

CONCEPT CAPABILITY PLAN: COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

By Mr. Larry Lazo, Lieutenant Colonel Thamar Main, and Lieutenant Colonel Bret Van Camp

The members of the concept team at the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, have their eyes on the future, envisioning warfare twenty years from now with a maneuver support focus. They are developing a concept capability plan (CCP) for combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). It describes what the Army will need to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the years 2015 to 2024 so that necessary changes in technology, equipment, organization, and infrastructure will mature and come together sensibly in the future to provide our Soldiers with better capabilities.

Determining Future Needs

A CCP describes the application of elements of joint and Army concepts to selected mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC).¹ A CCP draws its key future ideas and capabilities from national strategy documents; the family of joint concepts; the Army family of concepts; capabilities identified in war games, exercises, and experiments; and capabilities gleaned from lessons learned.² CCPs take the ideas founded in concepts and break them down into more detailed capability requirements. It is a very early step in a much larger process known as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS).

JCIDS is the process by which the Services look at future threats and the capabilities needed to meet those threats. Most changes to our force—whether in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)—are a result of this type of combat development work managed from within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Figure 1 represents an overlay of the various JCIDS efforts on acquisition. Notice

that *Concept*, which includes this CCP, is at the far left of the diagram.

This article focuses on the CCP for CWMD now in staffing, but it also helps to understand how this project fits in the larger JCIDS life cycle.

CCP Development

The CCP development process takes from ten to eighteen months and is typically followed by a capabilities-based assessment (CBA). The CBA is essentially a three-step process composed of a functional area analysis (FAA), functional needs analysis (FNA), and functional solutions analysis (FSA). The FAA output is a list of required capabilities to be accomplished, along with their associated tasks, conditions, and standards. The FNA assesses the ability of current or programmed capabilities to accomplish the FAA tasks and lists any capability gaps or redundancies. The FSA is an operationally based assessment of DOTMLPF approaches to solving or mitigating the gaps previously identified. The FSA is the basis for developing the required changes, which are stated in the form of a DOTMLPF change recommendation (DCR) for nonmateriel changes and/or an initial capabilities document (ICD) to describe changes in the quantity or type of existing materiel or facilities, adopt another Service's materiel, acquire foreign materiel, or begin development of new materiel.

CCP Purpose

The purpose of the Army's CCP for CWMD is to provide a concept at operational and tactical levels across the full spectrum of operations and in all environments from 2015 to 2024. The Army will use this CCP to conduct a detailed CBA for CWMD. This will provide the focus on how we will support national mandates on CWMD and how the Army will operate under chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environments.

This CCP refers to the eight mission areas found in the *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* and uses the six warfighting functions listed in Field Manual (FM) 3-0 to provide the framework of how the Army will conduct military and civil support operations. The Army CCP for CWMD reflects national, Department of Defense (DOD), joint, and Army guidance beginning with the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* and further refined in the *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*. The national strategy is based on the following pillars:

- Nonproliferation.
- Counterproliferation.
- Consequence management (CM).

The national military strategy expands on this construct with the following military mission areas:

- Security cooperation and partnership activities.
- Threat reduction cooperation.
- WMD interdiction.
- WMD offensive operations.
- WMD elimination.
- Active defense.
- Passive defense.
- CM.

Of the military mission areas, six have major impacts on the U.S. Army and how it will fight. The first two areas—security cooperation and partnership activities and threat reduction cooperation—while very important in CWMD, only affect a small number of specialized teams of U.S. Soldiers and civilians. The CCP for CWMD will only provide a brief look at these two areas.

The operational problem we face is that the military objectives of the future modular force in CWMD are to proactively dissuade, defeat, deter, or mitigate the rogue behavior of WMD threat networks. The thrust of current Army capabilities in such missions is to protect against and recover from WMD attacks. The Army will continually be challenged to proactively detect, identify, track, and engage WMD threat networks before they can launch an attack. Additionally, Army mission planning will continue to evolve to fully integrate the breadth of relevant considerations in CWMD.

To solve this problem, we believe that the solution is predicated on the following key ideas:

- *Proactive approach to CWMD.* The Army's concept for CWMD must center on the proactive engagement of WMD threat networks before they can obtain or use WMD against the United States, its allies, or its partners.
- *Layered approach to CWMD.* The Army must layer its approach to engaging WMD threat networks. The concept of a layered approach applies to counterforce operations, sensors, protection, and training.

- *Network-Enabled Battle Command (NEBC).* Commanders will rely on NEBC for information management that supports all combat decisions. Commanders must gain a situational understanding to enable effective operations inside the adversary's decision cycle. Army planners must fully use capabilities provided by the NEBC, which will provide a network that rapidly links tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
- *Leveraging new technologies.* Since many of the required capabilities presented in this CCP will be possible only through applications of new technology, the Army must leverage these new technologies.
- *Enhanced training.* Training will prepare Soldiers and leaders to exercise sound judgment in data analysis, to understand the impact of local cultures on operations, and to act in periods of uncertainty. These abilities, alongside the capabilities provided by NEBC, are vital to establish situational understanding.³

Central to the solution that the Army will work in concert with partners to deter WMD proliferation are the following ideas:

- Conducting counterforce operations to engage WMD threat networks before they can obtain or use WMD.
- Providing Soldier, platform, equipment, and facility CBRN protection as part of passive and active defense operations.
- Mitigating WMD effects in CM missions.⁴

CCP Completion

The CWMD CCP was approved in March 2009 (as TRADOC Pamphlet [Pam] 525-7-19) and is now available online at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-7-19.pdf>. This work was compiled through the collaboration of members of an Integrated Capabilities Development Team (ICDT). (See Figure 2.)

The Army Capabilities Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia, signed the ICDT charter for CWMD in April 2008, though significant work had begun as early as October 2007. The ICDT's task is to identify the required capabilities for the Army's role in CWMD during the 2015–2024 time frame. Research included guiding documents such as TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, Army concept strategy, operating and functional concepts, joint concepts, and any approved contingency operations applicable to CWMD. The relevant guiding documents are derived from the DOD mission to dissuade, deter, and defeat those who seek to harm the United States, its allies, and its partners by using—or threatening to use—WMD and, if attacked, to mitigate the effects and restore deterrence. (See Figure 3.)

Army's Role in CWMD

Of the three pillars of the national strategy—nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management—the Army has major operational requirements within the second two. The scope of this concept, while Army-centric,

is unconstrained in CWMD and includes relationships and integration with joint forces, governmental offices, and nongovernmental organizations.

Figure 4 shows what we believe are the primary audiences for guidance, beginning with national-level documents such as the *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*; the *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*; the U.S. Strategic Command CWMD Joint Integration Concept, which is a critical bridge from national-level strategy; and the CCP to combat WMD now underway.

The CCP scope is intentionally broad to provide a single-source body of work from which action officers can consistently and holistically ascertain the Army's future requirements. It is ambitious, but necessary, to approach this from an Army perspective in a holistic manner. We intend to formalize the process whereby ongoing JCIDS efforts benefit from this CCP. Ultimately, the results of this CCP will serve to inform CBAs already in existence, those under development, and those undergoing periodic review and update. Regardless, each of these CBAs has one singular focus—to provide better capabilities to the Soldier on the ground. So, if asked about ways to improve our Army, consider your input a contribution to the military that our sons and daughters will inherit. 🗣️

Endnotes:

¹*Concept Capability Plan (CCP) Writers' Guide*, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, 12 February 2008.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, *The Army in Joint Operations: The Army Future Force Capstone Concept*, 7 April 2005.

References:

FM 3-0, *Operations*, 27 February 2008.

National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 February 2006.

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.

Mr. Lazo is a retired Chemical Corps master sergeant with more than 22 years of service. He is now a military research analyst assigned to the Operational and Strategic Maneuver Support Branch, CDID, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Lieutenant Colonel Main is a future concepts officer with the Operational and Strategic Maneuver Support Branch, CDID. He served in numerous staff and command positions before being assigned to Fort Leonard Wood.

Lieutenant Colonel Van Camp is the Chief, Operational and Strategic Maneuver Support Branch, CDID. He has served as Commander, 82d and 84th Chemical Battalions, and Chief, Concepts, Studies, and Analysis Branch, Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

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


Figure 4. Guidance linkage