial entry into a theater of operations, whether by forced entry or permissive entry.

The MEB is designed to command and control the following battalions:

- Chemical
- Engineer
- Military police

The MEB may also command the following elements, as needed:

- Air defense
- Civil affairs (CA)
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
- Psychological operations (PSYOP)

Each of these elements is a combat multiplier during the early phases of an operation, ensuring that units deploying into the theater of operations are protected during their vulnerable JRSOI period. The MEB elements also ensure that deploying units have sufficient infrastructure, whether host nation or theater construction, enabling the combatant commander to rapidly assemble combat power and begin decisive operations according to the JRSOI principles of synchronization, knowledge, and speed. The MEB enables the combatant commander to establish command and control over these diverse units with a single command and control node, conserving deployment and JRSOI throughput capacity for the sustainment units who enable JRSOI and the combat units who will achieve the commander's objectives.

For initial entry under permissive conditions, the MEB controls CA, engineer, and military police units in support of the sustainment units conducting JRSOI.

- CA units interact with the local populace and government on behalf of the deploying U.S. forces to obtain access to infrastructure and available resources to reduce deployment demands for the deploying force.
- Engineers upgrade and maintain the host nation infrastructure required to receive units and their equipment, create and maintain the staging areas where units receive their equipment and prepare for onward movement, and assist the host nation maintenance of the avenues of approach that units use for onward movement.
- Military police help host nation forces control the movement of arriving units, units moving onward to integrate with the units they will fight with, and sustainment movements in support of all forces in-theater.

While the main force conducts JRSOI, the MEB should be under operational control of the senior sustainment command in-theater. Shortly before the combatant commander has sufficient combat power to initiate operations, the MEB should be assigned operational control of combat forces so that it can provide support to combat forces in keeping with the mission sets outlined in FM 3-90.31:

- Maneuver support operations
- Support area operations
- Consequence management operations
- Stability operations

Before the MEB, these diverse units each required a separate functional brigade headquarters to control them. Alternatively, they lost some capability if they were not assigned to a functional brigade headquarters, since each unit performed its own responsibilities, along with all of those normally performed by a functional higher headquarters. The MEB is a multifunctional headquarters that bridges the gap between these two extremes. Although it does not have the full capabilities of a traditional functional brigade headquarters, it does have significant capability for the chemical, engineer, and military police functions, as well as some capability for EOD, PSYOP, CA, and air defense functions. Assigning the MEB to control these units during initial JRSOI operations reduces the number of headquarters required for deployment during the crucial entry operations or drastically improves the capabilities of these units by freeing them from performing brigade-level responsibilities.

The MEB enables more efficient throughput during JRSOI in a permissive environment, but the full capabilities of the MEB may not be required, because the host nation will provide the vast majority of the support required by deploying forces. During forced entry operations, the MEB truly demonstrates its versatility. The missions required during permissive entry are still necessary, but other missions join them. U.S. planners expect many opponents to make use of rocket-delivered chemical weapons during U.S. forced entry operations. The MEB is well suited to address that threat to JRSOI operations, acting as the higher headquarters for air defense units protecting JRSOI nodes and controlling the chemical and EOD units that are able to mitigate the consequences of any rocket attacks, whether chemical or conventional. This mitigation will likely be required even following successful air defense against rocket attacks, because of the dangers of ordnance on the battlefield and the likely civilian population surrounding the ports of debarkation used during the JRSOI process. The MEB is also capable of assuming responsibility for the area of operations where the JRSOI operation occurs and is able to command and control a maneuver battalion to act as a tactical combat force for all of the RSOI nodes, if necessary. Assigning all of these missions to a single headquarters provides significant protection synergies in support of RSOI operations.

Deployment throughput capacity is always less than the combatant commander desires, and early in the process the commander must balance the requirements for combat units to achieve operational goals, sustainment units to process other units through JRSOI, and enabling units to support both combat units achieving operational objectives and sustainment units receiving the main body of the force into theater. Deploying an MEB reduces the requirement to deploy command and control nodes early in the deployment process, because it is able to control multiple functional battalions and reduce the initial need for functional brigade headquarters.

"The MEB provides significant capabilities to initial entry into a theater of operations in every circumstance...."

The MEB must be considered for early deployment as part of a theater opening force because of its inherent capabilities, particularly in environments that are not entirely permissive. Because of the multifunctionality capability it brings, the MEB reduces the requirement to deploy command and control nodes for the combatant commander during the early stages of deployment, when deployment capacity is at a premium. Because the MEB commands and controls both engineers and military police as a single headquarters in support of sustainment units during JRSOI, it supplies vital synergies for the sustainment headquarters to leverage, simplifying the very complicated process of JRSOI. With its capability to own terrain and protect the JRSOI process, it also preserves combat units for decisive operations. The MEB provides significant capabilities to initial entry into a theater of operations in every circumstance and should be among the first units to deploy into any new theater of operations.

Major Sutton is the executive officer for the 94th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He has been assigned to the 54th Engineer Battalion (Corps) (Mechanized), the 52d Engineer Battalion, the 43d Area Support Group, 7th Infantry Division, and Eighth Army. He holds a bachelor's from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and a master's from the University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and Technology), both in engineering management, and is qualified as an engineer in training.

MEBs Side-by-Side With a BCT: Is the Gap Filled?

By Major Troy S. Parrish

The contemporary battlefield is anything but linear. This notion is well documented and easy to confirm at any level from platoon to corps. As the United States and its allies continue to look into the future for ways to improve training, doctrine, and capabilities for combating enemies, one modular brigade-sized organization that is targeted to fill a multirole capability is the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). The expectation is that a carefully organized MEB can function independently in its own operational environment and control an area of operations, much as a typical brigade combat team (BCT) does. Based on my education at the Command and General Staff College, multiple deployments to Iraq, and personal beliefs and understanding, the MEB seems best suited to perform a supporting role in any area of operations and should not be overwhelmed with the role of owning an operational environment. It is an atypical expectation for the types of units that normally comprise an MEB and introduces unnecessary confusion in an already confusing environment.

The majority of combat and stability/support operations in the operating environment are conducted in urban areas. Urban operations are complex and confusing and require complete immersion in the urban area. When combat operations of a lethal nature are conducted, the BCT—whether an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), or heavy brigade combat team (HBCT)—is designed for that role. It seems logical that the organization that specializes in lethal combat operations controls the terrain that it is operating in, and supporting elements perform their responsibilities after careful coordination with the owner of the operational environment. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last eight years have proven that this ownership belongs with the unit that is managing all operations and is also capable of reacting to an increase in hostile, lethal operations.

Similarly, during stability operations it is expected that there is a shift in the role of the BCT. For obvious reasons, a BCT will not conduct lethal operations unless warranted under the rules of engagement or national policy. Nonlethal operations demonstrate a significant decrease in the necessity for units capable of affecting a target with direct and indirect fires. However, at any moment, a seemingly peaceful area of operations can explode with hostile actions and demand action. For this reason alone, the BCT is prepared to respond much more convincingly than any other organization on the battlefield—including the MEB.

"A BCT will have the [combat] capability—but during extended operations when the goal is to transition to stability operations, an MEB fulfills much of the increased requirement for stability tasks."

The MEB typically deploys to an area of operations with engineer; military police; civil affairs; psychological operations; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) units. It is important to note that these types of organizations greatly enhance the capabilities of the maneuver force commander in an area of operations. In fact, it is easy to conclude that a long-term operation would demand elements of each of those capabilities for a BCT to be successful. It is also easy to conclude that those units are reinforcing the existing capability already contained in the BCT. That is why I suggest that the MEB and its subordinate elements bring a combat capability to bear best during long-term operations. A BCT will have the capability—but during extended operations when the goal is to transition to stability operations, an MEB fulfills much of the increased requirement for stability tasks.

(Continued on page 42)



JTF Thunder: 149th MEB Operations During the Kentucky Ice Storm of 2009

By Major Timothy R. Starke

The morning of 26 January 2009 began with rumors of approaching inclement weather as the staff at 149th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) headquarters began their daily physical training routines. All day the discussion across the command was of the clouds on the western horizon, and an update from the Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) office advised units to expect "ice to the west and snow to the north, south, and east." Every unit in the state was ordered to double-check winter storm response standing operating procedures, verify vehicle readiness plans, ask full-time staff to check and recheck alert rosters, and ensure that contingency supplies were available for emergency response operations.

The night of 26 January became busy with incoming calls to the MSCA office, which relayed initial missions to the MEB's full-time staff. Early taskings required units to alert and mobilize Soldiers for MSCA missions in support of state Department of Transportation districts in the western and central parts of the state. These route clearance missions were a very small precursor of what was to come.

Throughout the day on 27 January, conditions deteriorated fast as freezing rain continued to accumulate across the western part of the state. By 1200 hours on 28 January, 46 counties had declared a "state of emergency" and nearly 350,000 homes were reported to be without power. Hours of sustained sleet and freezing rain followed by bitterly cold temperatures resulted in widespread icing that toppled large trees and cell phone towers, dropped power lines, and shattered utility poles. Telephone and radio communications with counties in the western half of the state were virtually nonexistent. The only information coming from the most severely affected areas was from residents and first responders who drove far enough east to pick up a cell phone signal. Units located immediately outside of the affected areas were alerted to mobilize, while initial damage assessments and requests from emergency managers were received by Joint Force Headquarters, Kentucky. By the evening of 28 January, Kentucky Army National Guard units were supporting multiple counties throughout the central and western portions of the state and preparing for a full mobilization.

Joint Task Force 149

The 149th MEB is the largest unit in the Kentucky National Guard and is composed of units stationed across the entire Bluegrass State. Units assigned to the 149th are based as far west as Benton, north to Walton on the outskirts of Cincinnati, south to Bowling Green near the Tennessee line, and east to Harlan along the Virginia border. As the initial main effort, the brigade immediately stood up its emergency operations center (EOC), issued a warning order to the entire command, and shifted the full-time force from operational support to civil support. Additionally, the brigade's full-time personnel made the immediate recommendation to alert the brigade commander and his entire staff to further develop the situation.

At 1257 hours on 29 January, the 149th MEB was notified that it would be fully mobilized in support of disaster relief operations. The unit was officially activated as Task Force (TF) 149 on 30 January at 1100 hours and assigned responsibility for all counties from Interstate 65 to the western boundary of the state, roughly one-third of Kentucky and by far the hardest-hit area. In addition to its organic 149th Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and 149th Signal Support

Company, the TF received 1st Battalion, 623d Field Artillery Battalion (1-623 Field Artillery), and the 206th Engineer Battalion to conduct civil response operations. During the next two weeks, the unit also integrated forces from the 198th Military Police Battalion; 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment (1-149 Infantry); and numerous other company-size units whose armories were located in the affected areas. Additionally, TF 149 received three "Strike Teams" from the 123d Air Wing of the Kentucky Air National Guard and was redesignated "Joint Task Force (JTF) 149." (See Figures 1 and 2.)

Following the total activation of the 149th MEB, the commander and his entire staff moved to the brigade headquarters in Louisville to establish the full brigade tactical operations center (TOC) that would facilitate centralized planning and command and control. As the command group and headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) Soldiers arrived, it became apparent that the current situation had become a disaster of a magnitude that none had experienced in their military careers.

JFT 149th MEB Task Organization

Task Force 149
HHC, 149th MEB
149th Signal Company
198th Military Police Battalion Headquarters
123d Air Wing Strike Team Dalton
123d Air Wing Strike Team Shelton
123d Air Wing Strike Team Howard
20th Special Forces Group (SFG), Military Intelligence Detachment (MID)

Task Force Morgan
1-623 Field Artillery
HHD, 1-623 Field Artillery
A/1-623 Field Artillery
B/1-623 Field Artillery
C/1-623 Field Artillery
HHC, 203d Forward Support Company
Detachment 1, 203d Forward Support Company
Detachment 2, 203d Forward Support Company
2113th Transportation Company
A/149th BSB (-)
940th Military Police Company
438th Military Police Company
2/75th Recruiting and Retention Battalion (-)
41st Civil Support Team (-)
75th Troop Command Medical Team (-)

Task Force Sapper
HHC, 206th Engineer Battalion
A/206th Engineer Battalion
A/2-138 Field Artillery
Service Battery/2-138 Field Artillery
C/1-149 Infantry
617th Military Police Company
2/75th Recruiting and Retention Battalion (-)
41st Civil Support Team (-)
307th Maintenance Company
Detachment 2, 307th Maintenance Company
176th/177th/178th Firefighting Teams
130th Engineer Company
Detachment 2, Medical Command
103d BSB
1204th Aviation Support Battalion Forward (-)
20th SFG, MID Linguist Team

Task Force Orphan
HHD/149th BSB
Detachment 1A/149th BSB
B/149th BSB
A/1-149 Infantry
D/1-149 Infantry
2/75th Recruiting and Retention Battalion (-)
Detachment 1/A/206th Engineer Battalion
Military Police Security Team
HHD, 198th Military Police Battalion (-)
223d Military Police Company(-)
1103d Military Police Detachment(-)
41st Civil Support Team (-)

Figure 1

JTF 149 Area of Operations



Figure 2

MEB Doctrine in MSCA Operations

The vast majority of MEBs are in the National Guard, due to their unique force structure and mission set that makes them extremely well-suited to conduct domestic disaster response operations. Several core mission-essential task list (CMETL) tasks of MEBs directly relate to domestic support operations, including "conduct consequence management" and "maneuver support operations." Consequence management includes the following subtasks: conduct relief operations; provide support to civilian law enforcement; respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) incidents; establish civil control; and restore essential services. Additionally, maneuver support operations entail route clearance operations, law enforcement operations, and route maintenance. Nearly all of these subtasks were executed as part of JTF 149 operations in response to the Kentucky ice storm of 2009.

The 149th MEB's initial mission set on activation consisted primarily of route clearance and transportation of relief supplies, such as cots and generators, to emergency shelters. Route clearance was particularly challenging, because nearly every road—including interstate and major state highways—was blocked by trees or power poles that had fallen under the weight of

Soldiers of the 149th MEB cleared paths to isolated homes after the ice storm.

the ice. During this phase of the operation, cargo vehicles from the 149th BSB (Task Force Orphan) and engineers armed with chainsaws and high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) from the 206th Engineer Battalion (Task Force Sapper) were the most valuable assets in the MEB's arsenal. Soldiers in these units cut paths to isolated homes in rural areas and either evacuated, or delivered provisions to, residents with no power or water. Their responsiveness, determination, and ingenuity undoubtedly saved lives during the opening hours of relief operations.

Following the full activation of the command, JTF 149th MEB was authorized direct liaison with each county emergency management office. Immediately, the mission set evolved, growing exponentially to meet requests that were coming in from each emergency management area manager. The full extent of the damage was still unknown, but requirements continued to grow as the findings of damage assessment teams trickled in.

State and local law enforcement became overwhelmed by the traffic control and security requirements resulting from widespread and sustained power loss throughout the region. Among the requests were numerous calls for armed military police to augment police patrols. The 198th Military Police Battalion provided troops throughout the JTF area of operations to improve security at emergency shelters, assist with traffic control, and prevent pilferage of unsecured shops and stores. Additionally, military police were called on to prevent the theft of anhydrous ammonia used in fertilizer by opportunistic producers of methamphetamines.

JTF 149th MEB's consequence management requirements also increased rapidly as county Division of Emergency Management (DEM) EOCs gained situational awareness about the level of damage sustained by their communities. Establishment and security of points of distribution (POD) for food, water, and kerosene throughout the JTF area became immediate-priority missions taken on by all three subordinate battalion task forces. TF Orphan (149th BSB) established Refuel on the Move (ROM) sites throughout the brigade area of operations in support of all vehicles in the MEB. TF Orphan established these critical "service stations" for military and state vehicles at a time when only a handful of commercial gas stations had the ability to pump fuel.

Additionally, the Kentucky Division of Emergency Services (KyEM) requested several damage assessment teams to assist emergency management officials in identifying and annotating damage to critical infrastructure and key resources throughout the area. These teams, provided by HHC 149th MEB (Team Spartan), had been trained to conduct this mission by KyEM officials during the response to a Hurricane Ike-induced windstorm several months earlier and proved to be an invaluable asset.

Door-to-Door Wellness Checks

Despite the best efforts of first responders, federal and state emergency services officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and National Guard units, several fatalities had occurred throughout the state due to carbon monoxide poisoning

Lessons Learned

Disaster response efforts in the wake of the Kentucky ice storm of 2009 helped the 149th MEB exercise many systems required in combat operations or other large-scale homeland security missions. The operation highlighted some of the MEB's inherent advantages in an MSCA role:

- Large span of control based on the size, diversity, and experience level of the brigade staff.
- Capability to conduct essential missions, such as route clearance, law enforcement augmentation, and sensitive site protection.
- Maintenance of lines of communication—as necessary and valuable in MSCA as it is in combat, and best performed by MEB assets.

In addition to validating existing force structure, operations helped to identify many lessons learned that will be incorporated into planning and execution of future MSCA efforts:

- Colocating military headquarters with DEM EOCs is necessary to validate requests for support and provide responsive forces.
- Extensive use of liaison officers with federal, state, and local officials is essential to ensure timely information sharing and "translation" of support requirements between agencies and back to the National Guard.
- Redundant communication systems were more important to command and control than physical proximity to the area of operations. TF 149 Headquarters remained in Louisville—where telephone, cell phone, Internet, video teleconference, and emergency radio services were functional—rather than moving west to Wendell Ford Training Center, in the affected area, as planned. This decision was essential to maintaining command and control and situational awareness.
- Understanding and effective dissemination of the incident commander's intent is essential to coordinating decentralized operations by military personnel working in conjunction with federal, state, and local agencies.
- MEB staff must be able to analyze information rapidly to provide the commander with recommendations for operations 72 to 96 hours out. It is easy to get immersed in the "now" of emergency response operations and fail to develop measures of effectiveness to determine when military forces should turn over operations to civilian authorities.
- Traditional relationships between units and their communities must be retained when standing up brigade-size task forces, to avoid perception of abandonment. Though integrating company-size units from multiple major commands into the JTF was a challenge, the trust and familiarity of local unit leadership with the elected officials and government agencies in their communities were essential to the effective communication of requirements and expectations.
- Establishment and operation of a central JRRSOI site is essential to ensure property and personnel accountability at the completion of operations.
- Limited organic maintenance assets create a challenge. The surface maintenance company in the MEB BSB does not have the personnel or equipment necessary to maintain all wheeled vehicles in the brigade. Close coordination with Kentucky National Guard field maintenance shops and the unit training equipment site was essential to mission success.
- Limited internal transportation assets created the need for external sustainment support. The BSB support plans officer was a critical link between the MEB and TF Logistics, a JFHQ-run TF that pushed supply and aid into the JTF 149 area.

and hypothermia resulting from improper use of space heaters in some residences and a lack of heat in others. In response to these deaths, and in an effort to prevent more from occurring, the governor issued a directive that every home in the state would be checked to ensure that residents were safe and had food, water, and necessary medical care. This massive operation required emergency responders to knock on more than 1.5 million doors. Most of these visits were conducted by National Guard Soldiers, since they had the vehicles and manpower to go where no one else could.

In the JTF 149 area of responsibility (AOR), company commanders and first sergeants worked with local KyEM officials to devise plans to check every house in their assigned counties or large cities. Brigade headquarters tracked reports that flowed into the TOC several times a day, along with coordinating the deployment of additional units into areas that needed more personnel. Much of the additional manpower came from 1st Battalion, 149th Infantry Regiment, which had remained in eastern Kentucky, responding to a very limited number of requests for support while awaiting activation as the National Guard Reaction Force. Kentucky traditionally responds to events like the ice storm of 2009 regionally, first employing units based in or near the affected area and then task-organizing additional forces as necessary. As a result, 1-149 Infantry Battalion was relatively "un-missioned" outside of the JTF 149 AOR, despite being assigned to the brigade and serving as its tactical combat force (TCF) during training exercises.

Units from 1-149 Infantry Battalion were released from their home communities in eastern Kentucky by Joint Force Headquarters on 1 February and task-organized back to their parent headquarters for employment in the

JTF 149 AOR. To provide the necessary mobility for the light infantrymen of TF Warrior (1-149 Infantry), 116 Soldiers from the battalion flew to Columbus, Ohio, from the Kentucky Air National Guard to draw 55 HMMWVs from the Ohio National Guard. The added mobility provided by these trucks was critical in the days ahead, enabling the state's only infantry battalion to significantly impact operations.

In addition to the HMMWVs from Ohio, equipment and personnel flowed into Kentucky from a number of other states. Tennessee and Indiana provided large numbers of HMMWVs, while Wisconsin and West Virginia contributed engineer support, and Florida sent additional communications assets to help bridge the gap left by inoperable cell phone towers and downed telephone lines. These contributions from other states were absolutely critical to successful execution of door-to-door searches and all other MSCA operations in response to the ice storm.

During the course of the door-to-door searches, JTF 149 Soldiers saved several lives. Task Force Morgan (1-623 Field Artillery) Soldiers found four teenagers stranded on top of a car that had slid off an icy road into a lake and recovered them before they succumbed to hypothermia. Several residents were evacuated by authorities after Soldiers found that their homes had dangerous carbon monoxide levels from the use of kerosene heaters or gas ovens to produce heat indoors. A Soldier from TF Sapper (206th Engineer Battalion) reached a house just as the resident was collapsing from a heart attack and summoned emergency medical responders who resuscitated the man. In addition to providing emergency medical care, Soldiers, first responders, and volunteers marked homes that were without electricity or water to make restoration of services easier for utility workers. Although there is no way to determine exactly how many lives were saved, it is certain that the door-to-door search missions had a dramatic effect on the well-being of residents in affected areas.

A Successful Conclusion

JTF Thunder reached its maximum strength of more than 2,020 personnel on 6 February 2009 as the commander surged forces to complete door-to-door checks in the area of operations. As the checks were being completed, the brigade staff shifted their focus to identifying measures of effectiveness and developing a withdrawal plan that would transition recovery operations back to civil authorities and allow Soldiers to return to their employers. Measures of effectiveness included reduction of the number of citizens in, or closure of, emergency shelters; restoration of power and water; clearance of at least one lane of traffic on all county and state roads; increase in the ability of state and local law enforcement to maintain security; and completion of door-to-door searches. A system was put in place in conjunction with the Kentucky Division of Emergency Services and Joint Forces Headquarters (JFHQ–KY) to require county and emergency managers to complete letters of release indicating that they no longer required the support of National Guard forces in their jurisdictions. These letters were the primary criteria for releasing units back to their parent major command (MACOM) and dismissing them from state active duty.

In addition to tracking mission completion, the JTF 149 staff worked with JFHQ-KY to develop a thorough joint reverse reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRRSOI) plan to gain accountability of all personnel and equipment before releasing units from the area and processing them off of active duty. A single JRRSOI site was established at Wendell H. Ford Regional Training Center in Greenville, Kentucky, where borrowed vehicles received technical inspections; state property purchased during the operation was accounted for and turned-in; excess Class I and Class III supplies were collected; and personnel were accounted for and processed out of the operation. By establishing a central point to conduct these functions, the MEB was able to significantly cut down on problems resulting from worker's compensation claims, state active duty pay, and Financial Liability of Property Loss investigations.

By 15 February 2009, all units had been released from state active duty and only a handful of volunteers remained on duty assisting Federal Emergency Management, KyDEM, and other agencies as they conducted follow-up assessments of critical infrastructure throughout the state. Though a significant number of Kentuckians remained without power, and debris littered yards and curbs throughout the state, civil authorities were very much in control of relief and recovery operations.

The MEB proved to be an effective force structure for commanding a major disaster response operation in support of civil authorities. While the geographical dispersion of MEB units will certainly impact their ability to bring all organic or administrative control units to participate in MSCA operations, the large and diverse headquarters of the MEB allows it to build a flexible and functional TF by integrating different types of forces from around the state and region. It is this flexibility that makes the MEB an ideal brigade to take the lead in major MSCA operations. These same capabilities will make the MEB an increasingly important asset in combat theaters in the coming years.

Major Starke is the Military Police operations officer (S-3) for the 149th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Kentucky Army National Guard, based in Louisville, Kentucky. Pre-vious assignments include tank platoon leader and mortar platoon leader with 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 4th Infantry Division; company executive officer with the 1st Armor Training Brigade; S-3 plans officer and S-1 with 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division; and company commander and area operations officer with the 149th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Kentucky Army National Guard. He holds a bachelor's in political science from Providence College in Rhode Island and is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, Infantry Mortar Leader's Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms Exercise Course, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education (ILE), and Airborne and Air Assault Schools.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade or Maneuver Enhancement–Brigade Combat Teams?

By Major Stephen A. Wickersham

There's a problem with the current manning and equipping and total planned number of the current maneuver enhancement brigades (MEBs). According to Colonel Robert H. Risberg, 4th MEB commander, the MEBs are manned and equipped only after the brigade combat teams (BCTs).[1] This article will argue that MEBs should not only be manned and equipped with the same prioritization as BCTs, but during stability operations, they should have priority. Arguably, the majority of combat operations in the foreseeable future will likely be stability operations such as the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, the MEB is arguably more capable and adept at conducting stability operations than other BCTs.

Thomas Barnett, author of *The Pentagon's New Map*, refers to *core* and *gap* countries or regions of the world.[2] He defines core regions as those that have viable technology and resources that can support their populace, and gap regions as those that cannot. He contends that most



"...MEBs should not only be manned and equipped with the same prioritization as BCTs, but during stability operations, they should have priority."

future conflicts will arise between the core and the gap nations and that the core nations must help raise the gap nations from their plight. The United States—the supreme core nation—must lead that effort, and this will lead us to conduct long-term stability operations. High-intensity offensive operations may still be required from time to time, but these will likely be short-lived affairs, followed by long-term counterinsurgency, stability, and security operations.

If this is what we expect the majority of our future operations to be, then would we not want to have enough properly outfitted units that specialize in stability operations? Would we not want to prioritize their equipment and manning?

The *United States Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress*, updated 5 May 2006, states that "while the Army's modular redesign may be adequate for rapid, decisive combat operations, it is inadequate to conduct stability operations." The report suggests that the MEB may be the unit to adequately conduct stability operations, and further suggests concerns over plans to have only three active duty MEBs.[3] According to Colonel Risberg, an infantry, Stryker, or heavy BCT that is eight months from deployment in the Army Force Generation cycle will get priority manning and equipping over an MEB that is just two months from deployment in the same cycle.[4]

This is a major problem. The MEB is more ideally fitted to conduct stability operations and security operations than any other BCT. Field Manual 3-90.3, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team*, states that "MEB operations contribute significant combat power, both lethal and nonlethal in nature, to all of the components of full spectrum operations…. The unique design of the MEB, based on the factors of METT-TC [mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations], postures it to be a potential unit of choice when conducting stability or civil support operations."[5] The MEB is well-provided with engineer, explosive ordnance disposal, and military police Soldiers, exactly the forces needed to support stability operations. It also has the staff expertise to support it. With 180 authorized positions, the MEB headquarters staff is the largest modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) staff of any brigade in the Army. It essentially has the same staff as a BCT, plus a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) staff section; an engineer staff section; and a military police staff section. These three sections provide added planning and command and control capabilities to the MEB that the other BCTs just don't have.

Additionally, 1st MEB has proved that MEBs—in a stability and counterinsurgency environment and commanded by an engineer commander—can not only be a "land owner" conducting full spectrum operations (with an emphasis on stability operations), but can do it well. So why is the BCT's priority for manning and equipment greater than that of the MEBs? The only risk in raising the manning and equipment priority of the MEB is to reduce the ready status of a BCT, but we have enough BCTs to fight decisive combat operations. What we need is more specialized units to fight the "long fight"—the stability operation. We need MEBs with manning and equipment priorities higher than, or at least the same as, those of the BCTs.

In conclusion, given the generally accepted fact that the majority of fights in the near future will be in stability operations, and the arguable notion that the MEB is the best-suited unit to conduct stability operations, the MEB should have at least the same priority of manning and equipment as the BCTs. Perhaps the MEB should be redesignated as the fourth BCT—the ME-BCT.

Major Wickersham is an Intermediate Level Education student at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previous assignments include project manager and project engineer, United States Army Corps of Engineers; supply officer, company commander, and assistant operations and training (S-3) officer, 1st Cavalry Division; assistant division engineer-plans, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized); and platoon leader, assistant S-3, and adjutant, 317th Engineer Battalion (Mechanized). He holds a master's in civil engineering from the University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and Technology).

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Route Clearance Shortfalls in the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

By Major Terry L. Stewart

As the United States Army continues to fight the War on Terrorism and wrap up its transformation to the modular force concept, the need for multifunctional units continues to rise. With the brigade combat team (BCT) the focal point for future rapid decisive operations, the United States will remain prepared for future conflicts well into the future. However, with the ever-changing face of warfare and the evolving complexities of the conflicts we face today, the nation more than likely will be involved more heavily in stability operations well into the future. In its current construct, I believe that the BCT is not suited to perform all aspects of stability operations, even with much-needed augmentation by functional brigades. Also, key to success on tomorrow's battlefield will be the ability to rapidly transition from combat operations to stability operations. A capability gap in today's force—and vital for future campaigns—is the ability to conduct stabilization as part of expeditionary land warfare. To bridge this capability gap between combat operations and stability operations, the U.S. military will need to grasp the concept of progressive stabilization.

To meet the capability requirements necessary for progressive stabilization, the U.S. military must form units that have embedded stabilization capabilities alongside traditional warfighting capabilities. In today's military construct, the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) is the primary organization that will be at the forefront of progressive stabilization. However, the MEB needs route clearance capability to detect and neutralize improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and maintain freedom of movement along ground lines of communication (LOCs) in the division support area.

Under its key task of conducting maneuver support operations, one of the supporting tasks is route clearance operations. The MEB is responsible for directing, integrating, and controlling the capabilities necessary to clear an area, location, or LOC of obstacles or impediments that could become a hazard or hindrance to friendly movement and maneuver or the occupation of an area. The MEB relies on mobility augmentation companies to clear and proof LOCs in the division support area. In the current operating environment, the IED threat and its defeat are the focus of every echelon of command. The likelihood of our adversaries attempting to disrupt operations throughout the entire area of operations is highly probable. If the IED threat cannot be completely defeated, our forces must be capable of detecting and neutralizing them. The MEB, as an owner of terrain, must have that capability to allow unimpeded use of friendly LOCs in division support areas.

The capabilities that a mobility augmentation company and a route clearance company bring to the fight are drastically different. Mobility augmentation companies can conduct hasty route clearance operations, primarily in support of BCTs during offensive operations. They focus their efforts on clearing assault lanes through obstacles. Route clearance companies have radio frequency jamming and extensive proofing and exploitation capabilities. The MEB would be greatly augmented by a route clearance company with robust deliberate route clearance capabilities. The route clearance company can scan, identify, exploit, and potentially clear hazards along main supply routes (MSRs) in the division support area by using its organic RG-31 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, Buffalo mine-protected vehicles with the ground standoff mine

detection system, and Husky vehicle-mounted mine detectors. Route clearance companies, combined with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) augmentees, allow for exploitation and—with the use of forensic kits—thorough investigation of suspected hazards.

It has been shown that our adversaries will exploit opportunities to emplace IEDs along LOCs unless they can be secured at all times. To minimize the risk to subsequent convoys travelling in the division support area, the assets in the route clearance company can be continuously employed to maintain open LOCs. Maintaining freedom of movement along LOCs, MSRs, and alternate supply routes (ASRs) within the support area is imperative to resupply operations and critical in protecting the force. The three organic route clearance platoons within the route clearance company provide the added capability of multiple clearance missions simultaneously, focusing on high-threat areas within the division support area. Route clearance companies, under the new modular force concept, have been the most effective units in maintaining freedom of movement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The MEB needs these added capabilities for its supporting task of route clearance.

Although the MEB possesses robust capabilities to exercise mission command over multiple functions in the division support area, it would benefit from greater route clearance abilities. This is a key task, not only in support of units operating in the division support area but also in support of follow-on forces and BCTs operating forward of the support area. The ability to continuously move logistics to the forward areas of the battlefield will be crucial to the success of the U.S. military in future stability operations involving insurgency activities. The MEB should be augmented with additional engineer forces in the form of route clearance companies. To effectively ensure mobility, engineer, military police, and EOD Soldiers must be correctly portioned into elements capable of performing all aspects of route clearance.

Major Stewart is Group Engineer, 3d Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. His past assignments include company commander in the 37th Engineer Battalion (Combat) (Airborne) during Operation Iraqi Freedom; 20th Engineer Brigade (Combat) (Airborne) training officer; and Project Engineer, Far East District, United States Army Corps of Engineers.

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("MEBs Side-by-Side,"continued from page 33)

Although the MEB has a much greater responsibility during stability operations, it is not perfectly designed to own an operational environment. The implication is that the owner will be able to respond to any threat decisively and quickly. I believe that a major offensive operation by a determined enemy would challenge an MEB. It cannot be assumed that the transition to stability operations is going to be a step in the right direction without setbacks. The situation in Afghanistan, where the enemy is increasing lethal operations, is an excellent example. Rather than repelling sustained attacks, the MEB is structured to secure itself and fulfill a supporting role to maneuver commanders.

The MEB is best suited to fulfill an endless list of operational tasks in a supporting role. The units that are combined under the MEB headquarters all specialize in support operations with one exception—the battalion-size tactical combat force (TCF), with its commensurate impact on sustained combat operations if the MEB is an operational environment owner. Conversely, a BCT typically has multiple battalions with specialized training in combat operations. The logistics units in a BCT fulfill their roles under the protection of the maneuver battalions.

An argument can be made that BCTs are expected to perform stability tasks, despite their focus on major combat operations and maneuver tasks, and therefore that an MEB should be able to switch back and forth as well. I disagree with that argument. An MEB is designed to "enhance" the capabilities of the BCT. An engineer battalion does not function best solely as an engineer battalion. Instead, it accomplishes much more when individual companies are in support of ongoing stability and support operations within a BCT's area of operations. The natural progression in combat operations is major combat operations followed by stability and support operations. Thus, BCTs transition to stability operations with the understanding that they will perform to the best of their ability while measures are taken to augment the BCT force with stability-focused units.

It is imperative that the strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of the MEB—in contrast to a BCT—be carefully evaluated before an MEB is given complete control of an area of operations. We cannot make the fatal assumption that stability operations equate with an end to combat operations. That is simply not the case, and the price for such an assumption is casualties. The MEB is an incredible combat multiplier—a headquarters with a long list of capabilities that significantly improve the battlefield environment. But it is not designed to control an area of operations; leave this responsibility to the BCT, since it trains to that end state every day. The role of the MEB is highlighted in stability operations.

Major Parrish is the current operations officer for the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado. He holds a bachelor's in sociology from North Dakota State University at Fargo.

JFO Sustainment

A Critical Requirement

In June 2006, Sergeant First Class Jared C. Monti, 3d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, found himself in a firefight and outnumbered nearly four to one. His patrol was pinned down and in serious danger of being overrun. Monti, a certified joint fires observer (JFO), immediately returned fire and sought cover from the hail of incoming enemy rounds. He calmly assessed the situation, informed headquarters and initiated calls for indirect fire and close air support (CAS). He provided target data to a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) located at his battalion's tactical operations center. The results of the indirect fires and CAS neutralized the enemy force.

By Lieutenant Colonel G. Todd Lang

This situation was precisely the reason that in 2004 United States Army, United States Air Force, and United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) leadership identified the need to provide additional training to forward observers in the execution of joint fires, particularly CAS. In fact, members of the joint CAS community were amazed at how fast the JFO Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed. From concept to three general officer signatures in only a few months is "lightning fast" for the joint community. The JFO concept is proving so successful that the United States Marine Corps, United States Navy, and a number of other nations' militaries are moving toward signing a revision to the JFO MOA under the auspices of the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

The JFO adds joint capability to deliver all types of surface-to-surface fires efficiently, support air-delivered fires that are not CAS (such as AC-130, close combat attack, and air interdiction), and facilitate timely and accurate targeting for a qualified JTAC in situations that are CAS as defined in Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)*. As a perishable competence, these tactical-execution skill sets require considerable initial training and continuation training to keep the JFO force ready and relevant.

Initial Training

The Fires Center of Excellence (CoE) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, is currently the lead agency in the U.S. military for conducting JFO training. Between August 2005 and October 2009, the JFO Course at Fort Sill produced 1,603 certified JFOs and can sustain more than 600 graduates per year at current production levels. As of October, there are more than 2,000 JFO graduates in the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force. In the United States Army, the JFO program is suited especially to the forward observer—military occupational specialty (MOS) 13F fire support specialist—and course graduates receive an additional skill identifier (ASI) of L7.

The collaborative development of the JFO program of instruction meticulously follows JFO MOA guidelines. Students are trained carefully and comply via a "go/no-go" system with 17 items on the joint mission task list (JMTL). Because JFOs will coordinate fires in close proximity to friendly troops—and they have a skill set recognized worldwide by JTACs, pilots, and maneuver unit commanders—there is no exception to meeting the JMTL. Maneuver unit commanders, JTACs, and pilots should feel confident that, upon certification, JFOs can access joint fires in a timely, efficient, and safe manner—if *they maintain their qualification*.

As of 1 October 2009, the JFO ASI is a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) requirement for Army units—it no longer is optional. Organizationally, each maneuver platoon should have one qualified JFO (with the exception of armor platoons, which should have one per maneuver company).

The results of a Fires CoE Joint and Combined Integration Directorate breakout of this requirement—by maneuver unit

in the Regular Army and Army National Guard—show that the Army alone needs 2,261 qualified JFOs filling JFO MTOE billets. This number does not include officers, fires NCO leadership, or any military transition team (MiTT) aspiration of two JFOs per team.

Additionally, the L7 ASI does not guarantee that a Soldier is available to fill a JFO billet in the force. The JFO is required to be qualified—not just certified—to perform JFO tasks. Qualification requirements dictate that a JFO successfully complete initial certification training, maintain semiannual training currency, and pass a recurring JFO evaluation every 18 months. These requirements are detailed in the JFO MOA and are similar to fire support team certifications; however, the JFO MOA and MTOE combination make JFO qualification a requirement. It is important to note that all JFO production plans to meet force requirements assume that JFOs are being sustained.

Why Train JFOs?

In the joint and coalition communities, common ground leads to common goals and increased motivation to work together. In today's high operations tempo world, motivation is critical. Good ideas are not enough—we must also be motivated to implement them. Limitation of resources is a common ground that all Services and countries can understand. Specifically, in this community there is a shortage of manning, qualified instructors, sorties, and equipment. These things are very expensive and are required for success.

JTACs. If a unit has the resources, a JTAC should be placed with every unit that may need air support. The Air Force must pursue its increased JTAC production plan aggressively because JTACs are the focal point of CAS operations with or without JFOs. With the Army transformation in full swing, keeping up with the demand for JTACs is no easy task.

JTACs start out by earning their Air Force Specialty Code 1C4 enlisted terminal air controller (or MOS) at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Success here is not guaranteed—the entry requirements are stringent, and the "washout" rate is high. After seasoning as a 1C4, their air support operations squadron (ASOS) may nominate them for the JTAC qualification course. This course is four weeks long and is only Phase 1 of qualification (initial qualification training). Upon graduation, JTAC candidates must receive Phase 2 from their home units before becoming fully mission-ready (mission qualification training). This training is both expensive and time consuming.

To abide by the JTAC MOA, a JTAC must comply with multifaceted qualification requirements. At a minimum, JTACs must control live aircraft a minimum of six times every 6 months (the JTAC MOA allows for two of these to be performed in Joint Forces Command accredited simulators). More specifically, JTAC continuation training involves training such as day and night controls of live munitions, target marking, and terminal guidance operations. At any time, if any of these requirements are not met, the JTAC immediately becomes nonqualified.

A Joint Fires Observer is a trained Servicemember who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and Type 3 close air support terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations. *Joint Fires Observer Memorandum of Agreement*, 14 November 2005.

Manning in the Air Force is especially tight at this point due to the recent elimination of 40,000 Air Force positions. In this environment, doubling the number of JTAC positions demonstrates the Air Force's commitment to this battlefield Airman program.

The number of JTACs planned by fiscal year 2012 allows for habitual alignment down to the maneuver battalion level and a pool of JTACs aligned with certain maneuver companies. Habitually aligning down to the maneuver platoon level would require the Air Force to triple its planned number of JTACs. Even if the Air Force could produce this many JTACs (which it cannot), it could never sustain this many of them according to the worldwide standards set by the JTAC MOA. There simply are not enough sorties. To exacerbate this problem, every F-35 aircraft produced will replace two A-10 aircraft or F-16 aircraft, reducing training opportunities even more.

In the current dispersed environment, organic fire support may not be available, and there are a large number of small-unit operations. All of these circumstances leave the Services two options—either do not worry about the maneuver platoon's access to joint fires, or come up with a suitable alternative.

If a commander anticipates that a planned maneuver will require CAS, it is incumbent on the commander to plan to deploy a JTAC with that company (or even to the platoon, assuming JTAC availability). Knowingly planning a maneuver that will require CAS without a JTAC, thereby forcing an emergency fire support situation, would be a careless violation of doctrine and simply not prudent. This leads to a very suitable alternate—the JFO.

JFOs. The skill set a JFO brings to a platoon commander is impressive. The skill that gets the most attention is working with a JTAC to get CAS. This alone is quite an accomplishment, considering JFOs are trained for day or night missions using very different tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and using a large variety of munitions, fuses, aircraft and guidance methods safely and in close proximity to friendly troops. (These missions may include using coordinate-dependent weapons that require precise coordinates or laser-guided bombs that require detailed knowledge of communications, laser codes, and TTP to guide these weapons.)

But a JFO brings more than this; he is also proficient at surface-to-surface call for fires, naval call for fires, AC-130 call for fires, and close combat attack five-line call for fires—*if he maintains his qualification*. With this skill set, he is truly a joint fires observer. The skill set is very flexible and easily can be adapted to different missions—it is good for the War on Terrorism, and it is good for any war that may arise in the future.

I often hear the comment that "a forward observer can do these things, so a JFO does not really add value." This is dead wrong and just talk—he must be trained to execute the skill properly. In the first 1,000 JFOs trained, almost none started the training with the required skills, and 138 could not execute safely even with the intense training they received from highly trained instructors.

FY09 student nonprogression attrition (failures) in the Fort Sill JFO course was approximately 20 percent. We simply cannot afford to just *say* the Soldier can do this—we must provide the training that the Soldier deserves.

Another comment I hear is, "If JFOs cannot do Type 1 CAS, then they are useless to me." Again, this is dead wrong. Today's technology significantly reduces the situations requiring a person on the ground to see the aircraft, see the target, and assess nose geometry before issuing clearance. In fact, the number of Type 1 controls being accomplished in theater is almost zero.

Photo by MSG Lee A. Power

Soldiers from the 3d IBCT, 10th Mountain Division, call in a CAS 9-line brief via AN/PRC-117F Radio System while JFO instructors evaluate.

Sustainment: The Road Ahead

It now is critical to the long-term success of this program for units to comply with the sustainment requirements of the JFO MOA. It is *unacceptable* to the worldwide joint fires community to not comply with the JFO MOA. Because this community routinely is held to the high standards of the JTAC MOA, all eyes are watching the United States Army right now for worldwide leadership of the JFO program. A properly executed sustainment plan will cement the JFO program, earn the mutual respect of a very particular joint fires community and, most important, keep JFOs proficient at their skills.

If resources do not allow for a JTAC, JFOs should be placed with units that may need air support—for many reasons. Using existing 13Fs (and junior fires officers), a program objective memorandum (POM) increase of manpower is not required. This MOS is suited for this job due to his location on the battlefield and existing training on artillery ordnance, fusing, weapons effects, and targeting according to the commander's intent.

A JFO requires only an incremental increase in equipment (still a substantial commitment from the unit); he is already battlefield-equipped. Also, JFOs do not require a forcewide increase of live sorties, the single most difficult asset required for JTAC sustainment worldwide. Finally, while working with a JTAC, the JFO logs a CAS "event," and the JTAC logs a "control." While this live JTAC interaction certainly is recommended, the JFO can log his sustainment events on a simulator.

If done properly, simulator training can be an outstanding training event; if not done properly, the event adds no value and is a waste of time. For meaningful simulator training, you must have a suitable and maintained simulator, a training plan, and a subject matter expert (SME) to ensure that proper training is accomplished. Consistent self-paced or buddy training with no SME involvement does not prevent negative training or the atrophy of skills learned.

The cost of the JFO program is drastically less than a JTAC, and this is what makes the program viable. This, combined with the JFO's battlefield placement and relevant skills experience, solidifies the JFO concept. The added fact that the concept uses existing doctrine and existing chains of command (Theater Air Control System/Army Air Ground System) makes the concept rock solid.

Sustaining JFOs

JFO managers should work with their aligned ASOS for JFO sustainment. CAS events are a large part of JFO sustainment, and a strong relationship with the ASOS will "bear fruit" with JFO sustainment as well as combat training center (CTC) spinups and combat. The most successful JFO-JTAC operations typically come from units with this strong relationship.

JFO managers can reference <*https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/387833*> (requires Army Knowledge Online [AKO] log-on) for specific information on JFO sustainment, JFO course prerequisites, and a course description. The core JFO sustainment document is the JFO MOA (which is scheduled for a major new release in November 2009), but the Army will soon publish Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-09.36, *Joint Fires Observer* (unclassified). This manual offers more details on how to sustain JFOs and incorporates changes from the new JFO MOA and the new JP 3.09-3. This manual is scheduled for release in November 2009 (with the new JFO MOA).

All JFOs graduate from Fort Sill with 6 months of currency. If they exceed 6 months without accomplishing all 13 semiannual events (see figure on page 44), then they become *unqualified*, but they are still *certified* JFOs. It is important to note that if a JFO deploys qualified, he remains qualified until redeployment. An unqualified JFO can accomplish the 13 semiannual events with a commander-designated qualified trainer, and he's "back in business" (unless it has been more than 24 months). JFOs who have been unqualified for more than

Joint Fires Observer Semiannual Requirements

- 6 Live or Simulated Surface-to-Surface Call-for -Fire Events
- 6 Fixed- or Rotary-Wing Events
  - 2 Live or Simulated Laser Terminal Guidance Operations (TGO) Events
  - 1 Live Type 2/3 Control with JTAC
  - 1 Live or Simulated Night Target-Marking Event
  - 1 Simulated as Nonqualified JTAC
  - 1 Live or Simulated Abort
- 1 Live or Simulated AC-130 Call-for-Fire Event

24 months must accomplish the 13 semiannual events and complete a comprehensive evaluation.

A very useful tool for JFO managers is the recently released JFO online familiarization course, designed to prepare Soldiers for the formal course. The two-week formal course is very busy and a bit like drinking from a firehose. The 23.5 hours of online training introduce students to the materials, which should increase their success rate at the JFO course. This online course also is an excellent way for JFOs to review portions of the course to help them with their sustainment training, especially when preparing for their evaluation every 18 months. The online course can be accessed at Joint Knowledge Online (JKO)—via Defense Knowledge Online or AKO—by clicking on "Take Courses" under JKO Tools and enrolling in the Joint Fires Observer Familiarization (JFOF) (requires log-on).

Considering that Armywide there are nearly 39,000 JFO events to be accomplished every 6 months, the most significant sustainment tool being developed is the online database for electronic tracking of currencies (within the existing Digital Training Management System (DTMS). The contract for this effort is established and the database should be fully functional in April 2010. Other efforts to help JFO sustainment at Fort Sill include developing trainer support packages and working with the United States Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) in an effort to upgrade call-for-fire trainer scenarios and to connect them with the Distributed Training Operations Center (DTOC). The DTOC then will schedule opportunities for units to work directly with JTACs in the virtual environment. This is an intriguing opportunity that will be complementary to working with units' aligned ASOS to participate in CAS opportunities.

Summary

The JFO is an important piece of the puzzle that has been missing. With the Air Force working to increase the number of JTACs and the Army working to increase the number of JFOs, we have an achievable harmony in sight. There are still some in the Army who will be happy only if the Army has JTACs, and there are some in the Air Force who only want to work with JTACs. These people must realize that the JFO–JTAC team is the only viable course of action when you consider the resources required. They also must understand—now that the JCAS leadership has committed to the JFO–JTAC concept—that recommended improvements in the joint fires arena will be much more likely to succeed if they are within the framework of the JFO–JTAC doctrine.

The success of the program is evident when Soldiers like Sergeant First Class Monti can access joint fires to neutralize an engaged enemy force. But there are other long-term benefits, including growing a much more "joint-minded" force. JFO training greatly increases a Soldier's joint knowledge, and the follow-on sustainment activities greatly increase joint interaction. This is a perfect building block for future joint leaders.

Today's maneuver unit commander has nearly the perfect excuse to not meet JFO MOA requirements. An almost unbelievable period of back-to-back deployments puts an incredible responsibility on these commanders. Their requirements are awing, especially since their actions and training have life-or-death consequences in today's War on Terrorism. But it is for precisely this reason that JFO sustainment training should be high on their priority lists.

Lieutenant Colonel Lang, Oklahoma Air National Guard, is the commander of Detachment 1, 138th Operations Group at the Joint Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He has worked at the Fort Sill Joint Fires Observer Course since August 2005. Previously, he was a combat-mission-ready F-16 pilot with assignments at Homestead Air Force Base (AFB), Florida; Kunsan Air Base (AB), Republic of Korea; Luke AFB, Arizona; and Tulsa Air National Guard Base, Oklahoma, with combat sorties during Operations Northern and Southern Watch. He also served as an OV-10 forward air controller (airborne) at Osan AB, Republic of Korea, and Wheeler AFB, Hawaii. During this time, he also served as a joint terminal attack controller (previously known as ground forward attack controller) and battalion air liaison officer at Camp Red Cloud, Republic of Korea; Camp Casey, Republic of Korea; and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

Note 1. The author would like to thank Major Joshua "Taz" Hughes, USAF, Commander of Detachment 1, 6th Combat Training Squadron, for his insight and assistance with this article.

Note 2. Sergeant First Class Jared C. Monti was killed in Afghanistan on 21 June 2006 as he attempted to help two fellow Soldiers who had been wounded when they were attacked by a large enemy force. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor on 19 September 2009.

A similar version of this article was published in the January-February 2009 issue of *Fires, A Joint Professional Bulletin for U.S. Field & Air Defense Artillerymen*.

Maneuver Support Update

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Integration Division. This division oversees collaborative capability development efforts between MANSCEN and the larger EOD community, including tactical and technical site exploitation, engineer explosive ordnance clearance agent (EOCA) and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) developments. The EOD doctrine, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) functions remain with the Sustainment Center of Excellence (SCoE) at Fort Lee, Virginia. Making sure that there are no gaps between the MANSCEN and SCoE DOTMLPF communities is a key function for the EOD Integration Division. The Division has been heavily involved in supporting the TRADOC Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT) and ensuring that the EOD community is being supported in its efforts against IEDs. One of the more significant actions was to ensure that the EOD maxi-candle capability was adopted for acquisition as part of the TRADOC capabilities development for rapid transition (CDRT) process. Keeping this capability in the EOD tool chest will guarantee that EOD Soldiers are equipped for combating vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Additionally, the Division was instrumental in moving forward the effort to establish an EOD Center of Excellence at SCoE, which had an initial operating capability (IOC) of 1 October 2009. The EOD CoE will consolidate the EOD DOTMLPF functions within SCoE.

The point of contact is COL James L. Shivers, (573) 563-8233 or <*james.shivers@us.army.mil*>.

Maneuver Support Battle Lab (MSBL). The MSBL provides the MANSCEN Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) and the CBRN, Engineer, and Military Police Schools an analysis and experimentation capability that gives the MANSCEN leadership information for decision-making on the combat developments and acquisitions process. The MSBL has three primary areas: focusing the Department of Defense's investments in science and technology toward MANSCEN requirements; conducting studies that provide analytic data to inform decision makers on choices on key performance parameters (KPPs) for material, possible solutions for organization sizing, insights on military utility, and effectiveness of possible solutions; and conducting experiments that inform concepts and doctrine and demonstrate possible technology solutions to operational gaps. Over the last few months the MSBL conducted several events with research and development agencies. These included a live experiment with the United States Air Force Research Laboratory to demonstrate the use of a laser technology in checkpoint operations and deterrence of vehicle operators; a technology demonstration of an unmanned aerial vehicle and an unmanned ground vehicle operating together in a semiautonomous mode; a military user assessment on a live-virtual-constructive computer training simulation that enhances training for Soldiers in a CBRN environment; and an effort with the Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory on development of autonomous behaviors for robots to detect mines. The MSBL also works with TRADOC and the United States Joint Forces Command on concept experimentation for the protection warfighting function and CBRN topics. The MSBL provides information to concept developers here at MANSCEN, as well as the joint CBRN community, as they develop new concepts and validate doctrine for all Services.

The point of contact is Mr. Richard Rodgers, (573) 563-5527 or <*richard.rodgers1@us.army.mil*>.

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV), Virtual Crew Trainer. The latest tool now available to help support NBCRV crew training and unit sustainment training is the Virtual Crew Trainer, Device No. 03-23. This training aids, devices, simulation, and simulator (TADSS) uses chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance-based scenarios to present individuals and crews with CBRN hazards that cannot be duplicated at the unit location due to various regulatory restrictions of using simulants. It can be configured to include six vehicles simultaneously or represent other mounted reconnaissance platforms such as the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) M93A1 and M93A1P1 variants. The NBCRV Master Instructor Workstation (MIW) provides the capability for exercise generation and after-action reviews (AARs) that permit performance and evaluation of individual and collective tasks identified using the Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) for CBRN reconnaissance platoons. All scenarios conform to current doctrine according to

Field Manual (FM) 3-11.19, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance*, and FM 3-11.86, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Biological Surveillance*. Using the MIW, the instructor/leader can manipulate the environment by changing weather data, type of agent, type of release, and detection component-specific parameters (for example, the Joint Biological Point Detection System [JBPDS] provides a presumptive identification of a known biological agent; and the Chemical Biological Mass Spectrometer [CBMS] Block II can detect known and unknown chemical hazards).

The virtual crew trainer is composed of four stations:

- *Commander Station:* Provides training for the .50-caliber Remote Weapon Station (RWS) with Joystick, RWS Camera View (Zoom and White Hot), 360-degree Vision Blocks, Force XXI Battle Command – Brigade and Below (FBCB2), and NBC Sensor Processing Group (NBCSPG).
- *Surveyor Station:* Includes Dual Wheel Sampling System (DWSS) control box with virtual view; Joint Service Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD) Operator Display Unit (ODU) box and virtual view; Chemical-Biological Mass Spectrometer Block II (CBMS II) Soldier Display Unit (SDU) box and virtual view; rear deck view, DWSS (wheels/arms/membrane); probe, markers; Chemical Vapor Sampling System (CVSS); Virtual Meteorological Sensor (METSMEN); and NBCSPG.
- *Driver Station:* Includes steering wheel with 6-speed transmission; gas and brake pedals, virtual drivers video enhancer (DVE), screen (change view) drivers alert panel (DAP), and screen (change view) vision blocks (F/B/L/R).
- *Master Instructor Station:* Provides the crew and commander with the ability to create various CBRN missions, or to alter preexisting scenarios from the scenario library. The MIW also provides the FBCB2 (networked with commanders' FBCB2), and provides playback capability to support AAR.

The primary purpose of the virtual crew trainer is to support unit sustainment of individual and collective training. The trainer is designed to be used by Soldiers with military occupational specialty (MOS) 74D/74A, with additional skill identifier (ASI) L6.

Four of these new trainers are located at the CBRN School. Each Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) and heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) will be authorized one trainer. Each chemical company with the NBCRV will qualify for two trainers. Based on the current distribution plan, 80 systems are projected for fielding, with all trainers being fielded to the Training Support Centers (TSCs) for accountability and maintainability. Contact your servicing installation's TSC for details.

The point of contact is Mr. Bruce Baldwin, (573) 563-8127 or <*bruce.baldwin@us.army.mil*>.

Standards in Training Commission (STRAC). Commanders refer to the approved training standards and strategies in Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 350-38 to determine their yearly training ammunition requirements for the following year's training events. The Department of the Army Ammunition Requirements Tool (DAART) is used by units to review, validate, and submit their ammunition requirements to the G-3. Following review and consolidation by Army commands and Army service component commands, and validation by the Army Training Support Center (ATSC), STRAC requirements become the basis for training ammunition authorized by the G-3. Each fiscal year, the MANSCEN STRAC manager ensures that necessary changes are made in DA Pam 350-38 for the CBRN, Engineer, and Military Police Schools. The FY10 (Draft) of DA PAM 350-38 can be found at <*http://www.atsc.army.mil/tcmlive/strac/MenuFY10.asp*>.

The MANSCEN new and modified strategies are as follows:

- Basic Officer Leader Course-B (BOLC-B) is a consolidation of BOLC II and III. Rifle qualification is a proposed element included in the BOLC-B program of instruction (POI). Each proponent will have to justify the additional training ammunition strategy driven by these changes to the next Army Munitions Requirements Working Group (AMRWG). If necessary adjustments are made, the proponent will proceed to the Army Munitions Requirements Council of Colonels (AMRCoC) to validate the need for extra funding.
- Close Combat Mission Capability Kit (CCMCK) temporarily converts service weapons, M16A2/A3/A4 rifles, M4/M4A1 carbines, M249 squad automatic weapons (SAWs), and M9/M11 pistols to fire low-velocity marking ammunition. The kit provides realistic force-on-force training; identifies shooter and shot placement; allows operator installation; fires from standard M4/M16/M249/M9/M11; does not penetrate skin through Army combat uniforms (ACUs) at 5 meters (T); discriminates among blue/red force killed in action (KIA), wounded in action (WIA), and fratricide; shoots through smoke.

Fort Leonard Wood has an established requirement for four CCMCK battalion sets and one authorized. The authorized infantry battalion set is due by December 2009 and consists of three company sets: 189 - M4/16 bolts; 54 - M249s; 60 - M9s, and 486 – Masks.

The service barrel assembly is replaced with a CCMCK training barrel assembly that allows the firing of CCMCK marking ammunition. Units will be required to supply their own vests, ballistic goggles, helmets, and other safety gear not listed above. Ammunition for the CCMCK is obtained through the ammunition supply point (ASP) and must be ordered/programmed according to ammunition regulations. Training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) are awaiting local guidance on priority of use. Once issued, further guidance will be given.

Systems tentatively scheduled to be presented to the next AMRWG are: improvised explosive device effects simulator (IEDES) training strategy and training support packages (TSPs); armored breaching vehicle (ABV) munitions requirement strategy combat load (CL); trailer ABV munitions requirement strategy for CL; engineer BOLC requirement for CCMCK; BOLC-B munitions requirements; Spider networked munitions system requirements; Scorpion networked munitions system requirements.

The next AMRWG will convene in March 2010 at Newport News, Virginia. The MANSCEN STRAC Manager and school subject matter experts will present new strategies or changes to existing strategies that will be presented to the AMRCoC in April 2010 for approval. This process is a semiannual event. Once approved by the AMRCoC, the strategies will be programmed objective memorandum (POM) for future Class V training munitions. The normal time for resources to be available to the field is four years from the date approved by the Army Munitions Council of Colonels (AMCOC). *(Note: The AMRCoC is not responsible for the resourcing of TADSS for unit-type training.)* The AMSWG and the AMCOC are also responsible for the munitions resourcing of institutional POIs, which go through the same semiannual process for resourcing. The resourcing dollars for POI Class V normally take 12 months to reach the institutions.

The point of contact is Mr. Gilbert Negrete, commercial (573) 563-5269, DSN 676-5269, or <*gil.negrete@conus.army.mil*>.

MANSCEN Doctrine Update

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center
Training and Doctrine Development Department
Doctrine Division

Publications Currently Under Development and/or Revision

Publication Number	Title	Date	Description (and Current Status)
FM 3-10	*Protection*	Pending	FM 3-10, *Protection*, is an Army keystone field manual that expands on the protection concepts outlined in FM 3-0, *Operations*. FM 3-10 will serve as a valuable resource to help commanders understand and visualize protection so they can describe it to their staffs and lead their Soldiers in the execution of those tasks required to preserve force effectiveness and accomplish the mission during full spectrum operations. FM 3-10 defines protection, specifies the twelve tasks that comprise the protection warfighting function, and introduces the five forms and principles of protection. Furthermore, the manual articulates how protection is achieved and integrated through the combining of reinforcing and complementary capabilities and affirms risk management as the overall process for integrating protection throughout the operations process. Finally, FM 3-10 reflects the addition of the protection cell in formations above brigade and provides advice to commanders on protection planning, preparation, execution, and assessment for staffs that lack a dedicated protection cell. Development Highlights: Protection warfighting function, twelve protection tasks, principles and forms of protection, and the protection planning process.

NOTE: Current (approved) publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at <*http://www.adtdl.army.mil*>. The manual discussed in this matrix is currently awaiting publication. Drafts may be obtained by contacting the MANSCEN Doctrine Division at: Commercial (573) 563-2740, DSN 676-2740 or <*james.b.jones1@us.army.mil*>.