



Chemical Corps Efforts to Support the National Guard in its Role as Responders for CBRNE Missions

By Lieutenant Colonel William Christmas (Retired) and Mr. Mike Todd

“The National Guard is organized, trained, and equipped by the Department of Defense, and can operate in all traditional DOD missions within the spectrum of Title 10, 32, or state active duty forces. Additionally, the National Guard in state status possesses many of the attributes required of an effective Joint Force, yet remains responsive to state sovereign authorities free of the limitations that constrain federal forces.”

—Department of Defense Homeland Security Joint Operating Concept, February 2004

Volumes of material are devoted to the role that the Department of Defense (DOD) plays in response to domestic terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE). Numerous “think tanks” across the United States are publishing articles restating the perceived role of the DOD in domestic terrorist events, and strategic guidance documents and directives have been issued defining the mission. But what does the Chemical Corps support effort to domestic consequence management, as it applies to the National Guard (NG), look like for the near term? How will the Chemical Corps focus its capabilities to prepare NG units to respond to homeland security (HLS) missions?

An understanding of the organization and service structure of the NG is necessary when discussing domestic CBRNE support missions. Currently, the Army National Guard (ARNG)—367,000 strong—makes up more than one-half of the total Army ground combat force and one-third of its support force. Air National Guard (ANG) units have a total strength of 109,000. The ARNG has units in 2,700 communities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The ANG has 88 flying units at more than 170 installations nationwide. Since each state and territory has an ANG unit, rapid deployment is enhanced. This “constitutionally unique” mission and the placement of forces are great advantages, especially in support of the HLS mission (see *Figure 1, page 8*).

The role of the NG as the first line of military capability under the control of the state governors is an important factor in its viability to support homeland defense (HLD). Doctrine and training are obvious areas for the Chemical Corps to expand its contribution to the HLS mission. The development of the weapons of mass destruction—civil support team (WMD-CST) is just the first manifestation in the evolution of a full-spectrum, response and support system fulfilling a defined need. WMD-CST state support requires personnel qualification and certification not traditionally trained by the Chemical Corps. But the Corps plans to absorb these capabilities, leverage its traditional expertise, and integrate with other services and Army branches to become the DOD experts. The NG is committed to a joint CBRNE ARNG/ANG force that is—

- Able to collaborate with other federal agencies.
- Prepared for present and future missions.
- Missions across the spectrum of contingencies (from domestic to warfighting operations).
- Structured and resourced to accomplish its missions.
- Capable and accessible when mobilized in State Active Duty status, under Title 32, United States Code (USC) and/or Title 10 USC.
- Staffed with trained citizen soldiers and airmen committed to serving their local communities, state, and Nation.



In essence, the NG wants a force that is fully integrated into CBRNE operations today and tomorrow, whether it be to support civil authorities (as part of the domestic Global War on Terrorism [GWOT] or in response to a natural disaster or a CBRNE incident) or to support a combatant commander (in response to United States Northern Command [NORTHCOM] Joint Force Headquarters HLS [JFHQ-HLS], Joint Task Force Civil Support [JTF-CS], and/or Joint Task Force Six [JTF-6]). Also, it is important to understand that most NG units are mobilized for a CBRNE, HLS, or HLD incident in State Active Duty status first (with the exception being the WMD-CSTs that respond in 32 USC status). However, when an incident becomes a federal incident, the status changes from State Active Duty status to either 32 USC or 10 USC status. *Figure 2* portrays the full spectrum of NG operations, including the response overlap in State Active Duty 32 USC and/or 10 USC status.

Strategic Concerns

There are three strategic concerns that could impact negatively on the capability of the NG to respond to CBRNE incidents:

- How long the GWOT will last. While the official position of the US government is that the GWOT is far from over, there is not a quantifiable assumption—general or specific—on how long this conflict will last.
- How the GWOT is viewed in relation to regional conflicts. There is currently no established relationship.
- How the military force structure and operational plans (historically designed to perform combat missions, obtain battle victories, and win military campaigns) will transition to a holistic mission of successfully concluding conflicts and building peace operations.

The first two strategic concerns are very important. The closest thing that we have to a quantifiable assumption is that the GWOT could last for decades. While some might argue that this establishes a general assumption, the position is




Figure 1. Guard unit locations (CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands)

vague and lacks a minimum and maximum time range. And there is no attempt to relate the GWOT to the periodic eruption of regional conflicts. The lack of a quantifiable time range, coupled with the lack of a relationship with regional conflicts, could have a negative impact on the research and development (R&D) of CBRNE equipment. Military R&D efforts have historically focused on the equipment requirements that are needed to support traditional combat missions (airplanes, tanks, artillery, trucks), but the GWOT is different and the stakes are higher. There is a good chance that CBRNE R&D equipment requirements may be relegated to a lower priority by military planners. The following approach is the preferred assumption; however, *Figure 3* portrays a more realistic way of viewing the current GWOT and its relationship with regional conflicts:




Figure 2. NG spectrum of operations




Figure 3. The GWOT and its relationship with regional conflicts

- The GWOT could last 20 to 100 years (or longer) and include periodic regional conflicts.
- There will be another significant terrorist incident in this country, most likely involving a CBRNE attack.
- NG units will play a prominent role in response to major HLS, HLD, and/or civil support incidents.

Another strategic concern has to do with how the military views regional conflicts. Most conflicts are planned and viewed as traditional combat operations. The Army, like the other services, uses this same approach. And yet it is the Army that must always assume the lead for stability operations and initial nation-building activities that directly follow successful combat campaigns. The shortfall in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, when focusing on combat operations, became readily apparent when the Army did not have trained chemical units in its force structure ready to hunt for WMD or deal with toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) or toxic industrial material (TIM) following combat operations in Operation Desert Storm and during recent operations against the terrorist insurgency in Iraq. While the Army responded to the challenge, it is apparent that regional conflicts are very different from combat operations. When viewing regional conflicts holistically, the following assumptions should be incorporated:

- Consideration for the various phases of regional conflicts—mobilization and deployment operations, combat operations (which may not exist in some small-scale contingency [SSC] operations), stability operations, nation-building activities, and redeployment and demobilization plans.
- Military support for all phases.

- A requirement for a minimum unit deployment time of one year.
- Unit rotations for extended conflicts (longer than 18 months).
- The prominent role of NG units, to include derivative unit identification code (UIC) functions.
- CBRNE equipment and the associated individual and collective skills needed and used for HLS, HLD, and/or civil support missions (required and necessary during stability operations and nation-building activities).

Figure 4 portrays a holistic and more realistic way of viewing regional conflicts and the associated phases of operations.

Capturing New and Emerging Technologies

The NG believes it should have the newest and best CBRNE equipment available to fight the GWOT. And this is not an issue of disagreement; however, the




Figure 4. Conflict phase line



perceived inability of the Army to provide rapid fielding of leading edge CBRNE equipment has caused some friction between the Army and the NG. The Chemical Corps has made considerable strides in identifying capabilities through doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) analyses and bringing the acquisition process of HLS support equipment under the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The US Army Chemical School must plan for sufficient resources to continue the progress gained thus far. To better understand what technologies might be needed for future planning, see *Figure 5*, which shows where the NG believes its CBRNE initiatives fit into the national response plan to WMD, TIC, TIM, and other terrorist incidents.

Much of the NG CBRNE technologies and equipment for this effort was obtained through commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) purchases, which often were not documented as required and/or authorized. This acquisition methodology is very similar to the way Special Forces units acquired materiel before being consolidated under a single command. The impact of not capturing new or emerging technical solutions resulted in the lack of—

- Standardization in COTS CBRNE equipment (performance abilities, maintenance man-hours, replacement parts, unit cost) purchased to satisfy the requirements of the different services.
- Timely (and, in some cases, no) equipment documentation, which further resulted in problems with—




Figure 5. NG initiatives in the National Response Plan



- Programming sustainment dollars and life cycle replacement costs.
- Planning training requirements and training courses to teach individual and collective skills.
- Programming training and execution dollars.
- Obtaining full visibility (to DOD planners and combatant commanders and their staffs) of the CBRNE assets and capabilities currently available.
- Determining the reliability of purchased COTS items that were not performance-tested by DOD.

The chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has stated that he wants to make NG assets designed for civil support missions available for worldwide deployment.

Because the NG is at the forefront in domestic CBRNE response missions and its assets are subsequently available to combatant commanders, there is an urgency to speed up the requirements determination and documentation processes. By being proactive, the Chemical Corps is avoiding a repeat of the mistakes highlighted in the Inspector General's report on the management of the WMD-CST program by the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO).¹ The report highlighted that the CoMPIO "failed to provide adequate guidance, training, and equipment for the 10 CSTs." Additionally, the "equipment acquisition process CoMPIO employed to purchase equipment for the WMD-CSTs unnecessarily circumvented the normal DOD acquisition channels." The Chemical Corps is mindful of the unique capabilities the NG needs to support the HLS mission and is actively institutionalizing the HLS requirements and acquisition processes.

Bridging the Gap

The chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) has stated that he wants to make NG assets designed for civil support missions available for worldwide deployment. This

will require a change in the federal statutory law to deploy the WMD-CSTs. In a March 2004 memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NORTHCOM commander stated his support for the formation of NG CBRNE-enhanced response force packages (NGCERFP). The NGCERFP will be organized from current NG units (matrix organizations) that could easily be mobilized by derivative UICs for CBRNE missions or could mobilize as part of organic units. However, the chief of the NGB has also stated that he wants to support joint expeditionary capabilities worldwide, while still ensuring that state governors and adjutants general always have 50 percent of their NG assets available for domestic missions. *Figure 6, page 12*, represents the vision of the Chief of the NGB and implies the following requirements to be considered:

- NG personnel and equipment missioned for HLS and HLD are moving toward an outside continental United States (OCONUS) deployment to support the GWOT.
- Battlefield vehicle platforms must be developed for the Unified Command Suite (Communications) and Analytical Laboratory Systems and pre-positioned with other equipment to support OCONUS deployments.
- CST and NGCERFP equipment must be retained within the states, territories, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam to support domestic CBRNE missions.
- Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) and mobilization day (M-day) personnel (soldiers and airmen) must be trained to backfill guardsmen who have been mobilized or are getting ready for deployment missions.

The CBRNE forces that must be addressed are the WMD-CST unit and the NGCERFP (a matrix organization made up of assets from various units). The principal capabilities are shown in *Figure 7, page 12*; the top two capabilities are of specific interest to the Chemical Corps.

The Chemical School is the executive agent for the HLS Office (Maneuver Support Center). As the executive agent, the Chemical Corps will develop a close working relationship with the NGB, the state adjutants general, the NORTHCOM combatant commander, other commands, US Army Training and Doctrine Command



PROTECTING THE NATION




Figure 6. Full-spectrum force

schools and centers, fellow services, and other federal agencies to ensure the force integration of CBRNE mission requirements for HLS and the GWOT.

Endnote

¹“Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction–Civil Support Teams,” Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Report No. D-2001-043, 31 January 2001.

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


Figure 7. Principal capabilities of the NGCERFP