
Creating CID and MI CI Partnerships

By Special Agent Ryan Averbek and Special Agent Jim Boerner

When Operation Iraqi Freedom began, an operations officer with the 3d Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation Division [CID]) had a unique idea that many thought outlandish. The idea advocated changing the traditional two-man investigative team, composed of CID special agents, to a partnership of a CID special agent and a military intelligence (MI) counterintelligence (CI) special agent. The concept was designed to leverage skills and experience across the military police and MI communities to accomplish battlefield investigative missions. The commander of the 3d was intrigued with the concept and approved the creation of this hybrid investigative team to handle war crimes and hostile fire death investigations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.



Two special agents were selected to form the team, bringing with them extensive CI experience and a thorough knowledge of intelligence discipline, assets, and reporting methods. While CID and MI CI organizations have different charters, the investigative process proved to be remarkably similar. Evidence collection and preservation, chain-of-custody procedures, sworn statement collection, source management, and interview procedures provided a common ground to begin team integration. Each agent was familiar with joint operations in the past, during which each organization conducted investigations pertaining to its charter and kept the other informed of the results. But until now, neither of the Army’s “gold badge” special agents had been partnered on a permanent basis. However, in Baghdad, the agents soon realized the full scope of each other’s experience and skills.

Testing the Partnership

Investigations of war crimes proved to be the perfect test bed for the investigative team. Each agent approached scenarios and gathered facts and evidence based upon past experience. For example, when a mass grave site was reported, each agent drew from his unique experience and organizational resources to facilitate the investigation. The experience of the CID agent allowed him to focus on crime scene preservation, evidence collection, scene sketches, and interviews to determine the who, what, when, where, and why (5 Ws). CID resources included a forensic science officer to determine the age of the site and the victims’ cause of death. The CID agent also used

established sources to determine suspects, witnesses, and victims. The CI agent focused on using MI resources to gather information, including imagery and measurement and signatures intelligence to determine when a grave site was dug. After a timetable was established, an order-of-battle technician from MI determined which military units were operating in the area during that time period and who the unit commanders were. The CI agent was also able to utilize human intelligence sources to determine the 5 Ws. The added value of this team included the capability to simultaneously harness skills and organizational resources.

As case managers and liaison officers in Baghdad, the team was able to coordinate interviews from high-value detainees. The CI agent assisted in opening doors with MI units running the interrogation facilities, while the CID agent provided the investigative expertise necessary to conduct proper interviews. The relationship between the CID and MI blossomed when the team was allowed to participate in Article V Geneva Convention tribunals. These tribunals are used to determine the status of detainees—prisoner of war or civilian internee.

With the emergence of hostile fire death investigations, the team again provided significant contributions. With access to MI reporting, the CI agent was able to analyze source reporting that named potential suspects involved in the deaths. The CID agent—familiar with homicide investigations, current case status and disposition logs, and assistance requests—was able to forward these leads through

operations to the appropriate investigative agents. The partnership provided valuable leads on several previously cold cases.

The team was able to obtain valuable evidence documentation from the document exploitation team, which falls under the Iraqi survey group. The physical evidence included videos, photographs, and paper materials of war crimes, assassinations, atrocities, and chemical extermination by Saddam Hussein and other regime personalities.

Looking to the Future

The team partnership continues to operate as the 3d Military Police Group prepares to transfer current cases to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. The partnership process has been long and tedious—involving thousands of military and civilian

personnel and countless coalition forces—but has greatly impacted scheme-of-battlefield investigations. Only time will tell the value of this CID/MI team concept, but success in the near term makes us think about how we operated in the past and how we plan to operate in the future.

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The 3d Military Police Company Supports EPW Operations in Iraq

By Lieutenant Colonel Mack Huey and Captain Mark Germano

The 3d Military Police Company had the honor of leading the charge for our Military Police Corps Regiment to support 3d Infantry Division (3ID) (Mechanized) during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The leaders of Marne team are very proud of the young men and women who met the challenge and performed under very austere conditions. They are truly at the “tip of the spear”! Not one soldier was lost during combat operations or accidents—which is a tribute to our officers and noncommissioned officers and the equipment and training provided at the unit and the U.S. Army Military Police School.

Preparing to Deploy

In the spring of 2002, 3ID was assigned as the Crisis Response Force in Kuwait as a defense against possible Iraqi aggression. The division tasked the 3d Military Police Company to provide direct and general support to the mission using 6-month platoon rotations. The 2d and 4th Platoons deployed to Kuwait with the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) in September 2002.

In November, before receiving the mission for the main body deployment, the division deputy provost marshal (DPM) and his staff deployed to Kuwait. For 2 months, they planned Operations Lucky Warrior and Victory Warrior training exercises among the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), V Corps, and 3ID.

In December, 3d Military Police Battalion staff began the military decision-making process and planning phase for additional personnel support, as military police force flow operations would not support the doctrinal attachment of a corps military police company. The division provost marshal (PM) cell was increased from 7 to 21 personnel to support planned tasks, including a protective services detail (PSD) for general officers. With additional personnel, the battalion formed a military police tactical operations and law and order cell. The 30th Military Police Detachment (Criminal Investigation Division [CID]) direct-support element from Fort Stewart, Georgia, provided 11 soldiers to support operations.

In January 2003, the 3d Military Police Company and PM cell deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Simultaneously, two military police companies at Fort Stewart received deployment orders—the 293d Military Police Company deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, to

conduct detention and other military police operations, and the 549th Military Police Company deployed to Kuwait in preparation for hostilities with Iraq. Elements of the 179th Military Police Detachment also deployed in support of both operations. By the middle of March, the majority of military police and CID assigned to Fort Stewart had deployed, so Army Reserve units—the 304th Military Police Company from West Virginia and the 3220th Garrison Support Unit from Florida—were assigned to conduct installation force protection.

In February 2003, the PM cell planned and led an enemy prisoner of war (EPW) exercise to train and evaluate the ability of the 3d Military Police Company to perform internment operations. The field-training exercise focused on capturing, transporting, and processing prisoners; establishing forward and division central collection points (DCCPs); performing sustainment operations; and learning the “five S’s” (silence, search, segregate, speed, and safeguard). These invaluable lessons were incorporated into the company’s tactics, techniques, and procedures and the division training plan. The training incorporated headquarters soldiers and CID personnel to assist with in-processing procedures, to prepare for the expected large number of EPWs.

While the majority of the division trained and prepared for conflict, the 3d Military Police Company performed security operations. During reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSOI) operations, the company provided more than 125 convoy security escorts from the port and Camp Doha to the four camps—located approximately 25 kilometers south of the Kuwait-Iraq border. The company also provided traffic and accident support.

Mission and Task Organization

The 3d Military Police Company was tasked to conduct all military police battlefield missions in support of the division's scheme of maneuver. Key tasks included supporting breach and berm-crossing operations, establishing forward collection points (FCPs) along the battlespace, establishing multiple DCCPs, conducting route signing for the march north, and performing convoy security operations.

The doctrinal application of military police within 3ID consisted of three direct-support platoons aligned with each BCT. The division DPM worked in the division main command post and the battle captain/operations sergeant major worked from the division rear command post. Due to the magnitude of the mission, the division PM colocated with the PM cell, company headquarters, general-support platoons, and other members and units in the task force. Before crossing the berm, the company was task-organized to best support all aspects of EPW operations. Many hours of brainstorming and planning went into what leadership referred to as "Task Force EPW," a combination of forces brought together to address the issue of sustaining EPW operations over several hundred miles of battlespace. Ironically, after the task force was formed, the former PM of the 82d Airborne Division presented the 3ID PM with an article he had written after Desert Storm. The article described the same mission challenges and similar personnel requirements.

After weeks of brainstorming, planning, and briefing division leadership, the 3d Military Police Company received resources to accomplish its mission. To support all aspects of EPW operations, additional units were assigned to the 3ID PM. The following personnel and units—which made up Task Force EPW—joined the company before moving into attack position:

- 546th Area Support Medical Company (ASMC) (from Fort Hood, Texas)
- 274th Forward Surgical Team (FST) (from Fort Bragg, North Carolina)
- 703d Main Supply Battalion (provided three 5-ton trucks and four drivers)
- Embedded reporter from *The Orlando Sentinel*
- Contracted linguist/interpreter
- Tactical human intelligence team
- Mobile interrogation team
- Staff Judge Advocate advisor

Crossing the Berm

When President Bush announced the beginning of combat operations with Iraq on 19 March, Task Force EPW began marshalling for movement. The task force linked up with 3BCT and moved to the initial attack position to support EPW operations within the berm-crossing area. Early in the morning of 20 March, the task force began the slow movement through near whiteout conditions (sandstorm) to the attack position, approximately 10 kilometers from the Iraqi border. The initial briefing called for 3ID to be in the attack positions for 36-48 hours; however, the Iraqis began launching Scud and other missiles into Kuwait. Missiles not intercepted by U.S. Patriot missiles missed their target and inflicted minimal damage. That evening, orders came to increase to mission-oriented protective posture 1 (MOPP 1) status, and obvious signs that the mission was a "go" were seen in the waves of cruise missiles headed to targets, Patriot missile battery counterfire, and radio transmissions between aviation and field artillery assets as they prepared the battlefield for the attack.

Task Force EPW moved into Iraq on the morning of 21 March. Two general-support platoons established the division's first FCP, centrally located at two exit lanes through the 17-kilometer crossing site. The platoons were supported with FSTs and ambulances from the 546th ASMC to treat wounded EPWs. The division expected to capture approximately 100 EPWs within the berm complex. The task force was prepared to use the 5-ton dump trucks to transport captured EPWs north to the first DCCP, as coalition forces were not able to establish a corps holding area (CHA) because the Kuwaitis would not allow EPWs on their soil. But the estimates were wrong. No EPWs were captured at the border, because most guards were killed in the artillery attack and aviation barrage, and the remaining personnel fled.

Task Force EPW continued north to the second planned FCP. Mobility was exceptionally difficult through the route; the desert sand was deep and soft, and most of the trucks and high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) towing trailers got stuck. After what seemed like hours spent conducting self-recovery operations, Task Force EPW found hard ground at an abandoned airstrip where it waited until morning before moving forward to help the direct-support platoons. The task force placed the company commander in advance of the main body and other elements to relieve the direct-support platoons of the EPWs received from the maneuver units in the division's first fight near An Nasariyah.

Shortly after the main body of Task Force EPW arrived at the FCP, 3BCT contacted the company commander to report that it was holding a significant number of EPWs in the vicinity of Tallil Air Base. A small element was immediately dispatched to the air base, and the main body started out a few hours later. One platoon and the FST were left behind to guard wounded EPWs and then transport them forward to the DCCP to be established at Tallil Air Base. There was no evacuation to the rear, as the CHA had yet to be established.

Tallil Air Base (DCCP No. 1)

Late in the afternoon of 22 March, the advance party arrived on Tallil Air Base, near An Nasariyah. Due to stiff resistance, the complex selected in the plan to be the first DCCP had not been cleared. Task Force EPW moved onto the airfield as a temporary measure and to relieve Task Force 1-15 of responsibility for 16 EPWs. That evening, the 3BCT commander requested that 3d Military Police Company relieve one of his companies that was guarding EPWs a few kilometers from the airfield, so two platoons spent the night safeguarding approximately 160 EPWs. The night passed without incident, and the next morning, Task Force 1-30 cleared the area. Part of Task Force EPW performed guard duties while the remainder moved into the built-up area and began clearing operations. Within 4 hours, CHA Tallil was established and operational. That afternoon, the tactical operations center (TOC) from the 709th Military Police Battalion arrived, along with a subordinate company. The PM and the commander of the 709th arranged for relief operations to occur the next morning so Task Force EPW could continue to support the 3ID fight—which had moved to An

Najaf. On the morning of the 24 March, more than 220 EPWs were transferred to the 709th and moved out once again.

An Najaf (DCCP No. 2)

After being relieved of the EPWs, Task Force EPW started out on “pipeline road” toward Objective Rams. Movement was slow and occasionally stopped, as 3ID and V Corps units jockeyed for position. The convoy separated on more than one occasion and finally stopped—after 15 hours—at the convoy support centers along the main supply route. Early on 25 March, movement continued, and 2d Platoon reported 14 EPWs at its FCP. The first unit stopped to relieve 2d Platoon of its EPWs, and the division PM had his first opportunity to contact the division main command post since crossing into Iraq. The task force had once again caught up to the fight; combat actions in the area were visible.

The division operations, plans, and training staff (G3) ordered the task force to immediately construct DCCP No. 2 at an ammunition storage facility northwest of An Najaf. But 20 kilometers from the next stop, the afternoon sky turned orange and then black as night. There was no choice but to halt the convoy and ride out the storm. To further complicate matters, they were moving through an escarpment, and the drop-off along the road at some points was several hundred meters. Security for the convoy was the primary concern, as visibility was zero. When the storm subsided, the convoy continued to the site of the next collection point and, by nightfall, had nearly 200 EPWs in custody.

With the potential of having to provide for hundreds of EPWs, logistical requirements immediately became a concern for Task Force EPW, as they were



EPWs were transported from the DCCP daily.

positioned well forward of the logistical trains. The first concern was the evacuation of the EPWs to CHA Tallil; the second—but no less important—concern was acquiring essential supplies. And the problem of how to deal with wounded EPWs—with varying degrees of injuries—still remained.

The evacuation of EPWs was conducted by air and ground transportation. When the unpredictable weather would not permit flight, internal and attached truck assets were used to transport prisoners to Objective Rams, 40 kilometers south. Soldiers from the company loaded EPWs into CH-47 Chinook helicopters (used to transport critical supplies to the division support area) and transported them to CHA Tallil. When aircraft was not available, elements of the 18th Military Police Brigade provided escorts. From 25 March through 3 April, 3ID captured and Task Force EPW evacuated approximately 628 EPWs and civilian internees (CI) to CHA Tallil.

Division maneuver units moved so fast toward Baghdad that supplies were difficult to obtain. Task Force EPW had a small amount of Class I and Class IV supplies but not enough to maintain sustained operations. Leaders in the task force were creative in their approach to solving these problems. The water shortage problem was solved after company mechanics were able to start a Russian-made water truck left on the garrison. In addition to providing one meal, ready-to-eat (MRE) daily, EPWs were also given rice, beans, and tea discovered in local storage areas. Prisoners even volunteered to prepare and cook a daily supplement using confiscated cookware and propane.

Because the 546th ASMC and the 274th FST remained at Tallil Air Base, the task force arrived at An Najaf with only organic medical support. After a few days, a small element from the 566th ASMC

and the 934th FST arrived to provide assistance. This significantly decreased the burden placed on the main support and forward support battalions, whose medical companies had limited space and were required to care for Americans and Iraqis. Soon, medical evacuation aircraft landed with increasing frequency, dropping off wounded EPWs and providing overflow facilities for friendly casualties.

Logistics Support Area Dogwood (DCCP No. 3)

On 4 April, Task Force EPW moved north through the Karbala Gap toward a location south of Baghdad and west of the Euphrates River. Reconnaissance of the two locations revealed unsuitable facilities. The division PM contacted the assistant division commander for support. A suitable location in the division support area—an excellent location close enough to Baghdad to support combat elements but located near the division's logistics base—was identified. Additionally, the new DCCP also had a large and open area that could accommodate hundreds of EPWs and provide overhead cover during the increasing desert temperatures. The area also had numerous buildings for command posts, barracks, and a hospital.

By this juncture, EPW operations were running smoothly. The task force had fine-tuned processing, sustaining, and safeguarding EPWs and had coordinated evacuation procedures with the 18th Military Police Brigade. However, a considerable number of noncombatants and displaced civilians were being brought to the DCCP, creating yet another challenge. Many people were wounded, requiring medical treatment for a wide spectrum of injuries. Family members often accompanied the wounded, so the task force began to work extensively with civil affairs units to ensure the safe return of civilians to their homes.

The 3d Military Police Company and supporting units were ordered to Baghdad two days after Baghdad International Airport was seized. On 10 April, advance elements of Task Force EPW moved north to the airport, and the last elements arrived the next day. The 566th ASMC and 934th FST remained at Logistics Support Area Dogwood to support the 720th Military Police Battalion, which conducted a relief in place with the company. This area became the location of the second CHA, processing 472 prisoners in 8 days.

Baghdad (DCCP No. 4)

The move to Baghdad saw many changes in the mission. Although the first few days at the airport brought many Republican Guard and regular Iraqi army EPWs, there was soon a drastic change in the



EPWs were transported by CH-47 helicopters.

population. The end of major combat operations resulted in a large number of CIs, mostly looters and criminals. Also, Task Force EPW confined a number of “high-value detainees,” including high-ranking government officials and individuals of vital intelligence value. To assist in the mission, the division attached a platoon from the 92d Chemical Company to perform guard duties and personnel from the 581st ASMC to provide medical care.

On 1 May, the 115th Military Police Battalion assumed all internment operations for the Baghdad area of operations. Operations on the airport netted 771 EPWs, CIs, and high-value detainees—the most prisoners at any site during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In all, 3d Military Police Company safeguarded 2,091 EPWs/CIs during the conflict.

Stability Operations, Support Operations, and CID Investigations

The assistance provided by the 92d Chemical Company allowed the 3d Military Police Company to concentrate on more traditional military police missions, forcing them to quickly learn the streets of Baghdad and become familiar with new enemies—paramilitary forces, common criminals, and looters.

Most of the missions assigned in the Baghdad area revolved around rebuilding infrastructure. The company supported a variety of missions aimed at establishing a safe and secure environment for the city’s citizens, to include providing security to the CFLCC in the forward operating base; guarding civil affairs elements conducting assessments of power plants, engineers conducting assessments of infrastructure, and health specialists assessing hospitals and delivering medical supplies; and protecting trucks supplying fuel for generators. The company also provided PSDs for the Sergeant Major of the Army, Secretary of Defense, Interim Iraqi Minister of Health, and Baghdad Station Chief. Additionally, the 3d Military Police Company supported the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) forward passage of 3ID lines with route reconnaissance, route signing, and traffic control points. The company was also charged with securing more than \$775 million of U.S. currency found on the grounds of the Presidential Palace complex.

The direct-support element of the 30th Military Police Detachment provided an exceptional amount of support to Task Force EPW throughout the war. It participated in planning in the rear, deployed with the company, provided investigative support in Kuwait, crossed into Iraq with the first CID element, assisted the military police in the execution of EPW operations and, most importantly, became a vital part



Soldiers guard a pallet of \$328 million of U.S. currency seized from the Presidential Palace complex.

of stability operations and support operations (SOSO). The direct-support element supported 3ID in investigating war crimes and mass grave sites, as well as crimes committed by soldiers. Most notably, a member of the task force was solely responsible for locating the last 3ID soldier missing in action. This soldier went home as a result of outstanding attention to detail and the investigative prowess of one Task Force EPW soldier.

Follow-On Mission in Al Fallujah

Just when the 3d Military Police Company thought it was heading home, 3ID received a follow-on mission to move to Al Fallujah, about 35 kilometers west of Baghdad, to secure the area. The division reattached the 1st and 2d Platoons to the 3d Military Police Company and placed the company under the operational control of 2BCT. The company conducted law and order and police intelligence operations through joint patrols with the Iraqi Police Force (IPF). In addition, the company assessed the status and capabilities of the existing force and detention facilities; established liaison with senior IPF officials; and assisted the IPF in standing up a viable police infrastructure by providing expertise, training, weapons, vehicles, uniforms, and other logistical support. The end state was to ensure that the IPF was able to shoot, move, and communicate and was legitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

Conclusion

Operation Iraqi Freedom was an event that members of the “Marne police” will never forget. The 3ID moved with lightning speed across the desert, faster than any other mechanized force in history. Soldiers

and leaders proved flexible in their support of a rapidly changing plan and agile in their ability to conduct multiple tasks simultaneously. The members of the 3d Military Police Company and Division PM cell were proud to serve their country, Army, and beloved Military Police Corps Regiment.


“Rock of the Marne”

Lieutenant Colonel Huey is the 3d Military Police Battalion commander, 3ID PM, and Director of Public Safety.

Captain Germano is the 3d Military Police Battalion assistant S3.



CID personnel investigate a possible mass grave site just outside of Baghdad.



13th Military Police Company

Lineage and Honors

Constituted on 10 August 1943 as the 1358th Military Police Company. Activated at Camp Ripley, Minnesota. Inactivated on 10 November 1945 at Buckley Field, Colorado.

Redesignated on 24 January 1969 as the 13th Military Police Company and allotted to the regular Army. Activated in Thailand. Inactivated on 1 January 1975 in Thailand.

Activated on 16 October 1987 in Italy.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

Normandy
Northern France

Rhineland
Central Europe

Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (streamer embroidered), European Theater



The 4th Infantry Division (4ID) (Mechanized), the Army's first digitized division, deployed as Task Force Ironhorse in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the deployment, the military police contribution was wide-ranging, covering long distances and battlespace that expanded far beyond its doctrinal capability.

From Fort to Port

Within 12 hours of receiving notification of deployment, the 4th Military Police Company had combat-loaded its modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and had its vehicles staged and ready for movement to the deployment ready-reaction field (DRRF). At the 96-hour point, the company had completed DRRF, rail, and port operations and had all cargo loaded on ships.

The initial plan called for 4ID to attack northern Iraq through Turkey. The unit loaded all equipment inside vehicles for immediate access at the seaport of debarkation (SPOD), anticipating that there would be limited assets in Turkey to support reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSOI) operations. Even though 4ID ultimately deployed through the more established port of Kuwait, the decision to combat-load MTOEs paid dividends as the unit moved into its first combat encounter in almost a quarter of a century.

Moving the Division

The basic concept of maneuver and mobility support operations is the swift and uninterrupted movement of combat power and logistics forward,

laterally, and across the battlefield in support of the maneuver commander's intent. The 4ID commander retained the 4th Military Police Company under division control because of the mission importance and the fact that there was no military police company to augment the division. With only 41 high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) systems (combat platforms) assigned to the company, it faced a monumental task. Another factor making the operation even more challenging was the lack of sufficient maps of Kuwait and southern Iraq, since initial deployment plans had been based on entrance through Turkey. Fortunately, the company had soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who had recently redeployed from Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Spring. That knowledge, coupled with the discipline and technical and tactical proficiency of the unit's soldiers and junior NCOs, set the stage for the 4th Military Police Company's first combat support mission since Vietnam.

The main body of Task Force Ironhorse arrived in Kuwait on 2 April 2003. That night, with only half of its vehicles unloaded and only enough time to perform quick preventive-maintenance checks and services, the unit loaded radios, mounted weapons,

and began moving personnel, equipment, and ammunition to base camps in northern Kuwait.

This rapid movement was possible because the unit had combat-loaded equipment at Fort Hood, Texas, and placed it early in the equipment and force flow of the task force. The company based its 1st and 2d Platoons at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) in Kuwait, where they were responsible for moving personnel and equipment from the APOD to their base camps and back to the SPOD. The 5th Platoon operated out of the Kuwaiti Naval Base and escorted convoys carrying the division's authorized basic load to Camp Udari, covering an average of 200 miles during the 16-hour round trip. Squad and team leaders assumed a great deal of responsibility in not only securing the convoys but in navigating and communicating with local national support personnel. The military police became a great asset to convoy commanders since they were able to provide valuable information on the status of routes and the local population. In many cases, the convoy commanders handed the reins of the convoy to the military police. Junior NCOs were also called on to demonstrate initiative during long escorts, coordinating for Class III supplies wherever possible.

The company headquarters and the 3d and 4th Platoons moved to Camp New Jersey to conduct integration tasks and begin preparations for the division's movement into Iraq. The rest of the division was located in one of four base camps. The maneuver elements began their push into Iraq 14 days after their arrival at Camp New Jersey.

Conditions for this movement improved greatly as map sheets of Kuwait and Iraq were loaded into the Force XXI Battle Command-Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System. The FBCB2 System gave squad

and team leaders the ability to create route overlays and e-mail them to other vehicles in the convoy—including the convoy commander's vehicle. It also allowed teams to maintain situational awareness and conduct text messaging when escorting large convoys that were out of radio range.

The first element of the 4th Military Police Company to cross the line of departure was 3d Platoon. Its mission was to provide in-transit security for the Task Force Ironhorse advance party as it moved to Tactical Assembly Area Ironhorse, just south of Baghdad. There, 3d Platoon provided area security as units downloaded combat platforms from heavy-equipment transporters and then secured their convoys up to the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) battle handoff line. In addition, 3d Platoon escorted convoys that were moving elements north to Taji, Samara, Baquba, Tikrit, Bayji, and Kirkuk.

The 4th Platoon secured the movement of the Task Force Ironhorse tactical command post and continued to provide area security when it established operations at Baghdad International Airport and later at the Tikrit Palace complex. The remainder of the company provided convoy escorts for the rest of Task Force Ironhorse, from the base camps to Tactical Assembly Area Ironhorse. Squad and team leaders were continually put to the test as they escorted convoys—ranging in size from 100 to 250 vehicles—on a 550-mile round trip that took 48 to 60 hours to complete. By the end of the movement, the 4th Military Police Company had escorted more than 30,000 soldiers and 14,000 pieces of equipment more than 600 miles without a single accident. Each platoon averaged 13,000 miles during the 3-week period, and only two vehicles in the company suffered non-mission-capable deficiencies during the operation.

NCOs—The Backbone of the Army

*"No one is more professional than I, I am a noncommissioned officer, a leader of soldiers. As a noncommissioned officer, I realize that I am a member of a time-honored corps, which is known as the **Backbone of the Army.**"*

These words from the NCO creed are well known to NCOs, but they may be less familiar to officers. One thing is certain—it is still all about the backbone of the Army when it is time for mission execution. In Iraq, our great NCOs have lived that creed day in, day out.

The 4th Military Police Company performed exceptionally. NCOs, staff sergeant and below, executed nearly every mission. Their decisiveness, initiative, stamina, and care of soldiers were remarkable. We should never forget the contributions these soldiers have made to our nation. It is clear that we have the best NCOs in the world. Our officers are fortunate to be carried by these great American heroes. We must continue to focus on what makes them so effective by providing the time, training, and tools they need to practice during peacetime so they can deliver again on the next battlefield. NCOs, thank you for your care, and watch over your soldiers and officers!



Soldiers from the 4th Military Police Company provided security escorts for 4ID.

Five days into the movement, the 978th Military Police Company was attached to Task Force Ironhorse and took over the remaining escorts and security operations for the division support element. This allowed the 4th to move the rest of the unit to the Tikrit Palace complex and begin security operations.

Area Security

In Iraq, the 4th Military Police Company began conducting operations to secure the main command posts of Task Force Ironhorse and its senior leaders. The company developed a force protection plan for the Tikrit Palace complex, which incorporated mounted military police patrols, static access control points, a mechanized quick-reaction force, air defense artillery sections, engineer boat patrols, and tower guard forces. The company command post served as the command and control for the force and coordinated the force protection effort. During the mission, the integrity of the command posts was never compromised.

The company also developed a comprehensive counter-reconnaissance zone plan for the city of Tikrit by establishing a strong military presence. The plan consisted of mobile military police patrols used to enforce curfews and establish order and discipline. The patrols were also successful in confiscating

many weapons and other contraband. A coordinated raid with the 1st Brigade Combat Team quick-reaction force led to the capture of a 60-millimeter mortar round, several AK-47 assault rifles, and ammunition. Counter-reconnaissance zone patrols enabled the task force to saturate the city of Tikrit with a military police presence, never allowing the enemy freedom of movement to coordinate attacks.

The 4th Military Police Company also provided a protective services detail (PSD) for the 4ID Commander, the Assistant Division Commander for Support, and the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver. These PSDs provided senior leaders around-the-clock protection during ground and air movements. The company also provided a PSD for the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, during his visit to Task Force Ironhorse.

In addition to providing site security of command and control nodes and personnel, the company also received a no-notice mission to secure two downed CH-47 Chinook helicopters from the 101st Airborne Division. Within an hour of the aircraft touching down, the company had a platoon on-site to provide 360-degree security. The military police flawlessly executed the 3-day security mission, in an area sympathetic to the Ba'ath Party, without incident. A large portion of the company's success can be linked to the use of the FBCB2 System. Platoons were able to communicate with the company command post from the aircraft site,



Soldiers conduct nighttime checkpoint operations.

75 kilometers away, using text messaging. Additionally, they could provide status and situation reports as they occurred.

After the security of the task force was well established, the commander was able to release direct-support military police platoons to their respective brigade combat teams. Direct-support military police platoons continued to provide the brigade combat team assets for area security, as well as critical convoy escorts, flash checkpoints, and raids. Once in place, the soldiers of the 4th provided support in every major area of Task Force Ironhorse operations—an area of more than 40,000 square kilometers.



Soldiers from the 4th Military Police Company travel on a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter to pick up high-value detainees.

Internment/Resettlement Operations

In addition to providing the task force freedom of movement and area security, the 4th Military Police Company also established and operated the central collection point to manage the large number of captured enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and civilian internees (CIs). The unit developed a “team EPW” concept. This consisted of a military police platoon (the 5th Platoon) designated to run the central collection point and provide EPW escorts; transportation assets from B Company, 704th Division Support Battalion; and CI interrogators from the 104th Military Intelligence Battalion. More than 800 EPWs/CIs were processed, interrogated, and evacuated during the first 45 days of the operation, including several Ba’ath Party members and Saddam loyalists. Despite a challenging mission, team EPW had no incidents, uprisings, or escapes.

Transition to Stability Operations and Support Operations

As the company transitions from combat to stability operations and support operations (SOSO), the greatest lesson they have learned is that they did it right. Too often soldiers, NCOs, officers, and leaders

relate their “significance” in an operation to the number of enemy killed. Significance is more accurately measured through mission accomplishment. Although the company had several armed engagements with paramilitary forces and inflicted casualties upon them, the most junior to the most senior soldier in the unit understands how military police best support the division. The 4ID has more than 40 maneuver companies, whose primary mission is to close in and destroy the enemy. It has only one military police company—and that company was ready when it was needed. More than 30,000 soldiers and 14,000 pieces of equipment were moved; three main command posts and their leaders were secured; and more than 800 EPWs/CIs were processed, interned, and evacuated. Without a doubt, the 4th Military Police Company distinguished itself as a combat multiplier and confirmed the key role military police will play in future operations.


Lieutenant Colonel Foster was the Task Force Ironhorse provost marshal and Captain Stanton was the 4th Military Police Company commander at the time this article was written.

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Integrating Active and Reserve Component Military Police Soldiers at Fort Hood



By First Lieutenant Christopher R. Davis

Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom have raised the operations tempo of the U.S. Army. With many Active Component (AC) soldiers deployed overseas, the Army turned to Reserve Component (RC) units to conduct force protection missions. In the case of Fort Hood, Texas, almost all of the AC military police units were deployed and replaced with RC military police units. So the question arose: Where should AC soldiers be assigned when they have a permanent change of station to Fort Hood? The commander of the 89th Military Police Brigade easily found the answer. In-processing soldiers were assigned to a deployed active duty unit and attached to the “War Eagles” of the 114th Military Police Company, Mississippi Army National Guard, mobilized at Fort Hood under the 89th.

History

The 114th Military Police Company was originally a combat engineer unit, but in the 1970s it was converted to a military police company. Based in Clinton, Mississippi, the company has two detachments—one in Canton and the other in Vicksburg—with its higher headquarters, the 112th Military Police Battalion, also based in Canton. The 114th proudly boasts that it is the most mobilized unit in the Mississippi Army National Guard. It received its first modern activation in 1991 during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In 1995 and 1996, it was activated for Operation Joint

Endeavor and deployed to Mannheim/Heidelberg, Germany, for law enforcement support.

In December 2001, the War Eagles were again called to active duty, deploying to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and integrating with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). In early May 2002, the unit deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to conduct prisoner security at the detention facility. After five months, the unit returned to Fort Campbell and then home to Clinton, where it was demobilized.

In February 2003, the 114th was mobilized with orders to Fort Hood. Unlike previous alerts, nearly half of the unit’s soldiers were on duty supporting other missions—41 on volunteer duty for a state security mission and 10 deployed to the Middle East with its sister unit, the 113th Military Police Company. The 114th could mobilize only 76 soldiers.

Integration

When the 114th arrived at Fort Hood, the commander of the 89th Military Police Brigade promised to get the unit back to its full modified table of organization and equipment strength. He directed that, with few exceptions, all soldiers reporting to the 89th Military Police Brigade would be attached to the 114th. AC officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted soldiers worked side by side with 76 RC soldiers. The new AC soldiers wore the 89th Military Police Brigade patch and the 114th Military Police Company

unit crest. At last count, the War Eagles have an unprecedented integration of 50 percent AC and 50 percent RC soldiers in their ranks. This has created a positive meld and a great training opportunity.

Most of the AC personnel attached to the 114th are junior enlisted soldiers, and all of the unit's platoon leaders are AC. This mix has allowed the unit to build teams, squads, and platoons, thereby providing more opportunities for leadership roles. The RC officers and NCOs organic to the 114th come from a wide variety of civilian professions, providing a breadth of talent that has not been seen in AC units since the days of the active duty draft. At least 20 percent of the RC soldiers in the 114th are civilian law enforcement or corrections officers, each with 2 to 15 years of experience. As a result, little training was necessary before they assumed patrol duties on Fort Hood, the Army's most populous installation. AC soldiers who work alongside these RC military police have the advantage of working with mature and experienced partners.

But this integration did not come without difficulties. The first obstacle was encountered while in-processing personnel. Significant differences between AC and RC personnel and pay systems created some confusion, but with assistance from the brigade staff, this challenge was quickly overcome. The administrative section, comprised of one NCO, performed in-processing procedures on more than 70 soldiers in two months. Additionally, logistical issues arose. All new soldiers had to be equipped with organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), but the 114th had deployed with a shortage of OCIE. With assistance from the brigade S4 and the Fort Hood Central Issue Facility, this problem was also quickly resolved.

An unforeseen benefit of AC and RC integration is the value in recruiting. AC soldiers have learned about the advantages of service as a citizen soldier, while RC soldiers have discovered the appeal of serving their country on a full-time basis—some have even applied for active duty status. AC soldiers are getting a unique opportunity to work with the RC soldiers, gaining the knowledge, expertise, and maturity of their counterparts. AC soldiers assigned directly out of advanced individual training are sharing the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures, thus improving the overall combat readiness of the 114th. Myths about the skills and the capabilities of RC soldiers have been dispelled. They know that they will make a lasting

impression on AC soldiers, influencing decisions they will make throughout their military careers.

The full integration of the 114th has proved a great success but has posed new challenges for leaders. NCOs who were normally only responsible for soldiers for a few hours, as was the case with weekend drills, were now responsible for soldiers at all times. Quick honing of leadership skills—counseling, drill and ceremony, and physical fitness training—under the watchful and supportive attention of the 89th Military Police Brigade helped ease the transition. Additionally, the support of the command sergeant major and S3 staff sergeant major helped the NCOs allay their concerns.

The RC is a family in the truest sense. RC units often include several members of immediate or extended families; the 114th even has two sets of identical twins. With a ratio of 50 percent AC to 50 percent RC in May 2003, it was necessary to form two Family Readiness Groups (FRGs)—one at Fort Hood and one in Clinton. Volunteers to staff the Fort Hood FRG were readily available and willing.

The War Eagles also had to address the integration of new soldiers into their culture. An important aspect of their closeness is their social connection outside of the military setting. The RC soldiers admit having had reservations about this integration, but the AC soldiers have blended smoothly into this cohesive unit. The esprit de corps of the 114th has increased and remains strong at Fort Hood.

Looking to the Future

The Army benefits from professional and personal bonds developed in this extensive concept of unit integration—a system for building partnerships. AC and RC soldiers have adapted to challenging circumstances by taking the Total Army concept to a new level. They have used the strengths of each type of force to overcome the weaknesses of the other and accomplish their mission. As the Army confronts an unpredictable and dangerous security environment, innovative and professional soldiers—found in both the AC and RC—will be needed to protect and defend the United States.

First Lieutenant Davis is the executive officer of the 114th Military Police Company. In his civilian job, he is the assistant football coach at Hinds Community College, Raymond, Mississippi.



Photo by Sergeant Heather Hilton

An instructor practices proper handcuff techniques with Iraqi Police Academy students.

Creating a Standard for the Iraqi Police Academy

By Sergeant Heather Hilton

The 156th Military Police Detachment (Law and Order), West Virginia Army National Guard, is not just setting a standard for the Iraqi police force—they are creating it. At the Iraqi Police Academy, Iraqi policemen are gaining knowledge and receiving proper training—training they have lacked for many decades—through interaction with their American counterparts.

The 156th is currently attached to the 503d Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The 45-member unit, consisting of mostly state and federal law enforcement officers, is making a difference in a country where there is much turmoil. The 156th, working hand in hand with Iraqi police, has created a curriculum and environment to lead the way for future Iraqi police operations.

Taught with the help of interpreters, the 3-week class is designed to teach internationally recognized law enforcement procedures to former Iraqi policemen and military personnel. Consisting of civilian and military training, the curriculum covers defense tactics, ethics, religious tolerance, Iraqi law, hostage procedures, domestic-dispute procedures, standard police duties, police reports, and physical training.

The academy's first class consisted of 74 students between the ages of 16 and 40. By the second class, all 120 available seats were filled. The top 4 students from the first class were chosen to help teach the second class, and 8 students were selected from that class to help with the third. The training program is designed so that it can easily be taken over and taught by course graduates, and selecting the best students from each class is the first step in this process.

As the academy continues to expand, so must its training facility. Due to the increased student load and the incorporation of a new 12-week program, the academy moved to a larger facility. The original 3-week program and corrections officer and security force training are still available to students, but the expanded program was necessary to provide

additional training to students having no prior experience in law enforcement.

Clad in new light blue uniforms, which distinguish them from the old regime, new academy graduates will hit the streets of the community ready to serve. The old regime instilled fear, but the newly trained force will institute improved community relations—giving to the community instead of taking away. Raising community awareness—through Iraqi television and newspaper reports—about the academy and the functions of the newly trained force is vital to the overall success of the program and its integration into Iraqi society.

The support of the Mosul Police Department, in addition to that provided by the 101st Airborne Division and the 503d Military Police Battalion, has been tremendous. In the beginning, there was mistrust between U.S. and Iraqi personnel, but the 156th has come a long way toward building rapport. Interpreters and former law enforcement officers are coming out of exile and retirement to help with the mission. They are smart and dedicated people. They have seen what went on under the old regime, and they are anxious to create a new democracy.

Sergeant Hilton is with the 16th Military Police Brigade Public Affairs Office, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

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By Specialist Jared Mulloy

Until a few weeks ago, military police personnel stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, relied solely on their on-the-job training to perform their duties. The positions they filled, while related to their primary duty as military police, actually fall under the duties of a separate military occupational specialty—correctional specialist. Military police are responsible for providing battlefield support by conducting area security, prisoner of war, and law and order operations. Correctional specialists are responsible for controlling, supervising, and counseling prisoners and managing confinement operations and correctional treatment programs. To prove that joint task force military police can easily adapt to new duties, military police personnel at Camp Delta are undergoing an intensive weeklong training program to complement their current experience and knowledge with the skills they need to be certified as correctional specialists.

Four instructors from the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, went to Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay to run a 5-week training program called “School of the Guard.” The Military Police School noncommissioned officer in charge of the mobile training team stated that it was an honor to train these young warriors—the Army’s pioneers for future corrections operations and the pride of the Regiment. He also stated that he feels safer knowing these troops are on the job. The other three noncommissioned officers on the team were all handpicked as the best-of-the-best by the Military Police School commandant to provide the best training possible.

Skill training that was new to soldiers included overseeing dining facilities, processing incoming and outgoing mail, and supervising visitations. Many students found the visitation module to be the most interesting part of the class because it was something not usually included in their training. Students learned unarmed self-defense (USD) techniques and weapon disarmament tactics and how to better understand and control detainees. To complete the School of the Guard, personnel were required to qualify with a shotgun, pass two comprehensive written examinations, and demonstrate hands-on proficiency of required skills. Upon course completion, the Military Police School accredited every soldier as a qualified correctional specialist. Not only did this training benefit the joint task force mission, but it also gave these soldiers credit for working as correctional specialists and validated to the world that joint task force military police are properly trained to do their job. The superintendent of Camp Delta believes that training military police at Guantanamo Bay with a mobile training team produced more versatile soldiers and saved the U.S. government at least \$5 million.

The 240th and 303d Military Police Companies completed the course with a passing rate of 100 percent. Students taking the training found it well paced, easy to understand, and very informative. The superintendent of Camp Delta expects a 100 percent passing rate for all soldiers taking the course.

Specialist Mulloy is a broadcast journalist with the 362d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (U.S. Army Reserve).

Standing Up the Iraqi Police Force

By Captain Jason Burke

Before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, many theories and rumors surfaced around Army posts worldwide about whether we would go to war or if it would be called off at the last minute. Regardless of what you believed, all roads seemed to point to an inevitable war. In this conflict, many saw the final major battle being staged in Baghdad—Iraq’s capital and, until recently, the crown jewel in Saddam Hussein’s corrupt and evil empire.

Unlike the first Gulf War, coalition forces do not have the luxury of pushing Iraq’s war machine back and leaving the region. Soldiers in Iraq know that this is the last stand for the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein’s regime, which ruled Iraq with an iron fist for nearly three decades. It was the job of the coalition forces to loosen Saddam’s grip over his people and liberate them, and the U.S. Army did precisely what it was trained to do—fight and win a very one-sided battle and successfully drive the enemy out of power. So what happens now that the bombs have stopped falling and the major engagements have all been fought? How will the country get back on its feet and get out of the shadows of the old regime? The military police have transitioned to stability operations and support operations (SOSO) to help this war-torn country get back on its feet.

With U.S. forces at the forefront, the simplest of governmental principals need to be reestablished—a system of government that will maintain law and order, while digging Iraq out of the shadowy past that has clouded its image with many nations across the globe. The military police are leading the way in restoring order and providing security in the lawless postwar Iraq, taking on the massive task of quickly and efficiently standing up a police force in Baghdad that can maintain order for years—long after coalition forces have departed.

In Baghdad, the mission of the military police is defined in the execution of two basic military police functions: law and order and police intelligence operations. This is a familiar role for the military police, having been called on to perform these tasks in similar situations during the last decade, including places like Haiti and the Balkans. And with this similar mission comes a similar problem—how do you stand up a

police force without getting embedded in day-to-day business and locking into a mission that could carry on for years? The Army needed results similar to those achieved in Kosovo, where an independent police force maintained law and order, but for a shorter duration. These new parameters required military police to be versatile in the many different roles of teacher, mentor, observer, and controller and flexible through the transition phases and short timelines of the operation. A good example of reestablishment operations includes having police officers return to work in a matter of days as opposed to months.

Reestablishment operations are very difficult too achieve in a country with a collapsed infrastructure. The lack of telephones, computers, and e-mail required troops to perform a lot of legwork before the Iraqi police force could return to work. Units coordinated



Soldiers from the 18th Military Police Brigade and members of the Iraqi police service cut the ribbon during a dedication ceremony for one of Baghdad’s newest police stations.

operations so everyone knew a starting point—a baseline—and worked with the Iraqis to establish goals to achieve a common objective. Some of the biggest issues were the lack of available communication equipment and weapons. With no modern radio system in place, the Iraqis could not communicate within the city or even from car to car. Additionally, very few Iraqi police had weapons, because many of them were stolen from the police stations during the war. The weapons that were available were either old or the personal property of the policemen, leaving no way to establish weapon and ammunition control. Many areas did not have a weapons system in place, choosing instead to mirror the American units.

Keeping things simple and relying heavily on the most basic unit—the military police team—the troops pushed forward with their mission. Local television and radio put out the word in the city for the Iraqi police force to return to work and, based on the agreed-upon standards, the Iraqi police and military police hit the streets. The first phase of the plan, the assessment of facilities and identification of issues and concerns, identified such things as power and water outages at stations, to stations totally destroyed during the war. Trying to find locations to base the future police force became a key objective in a town where, after the war, displaced civilians quickly occupied empty buildings and transformed them into homes.

When all concerns were identified and troops secured a foothold for operations within the city, sectors were identified and joint military police and Iraqi police patrols began. Teams and squads on patrol with the Iraqis observed how the police force functioned. In many cases, squad and team leaders also had to serve in teacher and mentor roles to guide the Iraqi police through serious cases. This was due to the early development stage of the system and the role the Iraqi police force played in the old regime. In the past, the Iraqi police force was a totally reactive unit, with the majority of law and order controlled by six layers of Saddam Hussein's thugs and secret police. Getting the new officers out in public helped gain validity for their new role, and the publicity helped boost the officers' morale as they worked to keep their streets and homes safe from crime. The first few weeks were full of hard work and many lessons learned on both sides.

After establishing patrol operations, the military police focused on reestablishing and, in some cases, establishing stations to process criminals and track crimes. This also posed a great challenge for the



A military police officer from the 18th Military Police Brigade coordinates with a member of the Iraqi police service.

military police in Baghdad, since some units were responsible for running 24-hour, 7-day-a-week operations for as many as seven stations. Additionally, many military police had a hard time adjusting to working within the vastly different Iraqi system. Team leaders in the majority of cases had to work 12-hour shifts alone, performing operations as desk sergeant and tracking prisoners, daily complaints, and police weapon and vehicle control.

The goals achieved and the sacrifices made by soldiers and citizens in Iraq are no small accomplishment. The new government and police force in Iraq will serve their citizens for many years down the road. There are still kinks in the armor—pay issues, uniforms, interpreter shortages, and training—but the foundation is laid. A clear plan is in place outlining the way ahead to achieve future desired goals. The Iraqi policemen are eager to learn and gain knowledge from their American counterparts. This information exchange will hopefully lead to both sides reaching the agreed-upon end state—a stable and secure Baghdad policed by a new Iraqi police force. There will be difficult issues left to resolve, but with the measures set in place, there will be a vast improvement in the Iraqi police system. Military police serving in Iraq can leave knowing that they served their country in time of war and aided a people in their new, free land.

At the time this article was written, Captain Burke was part of the S3 staff for the 18th Military Police Brigade; he is currently attending the Captain's Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Captain Burke holds a bachelor's in criminal justice from Norwich University.

Sending a Message to 9-11 Terrorists

By Specialist Kristopher Joseph

When the twin towers of New York's World Trade Center fell on 11 September 2001, it served as a wake-up call for not only Americans but for all the world to take a stand against terrorism.

Bernard Kerik, a retired New York police commissioner currently serving as the senior policy advisor for the Ministry of Interior in Iraq, knows all too well what "9-11" means. To share the meaning of the 11 September tragedy and remind V Corps soldiers of why they are in Iraq, Kerik invited deployed troops from the 18th Military Police Brigade to watch the documentary, *Twin Towers*, about those who gave their lives on that dark day.

Kerik spoke at length about the countless heroes of the tragedy. He said that one of the reasons America's military heroes are in Iraq and Afghanistan is so those who died on 11 September did not die in vain, stating that the terrible day happened because of America's principles on liberty and freedom—the very things that our enemies despise. He went on to say that it is now our job to send a message to those responsible for the terrorist attacks.

The film, which won an Oscar for best short story documentary, focused on police officer Joseph Vigiano, a member of the New York Police Department Emergency Service Unit—the equivalent of an Army Special Forces unit. The film portrayed Vigiano, a survivor of two separate gunshot incidents, as one of the best in his unit. The film spoke volumes on Vigiano's willingness and determination to put himself in harm's way to rid the city of crime and make it a safer place for his wife and three children. Vigiano was in one of the World Trade Center towers, trying to rescue victims, when it came crashing down. Sadly, his brother John, a fireman, also perished during rescue operations.

Kerik, a former military policeman, said that it takes special people to defend a city and a

nation and that others won't always understand what you do or why you do it. The 18th Military Police Brigade commander echoed those sentiments, saying that what the unit is doing there has to matter—for the sake of those who died on 11 September.

As if to underscore those remarks, that same day soldiers from the 18th and Iraqi police conducted a successful joint raid on a mosque to search for illegal weapons and members of the former Iraqi regime wanted for questioning. That raid uncovered at least one automatic weapon.

At the conclusion of the presentation, Kerik thanked the brigade for the improvements it made with limited resources. He especially praised the unit for rebuilding 35 police stations in only 15 weeks.

Specialist Joseph is a public affairs specialist with the V Corps Public Affairs Office in Heidelberg, Germany.



A military police officer displays an AK-47 assault rifle found in a Baghdad mosque during a joint raid with Iraqi police.



Soldiers from the 101st Military Police Company build a division central collection point in Iraq.

101st Military Police Company Supports Operation Iraqi Freedom

By First Lieutenant Jessica E. Donckers

The 101st Military Police Company (Air Assault) supported the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in a variety of missions—from combat to stability operations—throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Initially, the company was to act as general support for the division but was immediately put to work upon arrival at Camp Udairi, Kuwait. The unit was tasked to move the division from the port to each brigade combat team (BCT) staging area and provide security to personnel moving to and from the port.

After combat operations began, the company received an influx of security missions to escort critical supplies—Class I, Class III, Class V, and Class IX. The unit performed more than 500 security convoys—covering over 1,200 kilometers—and quickly and safely delivered critical supplies and ammunition.

In addition to running the Division Central Collection Point, the company processed 449 enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and assisted with transfer operations. In other EPW operations, 1st Squad of 1st Platoon constructed a brigade holding area.

In April 2003, the company shifted its focus when three platoons were organized into BCTs and given the mission to provide security for the rebuilding of

the Iraqi police force. Initially, 1st Platoon assisted with area security in Forward Operating Base Q-West, south of Mosul, Iraq. Taking a nonexistent perimeter, the platoon worked closely with the brigade commander, executive officer, assigned engineers, and air defense artillery personnel to determine how to turn a looted and abandoned Iraqi air base into an effective, secure, and self-contained operating base for the brigade. This was no easy task. It required the physical marking of new camp fence lines and close coordination with psychological operations and civil affairs personnel to convince the local Bedouins to leave the area. Additionally, until the sector was secure, 1st Platoon conducted patrols around the surrounding area, covering a 15-kilometer distance. These patrols—which uncovered weapons caches, unexploded ordnance, and abandoned Iraqi military equipment—proved to be a great aid in securing the sector.

The platoon conducted raids with the 327th Infantry Regiment to seek out and interdict black market operations within the regiment's sector. In particular, acting on a human intelligence (HUMINT) source, they conducted a raid on the town of Al Barit and ended a black market arms ring. The platoon

detained 9 civilians and confiscated more than 30 weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, which were turned over to local police. Intelligence gained from the detainees led to information about other black market arms rings.

Additionally, 1st Platoon was involved in joint patrols with local Iraqi police and intelligence personnel, initially focusing on the areas around civil-military operations centers (CMOC), and developing basic instructions to aid the Iraqis in reestablishing their own independent police forces. The joint patrols eventually grew to include four cities, covering an area larger than Rhode Island.

The 2d Platoon conducted mounted and dismounted presence patrols and built rapport with the citizens of Mosul. The unit conducted intelligence operations and developed a highly reliable HUMINT source. In particular, it apprehended a fugitive in less than 12 hours, with no injury or loss of life. The fugitive, the self-declared “governor” of Mosul, was wanted because of his ability to act as a destabilizing element in the city’s government. Upon platoon notification, orders were immediately issued to squad leaders to gather information from all possible sources on the fugitive’s location. After obtaining information from a local national, platoon personnel formulated a plan to use a local taxi driver to guide them to the compound. Once located, the compound was found to be guarded by approximately 100 armed personnel. Squad personnel maintained watch while a squad leader spoke to the guards, gaining their confidence and access to the compound. Under the watchful eye of the guards, the squad leader managed to talk the fugitive into coming with him to the CMOC—under the guise of civil affairs interests—to discuss his role in the new Mosul government. The platoon then delivered the fugitive to the 2BCT commander.

Working closely with the Mosul police chief, 2d Platoon mentored the Iraqi police in law enforcement operations and put the Mosul Police Department,



Military police prepare to escort a convoy.

which was in almost complete disrepair, back into operation in just a few days. Once the department was operational, joint patrols were conducted to rid the city of weapons dealers and destabilizing elements. In 2 months, the unit apprehended more than 300 suspects in crimes ranging from black marketing weapons to murder. The 2d Platoon also provided testimony and statements against apprehended suspects.

When 3d Platoon linked up with 3BCT, the unit immediately began conducting missions in Baghdad. One squad provided escort and security services for the BCT counterintelligence element and assisted with intelligence gathering on local tribes. Additionally, the platoon conducted presence and area security patrols up to 20 kilometers around the BCT tactical operations center. The platoon’s patrols focused on the edge of the Tigris River. This area provided valuable intelligence information leading to the identification of



Soldiers practice search techniques at Camp Udairi, Kuwait.

several high-ranking officials' homes, a possible chemical site, and two large weapon caches. Finally, the platoon conducted joint patrols with the local police and participated in a raid with the 3-7 Cavalry.

At Tal Afar and Rabeea'a, 3d Platoon's primary mission was to train and conduct joint patrols with the local police force. The police force in Rabeea'a was in such disarray that a mini-boot camp and a rigid training program had to be constructed to get them on their feet again. The 3d Platoon was often included in the planning process of raids and was appointed the quick-reaction force for the brigade support area during limited visibility.

The 4th Platoon continued its general support for the division by providing daily convoy security escorts from Mosul to Turkey—a distance of 260 kilometers—to establish supply lines. Escorts for Class I, III, and IX supplies, with an average of 70 trucks per convoy, provided much-needed propane and benzine to the city of Mosul.

Finally, throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, the company provided protective services details (PSDs)

for the division's general officers. All PSDs logged many hours of flight time, provided ground security for all vehicular movement, and worked hand in hand with general officers. The commanding general's PSD provided security during flights to Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey.

The 101st Military Police Company performed exceptionally in all areas of operation. It learned many valuable lessons and contributed greatly to the mission success of the 101st Airborne Division. The number of completed missions by the company throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom further bolsters the success of the Military Police Corps and proves that it really is the "Force of Choice."

When this article was written, First Lieutenant Donckers was serving as platoon leader for 1st Platoon, 101st Military Police Company (Air Assault). She is currently the battalion adjutant for the 716th Military Police Battalion. She is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy where she received a bachelor's in international relations.

Army Values

"We are, have been, and will remain a values-based institution. Our values will not change, and they are nonnegotiable. Our Soldiers are warriors of character. They exemplify these values every day and are the epitome of our American spirit. They are the heart of the Army."

— General Peter J. Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, arrival message July 2003

Loyalty—Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.

Duty—Fulfill your obligations.

Respect—Treat people as they should be treated.

Selfless Service—Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.

Honor—Live up to all the Army values.

Integrity—Do what's right, legally and morally.

Personal Courage—Face fear, danger, or adversity.

Iraqi Police Train at Weapons Range

By Corporal Todd Pruden

With the help of soldiers from the 382d Military Police Detachment, Iraqi police officers are getting the chance to hone their skills on a live-fire weapons range. The 382d, an Army Reserve unit from San Diego, California, is assigned to the 18th Military Police Brigade, part of Task Force 1st Armored Division.

The training is part of a 3-week integration program intended to teach Iraqi police officers basic weapon fundamentals and provide them the opportunity to brush up on basic police skills. Many Iraqis have never fired a weapon—they rarely practiced and were taught to put rounds downrange and hope that they hit the target. The training is



A member of the 382d Military Police Detachment observes and coaches Iraqi policemen during weapons training at a firing range in Baghdad.



An Iraqi policeman clears his weapon, with the help of a soldier from the 382d.

designed to develop marksmanship skills and produce effective police officers.

The training consists of a two-day classroom program to learn basic weapon function and safety measures and a four-day range program, with the final day designated for qualification testing. The fundamentals taught include the basics of marksmanship—breath control, proper trigger procedures, sight alignment, and muzzle awareness.

The firing range consists of paper targets containing human silhouettes. The Iraqis practice shooting from three distances, the longest being 15 meters, using Glock 19-series pistols.

Personnel from the 382d believe that the Iraqis were unaware of the weapon's capabilities. Under the old regime, they had no self-confidence, but now they are confident in their abilities. The Iraqis look forward to the opportunity to provide protection for themselves and their citizens.

Corporal Pruden is a U.S. Army Reserve journalist with the 372d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, Nashville, Tennessee. He is currently attached to the 1st Armored Division Public Affairs Office in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The TASER M26 in Operation Iraqi Freedom

By Lieutenant Colonel Bo Barbour (Retired)

Operation Iraqi Freedom has seen the introduction of many new weapon systems into the Army inventory. None has been more revolutionary to the Military Police Corps than the TASER® M26.

The TASER M26 is an electro-muscular disruptor weapon developed by Tom and Rich Smith of TASER International and marketed for law enforcement use. The Smith brothers originally conceived the idea when their mother needed a self-defense weapon but refused to use a lethal handgun. The TASER M26 is currently used in more than 200 domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies and has been effective in producing reversible incapacitation in 93 percent of incidents.

Operation

The TASER M26 functions by introducing 50,000 volts of electrical energy to the body and overriding the brain waves that control muscles. The complete operating cycle of the TASER M26 begins with the release of the ambidextrous safety. This prepares the weapon to fire by activating the laser-aiming system, which places a laser dot on the impact point of the top barb in the air cartridge. The TASER M26 is aimed using the laser pointer; a blade-and-notch sight atop the weapon is used as the backup. The safety release also sets the electronic trigger. When it is pulled, it activates a micro-processor and transformer that elevates the stored electrical power of eight nickel-metal hydride AA batteries into 50,000 volts of electricity, modulated to 26 watts. Simultaneously, a cartridge—with two chambers containing compressed nitrogen behind two projectiles tipped with No. 8 fishhook barbs—is activated. These cartridges are tethered to the pistol by insulated wire extending 21 feet. The projectiles angle 8 degrees from each other, spreading a foot for every 7 feet traveled. This spread is required to ensure conduction of the high-voltage electrical charge across large muscle



The TASER M26: “Lightning in the hand”

groups—optimally the muscle groups of the chest, back, and legs.

Effects on the Human Body

When the projectiles strike the barbs and enter the body, they make a 1/4-inch indentation and deliver 26 watts of pulsing electrical energy directly to the muscles and central nervous system, interrupting the brain waves that control movement. This can occur even when the subject is hit in the clothing, as long as the clothing has skin contact. This is the basis for the term “conducted-energy weapon.” This process continues for 5 seconds once the trigger is pulled, producing complete but temporary incapacitation. This process is not fatal because the amperage produced by the weapon (0.168) is only 1/100 of that produced by a defibrillator, commonly used to restart the electrical waves of the heart. The sensation of being shot is that of intense burning pain, accompanied by the conscious sensation of panic as the brain realizes it can no longer force the voluntary functions of the body to work. This sensation increases as the brain loses cognitive time awareness—in the course of a 5-second cycle—with each pull of the trigger. The immediate aftereffect is the sense of having awoken in the morning—with a groggy awareness of

surroundings—but dissipates after a minute. The TASER M26 has proven effective with the most belligerent subjects and those who are intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. Even the most aggressive subjects have rarely taken more than two cycles before surrendering. The effect on the conscious mind after a cycle is immediate compliance to prevent the interruption of muscle function (the Pavlovian response to pain). To date, no death has been directly attributed to the effects of the TASER M26 (when used within the guidelines of instructor training).

Additionally, independent testing has validated that the probes of the TASER M26, when attached to blasting caps and electrical firing systems, will not activate explosives. It has also been proven safe for use inside heavily instrumented and computerized aircraft cockpits, causing no electrical malfunctions to sensitive avionics.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The effectiveness of the TASER M26 has been known to the Military Police Corps since its development in 1999, but no valid requirement had emerged from field experience to immediately warrant fielding. When Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched in March 2003, new threats to the survival of soldiers emerged. The Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) requested a solution to this problem, and the TASER M26 emerged at the top of the solution set. In less than 7 days, an urgent-needs letter was forwarded to the Department of the Army Assistant Chief of Staff (G3), where it was validated and forwarded to the Project Manager for Close Combat Systems for action. In March, April, and May, the instructor team from the Nonlethal Center of Excellence at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, was trained on weapon use by personnel from TASER International. Subsequent modifications to the program of instruction enabled the mobile training team to provide soldier instruction anywhere in Iraq. Concurrent with instructor training, safety testing was conducted at Aberdeen Test Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, where the weapon was deemed reliable and safe for use under combat conditions. Additionally, an analysis by the Human Effects Center of Excellence at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, provided medical data recommendations supporting the weapon's safe employment.

Certification and Safety Procedures

With all of the essential elements in place, the mobile training team entered Iraq on 26 June



Soldiers from 82d Airborne Division practice firing the TASER M26.

and began fielding the TASER M26 to military police units guarding enemy prisoners of war. The team presented a 4-hour block of instruction, which covered the theory, operation, health effects, and required marksmanship skills of the weapon.

In the final block of instruction, soldiers experience the effects of the TASER M26 in a controlled environment. This experience proved to be a vital training tool; an operator is less likely to abuse the TASER M26 when he or she has experienced its effects. In the test, the soldier was placed in the kneeling position, with a soldier on each side serving as spotters, each holding a wrist and upper arm. The instructor then connected two alligator clips, one on the belt and one on the shirt collar. The alligator clips were attached to insulated wires that connected to the air-cartridge port of the TASER M26. The instructor asked the student if he was ready and then disengaged the safety, delivering a 1.5-second electrical charge from a 5-second cycle. While the soldier was “tased,” he was spotted by the two soldiers to prevent injury from falling. As an additional precaution, two side-by-side sleeping mats were placed under the soldier. This method proved to be much safer than tasing the soldier from a standing position.

TASER M26 training places great emphasis on having a premeditated plan before the trigger is pulled. One of the critical blocks of instruction is apprehending a tased subject. A team of officers must rapidly handcuff a subject, while avoiding the probes and insulating wires that carry the current. The TASER M26 operator must always be ready to administer another 5-second cycle when needed. Soldiers are taught to remove the barbed probes by making a

half-moon with the thumb and forefinger around the area of the probe and quickly pulling it out with the other hand. This leaves minimal bruising and scarring, no more than a pinprick.

Use in a Combat Environment

From 26 June to 15 July, the mobile training team issued 44 TASER M26s to military police units throughout Iraq, with the basis of issue being six weapons per 200-man nonlethal capability set. The TASER M26 was a well-accepted alternative to oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray and is the second step, after the verbal command, in the military police force continuum. The TASER M26 proved to be easy to train in varied environments—from “butcher board” laminated charts in dusty tents, PowerPoint® slides off of a laptop computer, or state-of-the-art plasma screens in classrooms. Due to its similarity to the M9 pistol, TASER M26 operation was second nature to most military police in Iraq. In many cases, the weapon went out with soldiers on patrol immediately after issue.

The TASER M26 received its best reception in enemy prisoner of war camps where prisoner and military police injuries were greatly reduced by its presence.

Future Military Police Operations

The fielding of the TASER M26 has introduced an advanced capability to military police in combat operations. A formal Capability Development Document is being developed at the U.S. Army Military Police School to ensure the inclusion of the TASER M26 in the nonlethal capability set. An advanced version of the TASER M26 has been fielded to civilian law enforcement and is under consideration by the Army. The TASER X26 is 60 percent smaller and is exponentially more effective, using shaped-pulse technology. A rail interface device has been developed to attach the TASER X26 beneath the barrel of the M4 Carbine. The TASER M26 and the reversible electromuscular disruption that it creates represent the most effective incapacitant available. It fulfills the Native American motto of “it is better to have lightning in the hand than thunder in the mouth.”

Lieutenant Colonel Bo Barbour (Retired) is the Army Nonlethal Weapons Program Support Officer and an Alion Science and Technology Program Manager. He served in Operation Desert Storm and returned to Iraq in June 2003 as a member of the Nonlethal Center of Excellence Mobile Training Team during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Military Police Community on the AKO

By Sergeant First Class Douglas Dailey

In an effort to share critical information with units deployed around the world, the U.S. Army Military Police School is establishing a military police community on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) Web site. This Web site will contain an assortment of folders providing information across the full spectrum of military operations—information useful to the Corps, Army, and joint community. The school’s Doctrine Division has taken the lead in creating a community that contains reference materials such as field manuals; observations from the field; special text manuals such as the Access Control Handbook; and interim doctrine in the form of intelligence operations manuals. Additionally, the Web site will contain draft field manuals, providing selected members of the military police community the opportunity to recommend changes prior to final publication.

To access the Web site, you must have an established AKO account. Log in at <https://www.us.army.mil/portal/portal_home.jhtml>. Upon gaining access, click on the *KCC* tab in the top window. In the left column, select *Army Communities* and then

TRADOC. Locate and select *USAMPS*. Under *USAMPS*, select *MP Doctrine*. Once inside, you can subscribe to the subcommunities and knowledge centers that interest you; some will automatically grant access, while others will require the administrator to grant access. If you encounter a problem, use the knowledge collaboration center (*KCC*) guide button for help topics.

To forward recommendations and comments, compose them in a Microsoft® Word document, click on the *Feedback* folder, and follow the directions for adding your file. As an alternative method, activate the *Discussion Thread* attached to some folders.

Remember that this Web site is in its infant stage. The Military Police School welcomes comments on how to make it a better tool for soldiers in the field and to military police worldwide. If you have questions or comments call (573) 596-0131, extension 37774 or DSN 676-7774; or e-mail <Doctrine.MP@wood.army.mil>.

Sergeant First Class Dailey is the Doctrine Division Operations Noncommissioned Officer.

Achieving Combat Readiness Through Training Progression



By Lieutenant Colonel Scott Jones and Major Detrick L. Briscoe

The 94th Military Police Battalion in Yongsan, Korea, continues to prepare soldiers and leaders to “fight tonight” by conducting tough, realistic, and challenging training. Over the past 18 months, the battalion has undergone a significant transformation, striking a balance between law and order and military police combat operations.

The commander of the 8th Military Police Brigade stated that Korea is quickly becoming the 12-month training base for the Military Police Corps. Based on the Corps’s support to operations in the Middle East, it is no secret that the brigade receives the bulk of its junior enlisted soldiers from the Army’s advanced individual training (AIT) base. Additionally, many noncommissioned officers (NCOs) come from assignments that focus on law enforcement operations and therefore have little or no experience in conducting military police combat operations. To prepare soldiers to execute operations in this environment, the brigade commander directed units to focus on the basics: physical training, soldier and leader development, weapons proficiency and live-fire exercises (LFXs), maintenance, and quality-of-life improvements.

In support of this guidance, the 94th established weapons proficiency and LFXs as the center of gravity for training. By inculcating squad and platoon LFXs, and convoy LFXs (CLFXs) as culminating events, soldiers and leaders train toward battle-focused

“high-payoff” individual, leader, and collective tasks necessary to accomplish important military police missions. Using this training strategy, soldiers quickly realize that they are not just preparing to fight in Korea but are also training toward their next assignment—possible deployment to Afghanistan or Iraq.

In order to prepare young and inexperienced soldiers, the brigade commander implemented a 6-week time management system in which units rotate through Red (law enforcement), Amber (support), and Green (mission-essential task list) training cycles. The Amber cycle focuses on soldier and leader development by using junior NCOs as trainers. We must ensure that their knowledge of training is on the same playing level and that one training standard is enforced—the Army standard. As part of this training process, NCOs must first undergo a weapons certification program that develops their skills in the operation and employment of weapons and crew-served systems (such as the MK19 machine gun). Certifying NCOs not only makes them subject matter experts but also enhances their ability to

properly train young soldiers on weapons employment during the Green cycle. Additionally, NCOs must endure a leader certification program that trains them on individual and collective tasks associated with the Green cycle. This program includes professional development, military police doctrine and tactics briefs, rock drills, and sand table exercises. Written and performance-oriented assessments ensure that leaders master the subject material and are thoroughly prepared to conduct rehearsals and execute training.

During the 6-week Green cycle, soldiers and NCOs have the opportunity to conduct individual and collective training on tasks that support response force and convoy operations. Additionally, the inclusion of an 18-hour MK19 individual gunnery skills test (IGST) has proven to be the cornerstone of the gunnery program. The IGST—consisting of eleven critical task exercises; AN/PAQ-4B/C infrared aiming light and AN/PEQ-2A target pointer/illuminator/aiming light technology; and a 4-day qualification range exercise—prepares the NCOs and soldiers for success during advanced gunnery and LFXs.

Individual Gunnery Skills Test

The brigade has a standardized IGST program to train and verify the expertise of gunners, assistant gunners, and team leaders before qualification. The IGST is supplemented by the brigade MK19 crew drill book, which further addresses each of these roles using tasks, conditions, and standards. The four main tasks imperative to success and lethality on the range are weapon zero, target acquisition and traversing, ammunition loading and stoppage



Conducting convoy live-fire exercises

reduction, and crew coordination. The IGST consists of the following elements:

- Preventive maintenance inspections on weapons.
- Eleven tested tasks (performed over a 2-day period).
- Individual knowledge and proficiency weapon assessment.
- A requirement for MK19 gunners and assistant gunners to achieve a “GO” on 100 percent of the tasks before proceeding to the qualification range.

Basic MK19 Gunnery Qualification

The standard MK19 military police qualification tables are designed to develop and test the proficiency of individual gunners and assistant gunners, while allowing them to properly demonstrate basic MK19 marksmanship skills. Basic MK19 gunnery qualification standards consist of the following elements:

- The performance of Crew Drill 6.
- Firing exercises with the MK 19 vehicle-mounted (on a M1114, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV]) and ground-mounted vehicle (using an M3 tripod) to a stationary target.
- Day and night qualification exercises (using the AN/PAQ-4 and AN/PEQ-2).

Advanced MK19 Gunnery Program

While the 8th Military Police Brigade fought for critical resources all year, the 94th was fortunate to acquire a substantial plus-up of ammunition (well beyond Standards in Training Commission [STRAC] levels) and premier training facilities known as “Warrior Valley” on the Rodriguez Range Complex and Republic of Korea (ROK) Aviation Range, BiSung. To capitalize on these opportunities, we quickly developed an advanced gunnery program with culminating events.

The new mobile gunnery concept was developed from previous CLFX after-action review comments and lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. What we discovered was that gunners were extremely challenged to shoot at moving targets and while on the move (free-gun). So our advanced gunnery program was specifically designed to develop these skills. The program, based on the Bradley Gunnery Tables, uses stationary and moving targets with varying degrees of difficulty—with soldiers engaging targets positioned high,

low, left, right, and moving on rail systems—and incorporates shooting and reloading procedures using free-gun and traverse and evaluation (T&E) configurations. It also demands the integration and synchronization of all crew members. Communication is crucial to successfully acquire, positively identify, and engage targets and maintain command and control while shooting and moving at combat speed. Soldiers must successfully complete three gunnery tables—instructional, qualification, and night-fire—within the prescribed time and ammunition allotments, as shown in Table 1. To qualify a platoon in day and night fire requires 96 rounds per gunner. Soldiers are scored using a crew coordination scorecard (in addition to the gunner’s scorecard). The gunner is still able to qualify if the team leader or driver demonstrates weaknesses, as shown in Table 2 on page 53. With young AIT soldiers having the opportunity to conduct IGST and basic and advanced gunnery, lethality percentages have increased dramatically. Soldiers tell us that it is all about good instruction, excellent training facilities, and additional weapon training time. Advanced MK19 gunnery qualification consists of the following elements:

- Engagement of targets (both stationary and moving) in a variety of sizes and at various distances.
- Method of engagement (free-gun and T&E use).
- Disposition of vehicle (both stationary and moving).
- Load and reload of weapons while traveling in a vehicle.

- Qualification for night fire (using the AN/PEQ-4 and AN/PEQ-2).
- Procedures for crew coordination.

CLFX Training Event

The CLFX training event consists of two phases: trainup and CLFXs. In a training progression methodology, a culminating event such as a CLFX challenges soldiers to be lethal with their weapon systems and demands proper execution of combat operations. A soldier’s ability to accomplish a mission extends from extensive doctrinal knowledge learned and the integration and synchronization of teamwork from three combat military police platforms.

Phase I: Trainup

Phase I assesses a leader’s ability to use troop-leading procedures, provides a detailed and relevant convoy security brief to a convoy commander, provides an operations order brief, and produces a thorough route reconnaissance overlay. Additionally, soldiers undergo a dry fire on the range to ensure that they are able to perform individual and collective tasks to standard and exercise proper safety precautions.

Phase II: CLFX

Phase II allows soldiers to execute training under simulated combat conditions. It challenges them physically, mentally, technically, and tactically and demands that they execute individual and collective tasks necessary to survive and win in combat.

Table 1. Qualification fire table

Task	Standard	Ammunition	Time
Station 1 (stationary to stationary) Engage a flank-moving BMP (Soviet mechanized infantry vehicle) target, using the free-gun method, at 660 meters.	Gunner must impact on BMP target	8 rounds	90 seconds
Station 2 (stationary to moving) Engage a flank-moving BMP target at 620 meters.	Gunner must impact on BMP target	8 rounds	60 seconds
Station 3 (moving to moving) Engage a flank-moving BMP target at 650 meters.	Gunner must impact on BMP target	9 rounds	60 seconds
Station 4 (moving to stationary) Engage a flank-moving BMP target at 775 meters.	Gunner must impact on BMP target	8 rounds	90 seconds
Station 5 (moving to moving) Engage a flank-moving BMP target at 845 meters.	Gunner must impact on BMP target	9 rounds	60 seconds
Each station is allocated 8-9 rounds (for a total of 42 rounds). If the target is destroyed with fewer rounds, the ammunition can be carried over to the next station.			

Table 2. Example of a 94th Military Police Battalion gunnery scorecard

Gunner		Team		Driver	Expert	Good	Poor
Distinguished	5 hits	Distinguished	100-90 points/5 hits	Maintain speed/ stable platform/ commands from team leader	10	8	6
Qualified	3-4 hits	Qualified	89-60 points/3-4 hits				
Unqualified	2 hits or less	Unqualified	59 points/2 hits or less				
Team Leader		Station	Team Leader	Driver	Gunner Hits		
Fire commands and target identification		1					
Seconds		2					
Points		3					
10	10	4					
12	8	5					
14	6	Total					
16	4	Scorer's signature		Date			
18	2						
20	1						

The CLFX provides stress, danger, and discipline and develops confidence and unit cohesion in the individual soldier and the unit.

The following is an example of a CLFX scenario used in a field-training exercise:

A light medium tactical vehicle containing soldiers and critical supplies is traveling through enemy territory to resupply the front line. Hostilities are imminent. The convoy encounters seven engagement areas at several locations along the route. Gunners return fire with devastating accuracy as the convoy continues to roll through the kill zone. At one engagement area, a Level III threat is identified and AH-64 Apache helicopters are called in for close air support. At the release point, the squad and soldiers encounter enemy resistance, requiring them to dismount and engage a series of targets at distances of 200 to 1,000 meters. The final engagement tests the gunner's abilities and forces the squad leader to integrate soldiers from the medical supply unit to successfully defeat the enemy and preserve the convoy. (Figure 1, page 54)

Planning

When planning training scenarios, they must be *tough, realistic, and relevant*—drawing from lessons learned from combat experience. They should be based on wartime environments and challenging situations. We must gain competency and confidence from soldiers and leaders through leader certification, reconnaissance, and rehearsals. To gain lethality and weapons proficiency from soldiers, training must

demand the integration and synchronization of all crew members, utilization of technology (such as M68 sighting devices), the AN/PAQ-4, the AN/PEQ-2, and bore light equipment—for use in day and night operations—and the implementation of a maintenance program to give soldiers confidence in their equipment (include weapons maintenance personnel, unit armor personnel, and representatives from the direct support unit level to support the exercise).

In Korea, it is common to build and design ranges from scratch to meet training objectives. The battalion operations and training officer (S3) is responsible for planning, resourcing, and executing all company LFXs. This allows company leadership time to focus on preparing, training, and assessing individual soldier skills and weapons proficiency and team and squad collective tasks. Since the implementation of CLFXs, the S3 shop has designed and developed two dynamic and challenging convoy lanes using the aviation range in BiSung.

The battalion followed the ten-step training model (Figure 2, page 54) to plan, resource, and execute all training events. This model provides a template for sequencing critical events and ensures the use of key principles for scenario development and the essential components required for realistic, challenging, and safe training.

One of many lessons learned is the integration of combat support elements, including the use of aviation (close-combat attacks and sling-load operations) and mortars (81-millimeter fire support). They provide combined arms experience at platoon and squad levels. This relationship has proved to be very valuable (as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan) and is




Figure 1. Diagram of a CLFX scenario

considered to be essential combat support elements routinely incorporated in battalion live-fire training exercises.

There are four essential components to be considered when setting up a CLFX:

Range and Training Areas. An optimal training area allows a squad to maneuver at least 5 kilometers, contains roads with bends and curves, and supports aviation or motor equipment (key assets to multi-echelon combined arms training). The area must

contain land and distance variations for a weapons mix—MK19s and squad automatic weapons—to be employed.

Targets. There should be a variety of targets (moving and stationary vehicles and pop-up silhouettes) that allow the gunner to manipulate the T&E or free-gun MK19, provide opportunities to shoot high and low, and provide squad and team leaders an opportunity to control fires. Figure 3, page 55, shows a detailed schematic for setting up targetry. This plan, along with the range fans shown in Figure 4, page 55, will help commanders and planners war-game the execution and calculate risk assessments.

Combat Arms Fire and Lift Support. These should simulate battlefield combat conditions. Sight and sound effects and real world support are necessary to train as a combined arms team. Squad leaders should be trained to communicate with gunships through frequency hopping and the use of close air support fire and control procedures. These tasks will be required on the modern nonlinear battlefield.

Observer-Controller (OC) and Safety Personnel. The OC maintains the exercise rules of

(Continued on page 58)

1. Assess mission-essential task list
2. Plan training
3. Train and certify leaders
4. Recon the site
5. Issue the plan
6. Rehearse
7. Execute
8. Conduct an after-action review
9. Retrain
10. Recover

Figure 2. Ten-Step Training Model




Figure 3. Targetry layout for BiSung Range




Figure 4. BiSung Range, Engagement Area 2

Combined Arms Training Strategy

By Matthew A. Richards

Throughout history, the Army has used a variety of animals in support of military operations. Horses and mules carried soldiers and pulled equipment such as artillery and ammunition, birds were used to detect dangerous chemicals and carry messages, and dogs were and still are used to detect enemy personnel, narcotics, and explosives. Now the Army is using the CATS to support training. That's right, "CATS!" When you think of a cat, you might envision a silent hunter stalking its prey. Like the cat, the CATS is also a silent—almost unknown but readily available—training tool.

What is the CATS?

The Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) is the Army's overarching strategy for planning, resourcing, and executing short- and long-range individual and collective training. Training strategies are the result of a multiyear effort sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Unit commanders and staffs are the primary audience of the CATS; however, all leaders can use its components to integrate individual and collective training. Army Training and Evaluation Program mission training plan collective tasks are the foundation of the CATS.

How Will the CATS Benefit a Unit?

The CATS integrates the appropriate training resources for heavy, light, and special operations forces. The CATS is a flexible system that does not limit leaders but rather provides them with a menu of training tasks, events, and resources to plan and manage training. A variety of links takes the user directly to applicable supporting individual and collective tasks. This decreases the need to sort through training materials used to develop training plans, schedules, and resource cost estimations (such as fuel and ammunition).

The CATS is the foundation of the unit-oriented training strategy used by the Standard Army Training System (SATS). The CATS and SATS assist trainers in designing military training programs, determining unit readiness, planning mobilizations, and developing training budgets. The CATS organizes tasks and provides descriptive training options for commanders. It describes one way of organizing

task-based, multiechelon training into a set of events that will achieve and maintain a high state of readiness in today's environment of high personnel turbulence and leader turnover.

Commanders are the primary training managers and trainers of their organizations. Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*, requires the commander to—

- Be present at training to the maximum extent possible.
- Base training on mission requirements.
- Train to applicable Army standards.
- Assess current levels of proficiency.
- Provide the required resources.
- Develop and execute training plans that result in proficient individuals, leaders, and units.

The CATS provides the tools for commanders to carry out this guidance. The essence of training is to develop and maintain proficiency in the execution of mission-essential tasks. The CATS emphasizes that commanders measure combined arms proficiency against a clear standard. To obtain a valid assessment, units must periodically train under rigorous, realistic conditions designed to challenge.

Is There a CATS for Every Unit?

CATSs are developed using individual tables of organization and equipment (TO&Es). Currently, 16 CATSs have been developed for military police units (see table on page 57).

How Can Units Access a CATS?

Commanders can access a CATS via the Reimer Digital Library or Army Knowledge Online (AKO). The CATS can be used as is or saved as a Microsoft®

Word document and modified to meet specific unit training requirements and conditions. A CATS can also be accessed via the SATS but in a less user-friendly format and without links to items such as mission training plans and supporting tasks. To access a CATS through—

- **The Reimer Digital Library.** Go to *<http://www.adtdl.army.mil>*. Select *Enter the Library*, and go to *Commandant-Approved Individual and Collective Training Support Materials*.

Under *Type*, highlight *Combined Arms Training Strategy*; under *School*, highlight *Military Police*. Select *Submit*. Access to the CATS site is restricted, so you must obtain access permission by selecting a CATS document number and then *Cancel* at the password screen. Follow the screen directions from that point to gain access. You may also access a CATS via *<http://atiam.train.army.mil/portal>*. Select *Login* on the top right of the screen, and provide your AKO account

CATSs for Military Police Units

TO&E	Unit Type	Date Developed
CATS 19333F000 (T1)	Military Police Company (Heavy Division)	10 May 2002
CATS 19476L000 (T1)	Headquarters, Headquarters Detachment Military Police Battalion	12 July 2001
CATS 19477L000 (T1)	Military Police Company (Combat Support)	8 May 2001
CATS 19546A000 (T1)	Headquarters, Headquarters Company Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement)	12 July 2001
CATS 19546A000 (T2)	Headquarters, Headquarters Company Military Police Battalion (Internment/Resettlement)	12 July 2001
CATS 19547AA00 (T1)	Military Police Detachment Internment/Resettlement Information Center	12 July 2001
CATS 19547AA00 (T2)	Military Police Detachment Internment/Resettlement Information Center	12 July 2001
CATS 19547AA00 (T3)	Military Police Detachment Internment/Resettlement Information Center	12 July 2001
CATS 19547AB00 (T1)	Military Police Detachment (Internment/Resettlement) (Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee)	12 July 2001
CATS 19547AB00 (T2)	Military Police Detachment (Internment/Resettlement) (Enemy Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee)	12 July 2001
CATS 19643L000 (T1)	Military Police Detachment Internment/Resettlement Information Center	13 July 2001
CATS 19643L000 (T2)	Military Police Detachment Internment/Resettlement Information Center	13 July 2001
CATS 19647L000 (T1)	Military Police Escort Guard Company	17 July 2001
CATS 19647L000 (T2)	Military Police Escort Guard Company	17 July 2001
CATS 19667L000 (T1)	Military Police Escort Guard Company	18 July 2001
CATS 19667L000 (T2)	Military Police Escort Guard Company	18 July 2001

Due to the large number of units and the ability to share tasks, there will not be a CATS developed for each individual TO&E. For example, CATS 19477L000 (T1) can be shared by the following TO&Es: 19313L, 19333L, 19333F, 19343L, 19477L, and 19677L.

information. Select the *RDL Services* tab. Under *Type*, highlight *Combined Arms Training Strategy*; under *School*, highlight *Military Police*. Select *Submit*. Scroll down the screen and locate and select the desired CATS document number.

- **Army Knowledge Online.** Go to <www.us.army.mil/portal/portal_home.jhtml>. Sign in to the system using your established AKO login and password. Select *MACOMS* on the bottom left of the screen, and then scroll down and select *TRADOC* to bring up the *TRADOC Community Page*. Click on the *More* drop-down arrow above the photo of General Byrnes, and locate and select *CATS*. This will bring up the *CATS Community Page*. Select *Go to the CATS Knowledge Centers*. This will bring up a screen that shows subscribed and unsubscribed communities. If you are unsubscribed, check the box to the left of

CATS. When you do this, the toolbar on the top of your screen will change. Select *Subscribe*. You should receive a notification-of-approval message. Select *Finish* to close out the page. Select the *CATS* icon, scroll down, check the box for *Military Police*, and click on *Military Police*. Locate the desired *CATS*, and click on the *TO&E* number. At the file download screen, select *SAVE*. This will download the *CATS* into a flat Word document without the additional links.

Is Training Available?

Training on the *CATS*s will be incorporated in Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Education Systems at the Military Police School in the near future.

Mr. Richards is a training developer with the U.S. Army Military Police School.

(“Achieving Combat Readiness Through Training Progression,” continued from page 54)

engagement and ensures that measurable standards are maintained through teaching and coaching. An important aspect of his duty is a full understanding of training execution through participation in the initial planning, coordination, development, and certification process. The OC should provide honest and constructive feedback based on Army Training and Evaluation Program/mission training plan checklists. Although range fans and target plans are formulated and war-gamed to reduce soldier risk, there is no substitute for a safety NCO. One person should never perform both OC and safety duties.

Conclusion

The 94th Military Police Battalion continues to build upon success by maintaining the highest level of combat readiness. Soldiers confident in their leaders, training, equipment, and themselves create a formula for success as they continue to prepare to fight.



Soldiers perform vehicle and equipment sling-load operations—the first such operation performed by military police on the Korean Peninsula.

Lieutenant Colonel Jones is commander of the 94th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's in business administration from Radford University and a master's in business administration from Saint Martins College, Olympia, Washington. Lieutenant Colonel Jones is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, the Military Police Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and Airborne School.

Major Briscoe is the S3 for the 94th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's in political science from Eastern Kentucky University and a master's in public administration from Troy State University. Major Briscoe is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy.

Quality Assurance Feedback Program



Much like the pace at which we entered Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the pace at which we transform the training of our soldiers to meet the Army's needs in the contemporary operational environment (COE) must be swift and deliberate.

As our nation continues the Global War on Terrorism, we must train the "critical" tasks required for success on the battlefield. Since the conditions will vary with each operation, our soldiers must receive training on a wide variety of tasks to function in the COE and accomplish the mission. Existing tasks may need to be revised, new tasks may need to be developed, and doctrinal changes may be warranted. Your feedback, as a member of the Military Police Corps Regiment, is needed.

To obtain ideas, concerns, and comments, the U.S. Army Military Police School has established the Quality Assurance Feedback Program to solicit feedback from graduates and their leaders. The program will help ensure that the tasks trained in the school are current and that soldiers feel confident they can perform the tasks upon graduation. We need frank and honest feedback to determine if modifications to the training base are needed.

To address these concerns, the following e-mail address has been established: [<atztqaomp@wood.army.mil>](mailto:atztqaomp@wood.army.mil). There are two ways that soldiers can assist the Military Police Corps: First, they can use this address at any time to submit concerns and provide feedback on training. Second, upon graduation from a resident course, they will be given a letter to present to their leader. This letter will request that each leader send an e-mail to the above address and provide the soldier's name, course name and class number, and graduation date. Six to twelve months following graduation, soldiers will be sent surveys to address concerns and/or comment on the training provided at the Military Police School. The graduate's leader will also receive notification to respond to a survey requesting feedback on the soldier's performance following training. Recommendations to change course curricula will then be forwarded to the commandant of the Military Police School.

Additionally, as veterans return from the Balkans, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, we will seek to collect their feedback as well. All comments and concerns should be sent to the Quality Assurance Office/Quality Assurance Element at the address shown above.

MILITARY POLICE Writer's Guide

MILITARY POLICE is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action-type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome.

Include photos (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photos in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photos in PowerPoint® or Microsoft® Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; and a fax number and commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to *MILITARY POLICE* must be accompanied by a written release by the author's unit or activity security manager prior to publication. All information contained in the article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. *MILITARY POLICE* is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

Send submissions by e-mail to <pbd@wood.army.mil> or send a 3 1/2-inch disk in Word, along with a double-spaced copy of the manuscript, to: *MILITARY POLICE*, 320 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 210, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8929.

