

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS



# MILITARY POLICE



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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*Military Police*, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about military police functions in maneuver and mobility operations, area security operations, internment/resettlement operations, law and order operations, and police intelligence operations. The objectives of *Military Police* are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other U.S. Army publications. *Military Police* reserves the right to edit material. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to *Military Police* and the author. All photographs are official U.S. Army photographs unless otherwise credited.

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# Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

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## *Brigadier General David Quantock*

Welcome to another edition of *Military Police!* I hope everyone enjoys, or better yet, learns something from the articles published in this issue. With all the great things going on in the Regiment, it is imperative that our leaders take the time to share the lessons learned while out in the field. It is also a great professional-development tool to train officers and NCOs on the art of publishing in a professional bulletin. One battalion commander made it a required bullet on support forms for his officers to share their lessons learned with the Regiment. This is a great technique to share lessons learned, programs, and perspectives while providing professional development. I encourage all leaders to build similar officer and NCO professional-development requirements in your units. And as an added bonus, we can benefit from printing this great information in *Military Police*.

I would like to bring everyone up to date with excerpts from my regimental review speech during the 66th Military Police Anniversary Review. During the review, I spent a few minutes discussing where the Military Police Corps has been, where we are today, and where we are going in the future, culminating with the seven imperatives (or lines of operation) that we are pursuing to remain the Force of Choice.

Our Regiment dates back to the Revolutionary War—always there to support the Army at war but disappearing when the conflict was over. It was not until 1941 that the Military Police Corps Regiment became a permanent branch of our Army. For 66 years, Regiment Soldiers have performed superbly in support of our Nation's struggles in World War II; Korea; Vietnam; Grenada; Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm; and the current War on Terrorism. In each conflict, the Military Police Corps contributed immeasurably to the warfight as a versatile combat support arm.

However, the Regiment was not without periods of challenge, when we as a Corps were grasping to find our identity. In the early 1980s, we were largely a law enforcement force who also operated prisons and performed missions like securing nuclear-weapon depots. But as a combat support arm, we had limited doctrinal use. However, that all changed in the mid-1980s when, faced with the threat of outsourcing and extinction, a few of our military police leaders changed the focus of our branch to combat-oriented missions where we would become the infantry of the rear area in the traditional linear battlefield. In fact, we have become so enamored with it that, for years now, we have almost completely focused on area security and maneuver, mobility, and support operations, letting our law enforcement skills atrophy.

Today, we find ourselves in the most complex combat environment ever, fighting a tough and diverse enemy who is completely bent on our destruction. Our combat skills have manifested themselves in awards from the Distinguished Service Cross to countless awards for valor, while the importance of our law enforcement, criminal investigation, and detention roles and missions are unquestioned. As our branch continues historical growth, the number of company-size combat support units will increase from 120 to 186 by 2011, nearly a 33 percent unit growth. And the growth is in more than combat support companies; internment/resettlement units and criminal investigation units will also experience tremendous growth.

We have more than 8,200 Soldiers deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—nearly 20 percent of our total force. What you will find in these locations is a force of multifunctional military police Soldiers—a force that is providing essential combat support to brigade combat teams, operating more than 300 Iraqi and Afghan police transition teams, providing oversight and training to thousands of policemen, and providing care and custody to more than 25,000 detainees in Iraq, while also conducting significant detainee operations in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.

Tomorrow, our future is equally as bright, but there is much work to be done. We must focus on our seven imperatives:

First, we must create officers and NCOs who are multiskilled leaders in law enforcement, internment/resettlement, criminal investigation, and maneuver support operations. We must provide these leaders with

*(Continued on page 4)*

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# Regimental Command Sergeant Major

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## *Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Butler*



Greetings from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri—home of the Regiment and your U.S. Army Military Police School! I want to spend some time in this issue of *Military Police* to introduce and discuss **Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) transformation**. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command recently announced the NCO Lifelong Learning Strategy. The role of the NCO is changing; we need to access our culture and determine how the NCO will support the future Army.

Building the bench requires a “train-ahead” strategy. We need a strategy that develops a lifelong learning culture. As I write this, the Army has a high NCOES backlog due to NCO availability issues caused by deployments and other mission-essential requirements. The average NCO now attends NCOES later than his predecessors. Our average Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) is composed of more than 90 percent staff sergeants, many with two or three years of time in grade. The current training plan addresses squad leader duties, but most attendees are already squad leaders or have completed their squad leader time. The Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) currently teaches platoon sergeant skills to NCOs but, again, many Soldiers attending the training have already served in that position. We are not training ahead; we are teaching our Soldiers things that they already know and do!

The Army mission and operating tempo will not decrease anytime soon. We must adjust our courses to best serve our Soldiers and our Army. The transformation will be two-fold: revamp resident instruction and introduce distributed learning courses that will fill the gaps between resident courses. NCOES will initiate a “pull-down” approach where we will pull First Sergeant Course and Battle Staff NCO Course tasks into ANCOC to create the Senior Leader Course (SLC)—training focused on military occupational specialty (MOS)/branch-specific platoon and company level operations. We will then push some platoon level tasks down to BNCOC, creating the Advanced Leader Course (ALC)—training which will focus on MOS/branch-specific platoon and squad operations. The Warrior Leader Course (WLC) will remain MOS-immaterial and will pull in some squad level tasks to better prepare our junior NCOs. This NCOES transformation will happen over the next two years.

The second part of NCOES transformation is self-development training, comprised of three types: structured, guided, and personal. Through Army Knowledge Online (AKO) accounts, Soldiers will access a list of tasks that will be linked to promotions and NCOES. Tasks labeled “guided self-development” will be recommended (not mandatory) by the Army or proponent school assisting the Soldier with his Army career. “Personal self-development” tasks will be available to the Soldier based on his goals and desires (such as college or correspondence courses). Lastly, but most importantly, “structured self-development” will consist of five levels: Level 1 is mandatory tasks that must be completed before attending WLC. The 80 hours of tasks are Army-mandated and are a common-core curriculum. Levels 2 and 3 must be completed before attending ALC or SLC and will be comprised of Army common tasks and proponent tasks. Levels 4 and 5 will be completed before and after a Soldier attends the Sergeants’ Major Course.

Structured self-development bridges the training gaps between NCOES resident attendance and provides the Army and proponent schools with the opportunity to ensure that critical and emerging skill “needs” are delivered to Soldiers in a timely manner. Courseware development will continue over the next five years. Level 1 training will be introduced in March 2008. There is still much that needs to be worked out as the strategy moves to the execution phase. This transformation will better prepare our NCOs with the necessary tools and skills at the appropriate levels to improve our support to the Army. We will continue to train our NCO Corps for the challenges of soldiering and leading in the modern Military Police Corps.

***Warrior Police!***

a professional military education and career opportunities that facilitate their development into adaptive and flexible warrior, law enforcement, criminal investigation, and corrections experts.

Second, we must fully implement all aspects of police intelligence operations as the principal integrating function that provides the combatant commander with a stream of critical intelligence that must be fully integrated into the common operational picture. We must work with the entire intelligence community to ensure that full integration is realized. Police intelligence operations are generated by military police Soldiers on the ground, Criminal Investigation Division agents operating in forensic labs or conducting a myriad of complex investigations, and internment/resettlement specialists conducting counterinsurgency operations inside the wire—all linked by the power gained from leveraging biometric identification instruments and a common intelligence backbone called the Distributed Common Ground System. These links, combined with the additional police intelligence structure of the brigade combat teams, ensures a capability that is already showing tremendous promise on today's battlefield.

Third, as the Army's proponent for nonlethal weapons, we must continue to push for the rapid distribution of the latest technology to the warfighters in the field. We are now a full-spectrum Army and must be as good at influencing the proper behavior as we are at terminating improper behavior.

Fourth, we need to deliver the best possible capability to military police Warriors by upgrading and upgunning the armored security vehicle and fielding the appropriate number of mine-resistant, ambush protection vehicles, while keeping our eye on the rapid development of the joint light tactical vehicle. Additionally, we must provide our military police Soldiers the right mix of lethal and nonlethal capabilities and the most capability and flexibility to meet the complex environment of the future.

Fifth, we must rebase our battalions and companies to provide two kinds of Army installations—those with the majority of Department of the Army military police and those with combat support military police companies. This will provide more military police companies with the ability to deploy, while still providing the training venue required to maintain our law enforcement skills.

Sixth, we must add a military police battalion to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, as part of the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade [MEB]. This will provide a tremendous opportunity to take the latest lessons learned from the battlefield and inject them directly into the training base—not just the information, but the experienced people as well—moving our units from a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to a U.S. Army Forces Command without having to move the family.

And finally, we must continue to operationalize the Military Police School through a War on Terrorism and expeditionary mind-set that is focused on bringing training to the Soldier through mobile training teams and leveraged technology. We must train our military police brigade and battalion headquarters before sending them to the fight—a luxury enjoyed primarily by combat arms units.

In summary: Today, I see the Military Police School as the Department of the Army Law Enforcement Center; tomorrow, I see the Military Police School as the Department of Defense Center of Excellence. Let there be no doubt—the reason for the success of our Regiment is not due to any gadget or piece of equipment, but rather the courageous performance of dedicated military police patriots who manage to accomplish the impossible under some of the most complex and dangerous conditions. I am proud to be associated with them and the great families that support them. Thanks to all of you for your dedicated and selfless service to your Military Police Corps, our Army, and our Nation.

Before I close, I want to remind everyone of our Military Police Warfighter Challenge Week coming up the last week of April (see the schedule of events on page 8). If you remember, I divided the Regimental Week into two separate annual events. In April, we will have the Warfighter Challenge, our Military Police Conference, and the Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony. Please mark 21–26 April 2008 on your calendars. Hope to see you there!

***Assist, Protect, Defend  
Warrior Police!***

# Army Leadership

Leadership is taking the point position when your unit or flight is expecting contact with the enemy. Leadership is flying a crippled bomber to the ground when a wounded crew member cannot bail out. Leadership is keeping your young Soldiers, Marines, Airmen, Sailors, and Coast Guardsmen alive and never leaving wounded behind. Leadership is writing a dead comrade's family a personal letter immediately following a battle.

Leadership is not glorifying war. Leadership is not doing "anything" just to get promoted. Leadership is not winning the battle at all costs, nor is it losing a war to avoid casualties. Leadership is not found in the security of a well-fortified command bunker, nor is it found in a plush officer field mess.

Leadership allows for no compromise in the integrity of one's word, deed, or signature. Setting high standards and seeing that they are met; applying intelligence, dedication, creativity, and selflessness; and employing stamina, vigor, commitment, and drive for self-improvement—these are key factors in leadership. Spontaneous enthusiasm is contagious.

Leadership is rewarding a Soldier, Marine, Airman, Sailor, Coast Guardsman, or Civilian with the appropriate recognition immediately after exceptional service. Leadership is commanding and managing with professionalism and establishing and meeting, by priority, specific objectives. Leadership is managing by exception, using job enlargement, and seeking job enrichment.

Believing in God, family, and country—in that order—is leadership. Being humanistic is leadership. Trusting the ideas and decisions of well-trained troops is leadership. Knowing where the mission is, when the troops and material are to be there, and how many troops and systems are needed to win is leadership. Blocking out periods of "private time" to accomplish creative work and recharge—that is leadership.

Leadership is treating men and women equally without regard to race, color, creed, religion, age, or custom. Leadership is learning the language, culture, and customs of a host country. Leadership is knowing and living by the Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Conduct, the Geneva Convention, and the basic human rights of all mankind. Practicing assertiveness, not aggressiveness, when dealing with peers and subordinates is leadership. Leadership is neither ruthless nor mindless discipline, but the ability to do the right thing at the right time—putting the whole before the parts. Leadership is not a good efficiency report or paper readiness. Leadership is not a court-martial for every mistake or leniency for serious violations. A leader must be fair, predictable, and consistent.

Giving sound professional advice to a superior, even when you know he or she does not want to hear it—that's leadership. If you have given your best advice and followed all legal, moral, and ethical orders (even when you do not agree with them), you have accomplished effective leadership. Leading when you can, following when you should, and getting out of the way when you have nothing to offer is leadership.

Leadership is the general who knows the friendly and enemy situations, the immediate action sequence for the M16 rifle, his driver's first name and family information, and the words to the Lord's Prayer. Leadership is the private who knows that he or she is in the chain of command and will have to take over when senior in rank. Leadership is knowing that a water truck in the desert is worth more combat power than an extra armored cavalry regiment.

## A Personal View

By  
Lieutenant  
Colonel Wayne  
Larry Dandridge  
(Retired)

*"Leadership is neither ruthless nor mindless discipline, but the ability to do the right thing at the right time . . . ."*

# Army Leadership

## A Personal View

*“Leadership can be good or bad, centralized or decentralized, warm or cold, offensive or defensive, macro or micro, or expensive or free.”*

Remembering that the past is our heritage, the present is our challenge, and the future is our responsibility—that is leadership. Staying in top physical condition—maintaining your weight, not smoking, saying no to drugs, and not drinking alcohol in excess—is leadership. Delegating authority, commanding confidence and respect, and accepting full responsibility for your actions is leadership. Ingenuity, sociability, tact, and tenacity are leadership.

Leadership is not being right all the time, and it is certainly not being wrong most of the time. Leadership does not place blame; it fixes problems. Leadership is adaptability, appearance, cooperation, and decisiveness. Leadership displays knowledge, manages resources efficiently, and plans beyond the immediate requirements of assigned duties. Leadership creates an organization of mutual respect. Leadership is building an organization and environment where it is not necessary to tell troops what to do. Leaders know that combat without conscience is evil.

A leader knows why there are air, land, and sea forces; why there are cavalry, infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, amphibious, special-operations, pre-positioned, reconnaissance, and logistical forces, and why combined arms and the concentration of combat power are important. A leader knows about Net-Centric warfare, defense in depth, civil affairs, urban operations, and the advantages our forces have at night (and how to use them). A wise leader knows that young Soldiers spend most of their time worrying about and planning tactics, while older, more experienced Soldiers spend the majority of their time worrying about planning logistics.

Leadership can be good or bad, centralized or decentralized, warm or cold, offensive or defensive, macro or micro, or expensive or free. Leadership can be Catholic or Protestant, Jewish or Muslim, Hindu or Mormon, or atheist or agnostic. Leadership prevents the overmobility of junior leaders and troops by keeping them in positions long enough to learn job duties, master common and collective tasks, and perform as team members. Establishing and promoting worker and troop certification and team certification programs are leadership.

Leaders hope and pray for the best and plan for the worst. Leaders know about the need to wage “total war” to win and the special advantages the defender has in cities, mountains, and jungles. Leaders know how to “own the night” and take maximum advantage of combat arms teams, snipers, attack helicopter operators, counterartillery personnel, naval gun/missile fire operators, and close air support personnel. Leaders know not to keep troop weapons locked up and away but, rather, to train troops to live with a clean weapon that they are an expert with.

Leadership was embodied in Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Abraham Lincoln, Pope John Paul II, Robert E. Lee, Winston Churchill, Sister Teresa, and many other well-known figures. But leadership is also embodied in thousands of unknowns.

Commitment to a team and a participatory form of leadership that draws on the knowledge and skills of all personnel—at every level—is leadership. Encouraging and rewarding suggestions and complaints is leadership. Having an open door and remaining open-minded is leadership. Empowering troops, civilian personnel, and support contractors with the tools, responsibility, and authority to get the tough jobs done is leadership. Making troops multiprocess, multiweapon, and multifunctional experts is leadership. Good leaders practice servant leadership.

Leaders know that “the bitterness of low quality remains long after the sweetness of low price.” Leaders allow talented Soldiers “long tethers” for experimenting.

# Army Leadership

Leaders find ways to satisfy the essential dualism of troops and civil servants to be part of a team and be recognized as individuals. Leaders know how to use internal and external benchmarking, observations, and inspections to rate their organization's readiness, products, services, and processes against the front-runners in their specialty.

Leadership is guiding. Leadership is legendary. Leadership is foresight. Leadership is absorbent, abstinent and, unfortunately, at times—abominable. Leadership is baccalaureate, balance, basic, and, too frequently, backward and barbaric. Leadership has saved lives, caused casualties and fatalities, stopped wars, and started wars. Leadership has walked softly and carried a big stick, but it has also been loud and nonviolent.

Saying what you do (in clear and concise standing operating procedures, plans, and operation orders) and doing what you say is leadership. Breaking down communication barriers between staffs, line units, support organizations, and sister units is leadership. Asking deep, probing questions and finding root causes is leadership. Changing problems into opportunities is leadership. Knowing that you can seldom wait until you have all the answers is leadership. Repeatedly doing simple things that demonstrate sincerity is leadership.

Leadership is honesty, enthusiasm, loyalty, courage, and wisdom. Taking care of your Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians (and their dependents) is leadership. Leadership is visiting your wounded and sick frequently. Leadership includes being a good boss, comrade, and friend; father or mother; son or daughter; sister or brother; or husband or wife. Knowing that the profession of arms is much more than just a job is leadership.

Being a champion of safety and quality and an unquestionable friend to the environment is leadership. Basing decisions on facts is leadership. Promoting and rewarding continuous improvement is leadership. Being a champion of safety and quality is leadership. Staying focused on internal customers, external customers, and the enemy is leadership. Performing preventive maintenance, knowing what cellular techniques involve, being skilled in setup reduction, understanding mixed-model methods, understanding rocks-in-the river inventory management, knowing how to level and balance a workload, understanding that distance (to supplies, replacements, ammunition, fuel) is usually detrimental, and ensuring that things are “in time,” not “just in time”—is leadership.

Leadership is enthusiasm, optimism, helping, training, encouraging, understanding, motivating, disciplining, crying, laughing, standing firm, giving way, counseling, correcting, giving a second chance, and trying again and again. Leaders are tall, short, thin, heavy, male, female, black, brown, white, yellow, old, young, naturalized, and unnaturalized. Leaders are from the city and from the country. Leadership works hard to close the gap between the potential and the performance of a Soldier.

Knowing how to use teams, flow charts, simple (but powerful) statistical methods, simplification, continuous improvement tactics, complaint and suggestion programs, and standardization to get the tough jobs done is leadership. Leadership makes quality easy to see, feel, smell, taste, and hear by finding root causes and permanently fixing the problem. Leadership is clarifying processes, flow-charting complex processes, and making every troop an expert at common tasks. (Everyone should be an infantryman first in their career!)

## A Personal View

*“Leaders are tall, short, thin, heavy, male, female, black, brown, white, yellow, old, young, naturalized, and unnaturalized.”*

# Army Leadership

## A Personal View

*“... a leader is so in love with life that he or she is willing to die for the lives and freedom of others and our great Nation!”*

Leadership is caring, compassion, understanding, and leading by example. Leaders look you in the eye, kick you in the butt, cover your flank, and take your place on the most dangerous missions. Knowing that there is a place for everything and everything in its place is leadership. Leadership is admitting mistakes and learning from them. Eating last is leadership. Practicing servant leadership and sharing the pains of heat, dirt, sand, cold, wet, insects, and other harsh environmental conditions is leadership. “Packing your own roll and digging your own hole” is leadership.

Leadership comes from experience, but experience comes from making mistakes. A leader changes the odds and knows the risks. Leaders develop teamwork. The tides, the channels, the seasons, the winds, the hazards, the weather, and the best forecasts are all known by leaders. Leadership knows that there is no end to change except failure. Leadership knows that if you treat every customer like your last or first, you will never have to worry about repeat business.

Leaders often make good grades in school and have many years of formal education and numerous important degrees. But they also have been known to fail math, English, and other equally important subjects. Leaders ensure that the enemy gives his life for his cause. Leaders ensure that their troops always have the tactical advantage, the best training and equipment, the highest morale, and plenty of food and water. Leaders work hard to ensure that the workload is distributed equally among all troops.

Leadership comes from family, friends, teachers, coaches, and pastors. Simple, easy-to-understand orders come from leaders. Complex tasks are changed into short and accurate plans through leadership. Leadership can be learned and taught, but it cannot be forgotten or bought. Leadership can be seen, tasted, smelled, felt, and heard; and it can also come from a blind person with no hands who cannot hear, speak, or walk.

Finally, a leader is so in love with life that he or she is willing to die for the lives and freedom of others and our great Nation!

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## Warrior Police Challenge Week 21–26 April 2008

### Events

- Icebreaker
- Warfighter (3 days)
- Strategic Forums
- Hall of Fame Presentation
- Hall of Fame Luncheon
- Award Ceremony
- Regimental Command Sergeant Major Breakout



"WHEN THE EARTH SHAKES!"

# Detainee Disturbances in an Internment Facility

By Lieutenant Colonel John F. Hussey  
and Major Robert L. Berry

*Military police forces in the contemporary operating environment are becoming increasingly involved in detainee operations. In addition to military corrections for military service members, an even larger number of military police Soldiers are performing detainee missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and other locations. These detainees are not the compliant prisoners of war found in the European theater of 1944. These extremists want to continue their "Jihad" by any and all means, even while they are detainees. These actions may include passive resistance to facility rules (such as refusing to participate in an accountability formation), escape attempts, and endeavors to use improvised weapons and engage in combat with guard forces. This article will discuss some observations made by the 306th Military Police Battalion during detainee operations at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2005.*

Every day, Soldiers in detention operations missions are guaranteed one thing: contact with the enemy. Once captured by coalition forces, detainees do not simply give up their will to fight but, rather, begin a new phase of warfare—insurgency within the wire. As in any prison setting, there are chains of command—formal (known by prison officials) and informal (known by members of the prison population)—that have objectives which are usually contrary to that of the prison administration.

Detainee disturbances can be classified into three broad categories: low-level, nonviolent protests; small-scale, violent disturbances; and full-scale riots. The factors that separate the categories include the number of detainees involved, the number of compounds affected, and the level of violence emanating

from the disturbance. For example, a peaceful demonstration by 200 detainees may be classified as a low-level disturbance, while a marauding group of 50 detainees attempting to take over a compound would be considered a full-scale riot. Some disturbances include detainee protests, group rivalry, diversionary tactics, and insurgency attempts. Detainee protests may stem from a variety of factors, including concern over the cause and/or length of their incarceration, quality-of-life conditions in the facility, perceived treatment by the guard force, and political expression. All of these factors should be examined within a cultural framework. For most detainees, everything was somehow connected to Islam. Suggestions to proactively reduce these protest factors include creating a forum for detainees to obtain information

on their specific cases. For instance, we allowed detainees to complete a form listing inquiries that, in turn, were answered by Multinational Force–Iraq staff judge advocates. Sometimes, the answer wasn't what the detainee wanted to hear; but, for the most part, answers were appreciated.

Military police guard forces who pay particular attention to detainee quality-of-life conditions help prevent many disturbances. Ensuring that detainee meals are appropriate (according to religious, cultural, and dietary requirements) helps to reduce the tension between the guards and the inmates. Soliciting detainee input with the help of host nation government consultation resolves many questions. In addition to food, quality-of-life issues include recreational opportunities, education, and religious expression. As a cautionary note, extremists within the detainee population often attacked these issues to stir up resentment among the other detainees. Additionally, while certain quality-of-life issues may be used as a means of rewarding correct behavior, this practice must be done according to applicable laws and command guidance (for example, denial of food is **not** an acceptable punishment; however, recreation privileges may be reduced due to rule violations).

All contact between guards and detainees should be monitored. Proactive leader involvement is the best means of preventing problems. Perceived transgressions may include guard handling of religiously sensitive items (such as the Koran), verbal insults or taunts, and unnecessarily rough handling. These concerns should not deter guards from properly performing their jobs and enforcing facility rules, but they should cause us all to consider our actions and assess subsequent effects (such as second- and third-order effects).

Detainees may cause disturbances due to their expression of political will. As mentioned before, culture often plays a primary influence. Giving detainees an outlet to express political views may be a means to reduce tension and, also, inculcate them to democratic values. However, demonstrations must be monitored to ensure that they don't escalate into violent confrontations.

Rivalry between detainee groups may be the cause of some disturbances. At Abu Ghraib, we often maintained a diversified population in the larger compounds. Careful monitoring, population management, and identification of all groups within the detainee population are important. The most obvious groups are religious sects (such as Sunni versus Shiite), but groups may become more detailed and diverse (such as religious extremists or former Baath party members). There may be local nationals and foreign nationals or detainees from the same

or rival insurgent groups. Tribal membership may prove to be as important as religious identification. This information must be carefully developed, constantly updated, and frequently disseminated.

The ultimate cause of a disturbance may be the desire of the most extreme insurgent detainees to continue their Jihad fight by engaging in direct combat with military police guards. Detainees will often use improvised weapons ranging from clubs, edged instruments, stabbing instruments (such as shanks), slingshots, and just about anything else they can think of and get their hands on. For these extremists, addressing quality-of-life issues will not matter. These insurgents are only interested in combat (and base their success on how many Soldiers they can injure and how much disruption they can cause). The best means of dealing with these problem detainees is identifying them and then separating them from the general population.

The best means to combat disturbances is to understand the root cause (if possible) and proactively address the problem. Reducing tension will decrease the severity and number of incidents; however, no actions will prevent all detainee disturbances.

Soldiers who have experienced traditional contact with enemy detainees understand the phenomena and complete adrenaline rush of the situation—a situation in which the instinct to survive takes over. Contact with the enemy during a detainee uprising is not contact in the traditional sense of a military engagement but is, nevertheless, frightening. If you can imagine 3,000 detainees chanting “Allah Akbar” while burning tents, throwing rocks, and massing into formations—you can visualize the conditions for a long and charged engagement. Military personnel will tell you that you can literally feel the ground shake—resulting, obviously, in physiological effects on Soldiers.

There are usually telltale signs when detainees are planning disturbances. When the identification of involved personnel is confirmed, all guards are told to be particularly observant of those detainees. Additionally, if a disturbance is suspected, the intelligence officer (S-2) tracks the activity of the suspect detainees. When the 306th Military Police Battalion confronted disturbances at Abu Ghraib, we practiced the following basic tenets:

- Facility rules are nonnegotiable.
- Violence will not be tolerated.
- Violators of facility rules will be disciplined according to facility standing operating procedures (SOPs).
- Verbal persuasion will be used first to gain compliance.

- The use of force by military police guards will be appropriate to the situation.
- Disturbances will be contained as well as possible.
- We control this facility!

While we were always willing to speak with the detainees, we were cautious to never allow them to believe that they could coerce us into changing the rules. While giving in to a simple demand to halt a disturbance and prevent further violence may seem reasonable, the detainees will not stop there and may feel emboldened to push the situation further in future incidents.

One of the most important things that must be done is capturing disturbances on video. Videos offer numerous advantages to military police and should be considered an assigned task for specified Soldiers. With video footage, enemy leaders can be identified (likely as the individuals encouraging other detainees to riot).

We always made it clear that violence, whether against fellow detainees or against Soldiers, would not be tolerated under any circumstances. Violators were dealt with according to the facility discipline SOP. We made every effort to make this system transparent so that every detainee could understand it. This practice also reinforced the democratic concept for the rules of law.

As we expected detainees to follow the rules, it was just as critical that military police forces follow the established rules regarding the use of force. Guards who act like lone rangers can cause disturbances and may make detainees more violent than necessary.

Preventing disturbances from growing and impacting other parts of the facility was key to our tactics for dealing with disturbances. We trained our leaders to—

- Immediately report disturbances.
- Take steps to isolate disturbances (keep them from moving).
- Contain disturbances (keep them from growing).
- Continuously gather and report information.
- Assess the threat of disturbances (think of the big picture and the impact of a facility-wide disturbance).
- Recommend and select appropriate courses of action and contingency plans.
- Provide overwatch security.
- Gather needed resources.
- Implement action plans.
- Reassess and monitor results.

- Maintain accountability of personnel and key equipment.
- Document and report all incidents.

After experiencing many disturbances, we discovered several issues that future military police guards should consider. Command, control, and communications are extremely difficult during disturbances. The sounds of conflict make voice and radio communications nearly impossible. Leadership and widely understood contingency plans can ease some of these issues. Logistics support during and after a disturbance can be a challenge. Operations in stockpiling, rationing, and emergency resupply missions should be planned and rehearsed.

As mentioned before, it is important to limit disturbances to a small area and a few detainees if possible. We found that disturbances had a tendency to cascade to other compounds. Other detainees may have had no idea how the incident started, but they jumped in at the first opportunity to riot. This is why it is important to consider the second- and third-order effects in every action you take with detainees. There may be occasions when it is better to “not make a mountain out of a molehill;” therefore, do not respond to a detainee provocation.

Detainees spend a great deal of time watching the actions of guard forces, both before and during incidents. Just as detainees will sometimes use disturbances as distractions from other actions (such as escape attempts), we can use distractions to combat disturbances. Considering the capabilities of counter-disturbance resources is crucial to success. At the 306th, we maintained levels of response forces to combat disturbances. The first-level response was several predesignated military police guards within each facility area that could rapidly move to reinforce areas encountering a disturbance. The second-level response was a full-time, squad-size, dedicated response force or immediate response force (IRF). Members assigned to the IRF lived and trained together 24 hours a day. They were specially trained and equipped to deal with a full range of detainee disturbances and could respond to any part of the facility within 10 minutes. The vehicles dedicated for use by the IRF were equipped with a variety of less-than-lethal (LTL) force options and tools. There is an abundance of LTL options available to military police guards. And additional options are constantly being introduced. It is critical to employ them in concert with one another and not in isolation.

For full-scale riots, we activated our third-level response plan to alert, mobilize, and deploy every Soldier in the battalion. Upon alert, all off-duty and on-duty, nonguard Soldiers reported to their company assembly areas. Each company maintained

pre-positioned vehicles, supplies, and equipment. Leaders mobilized their Soldiers and deployed them to designated rally points.

Some of the LTL systems we employed included oleoresin capsicum (OC) pepper spray, X26 Tasers, 12-gauge shotguns, FN303 rifles, 40-millimeter M203 rounds, flash-bang grenades, sting ball grenades, long-range acoustical devices (LRADs), modular crowd control munitions (claymore mines), and fire hoses. Military police guard forces were involved in an arms race with the detainees because, as new LTL weapons were introduced, detainees developed methods to counter them. For instance, detainees quickly realized the range limitations of our LTL shotgun rounds. They would simply hover just outside their range and use hand-thrown projectiles or slingshots to strike our Soldiers. We countered this with the introduction of the FN303, which greatly outranged the shotguns. An effective combination was the FN303 to engage detainees in the open and then sting ball grenades to clear combatant detainees from areas the FN303 could not engage. We used the LRAD to move large groups of combating detainees. We experimented with the use of modular crowd control munitions by mounting them on vehicles to produce rapid deployment and detonation, resulting in increased surprise and effect for the detainees. The important factor was thinking in terms of the effect and range of individual weapons and how to best employ them in concert.

The challenge of detainee operations is growing and will continue to be an essential part of military police missions in the foreseeable future. In order for military police guard forces to maintain proper care, custody, and control of detainees, we must be prepared to deal with detainee disturbances—an absolute fact in the War on Terrorism! Leaders must be prepared to deal with disturbances through realistic planning. This can be done by examining past disturbances, after-action reviews (AARs), Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigations, command

inquiries, and discussions with transitioning units. Leaders must have a plan in place to react to events. A large-scale detainee disturbance may be one of the most difficult leadership challenges that an officer or senior noncommissioned officer will encounter in his career. Remember the following:

- Stay calm!
- Videotape the disturbance.
- Include leadership presence in the camp.
- Develop a sleep plan.
- Maintain fire discipline.
- Engage detainee leadership.
- Reduce tension in the camp, and restore the camp to normal activity as quickly as possible.
- Hold instigators accountable (detainees and Soldiers).
- Conduct AARs.
- Review tactics, techniques, and procedures (for detainees and Soldiers).

The success of the 306th Military Police Battalion was largely due to the tireless efforts and dedication of its Soldiers. This article is dedicated to them!

**Reference:**

AR 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, 2 October 2006.

**Note:** Due to security concerns, this article was modified before publication in *Military Police*. Individuals with access to Army Knowledge Online may view the article in its entirety in that forum.

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# The Employment of Military Police Formations: The Synchronization of Military Police Assets in BCTs

*By Lieutenant Colonel Chad B. McRee*

General Douglas MacArthur once said, “In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.” This could not be truer today, as the U.S. Army undergoes a significant transformation in doctrine and methodology and a paradigm shift in every capacity throughout the force.


Military police are certainly in high demand, but they continue to be highly misunderstood, incorrectly employed, and misrepresented—specifically within the combat arms formations that employ them. Few will argue that military police can be a maneuver commander’s “Force of Choice,” as they possess skills that focus on missions from defusing incidents to providing lethal response at the right time, on the right target. What makes military police formations so unique are the skills acquired through law enforcement (LE) training and employment at home stations in support of an Army garrison. Unquestionably, the greatest risk to the Military Police Corps is the loss of the LE skill set. Without LE training and experience, we will cease to exist as a Corps and our “scientific” experience will diminish and fall to the wayside. What will be truly lost is the maneuver commander’s flexibility—an asset on the battlefield enabled by experienced military police Soldiers trained in particular skill sets and refined by experience “on the road.”

Simply put, military police Soldiers are being assigned to brigade combat teams (BCTs) with little senior military police oversight to assist with the growth, professional development, and learning of functional-area skill sets. It is absolutely essential that military police maintain their mandated LE skills by balancing professional requirements with the field craft support requirements of maneuver unit commanders. The end state: professional military police support that can execute all five battlefield functions—maneuver and mobility support operations, area security operations, law and order operations, internment and resettlement operations, and police intelligence operations—with the finesse identified by combat commanders.

It is the responsibility of the senior military police commander at every installation to help the maneuver commander get the most from his military police support. This must be accomplished through a deliberate training template that allows military police commanders to provide recommendations and oversight on military police-specific training, provide recommendations for employment, and monitor units for the mishandling of military police assets. Additionally, an LE certification program (red cycle) construct must be implemented that standardizes military police training, includes cyclic LE certification, and uses an LE tour-at-home station to reinforce LE skills and refine processes. LE requirements and the execution of these skills in the technical, scientific field of the red cycle remain perishable skills. A deliberate training template will provide guidance to keep training current—providing maneuver commanders with the best trained, doctrinally current, and professionally refined military police Soldiers available!

The sustainment cycle (green cycle) depicted in the graphic on page 14 places BCT military police Soldiers or platoons in a six-week training event. The green cycle is designed around the five military police functions, but more importantly, to support the maneuver commander in a manner that best uses military police skill sets, training, knowledge, and experience. Upon completion of specified field training, the military police platoon would enter a recovery cycle that includes individual training and maintenance followed by a ten-day to two-week LE event (red cycle). During the red cycle, BCT military police Soldiers receive LE-specific instruction and/or certification and a requisite road duty assignment lasting an average of 7–14 days. At the end of the 14-day LE cycle, the military police platoon or individuals are reintegrated into the BCT to prepare for the next set of field training (mandates) within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) conceptual framework.

The training of military police formations by combat arms units generally does not leverage the full capabilities of military police or the



**Figure 1. Military police platoon sustainment cycle**

employment of capabilities where they can be of the most value to units (a situation not unlike a military police unit training an armor unit on screening operations). Each unit has a particular skill set that is best honed by the expertise within that respective field.

Many units, due to a lack of knowledge, assign low-density military occupational specialty personnel to areas or duties that seem “reasonable”—or at least remotely related to their respective functions. This is true of military police assigned to nonmilitary police units. Oftentimes, it seems a simple decision to assign military police Soldiers to guard tactical operations centers or access points. If senior military police personnel are allowed to provide recommendations, they can ensure that the proper support to a maneuver commander’s overall intent is met. During the green cycle, the maneuver commander may conduct scenario-driven training that focuses on area security or maneuver and mobility support operations. For military police personnel, this training should include—

- Area security.
  - Response force operations.
  - Tactical combat force (TCF).
  - Counterreconnaissance.
  - Command post security.

- Maneuver and mobility support operations.
  - Route reconnaissance and surveillance.
  - Main supply route regulation and enforcement.
  - Straggler and dislocated-civilian control.
  - Area damage control.

During the amber cycle, military police should execute a comprehensive maintenance plan for the military police platoon that includes—

- Weapons.
- Vehicles.
- Communications equipment.

The amber cycle should also include qualification and certification on individual skills, which may include—

- Ranges.
- Driver testing.
- Common training tasks.
- Retests on shortcomings identified in previous training certifications.

As part of a BCT, military police units would also be subject to unit-specific taskings and/or requirements. During the red cycle, military police would be assigned to a senior military police commander to validate LE certification and participate in a utilization tour. The certification and tour would

be limited in order to integrate the concepts into overall BCT long-range training plans to ensure that military police platoons are able to support a maneuver commander's training objectives and still obtain the necessary LE training, certification, and experience on a recurring basis (as outlined within the ARFORGEN training strategy). An example of LE certification and training is displayed to the right.

Critical to the overall success of the BCT military police support template is the synchronization of efforts, training, maintenance, individual skills, LE experience, and commander support. The experience gained from the military police force generation construct (MPFORGEN-C) will ultimately result in a standardized package that has depth, experience, and no limitations on stationing and locations and that provides support to all BCTs, Corps military police brigades, and installation Army garrisons throughout the Army.

*Lieutenant Colonel McRee is the commander of the 759th Military Police Battalion.*

<p><b>Day 1</b></p> <p>Patrol policies and procedures.</p> <p>Use of force and assault command post procedures.</p> <p>Military police reports and forms.</p> <p>Community-Oriented Policing System.</p>	<p><b>Day 3</b></p> <p>Traffic accidents, traffic stops, and vehicle searches.</p> <p>DA form completion.</p> <p>Field sobriety tests.</p> <p>Drunk driver processing.</p> <p>Military police M9 qualification.</p> <p>Driver's training.</p>
<p><b>Day 2</b></p> <p>Domestic-disturbance response.</p> <p>Juvenile offenders.</p> <p>Crime scene processing/ evidence collection and marking.</p> <p>DA form completion.</p> <p>Interviews.</p> <p>Search and seizure, child neglect, and rape.</p>	<p><b>Day 4</b></p> <p>Radar certification.</p> <p>Federal and state wildlife laws.</p> <p>Unarmed self-defense, pressure point, and hand-and-arm signals.</p>
<p><b>Day 5</b></p> <p>Handcuffing.</p> <p>Restraint removal.</p> <p>Apprehension.</p> <p>Subject searches.</p> <p>OC (pepper spray) certification.</p>	
<p><b>On-the-Job Training</b></p> <p>Following completion of LE certification, Soldiers will be integrated into LE operations at home station for 10–21 days to maintain military police proficiency and sustain critical skills.</p>	

**Figure 2. LE certification and training objectives**

## The Military Police Creed

<p>I am a Soldier and proud member of the United States Army Military Police Corps Regiment.</p> <p>I am Of the Troops and For the Troops.</p> <p>I believe there is no higher calling than to ASSIST, PROTECT, and DEFEND my fellow Soldiers, their families, and the basic ideals of our Constitution that guarantee our freedom and our American way of life.</p> <p>I am always ready to help individual Soldiers retain or regain their dignity.</p> <p>I assist commanders in performing their missions, safeguarding their commands, and maintaining discipline, law, and order.</p> <p>I am proud of the Military Police Corps Regiment and fully understand the awesome responsibility given to all military police Soldiers.</p>	<p>At the same time, I am humble because I know that I am a servant of my Country and my Army.</p> <p>To perform my duties properly, my honesty, integrity, and courage must be balanced by competence, alertness, and courtesy.</p> <p>I know I am constantly in the public eye and my behavior sets the standards of excellence of my fellow Soldiers.</p> <p>To my unit, my commander, and myself, I promise sustained, just, and honorable support.</p> <p>To my Country, the Army, and my Regiment, I promise the skills of my training, my physical ability, my mental initiative, and my moral courage, for I am a Soldier in the MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENT.</p>
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# The Role of the Division Provost Marshal in Warrior Police Development

By Lieutenant Colonel Bradley W. Graul

*The days of the division having a military police company are gone, and we must adapt as Warrior Police to maximize our support to the brigade combat teams (BCTs) that now form our Army divisions. We all understand, and more importantly, appreciate the fact that the Military Police Corps is “growing” in personnel; however, this growth could be stifled if we are not careful with our arrogance and how “we” employ military police Soldiers assigned to divisions.*

We must first examine what I believe is a flaw regarding the assignment of military police officers to division provost marshal (PM) or BCT PM positions without requiring prerequisites. The division PM, in a perfect world, should be a former battalion commander or Soldier who is “seasoned” with experience or has held a Department of the Army staff assignment. The BCT PM, in turn, should be a captain who has commanded a company and understands the rudimentary deployment of military police assets. But in reality, we don’t have the luxury of filling these positions with Soldiers possessing these prerequisites or skill identifiers. The system that we have in place, with military police officers filling these assignments (especially at the BCT level), creates an uneven playing field among the other staff officers that make up a BCT (note that most of the other staff members are field grade officers). So how does the BCT PM survive in the fast-paced combat arms environment? He must get support from the technical control (TECHCON) of the division PM chain.

A great case in point centers on the vital role of developing and employing military police across a division front—particularly in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized). I experienced firsthand the criticality of the role to shape the operating environment with military police influence. It starts with organizing your division PM section, an area already resourced with a robust staff, as your senior

subject matter experts (SMEs) on military police battlefield functions and employment. This staff can provide invaluable assistance as you channel more than 250 years of military police experience to shape the operating environment. It starts with proving to senior division leadership—chief of staff, assistant division commander—maneuver (ADC-M), assistant division commander—support (ADC-S), and commanding general (CG)—that his division PM staff is a combat multiplier. You must build that trust among the combat arms community, now absorbed in maneuver and fires and the effects of the operational field. It can be done, but requires nurturing!

Prior to deployment, the military police in BCTs of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) were used continuously for installation law enforcement (LE) functions—our CG demanded it. He wanted the “Ironhorse patch personnel” providing daily LE within the division footprint because he appreciated the value of maintaining one of the five military police battlefield functions. This same approach was used for the remaining battlefield functions—maneuver and mobility support operations, area security operations, internment and resettlement operations, and police intelligence operations—and tangible benefits were reached throughout the division front.

When the BCTs conducted mission rehearsal exercises, we embedded portions of the division staff

*“The division PM, in a perfect world, should be a former battalion commander or Soldier who is “seasoned” with experience or has held a Department of the Army staff assignment. The BCT PM, in turn, should be a captain who has commanded a company and understands the rudimentary deployment of military police assets.”*

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as SMEs. This practice reinforced the value-added benefit that the division PM and his staff brought to the operation. Another important means of support is conducting periodic synchronization meetings with the BCT PMs at the division level. The primary purpose of the meetings is to reinforce the capabilities that military police bring to the fight and to see how each of the BCT PMs are establishing themselves as a commodity versus staff “flunkies.” These meetings provide enormous dividends and, in turn, give the BCT PMs a voice at the division level since the division PM has the ear of the chief of staff and, more importantly, the CG when asked to provide situation reports. Once again, the whole piece of trust and how it goes through the maturation process among other staff officers is what sets you apart.

The BCT PM (and how he is coached and mentored by the division PM) drives the cycle that feeds the necessary energy and confidence required to properly advise the BCT commander. BCT commanders are very hesitant to let assets out of the BCT sphere of influence and may push back “outsiders” from the division when weighing how military police should be employed. As a division PM, I had BCT commanders asking me directly about how they could better employ their military police assets (the fact that some commanders only had a platoon speaks volumes for the weight of the division PM position).

In the War on Terrorism, our military police focus mainly on LE and internment and resettlement operations. It is very important for leadership to foster and promote the division PM and BCT PM roles throughout our Army during this campaign. Fostering an apparatus that searches for officers and noncommissioned officers with experience in BCTs or divisions will be invaluable as we continue our efforts in Iraq with police transition teams (PTTs) and detention operations. The long-term campaign for Iraqi police (IP) development will solicit the experience inherently embedded in seasoned military police leaders at all levels (from Corps PM down to BCT, company, and platoon levels). The issue impacting the campaign plan is the nonsynergy that military police leaders have at all levels. As we continue to rotate senior military police leaders deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), careful consideration should be exercised when redesigning how the IP should be trained and how this training will deviate from the current plan for development. Staying the course with the campaign plan for police development will require current and

future leaders to commit to full ownership of plan execution versus presenting branch or sequel plans that foster IP development in a different direction. Goal posts for each year should be addressed in detail within the campaign plan, and buy-in with IP senior leaders should be accomplished so that we can collectively execute each goal post and continue to improve the readiness of not only the IP but also the National Police and the Iraqi Army. Numerous coordination meetings at the division level chaired by the ADC-M proved invaluable as we continued our endeavors of pushing the effectiveness of the PTTs, military transition teams, and National Police transition teams working with their Iraqi counterparts. The division PM played a critical role—as did each brigade, battalion, company, and BCT military police leader—to work the lines of operations to improve the training readiness assessment (TRA) levels to a point where the Iraqis can operate without assistance from coalition forces. Monthly TRA briefings with the CG were conducted at the division level, with the staff lead of the division PM working closely with BCT military police operating within the division’s battlespace.

In summary, our military police community can achieve much more as we support OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), using all of the military police leader assets to work whatever problems we have within the theater to support our warfighting brethren. Putting aside the traditional command relationships within the division operational environment may be a requirement to achieve the ultimate end state to a successful execution of the campaign plan for police development in Iraq and Afghanistan. This same approach could be tied to our support in detention operations. The Corps PM, military police brigade commanders, division PMs, battalion commanders, and BCT PMs are the key players working jointly to have complete ownership of how we execute and support division commanders. One approach used during OIF 05-07 involved the Corps PM chairing a monthly PM senior steering committee that included some of the key players mentioned above. This monthly meeting was invaluable and directly impacted the overall success of IP development. Practices such as these are great tactics, techniques, and procedures for all leaders to use so that we can achieve our desired end state in the OIF and/or OEF theaters of operations.

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*Lieutenant Colonel Graul is the commander of the 519th Military Police Battalion.*

# Success of the Combined Forces Model in Tal' Afar, Iraq

*By Second Lieutenant Michelle A. Weinbaum*

Several years ago, Marines from the 1st Marine Division announced the revival of a successful program from the Vietnam War—the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) Program.<sup>1</sup> The United States began the CAP Program in 1965 by placing a squad of Marines in select villages throughout South Vietnam to train the village militias to defend their own areas. Although not a major component of the strategic plan during Vietnam, the CAP Program was extremely successful. When I first learned about the CAP Program in a classroom environment, I was persuaded by arguments that touted a strong emphasis on counterinsurgency tactics and less emphasis on search-and-destroy missions (as the method believed to result in the most improved outcome). A year later, as a military police platoon leader, I had the opportunity to draw firsthand conclusions on the application of combined forces.

The police transition team (PTT) does not fit the exact model of the combat action platoon, but it approximates its strengths and weaknesses. The PTT model pairs military police squads with several Iraqi police stations to conduct or supervise training, conduct joint patrols and missions, and supervise the administration and logistics for the stations. The strengths of the PTT model are that close relationships are built with the civilian police and information is gained from the communities. We are able to influence larger areas with fewer forces and train a force capable of defending itself. But, less kinetic operations do not seem to be inhibiting our progress in the area. Perhaps this is a way in which our PTT differs from the CAP Programs of the Vietnam era—our Iraqi police counterparts capture and detain anti-Iraqi forces on a regular basis.

I am not in a position to evaluate the impact of our combined program at an operational or strategic level, but I can offer a handful of experience from my squad leaders that suggests the same success seen in the CAP Program. All of my squad leaders have gathered useful information from contacts they met during day-to-day work at the stations—all have gathered names and addresses of enemies in their areas of operations. While the main goal of the CAP Program is to use positions in the community to gather information, the PTT goal encompasses a more permanent solution.

At a meeting with all station chiefs in the area for which my platoon is responsible, I discussed the importance of training a strong second in command. The chiefs lamented that their executive officers (XOs) are incapable of running the stations without them. I instructed them to use a simple but specific process for training their XOs:

- Allow the second in command to shadow the chief.
- Exchange rank with the second in command, and force him to make decisions for a week at a time while you stand by to offer feedback.
- Leave the XO entirely on his own for periods of time.

I explained to the chiefs that they will not always be available—they must train their XOs to make the decisions that they would normally make!

In western Nineveh, many of our Iraqi police stations are well into the second stage of operations. They are conducting training and leading patrols and missions while we stand by to offer guidance when requested, suggestions when needed, or to simply say, “Zayn” (meaning “well done”). When a vehicle-borne, improvised explosive device (VBIED) is discovered in Tal' Afar, the Iraqi police respond to the incident, establish a cordon, and call for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). We assist with the treatment of casualties if necessary. On a recent dismounted patrol, we stopped in the evening at a local sheikh's house for tea. While the police chief, my squad leader, and I met with the sheikh, the Iraqi police secured the surrounding area. Our Soldiers stood by in their vehicles to respond if needed.

Iraqi police leadership is showing a strong entry into the third stage of operations—conducting training and missions on their own and making decisions in the absence of U.S. Forces. My platoon picked up a specific PTT mission when we first arrived in Tal' Afar—escorting 150 untrained Iraqi police. The concentration of personnel, equipment, and raw currency makes these convoys high payoff targets for the enemy. The turning point in this mission occurred when I arranged a linkup time in Mosul with the Iraqi police logistics officer for the last payroll trip. The impatient Iraqi police departed on the return trip without us. Following several similar missions, our commander convinced the Iraqi

police to conduct these convoys without our support. On the way back from Mosul, we reached Tal' Afar just in time to react to the detonation of a VBIED and a suicide vest attack at two checkpoints. When we arrived on the scene of the VBIED, an Iraqi police chief from my district had already taken charge of the situation. He had secured the perimeter with gun trucks, set up a casualty collection point, arranged for treatment and transport to the hospital, made contact with EOD on the forward operating base for a postblast assessment, cordoned off the immediate area, and directed investigators to take pictures and collect evidence at the scene. The successful reaction of the Iraqi police to this event is the result of years of combined training by the PTT model. However, this example demonstrates the most compelling strength that the CAP Program and PTT have over search-and-destroy and kinetic tactics—an exit strategy.

The success of PTT in western Nineveh is the result of a counterinsurgency strategy aimed at

equipping and training a foreign force. The Military Police Corps is best suited to this tactic because of the expertise we have in aspects of defending a community, such as police station operations, force protection, patrol distribution, investigations, and community policing. If the success of my squad leaders represents our counterinsurgency fight, the military police will continue to be the Force of Choice and the combined forces' models of CAP Programs and PTTs will continue to be our most effective tactic for restoring order in nations suffering from the threats of unlawful combatants.

**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>Mark Mazetti, "Good Marines Make Good Neighbors: Why a Vietnam Counterinsurgency Program is Being Tried Again in Iraq," 25 February 2004, <<http://www.slate.com/id/2096027/>>, accessed on 29 January 2008.

*Second Lieutenant Weinbaum is a platoon leader for the 116th Military Police Company, Forward Operating Base Sykes, Iraq.*

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## Letters to the Editor

*Military Police* welcomes letters from readers. If you have a comment concerning an article we have published or would like to express your point of view on another subject of interest to military police Soldiers, let us hear from you. Your letter must include your complete address and a telephone number. All letters are subject to editing for reasons of space or clarity.

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# MILITARY POLICE Online

Articles from recent issues of *Military Police* are now available for download online at <<http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/default.htm>>.

If you are interested in a particular article listed but not linked, send your request to <[leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil](mailto:leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil)>. Type "Request an Article" in the subject line, and list the article title(s) requested in the body of the message. If you do not have a military or government e-mail address, please indicate why you are requesting the article.

# The AN/PSS-14 Mine Detector Requires a License: *Mine Detection Moves into the Future*



Soldiers being graded on sweeping techniques while attending the UMT course

*By Mr. David Holbrook*

The AN/PSS-14 Mine Detection System is more advanced than any detector used to accomplish mine detection. But the AN/PSS-14 is only one part of this remarkable system; the other and more essential part is the operator. The complexity of the system requires operators to be licensed to ensure safe and effective operation. For that reason and for the safety of personnel involved in route and area clearance operations, commanders must emphasize that each operator be properly licensed before using the system in a real-world situation. Licensing on the AN/PSS-14 will ensure that the operator is properly trained and that the equipment is adequately sustained to perform as designed.

## **Basic Operational Theory**

The AN/PSS-14 mine detector applies two technologies: metal detection (MD) and ground-penetrating radar (GPR). The AN/PSS-14 employs aided target recognition algorithms that alert the operator to the presence of targets of interest. A trained operator learns to mute the MD or the GPR to identify an object buried in the ground, pinpoint its location, determine if it is a mine, and investigate it using the GPR. The GPR can be used to distinguish mines from battlefield clutter and other metal debris.

## **Fielding**

The first step in fielding the AN/PSS-14 is educating units on the system requirements. The program manager (PM) for countermines and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) sends a team to the unit location to conduct a new material introductory briefing. During the briefing, the PM representative explains the system's capabilities, sustainment requirements, licensing requirements, and training

devices. The number one goal of the briefing is to ensure that commanders schedule time to conduct new equipment training (NET) and unit master training (UMT). (UMT is conducted by master trainers from the U.S. Army Engineer School [USAES].) Both courses are 40 hours long and are conducted at the units' home stations or at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, whichever is more convenient for the unit. After the training is scheduled, the NET team travels to the training location, sets up the training site, begins training, and issues equipment (following successful NET completion). The operators that attend the training are considered operator-certified.

## **Training**

The PM provides proper training on every unit authorized the AN/PSS-14. This means that before a unit is fielded its authorized quantity of mine detectors, it must have an equal or greater number of licensed operators.

Every unit must send operators to NET before the AN/PSS-14 is fielded. Only **sergeants (E5s) or above** may attend the training. Selected attendees will then be qualified to take additional training and become unit master trainers.

UMT is conducted to provide a sustainment capability to each unit issued the AN/PSS-14. Units are encouraged to send as many attendees (E5 and above) as possible to this training.<sup>1</sup> These individuals develop unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and conduct new operator and refresher training when the fielding process is complete. Additionally, instructors are required to be operator-certified before participating in UMT. With this requirement in mind, units must capitalize on sending personnel to NET so that they are eligible for UMT later.

## Licensing

The leadership at USAES feels that equipment designed to detect explosives, mines, or other hazards must have a licensing requirement associated with it. The proper use of these types of equipment will prevent injuries and the loss of lives. The licensing requirement ensures the proficiency of personnel using the equipment. Army Regulation 600-55 (Chapter 7) states that all military personnel and Department of the Army (DA) civilians must have a completed Optional Form 346 and be able to demonstrate their proficiency before operating miscellaneous equipment determined by local commanders or higher authorities to warrant licensing (such as powered lawn mowers; agricultural machinery; food preparation equipment; field ranges; immersion heaters; laundry equipment; snowmobiles; and detecting sets, mine-portable, AN/PRS-7 and AN/PSS-11).

The USAES has recommended the following changes to AR 600-55 to clarify the licensing



Soldier using an AN/PSS-14

requirement for the AN/PSS-14: All military personnel and DA civilians must have a certified DA Form 5984-E and demonstrate their proficiency to operate mine-detecting or other explosive-detecting equipment, to include all portable, hand-held, and truck-mounted models (including, but not limited to, AN/PSS-12 and AN/PSS-14). The first draft of revised AR 600-55 is currently under review. The final version is scheduled for completion in early 2008.

## Summary

It is imperative that commanders become familiar with the capabilities of the AN/PSS-14. This system is essential to safe route clearance operations. The USAES has provided all the tools required to establish a successful training and licensing program, to include providing units with a draft SOP for adoption and immediate implementation. The PM has an aggressive fielding schedule for the AN/PSS-14. If NET and UMT are not on your unit training calendars, please contact the following personnel:

### NET

Mr. Rob Sellmer  
AN/PSS-14 Field Manager  
(703) 704-3397 or DSN 654-3397  
E-mail <[robert.sellmerii@us.army.mil](mailto:robert.sellmerii@us.army.mil)>

### UMT

Mr. John Sullivan  
Site Manager  
573-563-7646 or (cell) 573-528-9081  
E-mail <[john.b.sullivan@us.army.mil](mailto:john.b.sullivan@us.army.mil)>

### **Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>Because of the licensing requirement for this system, all personnel in the UMT course must be E5 or above. **Specialists are not authorized UMT.**

### **References:**

AR 600-55, *The Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program (Selection, Training, Testing, and Licensing)*, 18 June 2007.

DA Form 5984-E, *Operator's Permit Record*, 1 March 1991.

OF 346, *U.S. Government Motor Vehicle Operator's Identification Card*, November 1985.

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*Mr. Holbrook is a retired engineer lieutenant colonel and a former battalion commander. He currently works as a senior analyst for BRTRC Technology Research Corporation, Fort Leonard Wood office.*



The salute battery adds some firepower from their 105-millimeter guns.

# Salute Battery Serves USAREUR Communities

*By Mr. Dave Melancon*

The 105-millimeter, towed Howitzers from the 529th Military Police Company saw their last battles during World War II. However, the three guns in the company's salute battery have not stopped firing. "They do not fire projectiles any more, but they do fire out a boom," said Second Lieutenant Meagan Vosburg, the company historian and leader of 1st Platoon. "We are the only MP unit in the Army with 105-millimeter pack Howitzers."

Although the 529th performs several key missions, the duties of the salute battery are the more publicly visible operations performed by the company. Military police Soldiers patrol the community around Heidelberg, provide protection to some of the top leadership in the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), manage military working dog teams, and train for combat. The 529th—part of the 95th Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade, 21st Theater Sustainment Command—is the largest military police company and ". . . the most diverse MP company in the Army," according to Captain Whitney Jensen, commander of the 529th.

The 529th was activated in June 1945 in New Delhi, India, and relocated to Giessen, Germany, in 1946. In 1951, the company relocated to its current location at Patton Barracks in Heidelberg, where it

assumed the honor guard mission (which includes operations performed by the salute battery, color guard, and rifle-firing team) for USAREUR. Soldiers serving in the color guards have to meet height requirements; however, any Soldier in the 529th (except those serving on security details) can serve on the honor guard or salute battery. Each platoon has its turn in the honor guard, and clerks and supply personnel can also participate. "Historically, there was just one platoon dedicated to honor guard missions, but that's evolved over the years," Captain Jensen said. "With the Global War on Terrorism [sic], we have also been asked to deploy platoons to Operation Iraqi Freedom and to Afghanistan." Captain Jensen estimates that the company participates in at least one ceremony a month, with the spring and summer months being busier due to high-level changes of command.

In addition to changes of command, the salute battery and color guard participate in observances and celebrations for Independence and Memorial Days. The unit has also traveled to Lourdes, France, and Luxembourg to commemorate D-day activities. For Specialist Justin Haney, Headquarters Platoon, service in the battery includes travel and opportunities to support the community and show off

the company's skills during high-visibility events. "It's all about precision and practice," he said. "It's all about firing the cannon at the right moment."

There are no artillerymen in the company. The military police rely on one another to learn about maintaining and firing the guns, preparing the blank ammunition, and executing the drill movements. "It's fun. We get to go to a lot of different places—get seen by a lot of rank," Specialist Haney said.

Specialist Haney and his fellow Soldiers serving in the 529th are part of a long tradition. "We were the sharpest military police company in USAREUR," said Max E. Rockafellow, a sergeant who served in the honor guard from 1960 through 1962. "It was a privilege and a great life-forming experience." Similar to the current mission, the Soldiers of the 529th honor guard in the early 1960s were responsible for providing security to USAREUR leaders in the garrison and the field—the culminating event to the long hours of preparation and training. The

Soldiers even used tricks that included putting glue on leather items to ensure that they would keep their shine and helping one another dress to avoid wrinkled uniforms. "We walked out to the inspection before the honor guard ceremony like penguins, stiff legs and arms," Mr. Rockafellow continued. "The hours of marching practice for honor guard formations, to make them perfect, paid off when we marched onto the field."

The salute battery still uses the same three guns that it did in the early 1960s. These days, the battery recognizes each of the 50 states during a salute-to-the-nation ceremony held every Fourth of July. Mr. Rockafellow said he was part of this same formation in 1960 that honored the new 50-star flag of the United States. "It was a great honor to serve in the 529th Military Police Company," he said.

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*Mr. Melancon is a reporter for the Herald-Post, U.S. Army Garrison, Heidelberg.*

## **Celebrating the Military Police Corps' 66th Anniversary in Afghanistan**

By Major Yvette Kanney

The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan, Detention Capabilities Directorate (DCD), along with other fellow military police Soldiers, celebrated the 66th Military Police Anniversary on 26 September 2007 in Kabul, Afghanistan. Colonel Anthony D. Zabek, Director of DCD, hosted more than 45 personnel and guests at Camp Eggers to celebrate the occasion.

DCD is responsible for renovating the Afghan National Detention Facility; training and equipping the Afghan National Guard Force (ANGF); and developing the unit into a self-reliant, self-sustaining force capable of conducting independent confinement operations. The ANGF mission is to provide secure detention of Afghan enemy combatants transferred from the custody of U.S. Forces at Bagram Theater Internment Facility and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Distinguished guests attending the ceremony included the commander of the Combined Security Training Command–Afghanistan, Major General Robert W. Cone, and the Commander of the Afghan National Detention Facility, Brigadier General Haji Safiullah.

Major General Cone thanked the military policemen for their excellent service and dedication to duty throughout the years. He also stressed the importance of the military police mission in Afghanistan and, particularly, the strategic visibility of detainee operations missions. Major General Cone concluded his remarks by saying, "If I had it my way, there would be an MP brigade in Afghanistan."

Although there were no receiving lines, no disc jockey, no color guard, no memento wine glasses, and no cost for dinner, military police Soldiers in Kabul enjoyed themselves and paid tribute to the Warrior Police force—a force keeping the Army Strong!

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*Major Kanney is an Active Army officer assigned to CSTC-Afghanistan, DCD. Prior to deployment, Major Kanney served as the provost marshal at Fort Lee, Virginia.*

# *The 519th Military Police Battalion Continues to Strike Hard!*

*By Captain Rob Rodock*

U.S. Army Military Police have a long legacy and proud tradition as the Army's Force of Choice. The 519th Military Police Battalion "Vipers" embody that heritage as our Nation's Warrior Police. Despite a long history that spans more than six decades and support to all of the country's combat operations, the 519th does not rest on its laurels. Instead, today, the Vipers continue to stand ready to assist, protect, and defend our Army and our Nation through innovative training that incorporates our Corps' most lethal fighting systems, legacy programs that sustain and improve law enforcement expertise and proud traditions.

The War on Terrorism has taxed Viper Soldiers—more than 900 Soldiers have provided necessary military police experience in the Military District of Washington, Cuba, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (with many Soldiers conducting multiple deployments). Before, during, and after each tour, Viper Soldiers serve with distinction and keep with the

finest traditions of the Military Police Corps. Today, in a rare time in the recent history of the 519th, four of its five companies are home conducting training to prepare for future deployments while one of its companies—the 209th Military Police Company—expands the battalion's heritage in the blistering sands of Iraq. To support the ongoing—and oftentimes relentless—training program devised by the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Bradley W. Graul (with the support of his company commanders), the Vipers capitalized on the unique training opportunities presented at the premier training site for the U.S. Army—the Joint Readiness Training Center.


The multiple rotations of brigade combat teams through the rigors presented at opposing forces training (Geronimo) allow Vipers to hone their warfighting skills and provide consistent support to maneuver brethren preparing to fight the War on Terrorism. Most recently, the battalion shared its experience and keen understanding of the police transition team



**Soldiers conduct a lane-training exercise before deployment.**

mission with the Soldiers of the 194th Military Police Company. Recently, Viper Soldiers served as observers/controllers for military police from Fort Campbell, providing them with the “tools to succeed” that served the battalion so well during its deployment to volatile east Baghdad. However, the Vipers do not train to fight the last war; instead, leaders have developed and are conducting pioneering training programs to ensure the success of the battalion in future combat operations.

In August 2007, the 519th Military Police Battalion was selected to receive M1117 Armored Security Vehicles (ASVs). The ASVs provide improved protection and firepower and present the intimidation factor necessary to complete military police security missions. The vehicle, although not new to the Vipers, is novel to many newly arrived battalion Soldiers. In keeping with the Viper standard of excellence, the battalion massed its efforts to thoroughly train, comprehensively evaluate, and formally certify crews on the ASV. Gunnery exercises served as the culminating event to the training, although the concepts and training requirements to conduct gunnery exercises were new to Viper leaders. However, three factors—teamwork, dedication, and Viper pride—enabled battalion Soldiers to build the necessary unit and crew bonds (an absolutely essential building block for future training). Additionally, the battalion instituted a driver training program to ensure the safety, use, and maintenance of the ASV.



**Soldiers train on the ASV.**

In conjunction with sharpening its warfighting abilities, the Vipers consistently polished law enforcement skills to complete the watchwords “Warrior Police.” The Viper battalion continues to provide critical law enforcement mission support to the Directorate of Emergency Services (DES). Daily leader and Soldier commitments in support of road patrols and the sections that fall within DES ensure a safe living and working environment for the Soldiers, Family Members, and civilians who work and reside at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The infusion of military police Soldiers has created a balanced team that provides quality law enforcement operations. Although the cornerstone mission of the battalion law-and-order detachment remains law enforcement, the detachment continues to conduct Soldier readiness training in preparation for future deployments. The K9 section has shown its strength through aggressive live-fire training, combat detection operations, and medical evaluation (for Soldier and K9 care). The Vipers have internalized the moniker “Warrior Police” in aggressive preparation for combat and dedicated adherence to policing functions, understanding that both are essential to maintaining the traditions of the military police.

A wise man once said, “You can’t figure out where you’re going unless you know where you’ve been.” Elemental to Viper progress is understanding, remembering, and honoring the traditions and values of the Military Police Corps. Under Command Sergeant Major John Williamson’s guidance and direction, the 519th strives to preserve the military police and Army way of life. Command Sergeant Major Williamson understands that, regardless of the best training in the world, a Soldier needs to realize and internalize the importance of leadership and military police values to be trusted to make life and death decisions every day. To build great military police Soldiers, the Vipers take time to focus on the traditions that demonstrate and make tangible the importance of being a military police Soldier. On 18 September 2007, Command Sergeant Major Williamson hosted a ceremony that highlighted an example of merging history with operations of today. With Regimental Command Sergeant Major Jeffrey Butler as the guest of honor, the Vipers welcomed more than 30 Soldiers, from junior enlisted to noncommissioned officer (NCO) ranks, to an induction ceremony marked with the traditional “crossing the line”—a symbolic step that bears the responsibility and professionalism required of all NCOs. At the ceremony, Command Sergeant Major Butler commented on the importance of and the strength gained from actively remembering the history and traditions of the Corps to yield better Soldiers in the future.

On 26 September 2007, the Viper battalion dedicated time to honoring past and present military police on the Regiment's birthday. Following a moment of silence during a retreat ceremony for the Vipers who lost their lives in support of the War on Terrorism, Lieutenant Colonel Graul remarked on the historical significance of Military Police and the dramatic push for increased forces. Specifically, Lieutenant Colonel Graul emphasized how the sacrifices of our fallen Soldiers should inspire and strengthen the resolve of today's Soldiers as we move into the seventh year of the War on Terrorism. The military police Soldier in the Viper battalion is a strong professional who understands the long legacy of the Military Police Corps and stands ready to fight our Nation's battles today and tomorrow.

The hallmark watchwords of the Viper battalion are present in the vision statement of the Military Police Corps Regiment:

*The Military Police Corps provides values-based Soldiers and units that are highly trained, versatile, and multifunctional. These Soldiers and units will provide the Army with flexible firepower, innovative leadership, and critical situational understanding.*


The leaders of the 519th Military Police Battalion strive every day to live this vision. The progressive training, dedication to law enforcement and its intricacies, and reverence for military police history and traditions build an outstanding Viper team. Additionally, the Vipers focus on building complete family teams within its ranks. In this present time of multiple deployments, the strength of family is paramount to the success of the Soldier. Recently, the Viper battalion welcomed a family readiness support adviser. Her recommendations, coupled with Lieutenant Colonel Graul's guidance, have flourished to build outstanding family programs and support within the battalion. To date, the Vipers have hosted a "Shadow Day" in which families were able to spend a day with their Viper Soldier and learn the basics of being a member of the Viper battalion. The event culminated with a barbeque and numerous smiles. In keeping with the initiative to build Viper family teams, the battalion hosted an "Order of the Crossed Pistols" event in which Viper spouses competed to earn a crossed-pistols brooch or key chain by demonstrating knowledge of Viper skills and completing practical exercises. The unique family-oriented event allowed Soldiers to include their spouses in a uniquely military

police, hands-on experience, thus strengthening the Viper concept of team.

Our current chief of the Military Police Corps Regiment, Brigadier General David Quantock, has focused his vision for the Military Police Corps on eight "big rocks." The Vipers of the 519th Military Police Battalion carry all of those rocks in their rucksacks. The battalion has strived to build a multifunctional, progressive Viper team that is fully capable of bringing the fight to the enemy. Through aggressive training, the maintenance of our unique military police law enforcement functions, the understanding that history and tradition are building blocks for future success, and the construction of strong family teams, the Vipers continue to be the Force of Choice for the Military Police Corps.

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*Captain Rodock is the commander of the 204th Military Police Company.*



**Soldiers conduct strategic response training to hone their policing skills.**

# TRADOC Command Provost Marshal Directorate Sponsors Second Annual Military Working Dog Warrior Police Challenge

*By Sergeant First Class Theodore G. McCall, III*

Congratulations to the Soldiers and the military working dogs (MWDs) who competed in the second annual U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) MWD Competition, 15–19 October 2007. The event was sponsored by the Command Provost Marshal Directorate, Military Police Regimental Association, and hosted by the 217th Military Police Detachment, Fort Lee, Virginia.

The goal of the competition was to bring together the best dog teams the military police and our civilian counterparts had to offer, with the intention of sharing knowledge and techniques to improve MWD team skills and abilities. This enables MWD teams to be even more prepared for missions in support of the War on Terrorism (WOT) and security missions for visiting dignitaries.

MWD teams attending the competition represented TRADOC, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Military District of Washington, U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Marine Corps. Civilian competitors included the Colonial Heights Police Department from Colonial Heights, Virginia. Thirty-three working dog teams competed in—

- Narcotics detection.
- Explosive detection.
- Building searches.
- Area searches.
- Tactical obedience.
- Handler protection.
- Iron dog decathlon events.

Additionally, this year the competition included a specialized search dog (SSD) program, with teams competing in explosive-detection operations. Teams also competed for the titles of Top Specialized Search Dog, Top Kennel, and Top Dog.

MWD teams are currently deployed all over the world in support of the WOT. They are continually called upon to support federal agencies, providing protection for U.S. leaders and visiting dignitaries, and to provide security for events such as the Olympic Games and Super Bowl. At their home stations, MWD teams spend most of their time patrolling, guarding installations, training to maintain proficiency, and remaining on call to respond at a moment's notice. Sergeant Major Christopher Pickett,

TRADOC, said, "I never realized how much dog handlers are combat multipliers until I was assigned to this position. I want to do all we can to make commanders aware of the capabilities of the MWD team."

Sergeant First Class Jason Bird and his dog from the 217th Military Police Detachment, Fort Lee, Virginia, were named the Top Dog team. The team placed first in the narcotic detection event and, along with Specialist Matthew Hoffman, was awarded the Top Kennel award. Specialist Hoffman and his dog also earned a third-place award in the building and area search events. "It's amazing, really," said Sergeant Bird. "I was speechless when they called my name. It's a great honor, and we'll keep training and improving. Having been [sic] through a competition helps because we can see other competitors' levels of expertise. It's been a good get-together with the canine community." Staff Sergeant Jonathan Parsons and his MWD from Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, earned the Top Specialized Search Dog award. He said it is important for dog handlers to treat every event as a serious challenge. "You've got to spend as much time with your dog as possible. The more you put into training, the more you'll get out of it. And the longer you spend with your dog, the better a team you will be."

TRADOC Provost Marshal, Colonel Keith Blowe, said going beyond what the dog teams normally train is what ultimately puts them at the top of their field. "We pattern this competition on what these teams will be asked to do, whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, or on any installation. If anything, we make it more difficult to be sure the dogs are, in fact, doing their jobs and are tested to their fullest capabilities." Colonel Blowe went on to say, "This competition is all about sharing. When you bring everyone together like this, you see that exchange of information."

#### References:

Mike Strasser, "Lee Team Awarded Top Kennel," *Fort Lee Traveller*, 5 November 2007.

Jorge Gomez and Mike Strasser, "MP Teams Contend for Top Dog Award," *Army News Service*, 23 October 2007.

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*Sergeant First Class McCall is the TRADOC MWD Program Manager.*

# U.S. Army Materiel Command Security Forces

*By First Sergeant Lee Branham (Retired)*

When you think about the Army, the U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) may not be what first comes to mind. However, AMC is one of the three Army Commands (ACOMs). (The U.S. Army Forces Command [FORSCOM] and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC] are the other two.) AMC is the logistics and supply management backbone of the Army. If a Soldier shoots it, drives it, flies it, wears it, communicates with it, or eats it—AMC provides it. With headquarters located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, AMC operations span over 140 locations worldwide, including 45 states and 38 countries. AMC is directly responsible for 31 Army installations. The organization is manned by a workforce that consists of dedicated military, civilian, and contract employees—many with highly developed specialties in weapon research and development, supply management, engineering and sciences, and logistics management. AMC installations and facilities provide for the research and development of weapon systems and other equipment for the Army at arsenals; the production, distribution, and storage of ammunition and explosives at ammunition plants and depots; the storage and demilitarization of chemical stockpile items at chemical depots and activities; and with the support of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the ship-bound distribution of materiel worldwide through military ocean terminal operations.

AMC has no military police units assigned to the command; so the mission to assist, protect, and defend assets and facilities is performed by Department of the Army (DA) civilian police officers and security guards and contract security guards. AMC security forces are comprised of 15 percent DA civilian police, 61 percent DA security guards, and 33 percent contract security guards. Law enforcement operations and physical security requirements address the full spectrum of mission requirements, including access control; the conduct of criminal investigations; foot, vehicular, and boat patrols; and special-reaction team operations. All personnel must comply with new Army training, physical agility, weapon qualification, and antiterrorism exercises and planning requirements.

AMC also provides program management for two military working dog kennels—one at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and another at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. These facilities are managed and staffed by DA civilian police under installation management command garrisons. The Military Working Dog Program teams have supported Department of State, U.S. Secret Service, and local missions for the garrison and AMC.

AMC security forces play a critical role in the War on Terrorism. They provide protection for some of the most critical Army assets, and they defend AMC facilities against unwanted intrusions. AMC forces help ensure that weapons, equipment, and ammunition are available and ready for deployment to warfighters throughout the world. They protect facilities that perform research and development for future Soldiers and provide protection of the Army's pre-positioned stocks.

#### **References:**

- House Resolution 4986, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008," 28 January 2008.
- Title 10 United States Code, "Armed Forces," 2 January 2006.

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*First Sergeant Branham (Retired) is a security specialist with AMC and helps manage the Law Enforcement and Security Guard Program.*

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# Fort Leonard Wood Trains on Emergency Response Operations

*By Ms. Allison Choike*

Coordination among response elements is a key factor when it comes to emergency response services at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Emergency responders put their coordination skills to the ultimate test during a chemical accident/incident response and assistance exercise on 29 August 2007.

During the exercise (conducted at the former post exchange complex), emergency responders reacted to a simulated hostage and toxic chemical-agent incident. “The exercise involved Soldiers releasing mock chemical agent to a terrorist organization . . . [The agent was] later used on the installation (along with firearms) to take hostages in a public area,” said Master Sergeant Jason Mosher, the observer/controller noncommissioned officer in charge. “Law enforcement [personnel] took control, eliminating the immediate threat and securing the area so that the fire department could decontaminate all those affected. Chemical Defense Training Facility staff then recovered and accounted for the chemical agents that were removed, and medical staff treated simulated casualties . . . .”

Soldiers spent months planning and hours preparing for the most important part of the exercise—a realistic scenario. “Realism on the part of all responders in an exercise of this type is very important. Exercises of this nature allow responding organizations to practice working together and pool their abilities to overcome situations they are not equipped to handle on their own,” said Mr. David Schodlatz, a chemical surety specialist. Even the role players—initial-entry Soldiers with little experience in these types of situations—made the exercise more realistic and worthwhile. “I picked the Soldiers for two reasons: First, I needed people that would react like any civilian and not a regimented response to an emergency. Second, their [the initial-entry Soldiers’] availability. We don’t [sic] want to be training distracters, but there are a number of Soldiers not involved in training on any given day,” said Master Sergeant Mosher.


The exercise, which lasted a few hours, was less challenging than the planning that went into it. “The hardest part for me was keeping it secret while I was trying to coordinate all of the agencies to participate. In order to have an actual response (instead of a rehearsed one), surprise is necessary,” said Master Sergeant Mosher. But at the end of the day, the time spent on the exercise was rewarding. “The key players stated in the after-action report that they felt the event was the most realistic one that they had participated in . . . .” said Master Sergeant Mosher.

The objective of the exercise, according to Mr. Schodlatz, was to challenge the Directorate of Emergency Services Recapture and Recovery Plan by identifying strengths and weaknesses. “It is only through the challenges of an exercise of this type (where all of the support pieces are present) that everyone in the program can learn from each other and . . . make sure the proper systems are in place.”

Of course, no exercise (regardless of the realistic circumstances) can compare to a real scenario. “Everyone thought the timeline was very close to an actual one,” said Master Sergeant Mosher. “Once a real situation develops, it can roll like an out-of-control freight train.”

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*Ms. Choike is a staff writer for the Fort Leonard Wood Guidon.*



# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center Directorate of Training Doctrine Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
<b>Current Publications</b>			
FM 3-19.1	Military Police Operations	22 Mar 01 C1 31 Jan 02	A keystone manual that is the foundation for all military police doctrine. This manual communicates (to all levels of leadership and staff) how the military police provide a flexible and scalable force capable of full-spectrum operations. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 08.
FM 3-19.4	Military Police Leaders Handbook	4 Mar 02 C1 17 Dec 07	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement (I/R), law-and-order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 08.
FM 3-19.6	Armored Security Vehicle	24 May 06	A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 19-10	Military Police Law and Order Operations	30 Sep 87	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law-and-order mission, including law enforcement, investigation, U.S. military prisoner confinement, and counterterrorism operations. <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 08.
FM 3-19.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	13 May 05	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.12	Protective Services	11 Aug 04	A manual that addresses tactics, techniques, and procedures for special agents of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command and military police assigned to protective services duties. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.13	Law Enforcement Investigations	10 Jan 05	A manual that serves as a guide for military police, investigators, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command special agents operating in tactical and garrison environments. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.15	Civil Disturbance Operations	18 Apr 05	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.17	Military Working Dogs	6 Jul 05 C1 22 Sep 05	A manual that addresses the current capabilities of the Military Police Working Dog Program and the potential for future capabilities. <b>Status:</b> Current; planned revision FY 08.
FM 19-25	Military Police Traffic Operations	30 Sep 77	A manual that addresses traffic operations in garrison and combat environments. <b>Status:</b> Current.

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center Directorate of Training Doctrine Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
<b>Current Publications (continued)</b>			
FM 3-19.30	Physical Security	8 Jan 01	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. This manual is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be a one-stop physical security source. <b>Status:</b> Current; planned revision FY 08.
FM 3-19.40	Internment/Resettlement Operations	4 Sep 07 C1 17 Dec 07	A manual that addresses I/R operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. It serves as the key integrating manual for I/R operations and depicts the doctrinal foundation, principles, and processes that military police will employ when dealing with I/R populations (detainees, U.S. military prisoners, and dislocated civilians). <b>Status:</b> Under revision FY 08.
FM 3-19.50	Police Intelligence Operations	21 Jul 06	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, homeland defense, and protection of the force by integrating police engagement, police information, and police investigations to support law-and-order operations and the intelligence process. <b>Status:</b> Current; planned revision FY 08.
<p><b>Note:</b> Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the Reimer Digital Library at <a href="http://www.adtdl.army.mil/">http://www.adtdl.army.mil/</a> or at the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at <a href="http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/">http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/</a>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be sent to <a href="mailto:leon.mdotddmpdoc@conus.army.mil">leon.mdotddmpdoc@conus.army.mil</a>.</p>			
<b>Emerging Publications</b>			
FM 3-07.2	Antiterrorism Operations	Nov 09 (estimate)	A manual that will establish the Army's guidance on how to integrate and synchronize antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. This manual will show how antiterrorism operations nest under full-spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process.
FM 3-10	Protection	To be determined	A manual that will follow joint doctrine and introduce the protection warfighting function and its purpose of preserving the force, personnel (combatant and noncombatant), physical assets, and information.
FMI 3-90.31	Maneuver Enhancement Brigade Operations	Sep 08 (estimate)	A manual that will provide operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. This manual will facilitate operations and employment considerations of the maneuver enhancement brigade as it organizes, prepares for, and conducts full-spectrum operations.

## Address Corrections Requested

If your military **unit** has experienced difficulties receiving *Military Police*, please send us your correct, complete mailing address. We frequently receive returns when no street address is listed for the organization, so **please include a street address**. E-mail corrections to [leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil](mailto:leon.mdotmppb@conus.army.mil) with *Military Police* in the subject line.

Address changes for **personal** subscriptions should be sent to Superintendent of Documents, ATTN: Mail List Branch, Mail Stop: SSOM, Washington, D.C. 20402.



*By Major Donald R. Meeks, Jr.*

*Through a series of coincidental meetings, several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military police leaders decided to form what is known today as the Military Police Chiefs' Conference. The vision of the forming leaders was to create a conference where senior military police chiefs affect change, make decisions, and represent their regiments. The conference benefits allied forces and betters the military police community through efforts across the military operational spectrum. The end result is an annual meeting of military police leaders, hosted by a different nation each year. Since 2002, when the first few senior military police leaders met, the conference has grown to more than 40 military police chiefs and/or delegates representing more than 33 nations. More importantly, the longevity of the meeting serves to solidify the importance and legitimacy of the conference to NATO and Partnership for Peace nations and the entire military police community.*

The fifth successful meeting of the chiefs was hosted in September 2007 by the Royal Canadian Forces Provost Marshal in Ottawa, Canada. With the theme of the conference titled "Military Police Support in a Transforming NATO," the identified topics of discussion included NATO transformation, the role of military police in coalitions, and the level of understanding in different cultures during operations. In essence, these topics—

- Outlined the status of the new NATO structure and how it affects military police.
- Addressed commanders' and operators' expectations of military police and the efficient use of capabilities.

- Approached cultural differences as a capability rather than an operational constraint.
- Updated members on the status of the military police panel's doctrinal work and the progress of the Military Police Officers' Planners Course.

This year, the conference hosted a variety of military leaders and guest speakers, which built upon the knowledge base of participants. Lieutenant General Michel Gauthier, commander of the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, was the keynote speaker. Responsible for all Canadian forces outside of Canada, Lieutenant General Gauthier was able to articulate the importance and role of military police in operations abroad. When questioned on

his feelings and expectations of military police, he coined the phrase “all of the above.” He expanded his answer by stating that “as a force commander, I want my MPs to serve as statesmen, police trainers, combat enablers, ambassadors of peace, etc.”<sup>1</sup> In essence, he reiterated what the participants already knew: Military police today are tasked to conduct a plethora of missions outside their normal scope of operations. However, most of the tasks are within their capabilities (both trained and equipped), but are just not commonly seen.

Conference attendees shared experiences, knowledge, and ideas that built upon the foundation of NATO’s commitment to defeating enemies of allied forces through cooperation, partnerships, and understanding. Naturally, the later focus fosters a clearer understanding of operational capabilities, cultures, and willingness to serve as coalition partners.

The final portion of the conference consisted of presentations by the chairmen. The outgoing and incoming chairmen spoke of Military Police Chiefs’ Conferences of the past and plans for the future, with key focus on the importance of maintaining the NATO military police family and supporting efforts across the entire spectrum of NATO (transformation and operational). The conference concluded with the

handover of chairman responsibilities from Oberst Heiner Erdmann, the German Army Provost Marshal, to Brigadier Colin Findlay, the United Kingdom Army Provost Marshal. In the wake of his chairmanship, Colonel Erdmann leaves the allied military police doctrine work and various other documentary updates, several successful panel conferences, and the NATO Military Police Officers’ Planners Course. As Brigadier Findlay will serve the NATO military police family as chairman for two years, he described his vision and will seek more resolution in NATO on detention operations and the framework of provost marshals within coalitions and operational headquarters. Closure comments from conference participants were successfully accomplished and all looked forward to meeting in the United Kingdom next year.

**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>Lieutenant General Michel Gauthier, speech given at the 5th Annual NATO Military Police Chiefs’ Conference, 13 September 2007.

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*Major Meeks currently serves as the U.S. Army Military Police Partnership Exchange Officer to the German Federal Armed Forces Provost Marshal Office and as a NATO military police panel secretary. He holds a bachelor’s degree in environmental science from Oregon State University.*

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## **Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability Integration Team**

*By Mr. John Moore*

The Army has established a Capability Integration Team (CIT) to specifically assist active and reserve deploying units with improvised explosive device defeat (IEDD) training and materiel capabilities integration. The CIT was established as a result of gaps identified in the Army IEDD training strategy published in March 2007. The CIT serves all units as a point of contact for IEDD questions and issues. In June 2007, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, approved and funded six CIT locations: Fort Lewis, Washington; Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Hood, Texas; Camp Shelby, Mississippi; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Teams at each location are capable of traveling to other nearby Army unit locations or other service bases to assist units with their IEDD requirements. Priorities of work are driven by the Army Force Generation process and the deployment and training priorities established by U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army Forces Command. For further information regarding the CIT, contact <[leon.cdieddcdt@conus.army.mil](mailto:leon.cdieddcdt@conus.army.mil)>.

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## **Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Training Web Site**

*By Mr. John Moore*

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (IEDD) Integrated Capabilities Development Team has established an IEDD training Web site as a result of an initiative contained in the Fiscal Year 2007 IEDD training strategy. The site was established in close coordination with personnel responsible for operating the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Battle Command Knowledge System, and the U.S. Joint Forces Command Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE) sites. The IEDD training Web site encompasses the self-development, operational, and institutional training domains. Additionally, it provides training support products to remote locations to assist individuals with their current jobs and prepare them for future assignments with increased responsibility. The site further serves as a portal for access to other Army IEDD training resources that have been developed by various Army proponents. The uniform resource locator (URL) for the IEDD training Web site is <<https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/477426>>. An Army Knowledge Online (AKO) account is required to access the site.

# Governor and First Lady Tulafono Visit the Republic of Korea

*By Chief Warrant Officer Two Tevita Feiloakitau*

Being stationed in Korea can be exciting, but it became even more exciting for Chief Warrant Officer Two Tevita Feiloakitau, of the 21st Military Police Detachment Criminal Investigation Division (CID), when he received word that the governor of American Samoa, Togiola T.A. Tulafono, would be visiting and that he had been selected as the escort officer for the visit. The governor was scheduled to attend meetings in Guam and decided to pay a rare visit to the troops in Korea on his way back to American Samoa.

There are more than 37,000 U.S. troops currently stationed in Korea and about 50 American Samoan Soldiers and airmen on the peninsula. These figures do not include Family Members, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, contractors, or English teachers at the Korean academies on the peninsula.

On 11 October 2007, Governor and First Lady Tulafono arrived at Incheon Airport on the peninsula of the Republic of Korea. Their arrival marked the first time an American Samoan governor had visited the peninsula.

The four-day visit with American Samoan Soldiers, airmen, Family Members, DA civilians, and contractors was a busy one, with much on the agenda. The visit began with a breakfast the next morning.

The governor and select personnel then proceeded to Camp Humphreys via a rotary-wing aircraft provided by the United States Forces Korea (USFK) protocol office. The protocol office also arranged ground transportation for all American Samoan Soldiers of Camp Humphreys to gather at the headquarters building for an open forum with the governor.

Next, the governor and his official party were flown to Osan Air Base, where they met with young American Samoan airmen who were stationed there. The airmen discussed their occupations and their duties in Korea with the governor. They also expressed their concerns about their home. The governor and his official party left Osan Air Base and ended the day at Yongsan.

The governor received an orientation briefing on 13 October, which provided him with a better understanding of the mission on the peninsula and the effects of deterring the aggressor. The governor

then proceeded to Camp Red Cloud for an office visit with the commander of the 2d Infantry Division, Major General James Coggin, and his wife. At the conclusion of the official meeting, the governor delivered a heartfelt speech to Samoan Soldiers in their native tongue. He implored each Soldier to have integrity and take pride in everything that they do. He also expressed his pride in them and their service to the Nation. At the conclusion of the speech, Major General Coggin added, "I certainly don't know what you said, but I felt your heart." An open forum was also conducted, and many of the questions were similar to those previously asked at other installations.

The troops continued to ask questions and raise concerns to the commander during lunch. Though most of the concerns raised were military in nature, Major General Coggin was also asked about the process of U.S. citizenship. The Soldier who made the inquiry had applied for citizenship months earlier and had not been able to determine the whereabouts or status of his application. Major General Coggin was greatly concerned about this situation, as he believes that Soldiers deserve first-class service due to the sacrifices that they make.

After lunch, the protocol officer escorted the governor and his official party to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) for a tour. It was a beautiful day, and miles of North Korea were visible during the tour. The tour ended with a short visit to a gift shop to purchase souvenirs; the day ended with a dinner in honor of the governor and first lady.

Invitations to the dinner were sent to all American Samoan Service Members, Department of Defense (DOD) Civilians, Contractors, and Family Members on the peninsula. Except for a few who had military duties, all Soldiers who received an invitation were able to attend. The master of ceremonies presented a short Biblical message and charged individuals to keep their leaders in their prayers. "Our prayers can make a difference in the decisions that our leaders make," the emcee stated.

The troops had many questions and concerns that they wanted addressed. Some of the American Samoan Soldiers and their Family Members brought up issues concerning citizenship, jobs in American Samoa, tourism, the national museum, the

relationship between American Samoa and Samoa, medical support for veterans, current election laws, and difficulties faced in meeting the requirement to register in person to vote. The governor discussed current laws and explained the changes that are under consideration.

The Soldiers expressed their gratitude and appreciation to the governor and first lady for their visit. One of the Soldiers stated, "I know that it's not by accident that you are here. You are meant to visit us for such a time as this. It's definitely not an election

year, so we know that there is no underlying motives of your visit (sic) but that you really care about our well-being." Gifts were presented to the governor, first lady, and military liaison officer on behalf of all American Samoans on the peninsula.

It is imperative that our leadership express their gratitude to the young troops for their service and courage in the Republic of Korea. The visit from Governor and First Lady Tulafono was a once-in-a-lifetime event for those troops. It will be forever imprinted in the hearts of those who experienced it.

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## *Military Police* Writer's Guide

*Military Police* is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army law enforcement and investigation community. We include articles by and about officers, enlisted Soldiers, warrant officers, Department of the Army civilian employees, and others. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police. Articles may share good ideas or explore better ways of doing things.

Articles should be concise, straight-forward, and in the active voice. If they contain attributable information or quotations not referenced in the text, provide appropriate endnotes. Text length should not exceed 2,000 words (about eight double-spaced pages). Shorter after-action type articles and reviews of books on military police topics are also welcome. All acronyms must be defined.

Include photographs (with captions) and/or line diagrams that illustrate information in the article. Please do not include illustrations or photographs in the text; instead, send each of them as a separate file. Do not embed photographs in PowerPoint® or Microsoft® Word. If illustrations are in PowerPoint, avoid excessive use of color and shading. Save digital images at a resolution no lower than 200 dpi. Images copied from a Web site must be accompanied by copyright permission.

Provide a short paragraph that summarizes the content of the article. Also include a short biography, including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a list of your past assignments, experience, and education; your mailing address; a fax number; and a commercial daytime telephone number.

Articles submitted to *Military Police* must be accompanied by a written release by the author's unit or activity security manager. All information contained in the article must be unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. *Military Police* is distributed to military units worldwide and is also available for sale by the Government Printing Office. As such, it is readily accessible to nongovernment or foreign individuals and organizations.

We cannot guarantee that we will publish all submitted articles, photographs, or illustrations. They are accepted for publication only after thorough review. If we plan to use your article in an upcoming issue, we will notify you. Therefore, it is important to keep us informed of changes in your e-mail address or telephone number. All articles accepted for publication are subject to grammatical and structural changes as well as editing for style.

Send submissions by e-mail to <leon.mdottmppb@conus.army.mil >. If you prefer to send a hard copy, send it to *Military Police* Professional Bulletin, 464 MANSCEN Loop, Building 3201, Suite 2661, Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8926.

# Dedication

*The following members of the Military Police Corps Regiment have been lost in the War on Terrorism since our last issue. We dedicate this issue to them.*



Specialist Kamisha J. Block  
401st Military Police Company  
720th Military Police Battalion  
89th Military Police Brigade  
Fort Hood, Texas




Sergeant James S. Collins, Jr.  
303d Military Police Company  
(Combat Support)  
Jackson, Michigan



Staff Sergeant Eric T. Duckworth  
Headquarters, Headquarters Company  
759th Military Police Battalion  
89th Military Police Brigade  
Fort Carson, Colorado



Sergeant Blair W. Emery  
571st Military Police Company  
504th Military Police Battalion  
42d Military Police Brigade  
Fort Lewis, Washington



Staff Sergeant John D. Linde  
1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion  
1st Brigade Combat Team  
10th Mountain Division  
Fort Drum, New York



Private First Class Casey P. Mason  
552d Military Police Company  
728th Military Police Battalion  
8th Military Police Brigade  
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii



Private First Class Adam J. Muller  
 1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion  
 1st Brigade Combat Team  
 10th Mountain Division  
 Fort Drum, New York



Sergeant Derek T. Stenroos  
 1st Brigade Special Troops Battalion  
 1st Brigade Combat Team  
 10th Mountain Division  
 Fort Drum, New York



Staff Sergeant Donald T. Tabb  
 6th Military Police Detachment  
 1st Battalion  
 13th Aviation Regiment  
 Fort Rucker, Alabama



Staff Sergeant Robin L. Towns, Sr.  
 275th Military Police Company  
 372d Military Police Battalion  
 Washington, D.C.



Specialist Donovan D. Witham  
 1st Squadron  
 73d Cavalry Regiment  
 2d Brigade Combat Team  
 82d Airborne Division  
 Fort Bragg, North Carolina

# Farewell To a Hero



## **Colonel John (Jack) F. Hyde (Retired) 1917–2007**

*Compiled by Ms. Rebecca Higeons*

Colonel John F. Hyde was born 20 December 1917. He entered the U.S. Army on 4 May 1942 and, one year later, was commissioned a second lieutenant. In his first duty appointment, Second Lieutenant Hyde was detailed to the 9th Armored Division and appointed traffic control officer.

During the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, Second Lieutenant Hyde helped ensure the orderly rearward movement of the division. It was then that his leadership ability attracted the attention of the Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army—Lieutenant General George Patton. While maintaining a roadblock, Second Lieutenant Hyde prevented the commander from passing through a restricted area, despite Lieutenant General Patton's strenuous objections. Second Lieutenant Hyde explained that earlier that morning he had captured two German Soldiers less than 100 yards from the roadblock. After being denied passage, Lieutenant General Patton requested the Soldier's name. Because Lieutenant General Patton was famous for his temper, Second Lieutenant Hyde expected to receive a blistering reprimand; however, what he received was a letter of promotion to first lieutenant.

As the 9th Armored Division entered Germany in 1945, First Lieutenant Hyde was among the lead element of Allied forces that encountered the still viable Ludendorf Bridge over the Rhine River. The bridge, of great tactical significance, was a key asset in the advance of Allied forces. Under intense enemy artillery and tank fire and air bombardment, First Lieutenant Hyde's detachment was engaged for a number of days and encountered daily casualties. First Lieutenant Hyde established rigid traffic control and holding patterns to ensure that no vehicles were abandoned and that the flow of traffic continued unblocked and unimpeded across the bridge. The leadership of First Lieutenant Hyde and the actions of his detachment permitted Allied infantry and armor troops to cross this important river obstacle with needed vehicles and tanks. The actions of the detachment, in conjunction with division reconnaissance forces, were instrumental in establishing the Remagen bridgehead and trapping German forces on the west side of the Rhine. This operation is credited with shortening the war by approximately 6 months. For his heroic actions of bravery and gallantry under fire, First Lieutenant Hyde was awarded the Silver Star Medal. His involvement was

also instrumental in securing the coveted Presidential Unit Citation for the Military Police Platoon of the 9th Armored Division.<sup>1</sup> First Lieutenant Hyde participated in campaigns in the Rhineland, Ardennes-Alsace, and Central Europe, remaining with the 9th Armored Division until the end of the war.

After the war, John Hyde was integrated into the regular Army and commissioned in the Infantry Corps but transferred into the Military Police Corps. As he progressed through the commissioned ranks, he distinguished himself in numerous military police command and staff assignments (with special focus in security and intelligence). These military police assignments led to additional awards, including the Legion of Merit (with oak-leaf clusters), Bronze Star Medal, Army Commendation Medal, and Army General Staff Identification Badge.

After returning to the United States in 1945, the positions assigned to John Hyde indicated the high caliber of regard the Military Police Corps held for him. He served as provost marshal for the 8th Infantry Division and, later, as the provost marshal at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. In 1949, John Hyde was appointed Provost Marshal, Headquarters, U.S. Troops, Trieste; was later assigned a tour of duty at the Office of the Provost Marshal General and; subsequently, was designated provost marshal of the Mediterranean Division, U.S. Corps of Engineers.

In 1959, the then Lieutenant Colonel Hyde assumed command of the 504th Military Police Battalion at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Under his leadership, the battalion became a Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) unit in support of the 101st Airborne Division. In 1965, he was promoted to colonel and assigned as the Chief of the Security and Investigation Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General. In that capacity, he engaged in numerous confidential and sensitive investigations. Additionally, Colonel Hyde initiated several efforts that significantly impacted the doctrine and long-term mission of the Corps. He established the Military Police Detector Dog Program; and during its trial stages, demonstrated—to Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and members of Congress—the drug interdiction capability of German shepherds to detect concealed marijuana. After providing worldwide Army canine training information, he transferred this successful program to the Military Police School at Fort Gordon. As drug interdiction became a national focus, Colonel Hyde received commendations from the Honorable Frank Bartimo, Chairman of the DOD Drug Abuse Prevention Program.

During the period 1969–1973, Colonel Hyde served as the Provost Marshal and Chief of Safety and Security, Military Traffic Management and Terminal

Service. In this capacity, he was appointed as the alternate DOD representative to the Department of Transportation's Interagency Coordinating Committee for Nationwide Transportation Security where he was responsible for establishing a cargo security and pilferage protection program at a time of great national need. For his innovation and coordination efforts, Colonel Hyde was commended by the Honorable Joseph J. Leibling, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security Policy).

At his Army retirement on 28 February 1973, Colonel Hyde received an extraordinary personal letter of gratitude from the Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, recognizing many years of devoted service.

Colonel Hyde's education in military science and tactics and his military police skills provided the foundation for his successful second career at the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority in Washington, D.C. Immediately after his military retirement, Colonel Hyde participated in the now nationally recognized crime prevention design criteria for the underground railway transit facility. As the Deputy Chief of Transit Police, he implemented high-visibility programs in law enforcement, criminal investigations, physical security, and crime prevention in conformance with the policies and procedures of four local police jurisdictions surrounding Washington. For his accomplishments, John Hyde was awarded the Washington Metropolitan Police Distinguished Service medal. After retiring from the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority in 1983, he engaged in consulting work on the security of subway systems in New York City and Atlanta, Georgia. His knowledge and professionalism in transit security and crime prevention was sought by numerous law enforcement agencies. Upon his full retirement, John Hyde engaged in volunteer work, heading a cohesive notification chain for special events and activities for local retired military police officers and warrant officers.

John Hyde was inducted into the Military Police Corps Hall of Fame in 2001. His 30-plus years of distinguished service to the U.S. Army included significant and long-term contributions to the character, doctrine, and mission focus of the Military Police Corps. John Hyde passed away on 13 August 2007.

**Endnote:**

<sup>1</sup>John Hyde is cited for his heroism in Ken Hechler's book *The Bridge at Remagen*, Ballantine Books, 1957.

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*Ms. Higeons is an administrative operations specialist in the Directorate of Plans and Operations at the U.S. Army Military Police School.*

# 204th Military Police Company



## Lineage and Honors

Constituted 16 December 1940 in the Regular Army as the  
204th Military Police Company.

Activated 10 February 1941 at Camp Blanding, Florida.

Inactivated 30 June 1946 in Germany.

Redesignated 12 December 1952 as the 204th Military Police Company.

Activated 20 December 1952 at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

Reorganized and redesignated 8 October 1954 as the  
204th Military Police Company.

Inactivated 15 October 1982 at Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

Activated 16 October 1987 in Germany.

## Campaign Participation Credit

### *World War II*

Algeria-French Morocco (with arrowhead)<sup>1</sup>

Sicily

Rome-Arno

Southern France (with arrowhead)

Rhineland

Ardennes-Alsace

Central Europe

### *War on Terrorism*

Campaigns to be determined

## Decorations

Valorous Unit Award for Iraq, 2003–2004

<sup>1</sup>Second Lieutenant Walter Burns earned a Distinguished Service Cross during the unit's assault landing in North Africa in 1942.



Major Harry Hill Bandholtz,  
Division Provost Marshal, 1898

# Provost Marshal Duties During the Spanish-American War Era

*By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)*

*Military Police Hall of Fame honoree, Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz, had a long and interesting career interspersed with periods of law enforcement duties (even though he remained an infantry officer). Although it was his dream to incorporate military police duties into the Army, the Military Police Corps did not come into being until long after the death of Major General Bandholtz.*

The year 1897 found First Lieutenant Harry Hill Bandholtz on detached service from the U.S. Army and assigned as the Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Michigan Agricultural College, Lansing, Michigan. However, in early 1898, war clouds were developing over Cuba. War with Spain was imminent. As a result, First Lieutenant Bandholtz was ordered to return to his unit, the 7th Infantry Regiment, where he served in the Santiago Campaign. For his gallantry in the battle at El Caney, Cuba, on 1 July 1898, First Lieutenant Bandholtz was awarded the Silver Star Medal. However, this award was not presented until 12 April 1927, long after the conflict in Cuba ended and nearly two years after the death of its recipient.

Upon his return from Cuba, First Lieutenant Bandholtz was promoted to major and assigned to the 35th Michigan Volunteer Infantry. The 35th was later designated as part of the 1st Division, 2d Army Corps, and was transferred to Camp McKenzie,

Georgia. On 15 November 1898, three months after the armistice went into effect but still a month before the end of the war, the 15th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry was also transferred to Camp McKenzie. This location was organized as a winter camp for Headquarters, 2d Army Corps, and two brigades from the 1st Division. Unfortunately, the 15th Minnesota was known as the sickest regiment in the Army because of the illness that began shortly after the unit was formed near Minneapolis. Typhoid fever ran through the troops like wildfire.

Four companies in the 15th—F, K, M, and H—were hit hard. Personnel from the companies were relocated to an area 100 yards from the rest of the regiment, and lime was spread over the vacated areas. Company H—consisting of four commissioned officers and 105 enlisted men—suffered the most. With the exception of eight Soldiers, all company personnel reported to sick call; three later died.

On 4 February 1899, 24-year-old Private Dennis O'Connell, Company F, accompanied by his brother and two other companions, was drinking in a saloon in the Augusta area. The men got noisy and, according to some reports, used profane and vulgar language in the presence of the wife of saloonkeeper, C. Brown Hadley. Mr. Hadley warned the men about their language, and a shouting match ensued. It was then that Mr. Hadley produced a handgun and shot Private O'Connell to death. After the shooting, Mr. Hadley ran outside, mounted his horse, and departed. He surrendered to authorities sometime later, away from the scene of the shooting.

Private O'Connell was well respected in his unit, and his friends were upset when the news of his death reached Camp McKenzie. As Soldiers discussed what should be done, about 300 men gathered in front of the tent of their commander, Colonel Harry A. Leonhaeuser, demanding that he speak with them about the incident. He declined to do so, but received a few representatives and assured them that he would do everything within his power to bring the murderer to justice.

Later that evening, about 150 Soldiers broke out of camp and headed for Augusta. A lieutenant from the company managed to overtake the Soldiers, calm them down, and persuade them to return to camp. On the morning of 5 February, word reached camp that Mr. Hadley was being prepared for transport to Atlanta. Less than an hour later, Soldiers, led by Private Peter Foley, overpowered the few officers and noncommissioned officers guarding the ammunition storehouse. Breaking open the ammunition crates with pickaxes, the Soldiers armed themselves and headed to Augusta. Colonel Leonhaeuser tried to stop the mutineers, but a group of 70 continued with the march.

Major Bandholtz, the 1st Division Provost Marshal, was on notice due to the unrest from the previous day and had placed six troops of cavalry Soldiers and a large contingent of his provost guard on alert. The Soldiers were dispatched and were able to turn around most of the troops and return them to camp. The ringleaders were identified and put into shackles.

Elements of the Provost Guard, Troop A (Cavalry) and personnel from the 35th Michigan were dispatched to Augusta to round up the Soldiers and remove them from the city. Guards were left to protect the home of C. Brown Hadley, a target of the mutineers. In the meantime, Hadley was transported to Atlanta and placed in the Fulton County Jail pending trial.

Camp McKenzie was placed on lockdown; and the camp commander, Major General Samuel

*"Headquarters, 1st Division, 2d Army Corps, Camp McKenzie, GA, 12-2-1898, Special Orders 183, the appointment of Major Harry H. Bandholtz, 35th Mich. V.I. as Provost Marshal of the Division is hereby continued until further orders. By command of BG Cobin."*

**Text of the first document found assigning provost marshal duties to Harry Hill Bandholtz.**

**Note: At the time, there were no military police personnel in the U.S Army. Provost guard duties were assigned as added duties to personnel serving in line units.**

*"Lt. H.H. Bandholtz, 7th U.S. Infantry*

*Dear Sir:*

*It affords me much pleasure to certify to the energetic and efficient manner in which you performed the duty of Provost Marshal at Augusta, Ga., last winter. That you were selected for that responsible position, and kept on such detail during the entire time you remained in Augusta, is good evidence of the manner in which you performed the duty. The quiet and good order that prevailed generally in camp and in the city, was due in a great measure to your energy and good judgment. I wish particularly to certify the able manner in which you appreciated the unfortunate outbreak of the 15th Minn. Regiment. Your instant call on the Cavalry and disposition of the Provost Guard, prevented what might have grown into a serious outbreak. As the Commanding Officer of the Division, I am very glad to send you this acknowledgement of your service under me."*

**Text from the letter of commendation sent by Major General Samuel S. Sumner, Commander, 7th Infantry Division, dated 10 October 1899.**

Sumner, initiated an embargo that forbade troops to visit Augusta. A week later, after a delegation from Augusta visited the camp, the embargo was lifted.

Major Bandholtz is credited with calming the near-riot behavior of the troops from the 15th Minnesota. As a result of this unfortunate incident, the general courts-martial section at division headquarters placed nine of the instigators on trial. Eight of these were found guilty and sentenced to dishonorable discharges, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for periods ranging from six months to six years. The Soldiers were then transferred to St. Francis Barracks in St. Augustine, Florida, where they were confined.

In March 1899, eight months after the troops began their pointless and ill-fated tour of duty, the 15th Minnesota Volunteer Infantry was mustered out of service. In July 1899, the 35th Michigan was released from Active Army duty and Major Bandholtz returned to the 7th Infantry. However, most likely because of his ability to speak the Spanish language, he was assigned to Cuba to command the Sagua La Grande District and supervise the free elections. He remained in Cuba for five months and was later assigned to the Philippine Islands.

**References:**

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Franklin F. Holbrook, "Minnesota in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection," Minnesota War Records Commission, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1923.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*

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# Genesis of Criminal Investigation in the U.S. Army

*By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)*

Some say the birth of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) took place during the U.S. Civil War—or even earlier. I do not believe that is true. It was not until World War I that a military unit composed of regular Soldiers was assigned to criminal investigative duties. There were certainly civilian investigators during the Civil War, but they were primarily involved in intelligence operations and the enforcement of “draft laws.”

Before World War I, there was no provision for a provost marshal general (PMG) except in wartime—never mind a PMG department. There were Soldiers who performed military police duties, but they were regular troops assigned to temporary duty, generally at the division level. The commander of trains<sup>1</sup> was assigned the additional duty of division provost marshal.

On 16 April 1917, Congress declared that a state of war existed between the United States and the imperial German government. This resulted in a significant increase to the size of the U.S. Armed Forces and the transport of a huge Army to the European theater of operations.

Shortly thereafter, Major General Enoch Crowder, the Army’s Staff Judge Advocate General, was also appointed PMG. His main purpose was to enforce the provisions of the Selective Service Act.

General John J. Pershing was designated as Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces; and he appointed Lieutenant Colonel Hanson E. Ely, an infantry officer, as his first PMG. On 24 August 1917, after only a month, Colonel William H. Allaire, another infantry officer and the troop commander in Paris, France, replaced Ely.

Studies were made of British military police organizations and functions. A U.S. model was based

on those findings. In *Origin of the Military Police*, Jacob B. Lishchiner relates that officers and enlisted men performing military police duties were to wear a “blue brassard halfway up the left arm, between the elbow and shoulder, bearing the letters M.P. in white.”<sup>2</sup> According to the U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum, this brassard was made from blue denim material and the letters were outlined in white thread. However, according to the *Regulations for the Provost Marshal General’s Department*, the brassard was to be blue with red lettering. These regulations further stated that “The plain-clothes officer investigates, and if necessary arrests, frequently with the help of the uniform branch, all cases which lie below the surface, while the uniform officer deals mostly with what takes place openly and in the sight of all.”<sup>3</sup> This is the only reference to an “investigative arm” of the PMG Department, and nowhere are the duties of criminal investigators described.

On 11 May 1918, General Pershing ordered the formation of a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), which was to be under the direction of an officer “who possesses a thorough knowledge of detective work in all of its branches and who will be the technical advisor of the Provost Marshal General on all questions arising from criminal investigation work.”<sup>4</sup> However, this order remained virtually ignored until much later. In July 1918, the now Brigadier General Allaire was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Groome, who served in that position for two months before yet another PMG, Brigadier General Harry H. Bandholtz, was named.

“Now, Bandholtz,” Pershing said, “you are going to hate me for this. But the Provost Department is in a disgraceful condition. I want you to take hold of it and put it in shape. When you can come to

me and say that the provost guard is working to your satisfaction, you can go back to your command at the front.”<sup>5</sup> Of course, the war ended with General Bandholtz still in place as PMG.

In November 1918, Pershing directed that “a criminal investigation division be organized by the Provost Marshal General from the Military Police Corps and the attached commissioned and enlisted personnel, to which may be added a number of civilian operatives at such rates of pay and allowances as the commander in chief may from time to time authorize.”<sup>6</sup> Going a step further, Bandholtz reorganized the entire PMG Department. The result was a Military Police Corps that was superior in number to any law enforcement organization of that time.

Seven criminal investigation companies were organized to handle PMG Headquarters—the three field armies under General Pershing’s command, the city of Paris, and all the base sections. Another company of operatives was added to handle the Embarkation Center, Le Mans, France. A detachment from headquarters covered the British Isles. DCI companies were authorized 5 officers and 100 “operatives;” however, these numbers varied as the missions were formulated. At times, those in Paris and Bordeaux had 150 operatives; while others, like those in Le Mans, had a much smaller number.

It was soon determined that the draft brought many criminals and profiteers into the military. With large quantities of supplies stored in various areas, it became lucrative for those bent on making money to tap into these resources and sell what they could on the black market.

In one such instance, two enlisted men from the 58th Infantry posed as officers and hired a band of foreign nationals for their thievery. They ultimately became personnel of interest to operatives of the DCI, who recovered a motorcycle and more than 21,000 francs—the proceeds from sales of the stolen property. The two men were arrested, and the foreign nationals were turned over to French authorities.

Another case, which was investigated by the Paris office, involved a gang of deserters who committed crimes such as larceny, robbery, and sexual assault. In January 1919, a concerted effort was made to locate and identify the men involved. On the 29th of the month, a raid was conducted and nine men were arrested. Items recovered included large sums of cash, guns of various types and calibers, officers’ uniforms, equipment, and an American Red Cross ambulance loaded with loot from a railroad baggage room.

Corporal Allen J. Wilson of the 309th Engineers was a criminal who also became a man of interest

for DCI, Saint-Nazaire. During questioning, Wilson admitted no crime, but acknowledged that he had entered the Army fraudulently. He was fingerprinted and photographed, and the investigation continued. It was discovered that Wilson was, in fact, William Lustgarten, an embezzler wanted by the New York Police. He had faked his own suicide, changed his identity, and enlisted in the Army. Lustgarten was returned to New York and released to civil police.

On 31 July 1919, the *Brooklyn Daily Standard Union* covered his trial, reporting:

### **Lustgarten Convicted of \$20,000 Swindle**

A jury before Judge CRAIN, in General Sessions, Manhattan, to-day (sic) found William LUSTGARTEN guilty of fleecing New Yorkers out of a large sum of money. It is said the total amount of the losses of men who invested in the Tax Lien Company will amount to \$800,000, but the specific charge against LUSTGARTEN was getting away with \$20,000 belonging to Robert SCHALKENBACH.

LUSTGARTEN disappeared in August 1917, after leaving a bundle of clothes and a suicide note on a pier. He was later recognized at an army unit by two young women. He enlisted under the name of Allan H. WILSON and after serving in many camps was sent to France, where he was arrested.

Among LUSTGARTEN’s victims are F. LEUBUSCHER, Frank L. MONTAGUE, ex-City Chamberlain Milo R. MALTBIIO, ex-Dock Commissioner Calvin TOMKINS and John MARTIN. The money was invested to buy real estate, which was never purchased.

The PMG Report for 1919 states that during the period 12 December 1918 to 12 April 1919, more than 4,500 cases were handled by the DCI. Of these, 23 were highway robberies, 32 were murders, and 25 were rapes. Members of the DCI received many letters of commendation.

In March of 1919, a new *Manual for the Provost Marshal General's Department, AEF* was published. This monumental book describes the functions of the CID and the organization and duties of its units. It also provides for CID credentials, civilian clothing allowances, availability of separate rations, and housing allowances when required for an investigation.

Also during 1919, General Bandholtz submitted a proposed Act of Congress for the creation and organization of a Military Police Corps. Sections 21 and 27 of this proposal relate specifically to a DCI. Section 21 reads, "The division of criminal investigation shall be organized from and as part of the Military Police Corps and the enlisted force thereof by the Provost Marshal General for the investigation of crimes committed by members of or against the army." Section 27 deals with the appropriation of funds, and it reads: "Of the sum hereinbefore appropriated for carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, \$200,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, will be available for the payment of expenses of criminal investigation by the Military Police Corps, including employment of civilian operatives, traveling expenses of operatives, commutation of rations and quarters for officers and men of the division when absent from their stations on duty, and other expenses of criminal investigation, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe."<sup>7</sup>

Only one reference has been found indicating a casualty among the DCI units. An undercover operative from the Brest, France, office was posing as a stevedore. During September 1919, while he was trying to arrest criminals, he was overpowered and murdered.<sup>8</sup>

With this firm foundation, it must have been heartbreaking for those involved when, on 28 May 1919, the CID was transferred to Headquarters, Services and Supply; and on 1 June of that same year, the Military Police Corps was dissolved. CID units were not reintroduced until World War II.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>"A commander of trains is assigned for each division, together with the necessary assistants and troops . . . the troops consist of two companies known as the Train and Military Police Force under the command of a field officer. The commander of trains controls the marching and camping of the

combined ammunition, supply, sanitary, and engineer trains. He is also charged with all matters of general police in the rear of the division while on the march and throughout the command while it is in camp." Source: Lieutenant Colonel Henry Jervey, "Warfare of the Future," *National Service Library, Volume Five*, P.F. Collier & Son, 1917.

<sup>2</sup>Jacob B. Lishchiner, "Origin of the Military Police: Provost Marshal General's Department, A.E.F., World War I," *Military Affairs*, Volume 11, Number 2, Summer 1947, pp. 66–79.

<sup>3</sup>*Regulations for Provost Marshal General's Department, AEF in France*, U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1917.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, E.P. Dutton and Company, Incorporated, 1938. The statement appointing Brigadier General Bandholtz as PMG has not been documented through any other source. Nothing of the sort was found in the personal correspondence or diaries of Brigadier General Bandholtz.

<sup>6</sup>Jacob B. Lishchiner, "Origin of the Military Police: Provost Marshal General's Department, A.E.F., World War I," *Military Affairs*, Volume 11, Number 2, Summer 1947, pp. 66–79.

<sup>7</sup>"Draft of Proposed Act of Congress Creating and Organizing a Military Police Corps," *Bandholtz Papers*, Bentley Research Library, University of Michigan.

<sup>8</sup>The murder of an undercover operative is mentioned in *True Tales of the DCI* (p. 182); however, it has not been documented in other sources. A French-speaking friend contacted police in Morlaiz, but the authorities would not acknowledge the incident or release any information. Attempts to follow up with the information desk and military attaché at the U.S. Embassy, Paris, went unanswered.

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*Brooklyn Daily Standard Union*, 31 July 1919.

**Photograph:** Photograph used by permission, *Bandholtz Papers*, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan

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# New Changes for the Military Police Brassard

By Mr. Andy Watson

The brassard, the ever-present symbol of the military police Soldier, has gone through many changes. In keeping with uniform styles adapted for practical use in different climates, the newest official version of the brassard has a hook-and-loop backing and is foliage-green, rectangular-shaped, and embroidered. Lettering consists of “MP” for military police or “CID” for Criminal Investigation Division. Both sets of letters are sewn with black thread. Unlike other recent patterns, the brassard will not wrinkle in extreme temperature ranges and will retain its visibility.

## Origins

A symbol for instant recognition, the brassard (armband), comes from the French term for medieval armor. The metal covering for the arm was often referred to as the *brassart* or *brassard*. As armies advanced in technology and no longer used armor, newer symbols such as cloth ribbons or sashes retained the same name. By the late 19th Century, the brassard was made with cloth. In 1892, the U.S. Army officially adopted a brassard with a red cross for all privates in the Hospital Corps. During the Spanish-American War, use of the brassard by medical personnel expanded—other troops also favored brassards to denote their occupations. However, the use of the brassard by military police did not occur until years later.

After successful campaigns during the war in the Philippines, Army leadership began to realize the emerging importance of provost troops. By 1900, although not permanent, Soldiers performing policing tasks were termed “military police.” Later, they would have a new symbol of identification and distinction, first officially mentioned in U.S. Army Field Service regulations.<sup>1</sup>

“Officers and enlisted men, when actually performing the duty of military police, will wear a blue brassard on the left arm, half way between the elbow and shoulder, bearing the letters ‘MP’ in white.”

## World War I

As the Army expanded to meet the demands of combat during World War I, the role of military police also increased. Military police were needed for law enforcement operations, including a new mission—circulation control. Wearing the brassard on duty gave Soldiers a symbol of authority. The brassard was also more visible to motorized traffic in an age before reflective clothing. The negatives of brassard wear included harmful attention by unsavory Soldiers, snipers, and artillery observers.

## Evolution of the Military Police Brassard



Prominent letters and periods in the abbreviation appear on this World War I brassard.



A World War I Soldier wears a military police brassard consisting of a black or dark blue band with red letters.



Shown is a World War I era provost guard brassard with white letters over a narrow red band.



As the Military Police Corps grew to more than 200,000 during World War II, so did the need for brassards. A defense seamstress shows a few of the brassards she made for the war effort.



Shown is a custom-made brassard for the China-Burma-India theater during World War II. The band is silk, and the insignia is embroidered.



A 1st Division military police Soldier awaits embarkation shortly before the Normandy Invasion, June 1944.

While many units adopted a standard dark blue, rectangular cloth with the letters “MP” in white, there were variations. Red cloth with white letters and alternate abbreviations were also used, including “PG” for provost guard, “PM” for provost marshal, and “APM” for assistant provost marshal. Letters were solid or outlined and were usually created by local manufacturers (in France or the United States). The brassards were generally wrapped around the arm and pinned to the sleeve, although buttons and elastic bands were also used. In Europe, some military police brassards began featuring red letters on a black or dark blue band. This style closely resembled the British military police brassards of the time and may have been adopted for easy recognition by Allied forces or due to their availability. Despite similarities, U.S. military police wore brassards on their left arms while British military police wore them on the right, allowing for better visibility in traffic control and identification of military police riding in vehicles. Keep in mind that the two countries drive on opposite sides of the road, thus the brassard placement is reversed. Consequently, regulations for the red-lettered brassard soon appeared.

“Members of the MP, when actually performing the duties of military police, will wear a blue brassard on the left arm, halfway between the elbow and shoulder, with the letters ‘MP’ in red.”<sup>2</sup>

Some units adopted the red lettering; others continued to use white. Unlike the military police of the time, Soldiers in the Criminal Investigation Division were not to wear the brassard unless specifically ordered.

## World War II

Although there had been many variations, an age of consistency for the brassard began in the 1930s. With the adoption of the Military Police Corps as a separate Army branch in 1941, earlier symbols such as the brassard gained new importance. Although used temporarily between World War I and World War II, the dark blue rectangular band with white felt letters was adopted as the standard. Whether made from wool, felt, or other material or fastened with pins, snaps, or crossed-pistol insignia, the new brassard pattern remained in use until the 1960s.

## Insignia Change

Beginning in the early 1950s, some military police units started to sport a new brassard. The shape was different from the rectangle and featured a raised portion that allowed the unit shoulder sleeve insignia or patch to fit above the lettering. The earliest examples of this design date back to 1951. However, recognition of this change did not come until October 1963.<sup>3</sup> A proliferation of designs and material used for brassards soon followed. From the early 1960s through 2004, brassards mirrored the almost countless variations of unit patches in the Army.

Environmental conditions also changed the favored material for use in brassards. Military police serving worldwide have contended with the cold of Europe and Alaska, the heat of

Vietnam and Iraq, and both extremes in Korea and Afghanistan. Brassards made of vinyl, canvas, leather, and other materials have been worn, with some standing up to the temperature extremes better than others. Some brassards even had clear plastic sewn over the unit patch to combat rough use. With unit esprit de corps and recognition on the line, the “coolness” factor could not be ignored.

### 2004–2007

The U.S. Army adopted the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in 2004, prompting a change for the brassard. The ACU relies on hook-and-loop attachments for unit patches. Similarly, the new design for the brassard would also rely on the hook and loop for attachment. The brassard was reduced in size, reverted to the rectangular shape, and placed above the unit patch. At first, these interim brassards were made of vinyl and used reflective material. The brassards are still in use today, but do not withstand temperature extremes very well or, in many cases, do not fit the patch area. It has been recommended that the use of vinyl brassards be discontinued in favor of the embroidered patch design. Finally, the newest embroidered version of the brassard is an all-area item, allowing wear in both field and garrison areas. Brassards that have colors reversed for the designation of garrison and field locations are now obsolete.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Army Field Service Regulations, U.S. Army, 1914.

<sup>2</sup>Provost Marshal General’s Department Regulation, American Expeditionary Forces, 9 December 1917.

<sup>3</sup>Army Regulation 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*, October 1963.

*Mr. Watson is the U.S. Army Military Police School historian.*

Shown is an example of an early version of the brassard that allowed for a unit patch. This patch is from the Military Police Highway Patrol in Germany in the 1950s.



This brassard can be read like a road map, with the name, unit, position, and English and Korean text all prominently featured.

The newer version of the brassard, made of reflective vinyl material, can warp in extreme climates.



Shown is the newest, officially approved, embroidered military police brassard.



## **Military Police Professional Bulletin Wants You** to write an article!

We are constantly seeking articles for publication. Writers may discuss training, current operations and exercises, doctrine, equipment, history, personal viewpoints, or other areas of general interest to military police Soldiers. Articles may share good ideas and lessons learned or explore better ways of doing things. They must also include a statement from the local security office stating that the information is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public. Our complete writer’s guide can be found on page 35 of this issue or at Web site <<http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/guide.htm>>.

# 525th Military Police Battalion



## Lineage and Honors

Constituted 30 August 1944 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 158th Military Police Service Battalion.

Activated 5 September 1944 in India.

Inactivated 1 November 1945 in India.

Redesignated 25 April 1949 as Headquarters, 525th Military Police Service Battalion, and allotted to the Regular Army.

Activated 11 May 1949 at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

Reorganized and redesignated 15 December 1950 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 25th Military Police Service Battalion.

Inactivated 20 March 1953 in Korea.

Redesignated 18 January 1966 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 525th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 23 March 1966 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Inactivated 25 July 1968 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Activated 16 October 2004 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

## Campaign Participation Credit

*World War II*

India-Burma

Central Burma

*Korean War*

United Nations Summer–Fall Offensive

Second Korean Winter

Korea

Summer–Fall 1952

Third Korean Winter

## Decorations


Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for Korea, 1950–1952

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation for Korea, 1952–1953

*Looking Back in History:*

# The Battle of Saigon Forty Years Ago

*By Mr. William A. Oberholtzer*



**Military police from the 716th Military Police Battalion monitor Vietcong activity across the street from the U.S. Embassy, 31 January 1968.**

*On 31 January 1968, members of the Military Police Corps would face one of their most difficult trials. Coordinated attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and other areas throughout the city exacted a harsh toll on military police and infantry security units. There were numerous casualties; but despite the adversity, the embassy would be recaptured and the Vietcong defeated. Steps toward changing the military police from a service branch to a combat support branch were finalized. After witnessing the courage and determined actions of the military police, Army leaders were convinced of their abilities in frontline combat. The battles for the U.S. Embassy and Saigon have been and should remain constant topics of study within the U.S. Army Military Police School. The heroism, tactics and above all, sacrifice of these Soldiers should not be forgotten.*

—Andy Watson, Historian, U.S. Army Military Police School

On 31 January 2008, we marked the 40th Anniversary of the Tet Offensive and the Battle of Saigon. The Battle of Saigon was the direct result of a well-planned terrorist attack that called for violent, widespread, and simultaneous military action throughout the city by Vietcong units and their sympathizers. The North Vietnam Defense Minister, Vo Nguyen Giap (the master planner), was possibly one of the best tactical commanders of the 20th century. Only he had the skills to supervise the elaborate synchronization necessary to strike at the heart of the South Vietnam government and the American military nerve center in Saigon. For all of Giap's intricate planning to bring the 1968 Tet

Offensive to fruition, he made errors in judgment when selecting his targets in Saigon. According to Colonel Richard E. George (Retired), who served as Saigon's Provost Marshal in 1968, "The two major Vietcong errors were their failure to attack and eliminate both the provost marshal compound and the 716th Military Police Battalion Headquarters." Due to these mistakes, the military police were able to blunt an all-out assault on Saigon and defeat the enemy. By not attacking the 716th Headquarters, the Vietcong allowed the military police to continue as the eyes and ears of the command and to swiftly respond with reaction forces to firefights throughout the city. When captured Vietcong were asked about

the first defensive resistance, they replied without hesitation, “The military police.”

During the Battle of Saigon, the Military Police Corps lost a staggering number of personnel—27 killed in action and 44 wounded. Most of the casualties occurred when a military police reaction force, responding to an attack on Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) 3, was ambushed in an alley. Another location with a high concentration of casualties was the U.S. Embassy.

Military police, in an instant, switched from the role of “cop” to “combat Soldier.” They quickly adapted to street and house-to-house fighting. They did this with ease, skill, and determination—much to the dismay of the Vietcong. General William Westmoreland, commander of the American Military Forces in South Vietnam, said some years later, “Members of the Military Police Corps were called upon to fight numerous skirmishes in Saigon, each of which had a direct bearing on the rapid defeat of the enemy. Though usually outnumbered, they were victorious.” Brigadier General Albin F. Irzyk, Saigon area commander, remarked, “Their performances as combat troopers can be described in only the most glowing of superlatives.” Colonel Richard E. George, the Saigon area provost marshal stated, “These brave men won a costly change of image for the military police, one for which all past, present, and future members of the Military Police Corps can justifiably point to with pride and humility—for this was indeed the Corps’ finest hour.” During an awards ceremony honoring military police who defended Saigon, General Creighton W. Abrams, Deputy U.S. Commander in Vietnam, commented, “When raw courage, capability, and will to fight are required, military police will meet the standards.”

The most sacred Vietnamese holiday is Tet, a lunar holiday. If the American people were to celebrate Christmas, Thanksgiving, New Year’s Day, and Independence Day in one week, it might compare to the sacred feelings that the Vietnamese hold for Tet. It is a time of celebrations, family gatherings, forgiveness of enemies, and preparation for the coming year. Tradition called for a truce during Tet, allowing Soldiers on both sides to stand down for the duration of the holiday and enjoy time with family and friends. In 1968, the holiest day of Tet fell on 30 January, ushering in the Year

of the Monkey. Due to fears of a massive aerial retaliation by the United States on North Vietnam after the start of the Tet Offensive, Ho Chi Minh, president of North Vietnam, allowed his people to celebrate the holy day on 29 January.

Giap planned a feint attack in hopes of further overextending American assets. Early in January 1968, 20,000 communist troops surrounded the Marine fire base at Khe Sanh, outnumbering the Marines four to one. Some observers believed this was a replay of Dien Bien Phu, a major French defeat in their war with the Vietminh. Giap knew that he could not defeat the Americans in a head-to-head confrontation; therefore, Khe Sanh was staged as a decoy. Other attacks took place along the Cambodian border, drawing American attention away from Giap’s principal targets—Saigon and Hue.

While the Americans and South Vietnamese were preoccupied with the defense of Khe Sanh, Vietcong units began to slip into Saigon in final preparation of the forthcoming attack. After their failed attempt to capture Saigon in 1967, Vietcong units stockpiled arms, ammunition, high explosives, and men in Saigon and other towns and cities. They slipped many of the weapons and ammunition into the city under the guise of funeral processions, even going as far as to bury the weapons in coffins, only to unearth them hours before the attack. Lieutenant General Fred Weyand, commander of II Corps, became uneasy with reports of large enemy troop movement, the flow of Vietcong deserters drying up, and talk from captured infiltrators of “something big” about to happen. Lieutenant General Weyand expressed his concerns to General Westmoreland, who then ordered 15 maneuver battalions to fall back near Saigon. The first night of Tet was quiet, except for the usual celebrations taking place throughout Saigon and the country. No one expected the enemy to break the truce because the Vietcong had hinted that if all went well, the truce (which began 27 January) might be extended beyond 3 February and a permanent armistice could be established. This final deception by the enemy caused feelings of euphoria for South Vietnamese and American diplomats. But that euphoria was shattered on the morning of 31 January.

Three days into the truce, Brigadier General Irzyk summoned Colonel George and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Rowe, commander of the 716th

*“These brave men won a costly change of image for the military police, one for which all past, present, and future members of the Military Police Corps can justifiably point to with pride and humility—for this was indeed the Corps’ finest hour.”*

—Colonel Richard E. George

Military Police Battalion, to his office for a situational briefing. They discussed the possible infiltration of Vietcong sapper units in Saigon. Brigadier General Irzyk instructed them to prepare for possible enemy action. While Colonel George and Lieutenant Colonel Rowe were meeting with Brigadier General Irzyk, an alert message was sent to all units under Irzyk's command. As a result of the briefing and the alert notification, they changed duty commitments—all walking patrols were switched to motorized patrols, selected headquarters and communications centers were assigned extra guard posts, all Vietnamese personnel were removed from U.S. military police patrols, radios were placed on continuous dispatch, and all personnel were ordered to wear flak jackets and steel helmets. Military police reaction teams were organized and placed on standby.

In the late evening hours of 30 January, communist infiltrators left their hiding places and mixed with the celebrating crowds of South Vietnamese citizens. Recently unearthed weapons were test-fired, being masked by the sound of fireworks. By the early morning hours of 31 January, the enemy was ready. A command post was established in the Quang Buddhist Pagoda by the Vietcong, and groups of communist soldiers were in place near their targets, having been led there by local communist agents and sympathizers.

With clouds low in the sky, 20 members of a Vietcong sapper unit began loading a small truck and an old taxicab with high explosives and weapons. Their target—the U.S. Embassy—was only a few blocks away. The air was filled with tension and anticipation as the 23 men of Vietcong C-10 Sapper Battalion quickly and quietly finished loading the vehicles. At 0245 hours, the men climbed into the truck and taxicab for the short ride to the embassy. Each man was deep in thought as he contemplated his assignment and chances of survival, which were slim. Nguyen Van Muoi drove one of the vehicles by the U.S. Embassy on Thong Nhut Boulevard. As he rounded the embassy a second time, mortar fire began to drop on the city. Leaning out the window of his vehicle, Muoi yelled, "Tien!" (which means forward). The Peugeot truck and taxi parked next to the south wall of the 4-acre U.S. Embassy compound, and the sappers began to unload the vehicles.

At this time, Specialist Charles Daniel and Private First Class William Sebast, members of Charlie Company, 527th Military Police Company, were on guard duty at the Mac Dinh Chi entrance of the U.S. Embassy compound. All was quiet, until an explosion breached a hole in the compound wall near the military police guard post. Turning their attention toward the wall, Specialist Daniel and Private Sebast

killed two Vietcong soldiers crawling through the opening. Specialist Daniel radioed, "They're coming in! They're coming in!" While focusing their attention on the wall, Specialist Daniel and Private Sebast were shot in their backs by other attacking Vietcong. Due to their valiant stand and sacrifice, Marine Sergeant Ronald Harper had time to race to the main embassy building and close and secure the large teak doors. This action prevented the sappers from entering the embassy as they had planned. Although the doors were the target of rocket-propelled grenades, they remained intact and locked.


Meanwhile, calls for help began to pour into military police headquarters by phone and radio. One officer commented, "The calls for help came in by radio and phone faster than we could handle them. We have maybe half, maybe only one-third of the calls on the log." The following is a sample of the staff duty log for the 716th Military Police Battalion:

- 0300: BOQ 3 reports enemy action.
- 0315: U.S. Embassy under attack.
- 0317: Explosion at Townhouse BOQ.
- 0318: BOQ 1 under attack.
- 0319: McArthur BOQ under attack.
- 0321: Report of hostile attack at Rex BOQ.
- 0325: Explosion at BOQ 2.
- 0340: Automatic-weapon fire and attack at BOQ 3.
- 0341: Military police at U.S. Embassy request urgent ammo resupply.

The area provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel George, was briefed at 0300 hours about the developing situation, especially the situation at the U.S. Embassy. He ordered a reaction force led by First Lieutenant Frank Ribich and Sergeant Arthur Rivera to be dispatched to the compound. The force was on the road 17 minutes after being notified.

Before the reaction team's arrival, Sergeant Jonnie Thomas and Specialist Owen Mebast responded to Specialist Daniel's call for assistance. Sadly, they were ambushed by a Vietcong sniper as they arrived at the main gate of the embassy.

Approaching the embassy, Lieutenant Ribich and Sergeant Rivera assessed the situation. Heavy automatic-weapon fire was coming from an apartment building opposite the embassy, so Lieutenant Ribich sent Sergeant Rivera and his team to secure the building and street. In a matter of minutes, Sergeant Rivera's team had secured the area. While Rivera was securing the apartment building, Ribich made contact with Marine Sergeant Leroy Banks and they established a joint command, allowing Banks to continue to direct the Marine portion of the embassy



**Drawing of the U.S. Embassy compound and surrounding area.**

reaction force while coordinating with Lieutenant Ribich. This arrangement proved to be effective.

Private First Class Paul V. Healey, 716th Military Police Battalion, was on patrol about 0300 hours when the calls for assistance came across the military police radio net. His patrol responded to enemy activity near the Philippine Embassy, where Healey engaged a Vietcong in a firefight and eliminated him. Hearing that the U.S. Embassy was under attack, Healey's patrol raced to the area to help. Healey would later earn the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism during the battle. At 0420 hours, General Westmoreland ordered the 716th Military Police Battalion to clear the embassy and grounds, explaining that it was their first priority. Meanwhile, a resupply of ammunition had arrived and a 50-man reaction force was enroute. When everything was in place, the force waited. Lieutenant Ribich made contact with the military police net control station and was connected directly to General Westmoreland. Westmoreland ordered Ribich to initiate the attack as soon as possible since the security of the embassy was a first priority. Lieutenant Ribich responded with, "Airborne." The attack began well before dawn.

Across Saigon, near Tan Son Nhut Airport, a 25-man military police reaction force was approaching BOQ 3 in response to a reported enemy attack. Members of the force were riding in a 2½-ton truck and two jeeps. Circling the block once, the lead jeep pulled into an alley near the BOQ. Well into the alley, the convoy began to slow down, and then all hell broke loose. Military policeman John R. Van Wagner recalls, "Suddenly there were two loud explosions and bright flashes of light behind me. Automatic-weapon fire swept the alley, and we ran for the BOQ. We knew it was bad in there, but we didn't know how bad until almost noon."

A company-size force of Vietcong was preparing to hurl an attack at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Headquarters when the American convoy appeared in the alley. The last two vehicles absorbed the full force of the attack. At a range of less than 10 feet, the Vietcong poured their maximum fire-power into the convoy. They killed 16 military police Soldiers and wounded 21 others in the ambush and subsequent rescue attempts. Finally, after 14 hours of heavy fighting, military police and infantry (with armor support) were able to secure the area and recover the dead and wounded.



**Soldiers advance into the alley behind BOQ 3 in Saigon, 31 January 1968.**

Back at the embassy, Ribich signaled his men that it was time to attack and clear the embassy grounds of the enemy. Ribich's team entered the front compound, while Sergeant Rivera—with his team and the Marine contingent—entered the parking area through the Norodom compound. The American Forces entered the compound and began to systematically clear the embassy grounds with grenades and small arms fire.

During the assault, the Marines and military police killed 21 Vietcong sappers. Lieutenant Ribich killed the twenty-second Vietcong, who attempted to join the fight while driving a taxi. The final sapper was severely wounded and captured. In the assault to retake the embassy, one Marine was killed and several military police and Marines were wounded. As the military police were completing their operation, a platoon of 101st Airborne Soldiers landed on the embassy roof and General Westmoreland arrived by car. After a thorough search, the embassy was declared secure.

A force of 2,000 to 3,000 Vietcong had slipped into the city with the intent of toppling the Saigon government and its American allies. The only U.S. Forces instantly available for combat were fewer

than 300 military police; however by dawn, the 716th Military Police Battalion would have 800 men in action. How could such a small, vastly outnumbered force of military police hold and defeat an enemy of superior strength?

The answer to that question is found in the comments of the U.S. mission coordinator, who stated, "I saw raw courage tonight on the part of the Marine guards and military police. I saw them advance straight into the direction of enemy fire and silence that fire. If you want to be braver than that, I would rather not be around." Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Rowe, commander of the 716th Military Police Battalion, said, concerning the performance of his military police, "We delayed their plans long enough to upset their mission. We converted from a military police battalion to a tactical infantry battalion in less than 3 hours, and in essence, we were unassisted for the first 12 to 18 hours."

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*Mr. Oberholtzer is the chief of the U.S. Army Military Police School Officer Education System/Warrant Officer Education System Branch. He served with the 1st Infantry Division during the 1968 Tet Offensive as a medic with Battery A, 2/33 Field Artillery.*

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# Military Police Heroism

*By Mr. Andy Watson*

*On 31 January 1968, North Vietnamese Forces, primarily consisting of Vietcong guerrillas, began the first of several waves of coordinated attacks on all major South Vietnamese cities. Later named the Tet Offensive, these assaults influenced the course of American involvement in Vietnam. In cities and towns, street corners became ambush sites as alleys and the U.S. Embassy became combat zones. Bravely facing these surprise attacks and defeating them was a job readily undertaken by the Soldiers of the Military Police Corps. The Soldiers recognized in this article are just a few of those heroes.*

## **Sergeant Michael A. Grieve and Private First Class Roland M. Bowen**

### **Silver Star**

*As military police reaction teams answered calls for assistance, ambush sites appeared throughout Saigon, including the Phu Tho racetrack.*

Sergeant Michael A. Grieve and Private First Class Roland M. Bowen served in Company A, 716th Military Police Battalion. During the battle for Saigon on 31 January 1968, they were serving as members of a military police alert team on a reaction mission.<sup>1</sup> After securing billets in the Cholon/Tan Son Nhut area, the patrol was called to support a fellow unit that was under heavy attack at the Phu Tho racetrack.<sup>2</sup> However, before reaching the battle site, the patrol was attacked and its jeep was disabled. As personnel in the jeep sought cover, Sergeant Grieve and Private First Class Bowen disregarded their own safety and braved enemy fire to remove the machine gun from the jeep.<sup>3</sup> They then advanced 25 meters on the enemy, firing the gun despite bullets striking all around.<sup>4</sup> The machine gun barrage allowed other military policemen from the patrol to maneuver out of the ambush site. While the covering fire saved their comrades, both Sergeant Grieve and Private First Class Bowen were mortally wounded. In recognition of their gallantry and selfless service, Sergeant Grieve and Private First Class Bowen were posthumously awarded Silver Stars.

## **Staff Sergeant Herman Holness**

### **Silver Star**

Staff Sergeant Herman Holness served in Company C, 52d Infantry, 716th Military Police Battalion. Company C, along with other infantry rifle companies, was assigned to the 716th Military Police Battalion and the 18th Military Police Brigade to reinforce security forces. These Soldiers performed numerous tasks and duties alongside their military police counterparts. Security guard duty and work with the military police led to "SG" markings on their helmet liners and brassards. On 31 January 1968, Staff Sergeant Holness was part of a reaction force sent to relieve a fellow unit that was under attack in the vicinity of the Phu Tho racetrack.<sup>5</sup> While moving through the city, the lead vehicle of his unit was attacked by Vietcong forces using mines and machine guns.<sup>6</sup> The men in the vehicle were seriously wounded and trapped out in the open. Staff Sergeant Holness advanced to the disabled vehicle and caught the attention of the enemy, who diverted fire to his location, allowing the wounded men to exit the vehicle. When Staff Sergeant Holness reached cover behind the vehicle, he returned fire on the enemy position with devastating effect. While still under enemy fire, he began pulling the wounded Soldiers to safety.<sup>7</sup> Although badly injured himself, Staff Sergeant Holness refused medical aid until his fellow Soldiers had been evacuated.<sup>8</sup> In recognition of his selfless service, Staff Sergeant Holness was awarded the Silver Star.


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**Specialist Charles R. Miller**  
**Silver Star**

*After vehicles of a military police reaction force are ambushed with mines and machine guns, an extremely violent clash ensues. The ambush, firefight, and numerous rescue attempts during the alley fight near Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) 3 resulted in sixteen military police killed in action and another twenty-one wounded.*

Specialist Charles R. Miller served with Company B, 716th Military Police Battalion. On 31 January 1968, his unit was patrolling Saigon late at night when they responded to a call to provide reinforcements at a BOQ under attack.<sup>9</sup> Racing to the area, Specialist Miller's vehicle was attacked and rendered inoperable.<sup>10</sup> Although injured and soaked with gasoline, Specialist Miller assumed an exposed position near his fiercely burning vehicle and delivered deadly fire upon the Vietcong to cover the exit of the vehicle by a fellow Soldier.<sup>11</sup> Specialist Miller then found cover behind a tree and continued his attack against the ambushing force until forced to withdraw and seek medical attention.<sup>12</sup> For gallantry in combat and rendering assistance to a fellow Soldier in peril, Specialist Miller was awarded the Silver Star.



**General Creighton Abrams pins the Silver Star on Specialist Miller (center).**

**First Lieutenant Gerald L. Waltman**  
**Silver Star**

First Lieutenant Gerald L. Waltman served with Company C, 716th Military Police Battalion. On 31 January 1968, after receiving reports of enemy activity near BOQ 3, a military police reaction team was dispatched to the area. While proceeding down an alley to engage the enemy, the lead vehicle of the reaction force was hit by a mine, with rocket and machine gun fire soon following.<sup>13</sup> First Lieutenant Waltman organized a small squad of volunteers to attempt a rescue of the wounded men trapped in the vehicle still under enemy fire.<sup>14</sup>



**Military police move into the alley behind BOQ 3.**

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As First Lieutenant Waltman led the squad toward the burning vehicle, the rescue was halted due to intense enemy fire. First Lieutenant Waltman then directed an attack on the enemy emplacement in a nearby building.<sup>15</sup> As his squad entered the building, a rocket-propelled grenade exploded into the structure, injuring all but one of the men. Grimly acknowledging that the original rescue attempt could not proceed, First Lieutenant Waltman ignored his own injuries, calmly reassured his men, and led them out of the Vietcong entrapment under the cover of U.S. helicopter rocket fire.<sup>16</sup> For his leadership and as an example of courage under fire, First Lieutenant Waltman was awarded the Silver Star.

**Specialist Ronald P. Kendall**  
**Silver Star**

Specialist Ronald P. Kendall served with Company C, 716th Military Police Battalion. On 31 January 1968, following an attack on BOQ 3, the reaction force of military police sent to engage the enemy was ambushed. After the lead truck was attacked with mines, rockets, and machine gun fire, the focus of the mission was altered to save the wounded and trapped Soldiers in the disabled vehicle. Specialist Kendall was driving the second vehicle in the reaction force and immediately maneuvered into the alley to rescue the stranded and wounded Soldiers.<sup>17</sup> While still under an intense enemy barrage, Specialist Kendall positioned his vehicle to protect his comrades. Wounded in the process, he ignored his injury and helped two of the most seriously wounded military police Soldiers out of the killing zone.<sup>18</sup>

When informed that his unit was repositioning to another location, Specialist Kendall returned to the alley to recover his truck.<sup>19</sup> Refusing to turn back, he made his way to the truck and drove it clear of the alley, despite continuous and concentrated enemy fire. For saving his fellow Soldiers and exhibiting bravery in extreme circumstances, Specialist Kendall was awarded the Silver Star.


**First Lieutenant Frank Ribich, Bronze Star for Valor,**  
**and Private First Class Paul V. Healey, Distinguished Service Cross**

*The battle to recapture the grounds of the U.S. Embassy and the resulting images became iconic for the Military Police Corps in Vietnam.*

Although featured in previous issues of *Military Police*, one cannot omit the following heroes—First Lieutenant Frank Ribich and Private First Class Paul V. Healey—who served in connection with the assault on the U.S. Embassy. First Lieutenant Ribich, who served with the 527th Military Police Company, led the military police team to recapture the embassy. Ribich’s determined leadership and courage under fire were essential to the mission. For his actions, First Lieutenant Ribich was awarded the Bronze Star for Valor. Private First Class Healey, who served with Company B, 716th Military Police Battalion, eliminated numerous Vietcong from the embassy grounds with skill and perseverance. For his actions, Private First Class Healey was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

**Sergeant John H. Shook**  
**Silver Star**

Sergeant John H. Shook served with Company B, 716th Military Police Battalion. On 31 January 1968, Sergeant Shook was a member of the team assembled to retake the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. When the doors of the embassy compound were opened, Sergeant Shook led a charge into the bullet-swept enclosure.<sup>20</sup> Braving enemy fire and grenades, he moved from position to position within the courtyard of the embassy, killing Vietcong insurgents with rifle fire.<sup>21</sup> Sergeant Shook also assisted a trapped embassy officer, braving open ground to send riot gas grenades to the officer and then directing his comrades’ fire on the enemy.<sup>22</sup> Sergeant Shook was awarded the Silver Star in recognition of his “fearless and aggressive efforts” during the assault at the U.S. Embassy.<sup>23</sup>



**Military police pause near the U.S. Embassy after its recapture.**

**Specialist Leon J. Shrum**  
**Silver Star**

*Although Saigon received most of the attention in the massive offensive, there were numerous other cities that became targets of the Vietcong as well.*

Specialist Leon J. Shrum served with the 148th Military Police Platoon, 95th Military Police Battalion. On 31 January 1968, Specialist Shrum and fellow military police Soldiers from the 148th were defending My Tho against attacks by the Vietcong. While moving to engage a portion of the guerilla force within the city, a reconnaissance patrol was ambushed by a much larger force and trapped at a street intersection.<sup>24</sup> Responding to a call for assistance, Specialist Shrum volunteered to carry a supply of machine gun ammunition to the overwhelmed troops.<sup>25</sup> Under enemy fire and across approximately 250 meters of open ground, Specialist Shrum rushed the ammunition to the ambushed patrol.<sup>26</sup> While aiding the patrol members in repelling the attacks, Specialist Shrum was mortally wounded. For his actions in preventing further casualties in the ambush and for his selfless service in immediate danger, Specialist Shrum was posthumously awarded the Silver Star.

**Endnotes:**

<sup>1</sup>“General Orders No. 974: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 2 March 1968.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>“General Orders No. 1103: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 13 March 1968.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>“General Orders No. 1133: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 15 March 1968.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>“General Orders No. 1234: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 21 March 1968.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>“General Orders No. 1137: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 15 March 1968.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>“General Orders No. 1235: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 21 March 1968.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>“General Orders No. 1135: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 15 March 1968.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

<sup>24</sup>“General Orders No. 1216: Silver Star Citation,” Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, 20 March 1968.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

*Mr. Watson is the U.S. Army Military Police School historian.*

### Voices of Experience

The military police historian, Mr. Andy Watson, is currently conducting audio and video interviews with postdeployment military police personnel. Mr. Watson is also seeking unit histories and other documents from deployed units. The recordings and histories obtained will be compiled for use in research and as preservation. Security of the information will be maintained. If you are interested in preserving your experiences or those of your unit, please contact Mr. Watson via e-mail at <ATSJSH@wood.army.mil> or telephone at (573) 563-5440.

## The Military Police Corps’ Regimental Crest

The U.S. Institute of Heraldry developed the Military Police Corps’ regimental crest to symbolize the proud history and rich heritage of the Military Police Corps.


The regimental crest depicts the support that military police provide the Army in executing their three missions: assist, protect, and defend. The crest identifies the Military Police Corps as a member of the Army Regimental System.

The centerpiece of the Military Police Corps regimental crest is the Roman fasces. The fasces is carried by Roman soldiers who performed peacekeeping duties. The fasces is the ancient symbol of the magistrate’s authority. The sword that appears on the crest represents military leadership and guidance. The sword symbolizes the idea that military police Soldiers must set the example for all Soldiers.

The key represents security and embodies the role of protecting the vital military assets that are necessary for combat. The scales of justice embody the values of impartiality and fairness that must govern every military police action. The crossed pistols are the traditional insignia of the Military Police Corps and represent military and martial preparedness.

The banner on the regimental crest denotes the three military police missions. The word “protect” stands for the military police combat support role of protecting fellow Soldiers and equipment on the battlefield. The word “assist” embodies the law enforcement mission of aiding the commander in maintaining order and in safeguarding the rights of Soldiers and their families to be secure in their homes. The word “defend” represents the combat mission of resisting, containing, and defeating the enemy in the rear area to secure forward support and command and control elements that are needed to sustain and win the main battle.

The encirclement of the shield by the banner and crossed pistols symbolizes the unity of the Military Police Corps.



MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
A. Scott Jones	Freddie L. Brock	8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Randall Twitchell	Tommie Hollins	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
John F. Garrity	Brian K. Lambert	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Mark S. Spindler	Bernard C. McPherson	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, Germany
David P. Glaser	Edgar W. Dahl	42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
John Huey	Michael E. Ashford	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Deborah L. Geiger	John F. Schoenrock	3d MP Gp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Anthony Cruz	Craig P. Brott	6th MP Gp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Joe E. Ethridge, Jr.	Paul W. McDonald	701st MP Gp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Jeffery T. Harris	Thomas Seaman	202d MP Gp (CID)	Heidelberg, Germany
Mark S. Inch	Johnnie Jones	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Marguerite C. Garrison		Garrison, Ft McPherson	Ft McPherson, GA
	Dorsey L. Newcomb	Cmdt, MANSCEN NCOA	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Timothy A. Weathersbee		Garrison, Ft Leavenworth	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Pamela L. Martis		Garrison, Presidio of Monterey	Presidio of Monterey, CA
		Garrison, Ft Monmouth	Ft Monmouth, NJ
Bruce Vargo		Joint Detention Group	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
David J. Clark		USAG, Ft Drum	Ft Drum, NY
	Israel Talamantez	6th Recruiting Bde	N. Las Vegas, NV
	Mark F. Offermann	Phantom Cmd, III Corps	Ft Hood, TX
	Michael D. Hayes	MANSCEN CSM	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
	Jeffrey A. Butler	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
	Mark L. Farley	EUCOM	
Arthur Rovins	Jeffrey N. Plemmons	Army Corrections Command	Ft Belvoir, VA
	Leslie (Rusty) Koonce	HQ USA CID	Ft Belvoir, VA

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Robert Kenyon	Michael Shanner	11th MP Bde	Ashley, PA
Kevin R. McBride	Joseph Diniz	*43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Rod Barham	Andres Roman	*49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Michael Nevin	Richard Michael	*177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Dennis P. Geoghan	Kurtis J. Timmer	220th MP Bde	Gaithersburg, MD
John E. Cornelius	Scott Toy	800th MP Bde (EPW)	Uniondale, NY
Nelson J. Cannon	Daniel Lincoln	*46th MP CMD	Lansing, MI
Adolph McQueen		200th MP CMD	Ft Meade, MD
Robert Hipwell	Virgil Akins	300th MP CMD (EPW)	Inkster, MI

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Michael R. Thomas	John F. McNeirney	91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Leonard A. Cosby	Patrick R. Dawson	92d MP Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Thomas H. Byrd	Dawn J. Ripplemeyer	93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Donnie L. Thomas	Norwood L. Patterson	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
John V. Bogdan	Brenda K. Curfman	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, Germany
David L. Chase	Kevin P. Nolan	97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Jesse D. Galvan	Christopher S. Muller	342d MP Bn (P)	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Donna W. Martin	Charles R. Kirkland	385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Robert K. Byrd	Todd E. Sprading	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
James H. Mullen	Floyd A. Thomas	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Steven L. Donaldson	John W. Hopper	508th MP Bn (I/R)	Ft Lewis, WA
Bradley Graul	John T.C. Williamson	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
William S. Wozniak	Theodore A. Trahan	525th MP Bn (I/R)	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
James D. Wilson	Arthur R. Vanwyngarden	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Patrick W. Williams	Edward F. Weeks	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Robert N. Dillon	William B. Chambers	709th MP Bn	Hanau, Germany
Darryl H. Johnson	Jeffrey A. Palmer	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Frank Y. Rangel Jr.	Jerry Craig	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Brian R. Bisacre	Gerald Stegemeier	728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Laurence C. Lobdell	John E. Coleman	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Ramona D. Plemmons	Mark E. Porret	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Michael Blahovec	Eric D. Hodges	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, Germany
Robert E. Lowe	Roger D. Macon	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Gregory Thompson	Jonathan O. Godwin	796th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Francis J. Davidson	Kevin C. Rogers	LEC, Ft Knox	Ft Knox, KY
Barry V. Hadley	James A. Stillman	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, Germany
Kerrilynn A. Corrigan	John R. Mazujian	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Carter A. Oates	Patrick M. Zangarine	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Sioban J. Ledwith	Timothy S. Fitzgerald	19th MP Bn (CID)	Yongsan, Korea
Mark A. Jackson	Thomas E. Brown	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Bobby R. Atwell, Jr.	Denise L. Young	1000th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Kimberly S. Kuhn	Matthew J. Walters	1001st MP Bn (CID)	Ft Riley, KS
Michael R. Walker	Andrew F. Underwood	1002d MP Bn (CID)	Bamberg, Germany
Kevin J. Moffett	Henry James, III	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Renea C. Yates	Jeremy J. Monnet	3d RGN WA, District	Ft Myer, VA
Carter Duckett	Michael W. Jones	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

\*National Guard Unit

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